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ART. I.—F. CURCI AND THE ROMAN QUESTION.*

La Sovranità Temporale dei Romani Pontefici propugnata dal Suffragio dell' orbe Cattolico. Roma : 1860-1.

Recueil des Allocutions, &c. Paris : 1865.

The Independence of the Holy See. By H. E. Cardinal MANNING. London : 1877.

BY a few strokes of the pen, F. Curci has won for himself a reputation throughout Europe. He figures now in telegraphic despatches and in leading articles of every colour, as a kind of phoenix and nonpareil; as, in fact, if we may briefly sum up the wonderful truth, an "enlightened and patriotic Jesuit." He has taken the world outside of Italy by surprise. Just when it seemed that, between the new order of things at Rome and the ancient there could be no reconciliation, F. Curci has been bold enough to declare that the problem must be dealt with from another and an unexpected point of view; that it is not so much the national policy which requires undoing, as the conduct, past and present, of our Holy Father. Such a convert to Liberal opinions may well deserve the sympathy which non-Catholic Europe has bestowed upon him. Nay, he will find it hard, if not altogether beyond his power, to keep at arm's length the praise and the flattery which, accepted or refused by him, are still certain to lessen his authority with the faithful. "Tell me a man's friends, and I will tell you what he is." And,

* The literature upon this subject—the Pope's Civil Princedom—is so extensive that we have abandoned the thought of referring, as we at first intended, to all the books and articles consulted in the composition of the following pages. As regards F. Curci, we have employed a French translation of his Memoir given in a Döllingerite review, the entire original not having come into our hands. At the moment of writing we still await F. Curci's new volume, and have merely seen the notices upon it in current newspapers.

unhappily, we cannot always disown our friends; the kinship may assert itself in the very words and gestures that would fain deny it. Not the wishes of F. Curci, but his acts, his genuine feelings and the character of his thoughts, will make it clear to us whether he is for or against the Roman Church. That his intentions have been loyal we can easily believe, but intentions await another and a higher judge than the tribunal of this world; and, as we know, the best intentions have not sheltered from misfortune all that have been moved by them. What has F. Curci done to merit the perilous honours so recently accorded him? This is not a day when true Catholics, men of the genuine stamp in conduct and principle, are likely to please. Such men we see proscribed and driven into exile, or, if worse things be impossible, refused the position they should hold in society. Has F. Curci discovered the secret of combining in his own person the ancient and the modern, of setting antagonisms to sleep, and resolving essential differences? One of two things he must be: either he is the man of the future whom we have all been so long expecting, or he is one that has promised and cannot perform. Like his immortal Roman namesake, the new Curtius has leaped into the gulf, armour and all; but has the gulf closed up? We fear the sole result of such ill-advised rashness may be his own disappearance.

This, then, it is that excites on the one hand admiration and pleasure, and mournful anxiety on the other. F. Curci has laid before the Pope a memorandum or remonstrance, and has taken care to put the meaning of it into plain words. A more "unvarnished tale," or one that needed more varnishing, we have seldom perused. Its authorship and its composition are both remarkable. But no one that has known F. Curci in happier years can read it without feeling distress, and even melancholy—the change is so great in him and so much for the worse! He used to be a cheery, eloquent, undaunted spirit, consistent in defending Catholic doctrines, full of a pleasant native humour, and as courteous as he was firm. His name drew crowds to listen when he preached, and he preached in almost every city of the Peninsula. His authority recommended his teaching, and what he wrote was read by Catholics without suspicion. He was credited with excellent powers of judgment on the characters of men and on passing events. His shrewdness, his wit, his large charity, his attractive demeanour, gave him an influence over Italian Catholics which few besides himself have wielded. Somehow, as though he were dreaming at noon-day, he has put on a fresh nature. The

fine traits are overlaid, the sound sense has turned to inconsistent fancy, the trust that he so grandly showed in Holy Church and in divine Providence has given place to Cassandra's temperament of foreboding prophecy. To use an expressive figure, F. Curci has taken umbrage at the Vicar of our Lord, and all the light has gone out of his face and his thoughts. He is altered and his old friends cannot make him out; he perplexes them so that they know not how to render him the services which affection would prompt. For the moment he stands alone in the Church. Is not this very sad? We have ever been told that to affect singularity is fraught with danger. But this danger F. Curci must look in the face, or draw back from the advanced position which he seems bent upon defending.

Individuals before now have instructed the Holy Father in his duties, and that without waiting till they were asked; but the precedents are not of an encouraging sort. From setting lessons to the supreme authorities on one point there is no difficulty in proceeding to set lessons on all the points that can be raised. And F. Curci has not been too modest. The question of the Pope's reconciliation with United Italy opens out such a prospect and so distant an horizon that most Catholics would shrink from discussing it at all, if they could not rely on the judgment of the Church to guide them through its difficulties. Not so F. Curci. With a rare confidence in himself, he quietly waives the teaching of Pope and Bishops. As for the Catholic press, though it represents the laity in this matter, he despises it. He has struck out a pathway of his own. Can it astonish us if he arrives at some very strange conclusions? Perhaps he had made up his mind before beginning the inquiry: such things have been. Did he yield to a strong imagination, to some captivating ideal, which, like Tennyson's *Venus* before the Shepherd on *Ida*, smiled at him and whispered in his ear, and would not reason? Certain it is that he disregards realities patent to all others, and that logic is absent from his pages as well as theology. Let us see whether he does indulge in Utopian schemes. A bare recital of his main propositions will enable us to judge.

F. Curci says, with truth, that the present condition of Italy is not destined to endure. Change of some kind there must be, and all things foreshadow that the change is coming on at a great speed. But how will it affect the Church and the Roman Pontiff? That is our concern. F. Curci thinks the change cannot work towards good, unless first of all there is a complete reversal of the policy which has, so far, prevailed at the Vatican. For some things have been accomplished,

by what means it is not necessary to ask or decide, which, he says, never again will be impugned. The middle ages have passed away for Italy as for the rest of civilized Europe, and the last relic of them was the Pope's Roman Principedom, and that is gone too. Whatever it was, now it is no more. Europe is governed on notions, not of religion or vested rights, but of race and nationality. An institution like the Roman State is therefore something anomalous; its continuance would be merely a survival; at all events, the Italian nation has become a living reality, and, as such, has made for itself a position as one of the six great powers, and is a recognized member of the European family. So much is fixed and irrevocable. It is true that Pius IX. has striven his utmost to prevent this consummation; but F. Curci believes that he has done unwisely. What has it availed to resist? The Pope is at variance with Italy, Catholics have been taught to stand aloof from political life, the whole country suffers. Government is only a faction, but, thanks to the passive and silent attitude of the good everywhere, the faction can do what they will, and need not fear the vengeance of any man. What has brought about this unhappy state of things? Why, says F. Curci, nothing but the unreasonable hope which Catholics have cherished and are still too loth to put away. Without ground or warrant they have expected that the Holy Father will be restored. This he terms an immense mistake, which does more harm to the Church and to Italy—we are quoting his own words—than the Revolution itself, and the injurious consequences of which are getting past cure. Catholics have blundered into a path that leads to ruin; they must measure their steps back again. History will say that those are truly answerable for such disasters as may befall Italy, who have put their trust in idle aspirations and in the return of an order which is obsolete. The Civil Principedom is but “a portion and parcel of the dreadful past.” We must leave it out of our calculations or show ourselves to be as stupid as we are imprudent.*

Hence arises the duty of making terms with Italy. The nation, if only permitted to elect a Catholic parliament, is willing and able to arrange a “modus vivendi” with the Roman Pontiff. But it is he that must take the first step. Until he shows signs of yielding, nothing can be proposed to be done. But let him acknowledge Victor Emmanuel

* It must be borne in mind that we are not putting a gloss upon F. Curci, or drawing inferences, but giving the substance of what he says. “Stupid and imprudent” are not our adjectives, but his.

as a Christian sovereign (really, F. Curci, this seems to us somewhat unreasonable: how could any one find out that his Piedmontese majesty is a Christian at all?), and let him approve of the Statute or fundamental laws of the monarchy. Then the people will send up five hundred Catholic deputies to Monte Citorio, the oligarchy will be forced to resign, the ordinances against religion will be abolished, the King will go up to S. Peter's to receive his crown from the Pope, who has forgiven him, and means to convert him into a small Italian Charlemagne; and after that, we suppose, the millennium will not be far off. But it is well to provide against the too speedy passing away of these "Saturnia regna." How is the Pope to keep his independence? F. Curci sees no difficulty in this. The Head of the Church need not be a temporal sovereign. He can enjoy full liberty in the midst of the great Catholic nation which would look on his residence at Rome as their chief title to glory; and he would thus exercise a moral sway such as no accumulation of military and territorial advantages could secure him. This, we think, if it has any definite sense, must be Cavour's axiom in a slightly disguised form. It amounts to the "Free Church in a Free State." So that the course sketched out is pretty nearly the old one, which by this time is familiar enough. The Pope, having lost his territorial position, is to accept a moral sovereignty, guaranteed to him by law, in its stead. The Italian people are to ratify the misdeeds of Victor Emmanuel and his confederates, and to share in the distribution of the spoils. The comic effect of all this might be a little marred, perhaps, unless the injured Father consented, as of course he would, to appear in the last scene, and call down a blessing on his unruly but penitent children. What a subject for Terence!

F. Curci, however, is thoroughly in earnest. No doubt he has himself given ear to these oracular voices before trying to persuade others that they should obey them. But we cannot suppose he dreamt of winning over Pius IX. to the new policy. He must have been well aware that speeches, and letters, and official documents of every description had bound the Supreme Pontiff to resist even to the end. Neither can he have misjudged the character of the august personage whom his remonstrance chiefly concerns. Other men may have chafered and bargained with our modern politicians; this one man, entrusted with the government of the Church, has dismissed them with an absolute phrase: "*Non possumus.*" If any eloquence could have moved him, he might best have yielded to that of Napoleon III.; but the world still remembers the Pope's answer to a famous letter, and how that broke

the meshes in which it was thought to make him prisoner. F. Curci's resolve must have been not to persuade, but to protest. Now Europe is really asking whether he or any Catholic has the right to protest against the Papal resistance to the new order of things. May we think, as F. Curci has implied that we may, that the Roman Question has only to do with politics; that, even if it be somehow connected with religion, there are still no decisions of the Church that restrain our liberty of judgment? Or are we, as Catholics, under an obligation to take a definite view of the Pope's civil Principedom and to shape our acts accordingly?

The Memorandum grants (what could not well be denied) that authority has pronounced on this matter. It has been laid down "that if the Pope is to be independent, he must, of necessity, be a sovereign." "But," remarks F. Curci, "God has not promised any such sovereign independence to His appointed Pastor. God has even suffered it to be taken from him for a lustrum of years, and might let him remain without it for centuries. Still less has God undertaken to provide for him a temporal kingdom like that which fell in 1870." And therefore the Civil Principedom may not be restored at all. As for pretending to look on the restoration as "something like a dogma of the faith," that is mere sophistry, which, of course, may avail to scandalize the weak, but will be laughed at by unbelievers.* That our confidence in the future can borrow no strength whatever from the Church's teaching is the remonstrant's firm conviction. Those that appeal to the faith on such a point must, according to him, employ false reasonings and principles that are not to the purpose; they must be flatterers and sycophants, and, as usual with such, only too willing to hate all who differ from them. These are the writers, he says, that have asserted for themselves a monopoly, and nothing less than a monopoly, of the Papal prerogative to teach *ex cathedra*.

Passion has taken away some of its force from the language here employed. But it is not possible to misinterpret F. Curci's doctrine. He contends that Papal independence does not bring with it a civil principedom as a right; that the two certainly are not connected in themselves or by Divine ordinance.†

* This quotation from F. Curci may mislead. The question between Catholics and F. Curci is concerned with what *ought* to be, not with what *will* be. Catholics hope and pray that Rome may be given back to the Holy Father; but they do not profess their assurance that the world will perform this act of justice.

† In what sense the Pope's independence involves a *right* to the Principedom will be explained later on.

Perhaps he would say that the Pope became a king by the common course of the world, and that circumstances, which crowned him a thousand years ago, have disrowned him today. The transaction was a secular one; it had a beginning long after Religion was established in Europe; it has come to an end, and Religion still endures. If a state or condition is thus separable from a thing, we argue that the bond between them is not one of pure necessity or essence; we say they must be distinct. Precisely by such an argument many have held themselves free to believe that the Civil Principedom has no sacred or religious character. There are persons that account the Italian Government indeed guilty of sacrilege as having laid hands on the possessions of the Church, but not guilty of attempting to violate the Church's normal constitution; as sinning, therefore, against justice and charity, but not directly against doctrine. F. Curci may be looked upon as a spokesman for these. They have no very clear notions as to how far and in what sense the Pope is exempt from secular jurisdiction—this, at least, is the impression they leave on others;—but when it has been shown them that he cannot be properly the subject of a State, they refuse to conclude from this his perfect immunity to his demand for a temporal sovereignty. Sometimes even the suspicion lurks in their minds that an Apostolic Pope would not desire to have territories and townships. F. Curci unexpectedly discovers a vein of this Ebionitish temperament in himself. He recalls with emphasis the Gospel principles that lead men to despise this world and its goods; and he is daring enough to say that these principles not only have ceased out of our practice, but have escaped our memory, and that our forgetfulness of them is what keeps us from walking in the right path. Does he mean that, if Pius IX. were not in love with temporal dignities and emoluments, he would be less obstinate in putting aside the King's offer? The innuendo is unworthy of a generous or candid man; it is altogether unworthy, because every one knows it is false. Never was a Pope more simple in his desires and his way of living than our present Holy Father. And as touching Catholics generally, we need observe only this, that the spirit of detachment is quite compatible with the defence of rights entrusted to us.

But we are not minded to imitate F. Curci and treat the Roman Question on its merits, apart from authority. Very grave preliminaries require to be settled ere we can presume to express our opinion. Is it the case that in this matter Holy Church leaves us to our devices, to think what may seem right in our own eyes? The venerable F. Beckx, when granting F. Curci release from his vows as a Jesuit,

took occasion to explain how things had come to so mournful an issue with him. "For some time past," he says, "you have been possessed with certain views which it pleased you to call political; whereas, in reality, they affect the sacred interests of the Church and the way in which it is now governed. And to support these opinions you have not shrunk from rashly setting yourself up as a judge of those whom our Lord has appointed to direct His Church. Against the will of those over you, you have gone on cherishing these ideas, and what is worse, impressing them upon others; and by word and writing you have spread abroad what was nothing if not gravely offensive to the Vicar of Jesus, and a stumbling-block to the faithful." These are very severe words. They must be read in the light of the events that gave rise to them. The General of the Jesuits declares that he found it incumbent on him to satisfy the Holy Father, and to publicly point out that the Society reprobates and rejects the opinions which F. Curci had upheld. He therefore called upon F. Curci to retract them openly.* The preacher and remonstrant would do nothing of the sort; he asked, instead, to leave the Order, of which for more than forty years he had been a distinguished member. Writing since his departure from Rome, he makes large profession of obedience to the supreme authority, promises to let us know, by-and-by, his clear meaning, and begs the public prints in the mean time to occupy themselves with him as little as may be. And thus matters stand for the present.

But it cannot be denied that we have here a remarkable incident, and one that teaches a plain lesson. In what has F. Curci gone astray? The General informs us that he has broached certain opinions, certain views; that it was not, therefore, the manner of his addressing the Pope so much as the matter, which required apology. F. Curci gives out that the Roman policy has been false and fatal; that the Head of the Church is not in his own right a temporal prince; that he ought to let his claims fall into abeyance for the good of souls, and be content to have the respect and love of Italians as his protection. Moreover, the criti-

* It is plain from the letter of F. Beckx that a retraction on F. Curci's part had become necessary, because, without such a measure, the Society would have exposed itself to the suspicion of tolerating false and un-Catholic doctrine. F. Curci was required to publicly withdraw what he had *held and taught*, the reason given being this, that otherwise his superiors would have been held responsible for his errors. So that the matter was one, not internal to the Society, but of consequence to the Church at large; in other words, was a matter of doctrine.

cism itself implies that this question does not concern Religion. Such, we take it, are the principal points of variance between F. Curci and the Pope. But how any mind so clear as his could thus darken itself passes our finding out. Half an hour spent in his own library would have sufficed to show him his mistake, and the consequences of it. He should have known that he was venturing on charmed ground. The Church in this matter has not left us to think for ourselves; she has laid obligations upon us which it is better to understand than to ignore. The Roman Question may be political, but cannot be resolved by the mere politician. For we are told in the Syllabus—and we think no excuse can be needed for making the quotation once again—that besides the errors there explicitly censured “many others are by implication condemned in the assertion and setting forth of that doctrine on the civil principedom of the Roman Pontiff, which all Catholics are bound most firmly to hold.” Has our Holy Father withdrawn the Syllabus? No more than he has withdrawn the *Exurge Domine* of Leo X., or any other *ex cathedra* document. Could he indeed withdraw it consistently with the fact which Cardinal Manning has brought out in the passage we subjoin, and with the witness which that fact bears to the true character of the Syllabus as an infallible act of teaching and censuring? We may be sure, then, that there is an obligatory doctrine extant on the Civil Principedom. It is that doctrine which F. Curci has overlooked, and a clear account of which we will now endeavour, so far as we may, to put forward.

But we wish beforehand to guard against a wildly mistaken notion which has, in spite of its grossness, found acceptance here and there. F. Curci talks of journals claiming to be inspired by the Vatican, but really inspiring it. In his view these are the main promoters of the Pope's long resistance; these, likewise, have been able to make ordinary Catholics hold their peace, and have then interpreted the silence in their own favour. Of all this we know nothing; we can throw no light whatever upon it. Is there not some delusion in the manner of looking at things? Surely, the Pope does not wait to be prompted by a newspaper before deciding on his conduct; F. Curci must have learnt that better than most men,

* “In 1867, five hundred bishops unanimously proclaimed their adhesion to the pontifical acts of Pius IX., both in the teaching of truth and in the condemnation of errors; that is to say, to the Syllabus then recently published, which is a compendium of the acts of Pius IX., in the many Encyclicals and other letters promulgated before that date.”—“The Story of the Vatican Council,” p. 42.

for he has been a writer in Catholic journals himself. Why bring this visionary talk into a grave and practical discussion? What the Pope teaches is not put into his mouth by the "Univers," nor by the "Civiltà Cattolica." But, then, neither are we bidden to wait for particular "inspirations" from the Vatican before speaking upon points of Catholic doctrine. The Holy Father does not instruct us in a whisper. He may truly apply to himself the words of our Lord: "In secret I have taught nothing." The Encyclicals and Allocutions have been written for the whole world to read. Journals, even though they be orthodox, cannot require our submission to them. Who, in fact, has ever had the face to maintain that they possess such authority?

"But," it may be objected, "you are going to teach yourselves,—to lay down the doctrine which all Catholics must hold, as you put it a moment ago." We beg pardon, we are going to do no such thing. What does a teacher mean? We suppose one whose word must be received *because it is his word*: one that has authority, and may dispense with argument. He is one that has a right to command our assent, whether we see the grounds of the particular doctrines or no. Authority to teach in the master has for its correlative faith in the disciple. But how can it be said that we ask any one to put faith in our mere assertion because it is ours? What we propose to do is something quite different. We propose to quote authentic documents, to set down the reasoning they contain, to compare passages from them, and so to enable our readers to get at the meaning for themselves. We fulfil the office of an index, of a finger-post, occasionally of a commentator; but we should think it too stupid to be amusing if any one mistook us for an "authorized exponent" of Catholic truths; and, we maintain, there is no undue presumption in our bringing together passages of the Holy Father's teaching, for it is always he that speaks in his own declarations, and not any one else. Who, for example, can justly accuse us of dogmatizing when we say, "all Catholics are bound to hold most firmly" a given doctrine? The decree is not of our making, it was put forth by the Supreme Pontiff, and by him sent to all the Bishops. As well might you charge upon a lawyer that he makes the law because he quotes the law, or upon an actor that he composes the speeches set for him to recite. If it be said, indeed, that we pervert the Pope's meaning, that is entirely another objection. But we do not anticipate difficulties from that quarter. Pius IX. has the gift of speaking with an admirable perspicuity.

Let us now state our position. F. Curci, it appears to us,

cannot have taken the right course in recommending the Pope to make terms : because he has treated the question strictly and solely from the political point of view, whereas there are Catholic doctrines which determine the principles here to be followed out. And the practical result, when we compare such doctrines as are relevant, is this : the Roman Pontiff cannot abdicate for himself and his successors the claim to be sovereign, in a territorial and more than moral sense, of the Roman States. Circumstances may prevent him from asserting his claims by force, but no combination of events is equal to depriving him of his inherent right to be a temporal prince.* The reason is that such temporal dignity is the proper normal actuation of his God-given immunity. He has, therefore, never existed without the right to acquire it, even when he has been withheld from its actual possession. As the Church, by her very nature, has the right to acquire property, and in her normal condition does and ought to possess some temporal goods, so the Pope cannot renounce for himself the right to enjoy a real and territorial sovereignty ; he cannot acquiesce in a compact that would aim at keeping him for ever out of the dominions necessary ; and those dominions include the city of Rome. The Roman Princedom is necessary, not for the Pope's bare independence, but for his proper independence. In like manner (and the one case will help us to see how the other must be treated), the Church has a right, not to such things as may be just sufficient and necessary if she is to exist at all, not to those things only which persecution itself does not take away, but to all that normally befits a divine institution acknowledged by the creatures for whom God has intended it. And so the Pope, since he is the infallible and supreme Vicar of Christ, claims lawfully from us a sovereign state and power. It is not enough that he should be free, nor that human ordinances should confer upon him exemptions and immunities. God has exempted him from the control of men : and God, in making him so great, has willed that the temporal sovereignty should protect, and express, and clothe

* Our meaning will be plain enough to a careful reader. But it may be worth while to observe that we do not consider the Roman Pontiff to have been *de jure* sovereign of Rome from the time S. Peter established his see there. What we say is that S. Peter and his successors have had the right inherent in them of *becoming* temporal princes, and that this dignity is a part of their normal state. A peer, who is a minor, has a legal right to sit in the House of Lords, but not to sit there whilst he is a minor. Somewhat in the same manner, the Pope has a right to be the Sovereign of Rome when there are Catholic populations in different countries and the Christian religion has attained certain dimensions, but it does not follow that he must always have been King at Rome.

as it were with a visible splendour his spiritual prerogatives and graces. Hence the throne of the Popes in the Holy City is Providential and supernatural. For, as we have proved in an earlier article, it is the Roman territory that our Lord has set apart for His Vicar. Rome is divinely chosen, and except by an unjustifiable and illegal employment of force, the Pope cannot be torn from his place at S. Peter's shrine. If he has a right to be sovereign anywhere, it must be there most of all.

We crave the reader's patience until he has heard us out. These statements are not unreasonable,—they are merely Christian; and we would ask the modern to suppose for a moment with us that Christianity and unreason are not the same thing. If we desire to ascertain what rights the Pope has on a certain theory, it will be requisite to take the theory for granted. We are to say, then, that all the world, "every human creature," is under the obligation, whether it be recognized or no, to submit to the Roman Church and to its Supreme Head.* From those that submit, the Pope has an evident claim to receive honour: against those that do not submit, he has no less evident a claim to be protected. If men persecute him, hinder him in his government of the faithful, wantonly refuse him the means to fulfil his mission with the dignity, and even the magnificence, that beseeem it, they are guilty of injustice towards God and towards him. He is the Spiritual Father of all the faithful, the Bearer of the Keys of Heaven, the Prince of pastors, the living Representative of our Lord in His triple office as King, and Priest, and Prophet. Think whether the nations of Christendom could endure to see him a pensioner on the bounty of secular governments or treated as in any way beneath the kings that are his children. We know it was this instinct of reverence and love,—feelings which are due to a Father and cannot be denied him without sin,—which has given the Roman territory into his hand. The Christian ages have done it, and, as Napoleon tells us, "they have done well." They have had the grace to discover in the Roman Pontiff the abiding presence of something beyond nature, and they have built a sanctuary for him within the walls of Rome. For if in the ancient Israel there was a sacred portion assigned to the priests of a typical order, how much more ought there to be immunities, and privileges, and consecrated domains, and holy inviolate places for the priesthood which culminates in the Apostolic See? †

* This is the great fundamental definition in the Bull *Unam Sanctam*.

† Since writing the above we have studied with deep interest Mr.

But it is one thing to have a right of acquisition, another to have the power of exercising it. The Church was perfect from the first, but Christendom was not formed till after many centuries. Paganism, and Arianism, and a barbaric stage of social culture, hindered that full and free development which Religion at last was able to reach. Now, can it be said that any given inherent, and, as we may call it, essential prerogative of the Church, did not *exist*, so long as these antagonistic forces prevented its *exercise*? Because idolatry prevailed, was Christianity illegal before God? Here is a remarkable point of difference between the ordinary teaching of the Church and the modern theories. Great and overwhelming facts do not find a justification in their mere existence. It still remains to consider whether they accord with eternal laws and the decrees of Heaven. The Pope truly possessed all his rights, despite of Paganism, and though he could sometimes exercise none of them but the right of suffering for his Master. So far as the Imperial Law was concerned, the Pope had not even immunity, much less sovereignty: yet it is known that, *jure divino*, the Pope cannot be a mere subject. Rebellions and revolutions leave the question of right and equity where it was; at the utmost, they give rise to new conditions, and thus supply the matter with which justice has to deal. Conduct may alter, but not principles. And if it is a principle of the Catholic system that seculars should obey the clergy in matters of religion, or that the Pope should be a prince, these truths retain all their validity, even when seculars disobey and the Pope is a captive. What varies is not the principle, but its applicability. In other words, history and theology are different to this extent, that many historical facts have been mere deeds of violence, proving that moral dictates may be resisted, but not that they admit of repeal. The Church, as a great Pope* has said, knows how to pardon violence; but principles are in her keeping, not at her disposal.

It will appear in the sequel that the Italian Government asks much more from our Holy Father than a concordat—asks, when we get to the bottom of its thought, for the abandonment of the principle itself. He could not accept the terms now offered him, unless with the tacit acknowledgment that from henceforth no Roman Bishop is to be a king. He would have to deliberately erase from the Church's constitution her

Lindsay's remarkable chapter on the principle of the "Temporal Power," in the work we have elsewhere noticed. There the thought we have had only time to indicate is developed with clearness and beauty, and is shown to be again and again shadowed forth in holy Scripture. We strongly recommend this section of Mr. Lindsay to the devout theological reader.

* Paul V. in his contest with the Republic of Venice.

right to develop into visible, and what we may term political perfection. He would, by so doing, be reducing the Church from her status, which is that of a complete and sovereign society, to the inferior condition of a private corporation or "collegiate body," as the jurists have defined these words. And, be it observed, the change would not be one stopping short within the limits of ecclesiastical law, but would affect the divine law as laid down by Christ when the Church was founded. The Pope is not, then, conjured, for the sake of a great right, to do a little wrong; nothing less is at stake than the social perfection which religion may and ought to acquire. It is from this vantage-ground that the civil principedom is properly viewed. Standing so high, we see that it is the foundation upon which the whole fabric of Christian politics has been raised. Christianity is no longer, indeed, the form or ruling principle of secular government, as once it was; but only an infidel can doubt that the State has a duty of embracing and observing the true supernatural religion, just as every member of society has. It is in defiance of right and conscience that Europe has closed with atheism in politics; the duty to be Christian remains, and the penalty for its non-fulfilment will one day be exacted. And few would deny that, on mediæval or theocratic principles, as each government must be Christian, so the Infallible Teacher of all the governments and all the peoples must be an independent temporal sovereign. The point in dispute between Catholics and their adversaries is, therefore, whether theocratic principles can be true in one age and false in another. If they were ever binding, they bind now. They are not obsolete in the nineteenth century, unless they were an imposition and a mockery in the twelfth.

So much regarding the doctrine we hold. Now to show that it is contained in the Church's teaching.* Our materials are almost too abundant to allow of easy dealing with them; but we will select what seems clearest and more immediately decisive. The statement which has served as a kind of rule for both bishops and people in their declarations on the civil Principedom is taken from a well-known encyclical ("*Cum Catholica Ecclesia*," March 26th, 1860). We will quote the opening passage, only delaying to observe that the entire letter

* One of the best treatises, if not quite the best, on the doctrine of the Civil Principedom was published in the "*Month*" by F. O'Reilly, S.J. We would beg to refer the reader to it for the elucidation of various points that are here omitted or only slightly dwelt upon; it is, indeed, a most luminous exposition of the whole subject. See the "*Month*" for September and November, 1871.

was read officially in every diocese of the world when it appeared:—

“The Catholic Church, founded and instituted by Christ our Lord to procure the eternal salvation of mankind, has, by virtue of this divine institution, obtained the form of a perfect society. And therefore it must be endowed with such liberty as that, in the exercise of its ministry, it shall not be subject to any civil power. But to act with the freedom which was befitting, it must needs have such aids and helps as correspond with the condition of the various times and their necessities. And so it came to pass, by the special decree of Divine Providence, that when the Roman Empire fell and was broken up into many kingdoms, the Roman Pontiff, whom Christ had appointed to be the head and centre of the whole Church, was put in possession of a civil principedom. Thus did God Himself, in His wisdom, provide that, in the midst of so many and such different secular princes, the supreme Pontiff should enjoy the political freedom that he needs so much, since he is to put forth his spiritual power, authority, and jurisdiction, without let or hindrance, over the entire globe. And this indeed was as it should be, that the Catholic world might find no reason to suspect the Holy See, ‘to which, because it has the principality of power, every other church must have recourse,’ of giving way in its acts of policy to the urgency of secular powers, or to the spirit of party. Moreover, it is easy to understand that this principedom, appertaining to the Roman Church, is indeed temporal in its nature, but has nevertheless the character of a spiritual thing, by reason of the sacred purpose which it serves, and of the close bond which unites it with the most important interests of the Christian faith.”

A little before, in the encyclical “*Nullis certe verbis*” (Jan. 19th, 1860), Pius IX. had acknowledged the pastorals and addresses which a large majority of the bishops were delivering on this subject. To them he says: “You have strenuously defended the cause of our most holy religion and of justice. You have expressed your abhorrence of the sacrilegious attempts now making against the civil Principedom of the Roman Church; and manfully standing up for that Principedom, you have gloried in professing and teaching that it has been bestowed by a singular decree of the Providence which rules all things, that so the Roman Pontiff might exercise his office in full liberty, subject to no secular power. . . . And the children of the Church, so dear to us, being imbued with your doctrine and aroused by your noble example, have vied with each other, and are vying in their expression to us of the same sentiments.” And then he speaks tenderly of the won-

derful Catholic manifestations which we all remember, and which insisted, as he says, on the inviolability attaching to S. Peter's patrimony. The faithful knew how true it was, as the Holy Father declared to them, that "God Himself had willed the Roman See should be endowed with a civil principality for the sake of the apostolic offices" belonging to it. Not because they needed to be taught, but because the enemy persisted in his injustice, did the Pope repeat the same doctrine, and almost in the same words, at short and frequent intervals. We may instance the Allocution of Sept. 28th, 1860 ("Novos et ante"), and another of March 18th, 1861 ("Jamdudum cernimus"). But a most important affirmation of the Catholic teaching on this and kindred subjects, was that expressed by the Supreme Pastor when the Bishops had gathered round him in Rome to celebrate the great canonization of 1862. In substance it was very much the same as the passage we have quoted from the "*Cum Catholica Ecclesia.*" The part which most concerns us runs as follows:—

It is a pleasure on this subject to contemplate the truly marvellous agreement with which you, and the other our venerable brethren the bishops of the Catholic world, have never ceased, both in letters to ourselves and in pastoral addresses to the faithful . . . from teaching that this civil principedom was given to the Roman Pontiff by a special counsel of Providence: and that it is *necessary* in order that the same Pontiff may never be subject to any prince or secular power, but may be able to exercise with full liberty his supreme authority . . . and provide for the greater good of Church and faithful.

To this the Bishops desired to make a fitting reply; and under the presidency of our late illustrious Cardinal they drew up and presented a document which of itself is sufficient to preclude all possible controversy.

They begin by confessing the dignity of the Roman Pontiff, and declare their adhesion to whatsoever he has taught, for he is "a second Peter, the master of sound doctrine, the centre of unity, the rock, and the foundation of the Church." When he speaks, they hear the voice of Peter; when he decrees, they obey as if Christ Himself were speaking. Then they say:—

But to touch upon what is nearest us, we see you, most Blessed Father, spoiled of those provinces by the help of which provision was with justice made for the dignity of the Holy See and the government of the entire Church. This has happened by the wickedness and crime of usurpers that "make liberty the cloak of their malice." That your Holiness has resisted their violence with unconquerable spirit deserves, we think, an expression of gratitude from all Catholics, and we render thanks in their name. For we

profess that the Civil Princedom of the Holy See is a necessity (*quiddam necessarium*) and was manifestly set up by the providence of God. Nor do we hesitate to declare that, in the present state of human affairs, this very princedom is altogether requisite for the good and free government of the Church and of souls. For it was surely necessary that the Roman Pontiff, the head of the universal Church, should be the subject of no secular prince, and not even his guest, but that seated in his own kingdom and territory he should be independent, and should protect and defend the Catholic faith, and govern the Christian republic, with a noble, tranquil, and flourishing liberty.

Continuing their declaration, they point out the necessity of some holy place or sanctuary whence, amid so many conflicts of races and opinions, the voice of truth may issue forth to teach mankind. They even add that the liberty of the Bishops has a close connection with the Roman sovereignty of the Pope. They enlarge on the clearness, and authenticity, and venerable antiquity of those rights which the Holy Father will not surrender. But suddenly checking themselves, they forego their own words to quote and accept the pronouncements of their chief:—

It hardly becomes us to speak any further in this weighty matter, since we have heard you again and again not so much discoursing as teaching upon it. For your voice, sounding to the whole earth like a priestly trumpet, has proclaimed "that the Roman Pontiff, by a special decree of Providence, has acquired the civil princedom": by all of us, therefore, it is most certainly to be held that this temporal government has not by chance accrued to the Holy See, but has been given it by special disposition of God, by length of years and by unanimous consent of kingdoms and empires, and has been sustained and preserved as if by miracle.

The Bishops next recall how Pius IX. has declared he will not relinquish the princedom or the possessions of the Roman Church, which belong, as does the defence of them, to all Catholics, and how he is ready to give up life rather than forsake this cause of God, of the Church, and of justice. They encourage him to persevere in the same mind, and reiterate that the freedom of the faithful, and of Christianity, and the moral and social interests of civilized mankind demand this course of him. To illustrate the Catholic importance of the Princedom they mention how the Fathers at Constance, during the interregnum, took upon themselves to administer the temporal affairs of the Roman State. In concluding this part of their address, they once more express their adhesion to the Pope's teaching:—

But what need of more? You have, at length, by a just sentence, condemned the wicked spoilers of ecclesiastical property; you have proclaimed

all that they had done to be "null and void," you have decreed all their attempts to be "wholly illicit and sacrilegious," and you have declared that the doers of such evil deeds have fallen under the censures and penalties of the Church. These grave words from your lips, and these admirable acts, it is our duty to receive with reverence, and to renew our assent to them. For as the body suffers in all things with the head to which it is joined in the unity of the members and in the same life, so is it necessary for us to have one feeling with you. . . . We implore God to bring this iniquitous state of things to an end, and to restore the Church, the Bride of His Son, now so miserably despoiled and oppressed, to her former freedom and beauty.

All the Bishops then in Rome, numbering 265, signed these words. Many others afterwards sent in their signatures, nor has a single one (so far as we have ever heard) protested against what was said in the address, that the Bishops present spoke in the name of the entire episcopate and of the faithful clergy and people. The Universal Church agreed in condemning what Pius had condemned, whether false doctrines, or the sacrilegious rapine and violations of ecclesiastical immunity which had been perpetrated against the Holy See.

The prelates of the Church had made their sentiments known as a body: but the matter was urgent, political events had thrown Europe and America into an excited and passionate state; it became necessary for the Bishops to instruct the Great Powers which were at one time inclining to meet in Congress at the instance of the French Emperor, and to strip the Roman See of its remaining possessions. From the outbreak of the war against Austria down to the present day, the Bishops have steadily persisted in justifying by argument and in upholding by deeds the course that our Holy Father has taken. The documents issued would form an immense collection; especially since the occupation of Rome and the inauguration of those pilgrimages to the Vatican which alarm non-Catholic governments. For the latest declarations in this matter we would recommend a study of the Pope's speeches; for he knows how, in replying to them, to suggest what has been their spirit and their doctrine. But the most authoritative papers are those which were published by the "*Civiltà Cattolica*" in some eight huge volumes. They afford what may be termed a perpetual commentary on the solemn address of 1862. Most Catholics must have seen the outside of the work, but some, we fear, have not cared to investigate any further. But if they have never considered what the Catholic Episcopacy has taught about the Roman Princedom, and still think themselves capable of deciding

on the subject, we must beg leave to differ from them : in fact, we would deny that they *can*, under such circumstances, be competent. We do not pretend to say they must read all the pastorals and addresses : but it is not so difficult to find out their general, and we are sure it deserves to be thought, their unvarying tenor. It will suffice to study with care the writings of the Bishop of Orleans on the civil sovereignty, or the letter of Cardinal Caterini (republished in this REVIEW, July, 1869, p. 185), or above all, the full and most instructive pastorals, for which we have to thank the late Cardinal Rauscher, of Vienna.* We have looked all through the collection, and have taken pains to read the longest and most didactic pieces in it. And we believe that the Italian preface to the whole is correct in summing up their contents as it does. The author bids us remember that every bishop throughout the world has accepted and published the declarations of the Supreme Pontiff, in which again and again the specially providential character and the moral and normal necessity of the Principedom are insisted upon. But, taking the words uttered by the Bishops themselves, we find they contain and express the following points—That it is highly becoming, and at least in the present state of society, necessary, that the visible Head of the Church should possess evident freedom in his acts by means of a temporal sovereignty : so that if the Principedom be wanting there remains for the Church nothing but persecution or slavery. And hence, as the sovereignty itself is a sacred thing by reason of its destination and the interests bound up with it, questions concerning it are, to this extent, not political, but religious, though the matter of them may be political. Again, that Providence has supplied this necessity by giving to the Popes a principality that is at once the most ancient, legitimate, and incontestable of all now existing in Europe, and that from this patrimony vested in the successors of S. Peter, no part can be violently taken away without grave injury to the whole, and peril to what may still remain. Further, that the Roman Pontiffs are not hindered by their position in the Church and their spiritual character from governing their states according to the laws of humanity and civilization, that, on the contrary, they are much aided by such great supernatural prerogatives. And, lastly, that the pretended discontent of the Roman people was partly false and a calumny,

* The letters of the German, Austrian, and Spanish Bishops are most valuable as exhibiting the theological and intrinsic grounds of the Principedom : but we think Card. Rauscher's the clearest of all and the most complete. (See Part iii. vol. i. of the Collection.)

and partly got up by a few malevolent and rebellious persons, who hate the Pope's rule because it is Christian.

In 1864 our Holy Father issued the "*Quanta Cura*" with the Syllabus subjoined to it. Two propositions touching on the civil principedom are condemned, one affirming that Catholics may question the compatibility of a temporal with a spiritual sovereignty; the other saying that the Church's freedom and happiness would be greatly furthered by bringing the Roman State to an end. It is not impossible, even at this date, that some who wish to be good Catholics may discover these propositions in the sentiments they habitually cherish. But Pius IX. obliges us to much more than the abandonment of the two statements explicitly reproved. He specifies by name six pontifical Acts, from most of which we have been quoting, and declares that they contain the doctrine which all children of the Church are bound most firmly to hold—that is to say, to hold with interior assent as true.

We do not propose here to start a technical controversy on the original value of the Syllabus; though for ourselves we have no doubt whatever that from the first it was cognizable as an *ex cathedrâ* utterance. At all events let these facts be considered. The Bishops published it, in the usual way, to the faithful; they wrote frequently and abundantly on the doctrines put forth in it and declared they were Catholic teaching. When more than five hundred bishops were assembled in Rome to keep the centenary of S. Peter, our Holy Father set it before them as his act and renewed its force.* It is constantly quoted by Catholics and non-Catholics alike as an authentic expression of what the Church teaches and the world rejects. Pius IX. has repeatedly called it his own act. All these facts are surely equal to proving that no Catholic can affirm what the Syllabus brands as erroneous without falling into error. Then no Catholic can deny that the Civil Principedom is religious in its bearings, providential in its institution, and necessary to the Church's freedom.

But all this, it may be replied, is ten years old. Things have changed since then. What, and doctrines too? Can *ex cathedrâ* Acts lose their force by length of time? Have the principles on which the Church must proceed ceased to possess a value now that Rome is in the hands of the Revolution? Have Pope and Bishops drawn back from their solemn words and engagements, published in the face of the civilized world? What was the Allocution of March 12th last year

* Compare what we have quoted previously from Card. Manning, who was one of the Bishops present.

but a summing up and confirmation of all that had gone before? Pius IX. refuses to be "reconciled with our new masters" because the reconciliation proposed "would be a betrayal of the highest rights of the Holy See . . . and a surrender of the inheritance of Christ into the hands of an authority" which would gladly destroy religion itself. Once more he proclaims that "in no way does the Roman Pontiff possess, nor can he ever possess full liberty, or exercise his full authority, so long as he is subject to others ruling in his city. In Rome he must be either a sovereign or a captive; and never will there be peace, security, and tranquillity throughout the Catholic Church, whilst the exercise of the supreme apostolic ministry is left exposed to the agitation of parties, the arbitrary power of rulers, the vicissitudes of political elections, and the designs and actions of men that prefer their own interest to what is just." And not very long afterwards, the Pope wrote that letter to the English hierarchy from which we quoted in our previous article. But we will quote the whole reasoning now to show that in 1877 the faithful are just as much required to believe in the necessity of the Princedom as they were in 1860. The main points are in these lines:—

Do not all the faithful in the world hold, as you too hold, that the Church is not contained in this or that kingdom, but embraces within herself all the nations redeemed by the blood of Christ, and joined together under one Head . . . who as Pastor and Teacher exercises over them direct, immediate, and ordinary jurisdiction, and governs all their minds and wills in matters of faith and morals? Do they not *for this reason believe* that the Supreme Pontiff ought not to be subject to the power of any human authority, and that *on this account* a civil princedom was conferred on him by Providence that he might be able to discharge freely his supreme office, not only over the peoples, but over the rulers of the peoples, as they too, like the rest of mankind, are sons of the Church. Do they not think that *these considerations in themselves*, apart from the oaths taken to preserve in its integrity the temporal dominion of the Roman Church, utterly exclude all conciliation with those that have invaded the possessions of the Sovereign Pontiff, and have brought his person into subjection to their power? We rejoice then that you have in your letter so clearly expressed this Catholic sentiment.

It will throw light on some points of theology connected with this matter, and will suggest a large historical treatment of the whole—for which we regret there is just now no time—if we choose a passage here and there from Card. Caterini's letter in 1864. This was a letter addressed by the Cardinal, as Prefect of the Congregation of the Council, and by com-

mand of his Holiness, to a certain bishop, whose canon theologian had imagined that the doctrine on the Civil Princedom was new, and of late introduction into the Church. The Cardinal says therefore :—

Might not your Lordship refer [the canon] to the celebrated collection of documents relative to the temporal power, wherein not only the encyclicals and allocutions of our most Holy Father, but the letters of nearly all the Bishops of the world, are to be found? From what he can there gather, he may easily construct his argument; if the Roman Pontiff and the Bishops—in other words, if the whole Catholic Church—is of such a mind, why should I not hearken to its voice? If I hear not the Church, am I not under the stroke of that dreadful sentence, “whoso hears not the Church let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican”? When the Pope, the universal teacher, speaks, who shall dare to contradict him, and refuse to lead his understanding into captivity, whether the reason of the doctrine or command be plain to him or otherwise? And, granting that the matter in question does not *directly* concern the faith, are we, on that account, to refuse to hearken to the voice of the Supreme Pastor? Who does not know that, besides the articles strictly of faith, there are others closely connected therewith; as, again, with moral precepts, as for example, “Thou shalt not steal”? . . . This is no “new teaching of very recent introduction,” as he thinks it, but of ancient date.

The Cardinal then enumerates authorities on the subject, including Bellarmine. He refers especially to the acts of the Council of Lyons in which Innocent IV. deposed the Emperor Frederic for having seized on the territory of the Roman Church :—

This solemn act of an Ecumenical Council, with the Roman Pontiff at its head, supplies evident proof of the lawfulness and antiquity of the Civil Princedom of the Holy See, and *demonstrates its inviolability, its fitness, and its necessity.*

Again :—

In the Council of Constance the temporal power of the Holy See was no less solemnly affirmed and vindicated by condemning the propositions of Wycliffe; the 33rd of which was “Pope Sylvester and Constantine the Emperor did wrong in endowing the Church.” By this condemnation the Council not only affirmed the lawfulness of the Church’s holding temporal endowments, but insisted particularly on that one which is the most noble of all, the most advantageous, and necessary to the free and unrestricted exercise of the spiritual power committed to the Roman Pontiff, viz. his Civil Princedom. But not only in words but by its deeds did the Council testify to the lawfulness and necessity of the temporal power. It assumed the civil administration of the States of the Church . . . at a time when, in the absence of the visible head, the Church was represented by this General Council of Constance.

The Cardinal adds,—

It may thence be inferred that to assert that the doctrine as to the necessity and fitness of the Civil Princedom of the Holy See is a novelty of but recent introduction, is historically *false*, and doctrinally *erroneous*. It is equivalent to attributing error and usurpation to the Popes who have received and maintained their temporal sovereignty over the States of the Church, and to gainsaying the two councils of Lyons and Constance, which both, by word and deed, have sanctioned this temporal princedom. To assert the contrary would be to *renew the error of Arnold of Brescia, Calvin, and other heretics*. These, in their hostility to the Church and the See of Rome, taught that it was foreign to the spirit of the Gospel to conjoin spiritual jurisdiction with civil power—a proposition deservedly branded as heretical. But the canon may [likewise] consult the constitution of Nicholas III., “*Fundamenta militantis Ecclesiæ*,” given July 18th, 1278, and which would seem expressly written to meet this difficulty. He will find at the very beginning, that *it is not without a miracle* that the sovereignty over Rome is joined to the supreme pastorate of the Roman Pontiff, he being the chief teacher of the Christian people, to whom full power has been committed by Christ. Now, to the free exercise of this high charge . . . the Civil Princedom is useful and even necessary. Hence Nicholas III. treating, in this constitution, of the civil sovereignty of the Popes, very properly alleges the freedom and independence of the apostolic ministry as the main reason for the temporal power. “We do not deem it meet that the earthly emperor should rule where the Heavenly King has set the High Priest and Chief of the Christian religion: rather should the chair of Peter, now established on the throne of Rome, enjoy full liberty in its action, nor be subject to *any*, since, by a divine decree, it has been set over all.”

We may interrupt the Cardinal for a moment to remark that this mediæval document is worthy of most attentive study. There can be no doubt that it embodies principles which are constantly implied throughout the whole of the canon law. Nicholas, in the paragraph quoted, speaks of the donation of Constantine as an established fact, and such, indeed, it was considered for many centuries. But this, instead of weakening his doctrine, tends rather to confirm it. Mediæval Catholics would never have believed in the myth, if they did not already cherish the conviction that Rome belongs to the Vicar of Christ by a divine and providential appointment, and that no king or secular power could with propriety set up an earthly throne by the side of S. Peter’s chair. As soon as the empire became Christian, Rome put on a new and supernatural dignity in the face of the world. Any other city, Byzantium, or Milan, or Ravenna might be honoured by the presence of senate and Cæsar. But Rome was now too great to care for such transitory privileges: it was not the Empire but the Church which gave its full

meaning and its predestined scope to the "Urbs Æterna." This was what the Middle Ages understood when they celebrated Constantine's gift to Silvester; they exaggerated the historical fact, but only because they saw the end in the beginning, and perceived the shadow of the future Christendom spreading over the glories of the ancient empire. When Constantine turned the course of the eagles eastward, he left the Roman Pontiff clear space to lay the foundations on which all that is good in modern Europe reposes.

The Cardinal goes on:—

Bellarmino says: "Though it be granted that, strictly speaking, it would be better for the Popes to confine themselves to spiritual things, and leave temporal concerns to princes, yet, on account of the evils of the times, experience proves not only that it is *useful*, but that it is even a *strict necessity*, for Divine Providence to bestow temporal dominion on the Roman Pontiff and on some other Bishops." To the above-named constitution we may add the well-known and most ancient mode of proceeding, "In Cœna Domini," which decrees excommunication against all invaders of Papal cities and territories. Nor should we omit the Bull of that great and Holy Pontiff, S. Pius V., "Admonet" of the 29th March, A.D. 1567. This Pope, being fully convinced, not only of the fitness and advantages, but also of the necessity of the Temporal Power, and wishing to safeguard it in every possible way, forbids every sale, exchange, and even enfeoffment . . . and decrees against cardinals, or any others, the most grievous penalties, and even excommunication *ipso facto*, if they should attempt to persuade the Pope for the time being, to do any of the things aforesaid.

The purpose of citing here such canonical enactments as have just been mentioned, is partly to show how impossible would be the "reconciliation" of which some have dreamt, —except at the cost of absolutely breaking with tradition and the entire legislation of the Pontiffs; but partly, and indeed mainly, to bring out the inviolable character which has been set upon the Roman Principedom, and to argue from that to its necessity. For it would not be so completely outside the range of human eventualities, were it of a merely temporal nature, or not in some way bound up with the very constitution of the Church. Of what sort the bond is we have already pointed out; the Civil Principedom is the perfect and normal actuation of the Pope's necessary independence and immunity. The permanent condition of things, which no Pope, according to S. Pius, may lend a hand to overthrow, has its own theological, and, we do not fear to say, theocratic reason: God gave the kingdom, because He had willed that S. Peter should bear the keys. And that such has been always the Church's

doctrine, Cardinal Caterini makes evident to all in his effective quotations from the ecclesiastical law.*

The reader has not forgotten that F. Curci, in his remonstrance, attributes our hope of the Pontiff's restoration to sophistical reasonings, impertinence, and flattery. He scoffs at the notion of making it into "something like an article of faith" and a dogma. Now, we do not know any Catholic who has said or thought that the Pope's recovery of his dominions is an article of faith. We do not know any single one who has even said that the necessity of the Civil Princedom is a revealed dogma, or that persons cannot deny such necessity without falling into heresy. The Holy Father has declared none of these things, neither have the Bishops; and as for the Catholic press, we seem to get the notion that it has generally confined itself to repeating and explaining official documents from Rome. Therefore we take it that F. Curci is here "darkening counsel with words." But we can scarcely credit him with the strange view which his argument, on the surface at any rate, seems to imply. Is there no middle term between holding something to be an article of faith, and not holding it as infallibly taught by the Holy See? Are we at liberty to reject all doctrines defined *ex cathedra* that are not articles of faith? Readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW need not be told afresh what they know so well. We do not say the necessity of the Civil Princedom, in the sense explained, is a revealed dogma, or its denial a heresy; but we do say with our Holy Father, Pius IX., that all Catholics are bound most firmly to hold (and that means, of course, to internally believe and accept) that there is such necessity. And in accordance with the letter of Cardinal Caterini, we say there are principles involved which it would be simply heretical to call in question. If a man denies the necessity of temporal dominion, because the Church ought not and cannot, without sin or imperfection, possess any property, or because there is an essential incompatibility between the spiritual character of the Pope and the character of a temporal prince, we have no difficulty in measuring the error of these reasons. Or, if he says, in general terms, that the Pope could never become a prince without contravening the spirit of the Gospel, we think it is possible to know exactly where he stands.†

* In the case upon which the Cardinal was consulted, it appears that the canon theologian judged himself to have fallen under the censures, for he besought his bishop to give him absolution, and this was done in the presence of three ecclesiastics (vide DUBLIN REVIEW, July 1869, in loco). Yet he had done no more than say, "The doctrine is new in the Church."

† The condemnation, in mediæval times, of Wycliffe and the Lollards,

But what happens more commonly is this, that the "modern gentleman" informs us that he is not prepared to hold that the Princedom is necessary; he prefers to think the Pope can go without it and still enjoy his proper independence; he would, in fact, advise the Holy Father to trouble himself no more with the Roman State, and he is sure that such a course would greatly improve the Church's prospects. Well,—we say—our "modern gentleman" will have to reckon with the censures of Pius V., and with those of the Bull "*Apostolicæ Sedis*," if he goes so far as to actively recommend the Pope to make away with the territories of the Roman Church. And as regards doctrine, he is at once in opposition to all the Papal Acts we have quoted, to the unanimous teaching of the Bishops, and to the sentiments which almost all the faithful have expressed. He must, in all strictness, be pronounced out of harmony with the mind, spirit, and voice of the Church. It does not need to say that he prefers his own judgment to that of the Universal Pastor, whose obligatory teaching he disregards and disobeys. F. Faber has it somewhere that a man who is bent on going wrong in point of doctrine may choose which one of seven-and-twenty theological censures he will incur: it is, perhaps, advisable to try and incur none of them. However, we decline altogether to transgress the boundaries of our province, which is not that of the theologian qualifying errors for condemnation, nor of authority pronouncing censure. It is enough for us that our Holy Father has told us what we are to believe, and what to avoid. The incident which has coupled with it F. Curci's name, is a significant warning that we cannot pick and choose for ourselves in this matter. Evidently, Pius IX. intends us to listen when he speaks, and to hold what he prescribes. This is no act of severity on his part, but the carrying out of an office for which he is solemnly responsible before God and man. Here then is the test. If we *are* free to think as we like in the Roman Question, let some one come forward and deny what the Pope has asserted; let him set up a counter-opinion, as he might if the discussion were on an indifferent and purely secular interest, and let him see whether the Roman authorities will allow him his way any more than they allowed it to the Italian priest taken in hand by Cardinal Caterini, or than the General of the Jesuits has allowed it to F. Curci.

and of the Men of the Eternal Gospel, throws a vivid light on the exaggerated spiritualism of such Catholics as would gladly see the Church dispossessed of all lands and property. We marvel that the plain doctrine of Popes and Councils is so easily forgotten.

Whom, then, are we to believe on this point, ourselves and our too hasty imagination, or the plain, express, and reiterated teachings of the Holy Father? It is a Catholic principle that the Church alone can define the limits which she must not overpass. It is axiomatic that if the Pope, speaking in his place and with authority, decrees that a certain view is to be taken and a doctrine held, we sin against the faith by not obeying him. What sin we commit, and to what degree we separate ourselves from the Church in the various possible cases, it is not necessary to inquire. But that we cannot withhold our assent except at the cost of sin and separation is evident.

Whether the Pope has taught any doctrine concerning the Princedom, and what that doctrine is, are matters, to our thinking, sufficiently plain. He has not left us in doubt. But there may exist an ignorance of his teaching which the theologians would call affected, one that lasts only because we choose not to let it be removed. The documents, as we see, are plentiful, and not hard to procure, neither do they ask for long and searching studies into them. Moreover, the Pope's line of conduct has confirmed and brought out the signification of his words. He of all men has shown himself consistent from first to last. He has had to unsay nothing; he has not withdrawn nor modified a single statement. Where he was at the beginning he is now. That is the very charge made against him by his enemies: he is thought to be obstinate and unintellectual, because he has not allowed the age to make an impression upon him. Between Pius IX. and Hildebrand, as we are often told, there is nothing to choose. Haughty, unyielding, arrogant, these titles, when given to the Pope by his enemies, merely indicate that he never swerves from principles he has once laid down.

Thanks to the plainspoken language of the Syllabus, there is no one in Europe that imagines the Roman Church can sanction either peace or truce with the Revolution. Between the spirit that rules Catholicity and the spirit of so-called progress, liberalism, and modern civilization, an antagonism exists, and always must continue. One of the two movements in society may abolish the other; but it is inconceivable that they should coalesce or be brought into harmony. It was not our present Holy Father who began the contest, nor will it die out with his decease. Personal disputes come to an end; principles, being like the good and evil they involve, unchangeable, if once opposed, are opposed for ever. What compromise can any man suggest between yea and nay? Religion has its laws no less than geometry; and if the circle must necessarily be

different from a square, and the curve from a straight line, so must the principles and the dominant policy of the Roman Church contradict the Revolution in each stadium of its course. For we understand that Catholic teaching is summed up in the theory which affirms an infinitely perfect and personal God, and the natural subjection and supernatural elevation of finite man; whilst the Revolution holds that we can know nothing, and need not care to learn anything, of a Divine Legislator and a world to come. Speaking roughly, but with a certain broad effectiveness, we may lay it down that the great European struggle going on is between the principle called Supernaturalism and the principle called Secularism. "If the Lord be God, follow Him; and if Baal be God, then follow him."

The Revolution never alters in spirit and tendency, but it is skilful enough to speak many tongues, propound a more or less disguised theory, and hide itself under many forms of religious and political action. Where it cannot wrest all dominion from the Church, it will narrow Catholic influence and authority, will acknowledge the Pope in spiritual things, which it does not practise, and will deny his right to meddle with temporal things of which it gains possession. Sometimes it declares that religion ought not to exist at all, and decrees that there is no God, and that death is an eternal sleep; more often it separates God from the world, and dresses up a plausible doctrine of "the Free Church in the Free State." It would gladly see the last Pope dying, and Christianity proscribed by law. As that cannot be, the Revolution opens a persecution wherever it arrives at the supreme power, secularizes every institution on which it can exercise its tyrannical sway, and, to secure that the old order of things shall never be restored, it dethrones the Pope. Take away the Civil Prince-dom, and where can a reason be found for acknowledging that society must be Christian, or that Christendom is a legitimate, and should be the normal, union of civilized communities? As the Jewish polity ceased when the Temple was destroyed, so the Revolution hopes that there will never again be a Christian Europe, since Rome has become the Italian capital.

We do not see how any thoughtful person, be his religion and sympathies what they may, can deny the logical and historical correctness of what is here put forward. That the Revolution sometimes cultivates anarchy, and sometimes liberalism, is patent to all the world. That Christendom no longer exists, in name or fact, current events are proving in a way that strikes melancholy and terror into the hearts, not

simply of religious men, but of all that have any serious interest at stake. And that the Roman Principedom of Pius IX. was the last relic of an ancient and venerable system now in ruins we hear proclaimed with exultation by unbelievers, and admitted with growing sadness by the Catholic publicists abroad and at home. It seems even as if there were no longer any doubt as to the object of the attack and defence now so vigorously carried on. Shall the Church be visible or invisible? Shall it be an imperial power with jurisdiction over the earth, or a mere system of thought, impalpable and ghostlike, with no lever to move a single atom out of its place? And, in fact, the Revolution well apprehends that if once it can rob Catholicity of a visible form, and bring it down to the condition of "orthodox" Protestantism, the future is its own. Whilst man is what he is, no disembodied spirit will influence his heart and imagination, or impress upon him, in a practical and effective way, a sense of its reality. The Revolution desires to have the entire material world to itself; its aim is to take from all earthly things their consecration, their sacramental value, their spiritual life, and their relation to God. This is to be accomplished in every order and sphere, but chiefly and first of all in the sphere of political power. If society can be made atheistic, by-and-by the individual will receive from his atheistic education a happy impenetrability to religious ideas; he too will find himself converted into a machine, industrial or military, and his spirit and soul will be murdered. Then will the secular millennium come to pass, and divine honours be paid to the rich banker, the unscrupulous prime minister, the successful and unfeeling commander of armies, the inventive scientific professors, and the blasphemous but refined atheists. Nor can we suppose that the Goddess of Reason will be left without a throne.

There is no romance in this reasoning, nor caprice in the prophecy. Much of what the Revolution has striven after is already a fact. Europe, judged by its political spirit, its laws, its government, and its industry, has fallen below Greek and Roman paganism into the cultivated immorality of the Chinese Empire. Our Holy Father has said that the governments are all under the power of Satan; they do not seem to be their own masters: their acts are directed by a malice and a cunning beyond human nature.* It is not too much to say that the helpers of the Revolution are possessed, and that they need to be exorcised before they can be fit for baptism. They

* The Pope is speaking, not of *populations*, but of *governments*, be it observed.

are violent and sophistical by turns: with one hand they threaten persecution, with the other they offer reconciliation. The most daring and most treacherous amongst them have struck down Pius IX. from his temporal throne, have filled his Holy City with horror and profanation from end to end, have done their best to break his heart by continual and most ingenious tortures, and now, whilst he is defenceless and at their mercy, as they cannot coerce him, and fear to give him the honours of martyrdom, they smoothly propose that he shall accept their friendship, help them out of their present embarrassments, and forget his own rights in their favour. They, like their master, can quote Holy Scripture at need; and, accordingly, they tell Pius IX. that he is "troubling Israel"; they remind him that a priest should not yield to ambition, that he should surrender his wealth lest he seem to cling to perishable goods, and should make no further resistance, lest he be thought to harbour ineffectual and unchristian malice. They glorify the power of a moral sovereignty, which they are willing to guarantee both to him and his successor. They assure Pius IX. that his virtues would touch perfection, did he but add to them the virtue of a meek surrender. They murmur in his ear the sweet sound of concord and reconciliation, and they beseech him to have pity on the innocent Catholics who are suffering so many hardships because he will not give way. All the religious feeling, all the humanity and kindness, would seem to have deserted the breast of the gentlest of Popes, and to have taken up their abode in the swelling bosoms of those who never yet spared any age, or sex, or state in their search after power and plunder. The wolf chides the lamb, and reads him a lesson in Christian forgiveness. But the language is a little too smooth to be genuine, and altogether too lax to be Catholic. Religion is not quite the same thing as imbecile benevolence or peace at any price. The question for Pius IX. is, not what may be expedient just now, but what is the right course in itself.

And therefore he answers, with no slackening courage, though not without tears for his afflicted children: "It may not be." To whatever they say, he answers the same words, and will never change them. What the Italian Government offers as a political compromise, he knows is nothing but a betrayal of sacred interests. He will be no party to it. He has received a Divine commission to feed and rule the Church, and he has made up his mind at all costs to declare the truth, and to assert it in his actions. He will never have it said of him as of Honorius, that whereas his duty bade him quench the flame of falsehood, *negligendo confovrit*, he allowed it to

spread all over the Catholic world. Neither directly nor indirectly will he relinquish one iota of his claim on the possessions of the Roman Church which sacrilegious invaders have usurped. Nor will he suffer indifferent and lukewarm Catholics to suppose that he has engaged in so desperate a conflict to preserve merely temporal rights and his status as a European sovereign. He will teach, in plain words, that religion itself is assaulted by the enemy, and he will bring out, for the instruction of all, the close relationship that exists between the Civil Princedom and the freedom which God has bestowed on His Church. He cannot abdicate the sovereignty of Rome. It is not for him to prove unfaithful to the trust he holds, but for the men that have outraged him to ask pardon and make restitution.

This has been the even tenor of the Holy Father's most solemn declarations for at least twenty years. The points of doctrine concerned have found exponents and advocates in all the Bishops of the Old and the New World. Nor can we attach a worthy meaning to the pilgrimages and protests of the Catholic faithful, unless it be granted that the independence of the Holy See and the maintenance of the Civil Princedom are practically one and the same. The misfortunes of our common Father come home to us all, because the Church is affected by them and her proper freedom and dignity threatened. There is a cause at stake of more moment than Italian unity, and before we can dream of taking sides in political discussion, we must try to get perfectly clear on the nature of those immunities which the Pope is defending, and on the consequences which their destruction must involve.

It avails nothing, therefore, to ask whether Pius IX. should accept the friendship of the Italian Parliament and of Victor Emmanuel, until we are satisfied that, in so doing, our Holy Father would not be virtually denying the Revelation which has made him what he is. Let us be quite sure, first of all, that the King and the Parliament are not a concrete instance of the Revolutionary principle: for it might appear afterwards that the Church had been betrayed, and not that a merely secular compromise had taken effect. Perhaps we are living in days that require Christians to be martyrs rather than astute diplomatists: perhaps, as our Holy Father has said, the only safe political creed is the Pater Noster. Reconciliation and concord are words which naturally attract; they have the fragrance of tender memories upon them, and the promise of peaceful times is in their sound. But we know that other words are beautiful also, and there is one strophe of a great anthem which has more in it of needful encouragement: "Te

martyrum candidatus laudat exercitus." We have fallen upon evil days; and we cannot trust the world, unless at the risk of yielding to a great temptation, and exchanging our Christianity for Secularism.

Since the above article was in type, Victor Emmanuel has passed to judgment. It is ill disputing at the side of an open grave; and we defer all comment on the deceased monarch's career to our next number.

ART. II.—DE ROSSI'S ROMA SOTERRANEA.

Roma Sotterranea Cristiana, tomo iii. Con Atlante di LII. Tavole e molti disegni iscritti nel testo, descritta ed illustrata dal Commend. G. B. DE ROSSI, pubblicata per ordine della Santità di N. S. Papa Pio IX. Roma: 1877.

THE third volume of De Rossi's "*Roma Sotterranea*" has at length appeared, and so the first series of the gigantic work, of which the beginning was given to the public more than thirteen years ago, has been brought to a close. Three folio volumes, containing altogether more than 1,600 pages of text, and about 160 lithographs and chromo-lithographs, maps, plans, paintings, fac-similes of inscriptions, &c., have now been published; and nearly the whole of this has been taken up with illustrating a single subterranean cemetery, that of Callixtus. In the first volume, indeed, there was a good deal of prefatory matter as to the literary history of the subject, both the ancient authorities from which any particulars about the catacombs could be gleaned, and also all the modern writers who had contributed to our knowledge of them since their re-discovery at the end of the sixteenth century. It also contained some important chapters upon certain general questions which lay at the bottom of the whole subject, and a right understanding of which was an essential foundation for all sound knowledge with respect to it; such questions as the origin of the catacombs, their geological and architectural relations to the sandpits with which they had been sometimes confounded; their condition in the eye of the law, &c. &c. Some of these chapters were a real revelation; they announced and effected a complete transformation of certain portions of

early ecclesiastical history, and they have met with general acceptance from learned men, whether Catholic or Protestant. About a third of the present volume is occupied with the discussion of the same, or of similar general questions, and will not fail to command the same attention and (we anticipate) acceptance. Lastly, about fifty pages also of this volume are devoted to a minute examination of a catacomb, accidentally discovered in an unusual state of integrity about eight or ten years ago under the sacred wood of the *Fratres Arvales* on the *Via Portuensis*. But all the rest of the three volumes is taken up, as we have said, with the one cemetery of Callixtus; and we fear lest the minuteness of detail with which every corner of this cemetery has now been examined, and all its monuments discussed, may tend, in this age of bustle and hurry, to set narrow limits to the circle of De Rossi's readers.

Yet it ought not so to be. The importance of the subject in the interests of religion is immense. We live in an age when even in some seats of learning "men talk of history only to deny it, and in the freedom of social intercourse often express a wish that they could be rid of it. At such a time archæology is specially useful. For one cannot at one's mere will get rid of the importunity of a monument; nothing is so obstinate as a stone inscribed with letters, or a piece of sculpture just recovered from the depth of the earth. Even if it tells us nothing but what we knew before, yet it makes us realize it more vividly. There is a special opportuneness then in archæological studies just now, because they strike directly at that doctrine which resolves ancient history into myths, and which is the idol of the hour. They multiply elements of historic certainty, often more convincing and more readily accepted, because they are more fortuitous in their appearance, and more minute in their character. In this point of view nothing is small; neither fragments of inscriptions, nor the poor remains of old paintings, nor details of astronomy, nor notes of philology. All these various elements of knowledge, infinitesimally minute though they may be in themselves, yet when united in significative groups, conduct to dates; and it is hardly going too far to say, that in the face of the continual vacillations of thought which now characterize certain schools of writers, every date established with certainty in any part of history, but especially of ancient history, is a service rendered to the human intellect."* It is for this reason that we look upon the services rendered to religion by Signor de

* "Les Nouvelles Etudes sur les Catacombes," par le Comte Desbassayn de Richemont. Paris: 1870.

Rossi's works as eminently important, and we are hardly disposed to find fault on the score of exaggeration with another French critic of eminence, who says of his volumes that they are *l'ouvrage principal de ce temps*; because they give most instruction to their readers by correcting false ideas that had been heretofore universally received, and by opening out new paths of knowledge.

Time was when Roman catacombs were looked upon as one vast subterranean necropolis, established probably (for so men said) in the midst of deserted sandpits, in which galleries, chambers, and tombs were to be met with on all sides in endless confusion; by-and-by it was discovered that there were a considerable number of different cemeteries along the various Roman roads, and excavated by Christians for their own purposes; now, we know that even in each of these several cemeteries, at least in the largest of them, it is possible to distinguish many centres, round which certain parts were made, and then afterwards united. In this so-called cemetery of Callixtus, for example, there is the crypt of Lucina, belonging to the first and second centuries; the Papal crypt, and the crypt of S. Cæcilia, and others, belonging to the second and third centuries; and lastly, the cemetery of S. Soteris and a whole region of this subterranean world that was made during the Pontificate of Liberius in the fourth century. The development of these successive periods of excavation both here and elsewhere has been established, partly by means of a minute and laborious examination of every detail, whether of construction or of ornamentation, to be seen in the catacombs themselves, partly by the patient study of MSS. and other historical documents of various kinds. For De Rossi has laboured almost as much in critical researches among books, as in the analysis of material monuments; and the one study has, in many ways, greatly assisted the other. The masonry; the marks and names on the tiles; the quality of the plaster, where any has been used; the mode of execution and artistic style of the paintings, and the choice of subjects; the use of stucco, or of mosaics; the use of sarcophagi, whether of marble or of terra cotta; the form of the graves, whether mere shelves in the wall, or larger square-headed, or arched recesses (*arcosolia*); the language, style, symbols, names, writing, and spelling of the inscriptions; these are the solid and exact bases on which De Rossi has conducted his analysis below ground; and the acuteness, learning, and industry, with which he has sought and interpreted MSS. throughout the chief libraries of Europe have not been less admirable. The results attained by these two systems of

investigation combined have been truly amazing; and even more remarkable than the several discoveries and identification of important monuments which he has thus been enabled to make, is the fact that he has succeeded in establishing certain chronological canons, which are daily more and more confirmed by experience, and by which everything else of a similar kind found elsewhere may now be infallibly tested. For, as he himself says, speaking of earlier works on Christian archæology, the misfortune was, that even those monuments which had been most copiously illustrated with abundant quotations from ancient writers, nevertheless almost always remained in a state of hopeless uncertainty as to their precise date, their *rappports* with history, with the development of the Christian society, its arts, and its whole history, both external and internal. In order to arrive at that precision which assigns to each monument its date, and consequently its value, and so becomes the best guarantee also of the correctness of its interpretation, "I have been obliged," he says, "to make a very long route indeed, and to undertake the minute and immense analysis which had discouraged all who have gone before me. I have studied the inscriptions, the paintings, and the sculptures, not separately, nor according to a classification predetermined upon, but in their original positions, and considered in their relations to one another."

Thanks to the intelligent and the indefatigable assistance of his brother, a practical mathematician and a geologist, he has had before him a complete analysis of all the subterranean galleries, of all the chambers on the various levels, of the staircases or other means of communication between them, and even the measurement of thousands upon thousands of the graves. And at first he was content only to register these facts, without combining them, lest some premature effort of this kind should tempt him to form a system which would so occupy his mind as to render it less open to impressions from other facts that might be discovered later, and offer some apparent contradiction to the system too hastily adopted. By-and-by the time came when he must needs examine his vast accumulation of facts, compare them one with another, and draw deductions from them. And those who have made a conscientious study of his volumes can bear testimony to the cautious moderation with which these deductions have been generally made. Often indeed there is scarcely any process of deduction at all; the facts speak for themselves. It is a subject of real wonder to see how spontaneously light and order have sometimes seemed to come out of apparent chaos, simply by an intelligent gaze upon the vast mass of *data*, so

important and so scrupulously exact, as De Rossi's singular zeal and patience during five-and-thirty years had succeeded in bringing together.

We would cite, as a special example of this, his chapters in the present volume on the management or temporal administration, first, of the catacombs, and then of the non-subterranean cemeteries which succeeded to them, from the beginning almost down to the Middle Ages. We suppose the first impression of a moderately-learned student, if questioned on this subject, would have been that no reliable record has reached us, and that there are no materials for making one. Yet here we have a complete living history, put together partly from texts, partly from monuments, yet all clear and certain, proceeding steadily from century to century; and in this procession, pope and archdeacon, deacon and priest, priest and *fossor*, *fossor* and *mansionarius*, and *cubicularius*, and *præpositus*, all pass before us and take their places, as regularly as in a well-ordered chronicle; and we can see by the authorities quoted that they are all taking their right places. These, of course, are far too numerous to be transferred to these pages; and, indeed, it is not often that they are to be found, even in the pages of De Rossi, in any synthetical form. For the very nature and essence of his system necessarily involve his text in a kind of topographical labyrinth, very wearisome to an impatient or superficial reader. The details are scattered about in the order required by the description of the subterranean places in which the monuments are found; and analysis occupies by far the larger portion of his work; barely a few pages at the end of each volume are consecrated to synthesis, or the giving of *résumés* of the conclusions he has been able to establish.

For this reason we are delighted to hear that Messrs. Northcote and Brownlow are preparing another edition of their "*Roma Sotterranea*," in which it is intended to embody all the substance of this new volume. Such abridgments are compiled, of course, on the synthetical method, and set the facts before us in their historical and chronological sequence. And to those readers who only desire to gain the latest information on the subject, they are sufficient; but "to him who wishes honestly to examine the evidence for each discovery, nothing will supply the place of a perusal of the original exposition, either in profound interest or in the abiding conviction it will produce. . . . In this way we, as it were, accompany him through the successive labours, the brilliant inductions, the startling verifications of a career which has been full of results. We see the morning twilight, then the first streak of dawn, then the full

brightness of day. His work possesses, too, that peculiar fascination exercised by minds of the highest order alone. It is not more remarkable for bold and original thinking than for profound and varied learning, for extreme calmness and caution. And it is important to insist upon this, because some of his conclusions have not been arrived at without much conjecture, without many inferences on very delicate evidence indeed, the weighing of which depends upon that subtle diagnosis which is the essential difference of a great and skilled observer."

This is the language of a modern scholar,* when speaking of the fragments of ancient history and literature that have been rescued from oblivion by means of Champillon's interpretation of Egyptian hieroglyphics; we know of none that would describe more accurately, both the charm and the value of De Rossi's "*Roma Sotterranea*." We hope to give a specimen or two before our article is finished. But, first, we must say a word about the trustworthiness of the author, whose discoveries and conclusions we are commending to the acceptance of the English public. For in a subject of this kind, which may be expected to trench in many points on matters of religious controversy, it is very important that the reader should have confidence in the absolute candour and impartiality of his guide. We will produce, then, three or four witnesses upon this point, all of them selected, for obvious reasons, from the ranks of undoubted Protestantism. Thus, Mommsen, the learned historian of Rome, whose distance from the Catholic faith may be measured by his attack on the historical veracity of S. Luke, speaks of De Rossi, as an author on the Roman Catacombs, "as conscientious as he is acute."† When some of his statements were called in question in high quarters in Berlin, precisely because they rested only on the evidence of "a Catholic, whose labour in the catacombs was subject to no control," the learned Prussian archæologist, Henzen, Secretary to the Imperial Archæological Society in Rome, at once came forward to defend the scientific integrity of his associate, and declared that "his well-known character and exclusive devotion to the cause of truth placed his testimony above all suspicion."‡ In our own country, Mr. Burgon, the Dean of Chichester, says of his researches that they have been "conducted with a sincere zeal for truth"; and of his conversation, that it was such as "to inspire perfect confi-

* "*Prolegomena to Ancient History*." By Rev. J. P. Mahaffy.

† "*Im neuen Reich*." 1871.

‡ "*Revue des Sociétés Savantes*." Février, 1868.

dence in his statements."* Lastly, the late Mr. Wharton Marriott, whilst writing bitterly about Roman controversialists generally, says of De Rossi, that "he has the rare merit of stating his facts exactly and impartially, precisely as he finds them."†

But now let us take a sample of our author's method of argument; we will trace his progress through one special labyrinth of difficulties, and mark how his mode of handling them exhibits at once his high powers of intellect and his rare candour and sincerity.

When writing in an early part of the second volume (p. 104) on the Papal crypt and the place of burial of each individual Pope in the third century, he came in due course to Caius (A.D. 283—296), but he was obliged to confess that he could say little or nothing of his sepulchre; that the "*Liber Pontificalis*" says of him, that he was buried on the 22nd of April in *cæmeterio Calliati*—a phrase which experience had taught him was used specially to designate the Papal crypt in that cemetery; that the oldest calendars, as well as the "*Martyrologium Hieronymianum*" and its followers, assign the same date; but that some other martyrologies have *X. Kal. Maias*, instead of *X. Kal. Martias*, or rather they have both dates; that different explanations had been given of this, but for his own part he thought it evident that some copyist had first made the very easy blunder of writing *Martias* for *Maias*, and then another had inserted both; but he added that it was far more difficult to account for yet a third commemoration assigned to him in some martyrologies on the first of July; he would only say that he was not himself satisfied with the explanation suggested by the learned editor of the "*Martyr. Hieronym.*," the Bollandists, and others, who had recourse to the theory of some translations of the saint's body at various times, of which no record had reached us.

This was the state of his knowledge on the subject in 1868. In 1875, or 6, when writing the early part of the volume now under review, he interrupts his narrative to tell us of certain fragments which he has found near the crypt of S. Eusebius of a slab of very fine Greek marble, beautifully engraved, with Greek letters of unusual size, and cut more deeply than usual, and the words separated from one another by a very peculiar ornamental figure, which he had seen before on a Christian epitaph of the year 291, and published in his volume on the Christian inscriptions in the year 1861.

* "*Letters from Rome*," p. 139.

† "*Testimony of the Catacombs*," &c., p. 3.

Having hunted with great diligence for every fragment of this slab, however small, and studied attentively how the broken bits should be put together (for unfortunately many of them did not fit into one another), at last I saw, and after much deliberation I was convinced, that they belong to the sepulchre of Pope Caius. When I wrote the second volume, and treated of the Papal crypt, I had not succeeded in putting the fragments together, so I could not make any use of them, though the inscription really illustrates the matter which belongs to that volume. The study of minute fragments, the distinguishing amid so enormous and confused a mass the bits that belong to the same inscription, is an undertaking so long and wearisome, and is often interfered with by so many even material hindrances, that if a conscientious determination to fulfil what has been enjoined me, and what I have promised to do in this work did not oblige me, and if the ordinarily moderate fruit which I reap from so much labour were not occasionally multiplied a hundred-fold by some unlooked-for discovery, my patience would have failed, and I should not have persevered. Let so much be said by way of apology and explanation why I bring forth to the world to-day so remarkable a monument, when its proper place should have been in the preceding volume; and now, without further preface, let us come to the point.

He then gives all the fragments of the slab on which there are any letters or parts of letters, or any of the ornamental stops we have spoken of. Our description will not do complete justice to his ingenuity, for lack of an exact fac-simile of the several fragments; but we will do the best we can by printing the whole inscription as he would restore it, giving the letters which are actually recovered in large type, and his conjectural supplements in small, and marking the stops where they occur:—

• ΓΑΙΟΥ • ΕΠΙΣΚ
• ΚΑΤ •

ΠΡΟ : ΚΑΑ ΜΑΙΩΝ.

We must add that the position of the ΕΠ in the first line, the T in the second, and the ΜΑΙ in the third, is fixed with certainty by the way in which the three fragments of stone dove-tail into one another, and it was the arrangement of these three bits which gave the key to the whole. In like manner, the relative positions of the Γ in the first line, ΚΑΤ in the second, and Α in the third, were determined with the same absolute certainty. It remained only to assign their proper places to ΠΡ and to Γ; but even of these it was certain that ΠΡ belonged to the last line, because of the long uninscribed portion of marble below them; and of Γ, that it was the initial letter of a word, because of the point before it. Having thus arranged his fragments, De Rossi proceeds as follows:—

The arrangement, now that it has been made, is so evidently correct that it will seem strange that I should have been delayed so long and laboured so hard to make it. The epitaph begins with the proper name of the deceased in the genitive case; then follows EII, which in so noble a monument naturally suggests that he was a Bishop; and then in the two lower lines the burial (*καταθεσις*, *depositio*) is assigned to some day in the latter half of April; and the deceased man's name began with Γ. Now, of all the Popes and Bishops buried in the cemetery of Callixtus, whose names have been preserved to us by ancient documents, the only one whose name begins with Γ is Caius, who was buried on the 22nd of April, 296; and it has been already mentioned that the singular stops between the words have been found precisely on an epitaph of about that time (291). Moreover, the abbreviation KAT is found on a whole group of epitaphs belonging to this very place and period. Thus everything conspires to confirm the reading we have suggested, and the supplements we have made to these mutilated fragments of a noble epitaph. A most attentive analysis of the epitaph, and of the beautifully symmetrical form of the letters convinces me that this is not a mere happy play of fancy, not a mere specious probability, but a true and solid reality. It is scarcely credible that it should be an entirely fortuitous and deceitful combination of circumstances, in such wonderful harmony with one another, which recalls to us the memory of Pope Caius.

He then shows by a still more minute analysis of the arrangement of the letters and stops that there could only have been two or three letters after EII, and that the name at the beginning can only have consisted of five or six letters; and so, he says, "the intrinsic and historical reasons which justify his restoration are still further confirmed by extrinsic reasons and material facts." Finally, on a ninth fragment of the stone, which has not yet been mentioned, is found a *graffito* of the name of *Leo*, preceded by a cross, the same as appears on the sepulchre of Cornelius and elsewhere, and which clearly shows that this was no common tomb. In addition to all these arguments, "the very drawing of the epitaph as restored will satisfy, if I am not mistaken, every practised eye and every competent judge that it is no result of ingenious combination, but a happy discovery of the truth."

Having now established the fact, he next examines it in the light of all the historical and archæological data which concern it. We have already seen that a number of ancient authorities give April 22 as the date of Caius' burial; one of these (the catalogue of Popes in the book of *Furius Dionysius Filocalus*) is almost contemporaneous; and although two other days are given as commemorations of Caius, it is certain that this is the date of the *depositio*. And this the newly-discovered tablet confirms. But this is the first Papal epitaph which registers the day of the death or burial; all the others

were more simple, and only give the name. But the development of the form of epigraphy on this tombstone is in exact conformity with the custom which gradually prevailed during the latter half of the third century, so that by the end of it, KAT or ΔEP, and even still shorter abbreviations, sufficed to stand for the whole word. No doubt the solemn registration of the day of the Pontiff's death in the diptychs of the Church would have sufficed, as for Anteros, and Fabian, and Lucius, so also for Caius; but the custom which was then in vogue for others was used also for the Pope. There may have been another reason too which contributed to influence the selection of a less laconic formula for the epitaph of Caius than had been used for those of his predecessors. This was no narrow oblong slab of marble, to shut the mouth of a common grave in the walls. It is large and broad, and must have served for the *mensa* of an *arcosolium*, or it might have been fixed in the middle of the lunette of the *arcosolium*, with some cornice or ornamental border all round it; and this latter conjecture is corroborated by the traces of plaster which may yet be seen upon the upper edge of the stone; and, in fact, in the crypt of S. Eusebius, near which the fragments were found, there are traces of tablets having been so fixed, with slabs of various coloured marbles round them.

This observation may seem trifling, but it is really of some importance. For the fact that the fragments of the epitaph were found in and near the crypt of S. Eusebius, is at least the beginning of a presumption that here must be the sepulchre to which the epitaph belongs; and this presumption receives further confirmation from the fact already mentioned, that the shape of the stone is better suited to the *arcosolia* of this crypt than to the ordinary shelf-like graves of the Papal crypt. And it is much more probable that the fragments should have remained where the perfect original once was, than that they should have been carried out of the cemetery by some plunderer of the Papal crypt, and then fallen down again through the *luminare* into the crypt of S. Eusebius.

But now, if this is assumed to have been the original position of the tomb of Caius, it is certainly contrary to what we expected, and no historical or topographical document of antiquity had given us a hint of it. Cornelius and Eusebius are named as lying in separate chambers, apart from the Papal crypt; but no such remark is made about Caius. And yet there was a great devotion to him in the seventh century, and there was a tradition that he had been forced to hide in these catacombs during the early years of the reign of Diocletian. There was every reason then why the itineraries should have men-

tioned his tomb in the crypt of S. Eusebius, if their authors had really seen it there. Is there any way by which we can reconcile the written testimony of the "*Liber Pontificalis*" and other authorities, with the new archæological discovery which seems to contradict it? De Rossi thinks there is, if we take account of every scrap of knowledge we have on the subject, however minute. And he proceeds to observe (what he had proved elsewhere) that the subterranean region round this crypt was certainly much frequented during the early years of Caius' pontificate; and to conjecture that Caius may have been buried here apart from his predecessors, because it was here that he had presided over the Christian assemblies and himself lived in concealment. But, in 303, the cemeteries were confiscated, and all access to them forbidden. The cemetery of Callixtus would have been specially exposed to danger, and we have proof of extraordinary precautions having been taken in consequence; the Papal crypt was filled with earth; the bodies of some of the martyrs, e.g. Calocerus and Parthenius, were removed from their original resting-places and hidden in more ignoble crypts of the same cemetery. Why may not, then, the body of Caius have been removed to the Papal crypt, there to be concealed with the rest, and then suffered to remain there?

Thus writes De Rossi at p. 115 of the volume before us. A hundred and fifty pages further on, when all that preceded had been (he tells us) already printed, he has something more to say on the same subject. He has found in another part of the cemetery—at no great distance from the crypt of S. Eusebius, it is true; yet still distinctly in another and a later area of it—sixteen fragments of another large slab which had evidently served as the *mensa* of an *arcosolium*, and from which he is able to gather that a certain Jovina had bought an *arcosolium* in the cemetery of Callixtus, near the tomb of some martyr (*Arcosolium in Callistiæ Domn. . .*). This discovery was of great interest and value even in its imperfect state; not only because it speaks of S. Callixtus (omitting the word cemetery) exactly as it is written in the old calendars which were published by F. Dionysius Filocalus in 354, just when this part of the cemetery was in use; but, also, because it confirmed with a seal of absolute certainty what De Rossi had already announced as the result of his own personal examination: that this Liberian district (so to call this part of the Catacomb, from the Pope in whose time it was made) had no specific name, but was considered a part of the famous cemetery with which it was connected. But the inscription would have been a hundredfold more interesting and more valuable, if it had not

been broken off precisely at the middle of the word *Domn*. This was the second time he had been thus cruelly disappointed (see iii. 224) by the mutilated condition of an inscription which seemed to promise important revelations; and the most diligent search was therefore made for the missing fragments. The search was unsuccessful; so, having resigned himself as best he might, he set to work to make the most of what he had, and read a paper upon it to an academic audience. He has given us some account of this paper, rightly judging that, in the light of later discoveries, it would be both amusing and instructive; teaching (he says) a lesson as to the caution that is necessary in pronouncing judgment in cases of this kind, and at the same time leading to a most unexpected discovery of the truth.

The first line of the inscription began, as he then supposed, with *merenti Jovinæ*; and he considered it to be quite perfect on that side, i.e., on the left-hand side as one looks at the stone; so that all his energies were concentrated on an attempt to supply what was wanting on the right-hand side, or at the end of each line. First, he determined that not more than five or six letters could be supplied in any line; and this he judged, 1st, from what he saw of the last two lines, which needed no supplement at all; and 2ndly, from the supplements which were obviously required in the first three lines, to complete the words *cojugem*, *decessit*, and *comparavit*. Unless, then, the fourth line were prolonged out of all proportion to the others, there was only room here also for very few letters. This being assumed, it would seem to follow that the *ita* at the beginning of the fifth line could not be the ending of the word *deposita* (as would otherwise have been thought certain), but must form part of the missing name of the saint, wherefore he suggested *at Domna(m) Soterita(m)*, the name of the martyr, S. Soteris, being sometimes found declined in this corrupt form instead of *Soteridem*. Another adjacent area of this cemetery bears the name of this very martyr; and De Rossi could bring an example to prove that *ad martyrem* did not always mean an immediate and material contiguity of the two sepulchres, but only a certain general and moral proximity; e.g., a husband and wife were buried in the portico of the Vatican Basilica, yet they described their tomb as *ad Sanctum Petrum Apostolum*, though it was a long way off from the "confession" where the body of the Apostle lay. Finally, he observed as a singular coincidence that the feast-day (*Natale*) of S. Soteris was the very day on which the lady whose epitaph was under consideration is stated to have been buried. What conclusion then could seem more obvious and

certain than that he had hit upon the correct restitution of the missing letters?

De Rossi himself, however, was not well satisfied with his own explanation. All the instances of *ad martyrem* hitherto found in the Catacombs had seemed to denote material contiguity; the example of its use in a wider sense belonged to a later period. Moreover, the inscription seemed imperatively to require *Deposita*; it would have been very strange indeed if that word had been omitted, and so the inscription had announced that Jovina had bought the tomb on such a day, but made no mention of the day on which she died or was buried. A learned colleague also called attention to the strange way in which the inscription must have been arranged, the letters touching the very edge of the stone on the left-hand side, whilst yet there must have been a quantity of unoccupied space on the right. Was it possible that the stone had been cut in half, and that they had only half the inscription before them? This led to a more minute inspection of the monument itself; and it was discovered that, in the upper corner of the left-hand side, a bit of mortar, which it had never occurred to them to rub off, covered the letter E. *Merenti* had been a possible word; *emerenti* was impossible. It must certainly have been *benemerenti*, and there must be another section of the stone somewhere. And then it flashed upon De Rossi's memory, that he had found a few months before, at some distance from this part of the cemetery, yet in the same quarter, a section of an inscription, containing many letters, which gave no sense whatever. The reader may be sure that no time was lost in bringing the two fragments together, and this was the result:—

BEN	EMERENTI JOVINE QUE CUM COJ
GEM	SUUM HABUIT ANNOS V ET D
CESS	IT ANNORUM XXII QUE COMPA
BIT SIBI	ARCOSOLIUM IN CALLISTI AT DOMN
DEPOS	ITA DIE III IDUS FEBRUARIAS
GAIVM	FECIT COJUGI SUE MERENTI IN PACE.

Strange to say, the fragments originally discovered had given the endings of nearly all the lines, so that there was hardly any need of supplements where it had been attempted to make them; the supplements were wanted at the beginning of the lines, where all had been supposed to be perfect; and in most instances they were precisely what had been suggested. Only the beginning of the last line was new, and made a most unexpected revelation, that the saint whose name had been so eagerly sought for was not S. Soteris, but Caius. The reader will say that the name does not follow the title *Domnum*

immediately ; a whole line intervenes. But if we could reproduce De Rossi's *facsimile* of the original, he would see that, as the inscription was first engraved, the two words did follow each other without any interruption whatever ; at first there were only five lines, written at regular intervals ; the line which records the date of the burial is a manifest addition, squeezed in between lines 4 and 5, to the complete destruction of the symmetry of the engraving.

The inscription being thus restored to its primitive form, three questions present themselves for solution. First, Who is this S. Caius ? Is he the same whose Greek epitaph has been so laboriously restored in an earlier part of this article ? Secondly, If so, how can this topographical notice of his tomb be reconciled with what has been said of his burial in the crypt of S. Eusebius, which lies some way off ? Thirdly, how can we account for his tomb being placed in this Liberian section of the cemetery of Callixtus, which was not made until fifty or sixty years after his death ? De Rossi acknowledges the difficulty of the subject, and the scarcity of materials, yet proceeds to do his best to give as faithful an answer as he can to these questions. To the first, he considers that only one answer is possible. It would be ridiculous to have recourse to some new and unknown Caius, whilst we never find this formula, *ad martyrem*, used, except of martyrs who are famous, and we know that a famous martyr of this name was buried in this very cemetery. On the second question, he reminds his readers of the conjecture he had hazarded as to the translation of the relics of Caius to the papal crypt during Diocletian's persecution. But he says that, at any rate, he considers it certain that the original burial-place of the Pope was in the crypt of S. Eusebius ; and that, if the wider sense of the words *ad martyrem* be admitted, there is no further difficulty at all ; since part, at least, of this newly-discovered stone (which is too heavy to have been moved about unnecessarily) was recovered from a gallery which leads directly from that quarter of the Catacomb. But, he adds, "the fear of allowing myself to be led astray by the very natural satisfaction of finding an opinion which I had advanced long since now confirmed and proved in so unexpected a manner, causes me to distrust this broad interpretation of the words in question, and bids me seek for some probable explanation, which may allow us to leave to those words their stricter and more ordinary sense." Finally, therefore, he falls back upon the theory of Fiorentini and the Bollandists, as to a repeated translation of the relics,—a theory which he had rejected before because it had no foundation in any monuments, being

only invented to account for the three festivals, but which now has received important topographical confirmation from the two newly-discovered inscriptions, neither of which agrees precisely with the notice in the *Liber Pontificalis* and oldest martyrologies. And he quotes, by way of confirmation, the instance of another bishop and martyr, in whose honour three yearly festivals were kept, the occasions of which are known. One was on the 21st of September, his true *Natale*; another on the 23rd of March, because on that day a church was dedicated that had been built over his tomb, A.D. 321; and a third on the 26th of November, in honour of the translation of his body by Pope Damasus to a more worthy crypt (*cryptam condignam*).

We hope our story has not been too long for the patience of our readers; we could hardly have made it shorter, and at the same time done even moderate justice to our author; and we are sure that those who have followed it to the end will have received a far more lively impression of the patient labour, the ingenuity, and the scrupulous conscientiousness of De Rossi than they would have gained from any mere eulogy of his merits, however enthusiastic. One reflection, however, upon the narrative may possibly occur to some of them, on which we should wish to make a remark. It is this; that, as De Rossi has not yet all the facts before him, but is sometimes obliged to correct or modify his views, even within the compass of a single volume, he has begun to publish too soon. To this it would be a sufficient reply, that he had studied the subject for more than twenty years before he published upon it at all (—would that some other authors had been equally reticent—); that he has published only three volumes in thirteen years, and that the means at the disposal of the Pontifical Commission of Sacred Archæology are so miserably inadequate, that if he waited till the work of excavation was even tolerably complete, he could never hope to publish at all. But a second and far better reply is this; that all the corrections which new discoveries oblige him to make are on mere matters of historical or topographical detail; not one of them affects the main outlines of the chronological system he so carefully elaborated at the beginning, still less weakened any of the fundamental principles on which it rests. On the contrary, as he points out with very just satisfaction, though much may remain involved in deepest obscurity, even after most diligent research, still, every new fact that is really ascertained and settled finds its place in that system at once and without difficulty.

We have seen a specimen of De Rossi's ingenuity in dis-

entangling a thread of true history from amidst a web of no ordinary difficulties. We will cull one more specimen of his work from the volume before us, showing what a flood of light his accurate knowledge both of Pagan and Christian history enables him to throw upon each new discovery as it is made.

The College of the *Fratres Arvales*—a sodality which consisted only of twelve members, because they were supposed to be the successors of the twelve sons of *Acca Larentia*—was one of the oldest and most aristocratic of the religious *collegia* of Rome. It was their duty to offer sacrifices in the month of May for a good harvest; also, on the birthdays of the Emperor and the principal members of his family, and on other great state occasions. From the time of *Tiberius*, they kept a record on tablets of marble of all their acts; and these tablets were at first attached to the walls of their temple, the *templum Deæ Diæ*; then to the seats in the grove which surrounded the temple, and finally to the walls of other houses belonging to them. They are of great value for the light they throw on many vexed questions of chronology during the imperial period; and an important work was published by the learned *Marini* in illustration of such tablets as had come to light before his day. Of these, the principal part had been discovered in the sixteenth century under a vineyard on the right-hand side of the *Via Portuensis*, about five miles from the city. In 1858, a few more fragments, and in August, 1866, an entire tablet, were discovered in the same place; whereupon there was a great desire among the learned to institute a regular search in a place which seemed to promise so much. The necessary funds were supplied by the King and Queen of Prussia, and the work of excavation was carried on under the direction of the great Prussian archæologist, *M. Henzen*. At first nothing was found; but when they transferred their labour from the bottom of the hill to the top, they came on something quite unlooked-for; graves of a non-subterranean Christian cemetery, some of which were covered with the coveted tablets. Henceforward, the search was continued in the interests of Christian as well as of Pagan archæology; and it was rewarded by a rich and unexpected discovery. Other Christian inscriptions came to light, belonging to the beginning of the fourth century; bases and capitals of columns; fragments of a marble architrave, having on them a few letters of the familiar *Damasine* type; and, finally, an entrance to a catacomb was laid open. On the wall of the staircase appeared the Christian monogram; in the first gallery, a painting of the Good Shepherd, whose tunic bore the same kind of *crux gammata* as is to be seen on the

dress of the well-known figure of Diogenes the fossor from the cemetery of Domitilla, and belonging to the age of Damasus. In 1868 they discovered an oratory or small basilica, made according to the usual type of the Damasine buildings. The apse was almost perfect; in the semicircular recess at the end of it was another smaller recess, as in the Basilica of S. Petronilla, for the episcopal *Cathedra*; and behind this chair was a window. At last they penetrated into a *cubiculum*, which bore marks of having been the principal centre of attraction in this cemetery. It was situated immediately behind the apse of the Basilica; and the window which we have described opened directly upon it. On one of the walls of the *cubiculum* were paintings (of very late date, i.e. of the sixth or seventh century) of our Blessed Lord seated, with two saints standing on either side of Him. The legends of those on the left are *SCS*+*FAUSTINIANUS* and *SCS* *RUFINIANUS*. Of those on the right, one is hopelessly effaced; the other represents a woman in rich apparel, but we can only decipher the last letters of her name, *TRIS*. More fragments, however, of the Damasine inscription, found within the Basilica, here come to our aid and enable us to supply *VIATRIS*.

With this clue, De Rossi had not long to search before he could identify the martyrs whose memorial was before him. The "*Liber Pontificalis*" records of Leo II., A.D. 683, that he built a church in Rome near S. Bibiana, in which he placed the bodies of SS. Simplicius, Faustinus, and Beatrix, and of other martyrs. There is an inscription on the front of a sarcophagus which has been moved from one place to another in the Basilica, or sacristy, or precincts of S. Mary Major's for the last three or four hundred years, and which was probably written at the time of the translation of the relics by Leo. It runs thus: *Martires Simplicius et Faustinus qui passi sunt in flumen Tibere et positi sunt in Cemeterium Generoses super Filippi*. The old martyrologies fix the *natale* of these saints for the 29th of July; and their legend in the martyrology of Ado (compiled in the ninth century) states that they suffered in the persecution of Diocletian; that the two men were thrown into the Tiber from off the bridge called *Lapidæus*; that their bodies were recovered by their sister Beatrix and the priests Crispus and John, and were buried in a place called *Seatum Philippi* on the Via Portuensis; finally, that Beatrix herself suffered martyrdom not long afterwards, and was buried by the venerable Lucina near her martyred brothers.

This legend says nothing of S. Rufinianus; nor has De

Rossi been able to identify this saint, unless the name be only another form of Rufus (as Faustinianus certainly is of Faustinus), in which case it appears in the "Martyrologium Hieronymianum" on the same day as the rest. But he is nowhere associated with them in their Acts; and his dress, as represented in this painting, would seem to show that he belonged to a different grade of society; it indicates that he was an officer of the imperial court, and perhaps, like S. Sebastian, he had been called upon to make his choice between the service of his Emperor (Diocletian) and his God. But at any rate nobody can doubt that we have here a memorial of the three other saints whose names have been mentioned, and that we may therefore safely supply the name of Simplicius for the figure which can no longer be distinguished.

But how came the memorial of these saints to be here? Is this the place mentioned in their Acts under the name of *Sextum Philippi*, and in the inscription, *super Filippi*? The evidence of a Christian writer of the fifth century is objected against us, because he put the farm *Sextum Philippi* seven or eight miles further down the river, near the island called *Isola Sacra*. But a careful examination of all the passages in which this place is mentioned, had long since led Bosio to suspect that the name belonged to a considerable tract of country, viz., all the low land which stretches out towards the sea, beyond the height on which this cemetery has been excavated, and which is the last spur of the whole range of hills on that side of the Tiber. There is therefore no real inconsistency between the locality of the newly-discovered cemetery and the description of it in ancient documents. On the contrary, there is a special fitness in the word used, *super Filippi*; for the cemetery is in the hill which overlooked the *prædium Filippi*. Moreover, it is just opposite a reach of the river, where the bodies of the martyrs might easily have drifted ashore, and so been recovered by those who were looking for them; and nothing was more natural than that, in a time of persecution such as was then raging, they should have made use of the nearest and most convenient spot in which to bury, at least temporarily, the sacred relics. It is a part of De Rossi's theory, or rather, as we ought now to say, of the history and chronological development of the catacombs as explained by him, that their connections with sandpits belong precisely to the periods of persecution.

Here, therefore, within the recesses of an *arenaria*, did Viatrix and her assistants deposit the mortal remains of Simplicius and Faustinus; and these became the nucleus of a small subterranean cemetery, which Damasus afterwards honoured in his
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usual way, and which continued to be visited by pious pilgrims until the translation of the relics in the seventh century. The history of the catacomb is written with unusual clearness and certainty in its monuments. Not a single grave has been found which would lead us to assign to it an earlier beginning than the reign of Diocletian; indeed, probably, it was not used for general sepulture till after peace was given to the Church, which was within a very few years after the martyrdom of our saints; and it did not remain in use more than ninety years, so that it never became an extensive cemetery. It has been almost thoroughly explored, and does not seem to contain more than eight hundred graves altogether. It was the first catacomb, so far as we know, from which the bodies of the saints were removed; and the reason of this was probably its specially exposed situation on the road which led from Porto, a place the possession of which was so coveted and keenly contested by the various hostile armies which from the year 408 succeeded one another, bringing ever worse and worse ruin upon the doomed city. Thus we have here an epitome, as it were, of the whole general history of the catacombs compressed within very narrow chronological limits. We have its hurried beginning in times of difficulty at the very commencement of the fourth century; its continued use in times of peace; its partial transformation and decoration by Pope Damasus, for the sake of the martyrs who lay in it; then burial within Damasus's basilica; next, the growth of a non-subterranean cemetery above and around it; and finally, the translation of the relics and the complete abandonment of the place before the end of the seventh century. For it would seem that it must have been carefully shut up after the removal of the bodies. We can see the opening that was made in the tomb to effect their withdrawal; then there is no token of its ever having been visited again till our own day.

Our readers will probably agree with us in thinking that we have said more than enough to settle beyond all dispute De Rossi's identification of this cemetery. Yet there remains one grave difficulty which requires some explanation. At first sight it would have seemed almost incredible that the Christians should have dared to penetrate beneath a wood belonging to a Pagan *collegium*, and to have buried their dead there in the days of Diocletian. But the truth is, that we have every reason to believe that the *collegium* of the *Fratres Arvales* had from some cause or other either been suppressed before that time, or else incorporated into some other religious sodality. When Marini first published his great work upon their tablets, he expressed an earnest hope that tablets of a later date would

one day be discovered ; for those that he had had an opportunity of seeing did not come beyond the first quarter of the third century. Not one of those which have now come to light belongs to any later date. Moreover, the emperor Gordian, who reigned about this time (A.D. 240), is the last upon whose statue the title of *Frater Arvalis* is enumerated among all the other imperial titles ; neither does it appear as belonging to any other public magistrate after this time, neither is it named by any later author. So many coincidences seem to warrant the conclusion we have mentioned, and which De Rossi published to the world in 1858. The new discovery in 1866 may be said to set the seal of certainty upon it ; for we could hardly account for finding a Christian cemetery in this place, unless the college had been virtually suppressed and its property abandoned. Nobody, we suppose, except Mr. Parker himself, will accept the conjecture which that gentleman has hazarded, that it was done with the knowledge and consent of the *Fratres Arvales* themselves. In 382, Gratian ordered the confiscation of all property belonging to the heathen places of worship ; but he did not abrogate the decrees of his predecessors (which were also renewed more than once by his successors), that the buildings should not be injured, but preserved in their integrity.* And Pope Damasus appears scrupulously to have followed the rule laid down in this discriminating legislation. He built a basilica as a public monument of the final victory of the martyrs and of the Christian faith in a place that had once been profaned by idolatrous rites ; he destroyed—or at least there was destroyed, and it has been found buried in the earth before this basilica—the round altar, adorned with the usual carvings of festoons and of the skulls of oxen and a serpent (the *genius loci* to whom sacrifices were offered), and the head of the serpent was (probably on purpose) defaced and broken ; but he did not touch, so far as we can ascertain, the tablets that were affixed to the walls of the temple, and therefore (we may be sure) not the temple itself. The tablets that have been found used for gravestones were the coverings of graves later than the time of Damasus ; graves belonging to the non-subterranean cemetery, which were made probably in the sixth century, during the troubled times of the wars against the Goths. Of the wise moderation of Pope Damasus himself, we have an interesting illustration in an incident in the life of Symmachus, to which De Rossi has been the first to call attention in connection with this subject, and with which we will

* "Ædificiorum sit integritas."—Cod. Theod. xvi. 10, 18.

conclude our abridgment of his interesting account of the cemetery of Generosa.

Symmachus was prefect of the city, A.D. 384; and he was denounced to the emperors as having abused his official power in the interests of Paganism, to which he remained obstinately attached. The occasion of the charge was this: Prætextatus, the military prefect, or prefect of the Prætorium, himself also an ardent champion of Paganism, had obtained an imperial rescript authorizing criminal proceedings to be instituted against those who had exceeded the limits assigned in the law of Gratian, and plundered the marble facings, or mutilated the marble ornaments of heathen temples. The execution of this commission had been intrusted to Symmachus, who, however, shrunk at first from undertaking it, foreseeing probably the charge of unjust persecution to which it might expose him. But his forbearance was not allowed to shield him. He was accused, as we have said, of having imprisoned priests and bishops, and tortured others of the faithful, for supposed violation of the imperial laws on this subject; and he received a peremptory order to release all the Christians, and especially all clerics, whom he might hold imprisoned on this charge. In reply, Symmachus appealed to the Romans generally, but especially to a letter of Pope Damasus, in which he denied that any injustice whatever had been done to the professors of the Christian faith: he acknowledged that some Christians were in prison for various offences against the laws, but certainly not for anything which was involved in the practice of the Christian law (*variorum criminum reos, sed a ministerio Christianæ legis alienos*). On a subsequent occasion, Pope Damasus was amongst the foremost of the opponents of Symmachus, when he sought to restore the altar of Victory, which had been removed from the Senate-house; he sent to the emperors the protest of the Christian senators against this partial re-establishment of Paganism, and wrote to S. Ambrose to ask him to use his influence in support of their petition. But this was a very different thing from allowing the heathen temples to stand as architectural and historical monuments. Here he was ready to co-operate even with the heathen magistrates, and what we can see for ourselves in the cemetery of Generosa, taken in connection with the letter quoted by Symmachus, shows how sincere and generous that co-operation was.

ART. III.—THE RENAISSANCE AND LIBERTY.

Renaissance in Italy. The Age of the Despots. By JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS. London : Smith, Elder, & Co.

Renaissance in Italy. The Fine Arts. By JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS. London : Smith, Elder, & Co.

Renaissance in Italy. The Revival of Learning. By JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS. London : Smith, Elder, & Co.

IT is not our intention in this article to make any detailed examination of Mr. Symonds' three books, the titles of which we have prefixed to it. Our judgment of them is in substance this, that they are scholarly volumes, containing much and varied information, but not indicating the possession by their author of any of the higher qualities of the historic mind. On the contrary, they manifest a lamentable deficiency in that mental grasp which is essential to a truly philosophic treatment of any period, and are clouded by a misty sentimentality fatal to the "dry light" in which alone a just apprehension of men and events is possible. As far as regards mere concrete facts, Mr. Symonds is generally accurate. But his deductions, abstractions, and speculations, are, upon the whole, of little value.

Our present object is to inquire into a question which lies at the root of Mr. Symonds' performance, and of much else that is far more important. That question is, whether the meaning now very generally put upon the word Renaissance is true. Renaissance or new birth of what? "Of freedom," we are answered by a crowd of writers in great repute at the present day. Thus, M. Michelet :—"L'aimable mot de Renaissance ne rappelle aux amis du beau que l'avènement d'un art nouveau et le libre essor de la fantaisie. Pour l'érudit, c'est la rénovation des études de l'antiquité ; pour les légistes, le jour qui commence à luire sur le discordant chaos de nos vieilles coutumes. Est-ce tout ?" And he decides that it is by no means all. "Le seizième siècle," he tells us, "dans sa grande et légitime extension, va de Colomb à Copernic, de Copernic à Galilée, de la découverte de la terre à celle du ciel. L'homme s'y est retrouvé lui-même."* So, turning to contemporary English writers, we find that Mr. Pater understands by the word "a general stimulus and enlightening of the human

* "Histoire de France," vol. vii. Int.,

mind," "an outbreak of the human spirit," the qualities of which were "the care for physical beauty, the worship of the body, the breaking down of those limits which the religious system of the Middle Ages imposed upon the heart and the imagination."* Mr. Symonds holds similar views; he tells us that what the word Renaissance really means is

New birth to liberty—the spirit of mankind recovering consciousness and the power of self-determination, recognizing the beauty of the outer world and of the body through art, liberating the reason in science and the conscience in religion, restoring culture to the intelligence, and establishing the principle of political freedom.†

It should be observed that Mr. Symonds regards the Protestant Reformation as being merely a phase of this great movement—and here we think he is undoubtedly right. Once more, Mr. Freeman, discoursing before the University of Cambridge of the "Unity of History," says:—

The revival of learning in the fifteenth and sixteenth century marks, as is agreed on all hands, one of the great epochs in the history of the mind of man. . . . That age was an age when the spirit of man cast away trammels by which it had long been fettered; it was an age when men opened their eyes to light, against which they had been long closed from ages. . . . The revival of learning which brought the men of our modern world face to face with the camp before Ilios and with the Agoré of Athens was indeed a revolution which amounted to hardly less than a second birth of the human mind.‡

It would be easy to multiply quotations to the same effect. But these which we have given from four popular writers of different schools are sufficient for our purpose. It will be seen that they all four concur in regarding freedom as the chief note of the Renaissance. It is defined by one, in express terms, and impliedly by the other three, as "the new birth to liberty" of the modern world. There is something very engaging about this definition. It is no rhetorical flourish, but a simple statement of fact, when liberty, "best beloved of best men," is celebrated as the very breath of life to all that is most excellent in human society, "rarefying and enlightening our spirits like the influence of heaven."§ It is not too much to say that it is in the political order what freewill is in the moral, that it is

* Pater's "Studies in the History of the Renaissance," Pref., p. xi.

† Symonds' "Renaissance in Italy": Age of the Despots, p. 30; so at page 13; we read "The Renaissance was the liberation of humanity from a dungeon."

‡ "Comparative Politics," p. 296.

§ Milton's "Areopagetica." It is a pleasure to us to find expressions which we can quote with full assent, in a great English writer from whom we are obliged to differ often and strongly.

"the nurse of all great wits,"* at whose fair breast, art and science and literature are most purely and happily reared. If the movement known as the Renaissance was indeed a new birth to liberty, no words are too strong to express its claim upon the veneration of mankind. Whether this is a true definition is a question of fact, for the determination of which ample evidence exists, and that question we now proceed to consider.

But as liberty is a word

Defamed by every charlatan,
And soiled with all ignoble use,

we shall here set down, once for all, the sense in which we understand it; namely, the absence of restraints upon the true development and right exercise of the human faculties.† In the political order, protection from such restraints is the very *raison d'être* of government; for the end of government is justice, and justice is rightly described by the juriconsults as "*constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi*"; nor is there any more indisputable "right" or sacred prerogative of man, than to live according to the laws of his being. To uphold this right over the might, whether of "purple tyrants," or of "bibulous clay" collected in polling-booths,‡ is the prime function of the State. It is observed by Milton:—

The whole freedom of man consists either in spiritual or civil liberty. As for spiritual, who can be at rest, who can enjoy anything in this world with contentment, who hath not liberty to serve God and to save his soul? The other part of freedom consists in the civil rights and advancement of every person according to his merit.§

* *Ibid.*

† We are very well aware of the indefiniteness which so often attends definitions, and in particular of the vagueness which attaches to adjectives. To work out what we have said above, in any manner not absolutely inadequate, would require an essay, or rather a volume, so much might be said, and would, indeed, have to be said, about the two epithets, "true" and "right." Mr. Mill, in his "Essay on Liberty" writes (p. 27): "The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it." We should not in the least object to adopt this definition ourselves, but the sense to be put upon the words "our own good" would be a question for much discussion. Are we to take "good" in the signification indicated in "Pig Proposition No. 2" ("Lat.-Day Pamph.," viii.):—"Moral evil is unattainability of pig's-wash; moral good attainability of ditto"?

‡ Aristotle has pointed out ("Pol.," L. iv. c. 4) that the *ἡθος* of monarchical despotism and of mob despotism is the same. Both are *ἐσπορικὰ τῶν βελτιόνων*.

§ "Areopagetica."

And, as he says in another place,

This is not the liberty which we can expect, that no grievance should ever arise in the commonwealth; that let no man in the world expect; but when complaints are freely heard, deeply considered, and speedily reformed, that is the utmost bound of civil liberty obtained that wise men look for.*

Harsh and crabbed must be any speech of ours in continuation of these majestic sayings. Still, if we may venture to carry on the thought therein expressed, we would affirm that, in the purely intellectual province, liberty is the undimmed possession of inward light, the enjoyment of "the vision and the faculty divine," unobscured by arbitrary rules, unrestricted by false conventionalisms—there are rules which are not arbitrary, and conventionalisms which are not false—whereby the thinker is enabled to discern, after his measure, the objective reality of things—to look through phenomena upon the venerable face of Nature (*natura naturans*, not *natura naturata*, as the schoolmen distinguish), to apprehend Truth in his own mind, and creatively to fashion it there. For Truth is the object of the human intellect in whatever department of thought engaged; and where its bright beams are shut out there is no freedom,† but—worst imprisonment—the darkened mind becomes the dungeon of itself.‡ Philosophy, morals, art, do but contemplate different sides of Truth, for nothing but Truth is good or beautiful, and nothing is good or beautiful that is not true; all truth, goodness, and beauty of which we have knowledge being but the faint emanations, the dim shadows of Him who alone, in the highest sense, *Is*; whose revelation of Himself is *Ego Sum Qui Sum*.§

And now, turning aside from these high matters, let us, before we enter upon the inquiry immediately before us, touch briefly upon one of the greatest difficulties of the historian, as distinguished from the annalist—chronology. It is easy to assign dates for specific facts. It is exceedingly hard to give them for vast and complex movements of the human mind, which, with the great religious, intellectual, and social phenomena that they produce, are alone worthy of serious study in the records of the past. For such movements, in the first stages of their existence, are hidden out of sight. Like the individual man, they are made in *occulto*, fashioned in *inferioribus terræ*, and generations in which they have been ma-

* "Ready Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth."

† "Cognoscetis Veritatem, et Veritas liberabit vos."—Evan. sec. Joannem, cap. viii. v. 32.

‡ Thou art become—O worst imprisonment—

The dungeon of thyself.—"Samson Agonistes," 155.

Lib. Ex., c. iii. v. 14.

turing and gathering strength pass away unconscious of their growth, until the fulness of the time appointed for their manifestation.

Still chronological divisions are absolutely necessary, and in the case of modern history there would seem to be no sufficient reason for rejecting those which custom has rendered familiar to us. It is generally correct to speak of the first eight centuries of our era as the period of the formation of Christendom; the next seven are fitly styled the Middle Ages; and the three which follow, down to the end of the last century, the Renaissance epoch. Thus we are brought to the New Age, in which our lot is cast. But it must never be forgotten that in every case the roots of the later period are buried in the earlier. The new idea germinates under the débris of the old order as it falls to decay and dissolution. In this sense, too, the Homeric comparison between the generations of men and the generations of the leaves, holds good. The world of green furnishes an apt emblem of the life in death which we find in the world of ideas. But further, ideas, like the productions of the vegetable kingdom, are subject in their growth and in their decay to the influence of local and other accidents, sometimes exceedingly difficult to trace. In the happy soil,

Where some irriguous valley spreads her lap,

they mature more quickly, flourish more luxuriantly, and die sooner than in a land where nature's gifts are less profusely bestowed. Everywhere they obey the same laws, but in the time, the manner, and the measure of their development there are innumerable differences, because in those laws there is diversity of operation.

Bearing these considerations in mind, we proceed to our inquiry whether liberty is the characteristic note, the motif of the Renaissance. And in pursuing this inquiry it will perhaps be best to glance first at the political order. "The dates 1453 and 1527," observes Mr. Symonds, "marking respectively the fall of Constantinople and the sack of Rome, are convenient for fixing in the mind the narrow space of time during which the Renaissance culminated."* By common consent the highest point of that culmination would seem to have been reached during the eight years of the pontificate of Giovanni de' Medici, celebrated by Pope and a thousand others as "Leo's Golden Days."† Let us see what, in point of fact, was the political condition of Europe then. Italy presents "the spectacle of

* "Age of the Despots," Pref., p. i.

† "Essay on Criticism," 698.

States founded upon force, controlled and moulded by the will of princes, whose object in each case was to maintain their usurped power by mercenary arms, and to deprive the people of political activity."* In England we find the "all-absorbing, unrestrained despotism"† of the Tudors; forced loans and benevolences strike at the root of private property; attainders, taking the place of trial by jury at the will of the Government, annihilate security of life and personal freedom; the pleasure of the prince is law to his subjects, his "sic volo sic jubeo" the sufficient motive and defence of legislation. In France there is a tyranny not less crushing, gilded, as in England, by the splendour of a luxurious court. In Germany, "an universal reign of force singularly characterizes this period,"‡ "the general disorder of the country had become intolerable."§ In Spain absolutism had attained a sway which Charles V., who probably saw its danger, was unable to remedy.§ One of the wisest and best men then living has left us a faithful picture of the state of his times. As Mr. Brewer testifies:—

If any one wishes to see the real condition of Europe at this period; the arbitrary rule of its monarchs, bent on their own aggrandizement, and careless of the improvement of their people; the disputes among their councillors, agreed in one point only—to flatter and mislead their sovereigns; the wide separation between the luxury of the rich and the hopeless misery of the poor; the prevalence of crime; the severe execution of justice, earnest for punishment, but regardless of prevention; the frequency of capital punishment; the depopulation of villages; the engrossing by a few hands of corn and wool; the scarcity of meat; the numbers of idle gentlemen without employment; of idle serving-men and retainers turned adrift on a life of vagabondism: in short, whoever wishes to see society full of the elements of confusion, requiring only a small spark to kindle them into a flame, may read with advantage the "Utopia" of Sir Thomas More.||

Strange "new birth to liberty!" Let us now turn to the period of gestation which preceded it. That period Mr. Symonds dates, and rightly, so far as the political order is concerned, from the beginning of the fourteenth century.¶ "It was during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries," he writes, "that the conditions of the Renaissance were evolved, and that

* Symonds' "Age of the Despots," p. 126.

† Green's "Short Hist. of the English People," p. 284.

‡ Ranke's "Hist. of the Reformation in Germany," Mrs. Austin's trans., vol. i. p. 220. The whole of the section from which we quote, entitled "Intestine Disorders," is well worthy of careful perusal.

§ Schlegel's "Philos. of Hist.," Robertson's trans., p. 395.

|| "Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII., Arranged and Catalogued by J. S. Brewer." Vol. ii., part i., pref. p. cclxxviii. Sir Thos. Moore's "Utopia" was written in 1516.

¶ "Age of the Despots," p. 12.

the Renaissance itself assumed a definite character in Italy.”* At that era Italy was the fount of the ideas which ruled throughout Europe. It is, therefore, from Italy that we shall obtain the clearest conception of the course of events.

If any historical fact is established beyond the possibility of cavil, it is that of the high and vigorous national life existing in most of the Italian cities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Fifty years have passed away since Lord Macaulay wrote, “We doubt whether any country of Europe, our own excepted, has at the present time reached so high a point of wealth and civilization as some parts of Italy had attained four hundred years ago”;† and he quotes Giovanni Villani’s well-known account of the state of Florence by way of illustration. “Liberty,” he further observes, “partially indeed, and transiently, revisited Italy; and with liberty came commerce and empire, science and taste—all the comforts and all the ornaments of life.” “The deluge of barbarism receded, the wilderness was as the garden of God, rejoicing on every side, laughing, clapping its hands, pouring forth in spontaneous abundance everything brilliant, and fragrant, and nourishing.”‡ Much has been added to our knowledge of the facts of medieval Italian history since these passages were written, and the evidence which has been so largely accumulated justifies over and over again what is said in them. The offspring, not of revolutionary violence, but of the successful vindication of immemorial rights and chartered immunities against the extortions of feudal lords and barbarian Cæsars; nay, higher glory of the greatest of them, the loyal champions and ever-ready defenders of the Apostolic See in its assertion of the supremacy of the spiritual order over brute force, the Italian republics, during the too brief period of their glory, furnish the noblest example of civilization in its highest sense,§ which the world has ever witnessed. There alone, through all the centuries of our era, do we find the realization of Milton’s grand idea of a Christian Commonwealth, not founded on any idle figment of the “rights of man,” not held together by any visionary threads of social contract, but based upon the religion of Jesus Christ, and firmly compacted by the strong bonds of divinely-sanctioned duties, when “they who are greatest are

* *Ibid.*, p. 35.

† Lord Macaulay should have said five hundred years ago. John Villani’s account relates to the early part of the fourteenth century.

‡ “*Essay on Machiavelli*,” in *Works*, vol. v. p. 52.

§ *Viz.*, that of eminence in the best characteristics of man and of society, advance in the road to perfection, happiness, nobility, wisdom. See J. S. Mill’s “*Discussions and Dissertations*,” vol. i. p. 160.

perpetual servants and drudges to the public at their own cost and charges, neglect their own affairs, yet are not elevated above their brethren, live soberly in their families, walk the streets as other men, may be spoken to freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration.”*

It is the lot of all things human “to fade, e’en when they to perfection grow.” This flower of liberty, sweet and graceful as the lily of Eden, bloomed fully but for a brief one hundred and twenty years.† Its decadence begins with the removal of the Apostolic Throne, under the shadow of which it had rejoiced. As the years run their course, “the same event repeats itself in the history of a hundred cities: every town gradually . . . loses its liberties; in each the demagogue stealthily converts himself into the chief of the republic; in each the chief of the republic stealthily or forcibly converts himself into the tyrant;‡ in each the tyrant or his successor procures an outward legitimacy of the wrong by some ceremony, which admits him into the favoured order of acknowledged sovereigns.”§ In Venice, indeed, we do not find the sway of a titular despot established upon the ruins of the republic. But the beginning of the fourteenth century saw the completion there of the series of usurpations by which the aristocracy seized upon the powers of the State, and substituted for the old popular constitution that close and tyrannical oligarchy of which the Council of Ten was the organ. Florence, “ever animated by her ancient spirit of freedom,” || as Sismondi remarks, escaped longest the fate of her sister commonwealths; but if she threw off the dominion of the Duke of Athens, it was only to fall by a slow and irretrievable process into the sordid toils of the

* “Ready way to Establish a Free Commonwealth.”

† Viz., from the Peace of Constance (1183) to the retirement of the Papal Court to Avignon.

‡ Mr. Symonds distinguishes six kinds of tyrants, viz. :—

1. Those whose power was built upon some kind of dynastic or hereditary right.

2. Nobles who obtained the title of Vicar of the Empire, and built an illegal power upon the basis of imperial right in Lombardy.

3. Nobles charged with military or judicial power, as Capitani or Podestàs, by the free burghs, who used their authority to enslave the cities they were chosen to administer.

4. Condottieri who made a prey of cities at their pleasure.

5. The nephews or sons of Popes.

6. Citizens of eminence who acquired more than their due weight in the conduct of affairs, and gradually tended to tyranny.—See “Age of the Despots,” p. 46.

§ Freeman, “Essay on Ancient Greece and Med. Italy,” in “Oxford Essays,” 1857, p. 133.

|| “Hist. des Répub. Italiennes,” t. ix. c. lxvi.

Medici. The burning appeals of Savonarola are the "last words of expiring liberty" in Italy.

It is, therefore, with simple accuracy that Mr. Symonds has termed the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Italy, "during which the conditions of the Renaissance were evolved," "the age of the despots"; and in the rest of Europe the current of politics was flowing in the same direction. In England the struggles of the thirteenth century, associated pre-eminently with the heroic name of Simon de Montfort, had given birth to the constitution under which it is still our happiness to live. By the close of that century the principal English towns had secured all the most important rights of self-government which they at present enjoy, and artisan labour was organized with singular completeness in guilds and companies, the disappearance of which from modern society, it is now beginning to be understood, is not, as was once judged, an unmixed benefit. It is extremely difficult to estimate with accuracy the liberty of the subject during the next hundred years. There is a great weight of evidence that by the end of the fourteenth century the condition of the English peasantry was one of abject oppression. It is certain that from the accession of Richard II. security of person and property steadily decreased, notwithstanding the strong assertion by Parliament upon several occasions of the rights and privileges of the people, until the victory of Bosworth gave the crown to Henry VII., and the ancient liberties of England suffered an eclipse under his gloomy despotism.

In France the progress of the decadence of freedom during the period we are considering is even more absolute. It was under S. Louis that French liberty reached the highest point of development which it has ever attained. In his limitation of feudal jurisdiction, in his rigid repression of judicial combats and private wars, in his provision for the exercise of the right of appeal to the Royal courts, in his legislation for guilds, in his solicitude for the protection and development of the ancient republican constitutions of his cities, this monarch stands alone in the long series of French kings. From Philip the Fair we may trace, sadder spectacle even than the anarchy and desolation of the foreign wars, the consolidation of the central authority by the suppression of those privileges which were the fortresses of liberty. Usurpation succeeds usurpation: one encroachment is but the stepping-stone to another, until every vestige of freedom disappears under the twenty years' tyranny of Louis XI. Spanish history tells a similar tale. The old constitutional liberties of Castile and Arragon

were of an amplitude unsurpassed in medieval Europe.* The Valentians and Catalans possessed, by virtue of the ancient usages which they so dearly cherished, rights not less extensive. The fifteenth century saw the gradual infringement and curtailment of these privileges, until under Ferdinand the Catholic, who united the two kingdoms of Arragon and Castile, they were well-nigh rendered a dead letter by the application of arbitrary principles of policy and government. And if we turn to Germany we find there the same course of events under different conditions. The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were the palmy age of Teutonic liberty. Civic independence was secured by illustrious confederations like the Hanseatic Union and the League of the Rhine, while in the several principalities the power of the ruler was strictly limited by immemorial usage and the rights of the provincial states, as well as by the imperial supremacy, which was the "guarantee for legitimacy, security, and permanence."† In the fifteenth century all this is changed. The great princes of the Empire were virtually absolute in their own territories; their allegiance to their elective head had become a mere name: the free cities were torn by factions, and were at variance among themselves. A large body of nobles of various degrees, secure in their fortresses, and acknowledging no feudal lord, were so many centres of anarchy. On every side we find a multitude of opposed and quasi-independent powers, "hateful and hating one another."

It was, says Ranke, the age of universal private war. The right which the supreme independent power had hitherto reserved to itself of resorting to arms when no means of conciliation remained, had descended in Germany to the inferior classes, and was claimed by nobles and cities against each other, by subjects against their lords; nay, by private persons as far as their means and connections permitted, against each other.‡

Thus in utter lawlessness did German freedom find its extinction.

The political condition of Europe, therefore, at the time of Leo X. was the natural sequence and legitimate outcome of the previous two centuries, and the true description of that condition is absolutism. It is a reproduction in the modern world of antique Cæsarism; all power is gathered up in the person of the prince; all liberties sink into nothingness before his prerogative; even the spiritual order, the last surviving check upon his domination, is either openly defied, or secretly debased

* Mr. Hallam has correctly pointed out that the Arragonese had acquired a positive right of maintaining their liberties by arms, under the Privilege of Union granted by Alfonso III. in 1287. See "Middle Ages," c. iv.

† Ranke, "Hist. of the Ref.," Introduction, p. 54, Mrs. Austin's Trans.

‡ Ibid., p. 72.

into an instrument of his authority.* By the end of the sixteenth century despotic monarchy is triumphant throughout Europe. For two centuries more it continues the blight and corruption of national life, until the hour of vengeance, which preachers of justice had tremblingly predicted,† strikes, and in the stern reckoning of the Revolution the uttermost farthing of the long accumulated debt is exacted. It is not easy to overstate that debt or to paint in too deep colours the depths of misgovernment and political servitude into which Europe had sunk during the three hundred years which followed the supposed "new birth to liberty" of the modern world. France languishing in an oriental despotism, which had written in all too legible characters the tale of its merciless extortions on the "miserable starved faces of the people,"‡ which squandered their blood and treasure at the caprice of harlots, which was not ashamed upon occasion to appear before an amazed world in the part of "Sir Pandarus of Troy"; §

* We should be the last to undervalue the work done in the world by the Catholic Church, in a period illustrious for S. Ignatius, S. Charles, and S. Philip—not to speak of the Council of Trent and its urgently-needed and unspeakably valuable reforms. And, of course, the prime object of the Church is the reconciliation of individual souls to God. This object she pursues unswervingly, whether Nero or Charlemagne is Cæsar, whether S. Louis or Louis XV. is king. But that in the Renaissance period the action of the Church in the public order was smitten with an ever-increasing paralysis, is too evident from every page of the history of that period.

† See particularly a very striking passage in Fénelon's Sermon for the Feast of the Epiphany, ending "O Dieu! que vois-je? Le jour de la ruine est proche et le temps se hâte d'arriver. Mais adorons en silence et avec tremblement l'impénétrable secret de Dieu."—"Works," vol. ii. p. 373. Paris: 1838.

‡ The expression is taken from a letter of Lady Mary Wortley Montague ("Works," vol. iii. p. 71). St. Simon remarks "The first king in Europe is great simply by being a king of beggars" (quoted in Taine's "*Ancien Régime*," book v. c. 1.), where a perfectly appalling mass of evidence—not rhetoric—is accumulated as to the abject condition of the people during the century preceding the French Revolution.

§ *E. g.* in the affair of Maurice de Saxe and "la petite Chantilly," of which a full history may be found by those who care to look for it in Grimm's "*Correspondance Littéraire*," vol. vii. p. 463 (ed. 1829). For most readers, probably, Mr. Carlyle's characteristic account will be sufficient, or more than sufficient. "Playwright Favart had a beautiful clever wife, upon whom the courtships, munificent blandishments, and utmost endeavours of Maréchal de Saxe (in his character of Goat-footed Satyr) could not produce the least impression. For a whole year, not the least. Whereupon the Goat-footed had to get a 'lettre de cachet' for her; had to—in fact produce the brutallest adventure that is known of him, even in this brutal kind. Poor Favart, rushing about in despair, not permitted to run him through the belly and die with his wife undishonoured, had to console himself—he and she, and do agreeable theatricalities for a living, as heretofore. Let us not speak of it!"—Carlyle's "*History of Frederic the Great*," book xvi. c. iii.

Spain, in Burke's apt description, rendered "nerveless" by long years of absolutism, not possessing "the use but only the abuse of a nobility"; "the clergy, the only thing in the country that looked like an independent order"; "the Inquisition," "become mostly an engine of state," "the sole but unhappy resource of public tranquillity and order which remained";* Germany, save where the mild sway of the ecclesiastical sovereigns prevailed,† crushed by Hohenzollern militarism or Josephine doctrinairism, or groaning under the foul despotism of some three dozen little potentates, veritable Satyrs and Sileni, who regarded and treated the peasant and burgher classes as mere beasts of burden and sold them like horses for foreign military service;‡—such are the most salient points in the condition of Europe as the eighteenth century draws to its close. Happily the picture is not wholly unrelieved. In the Catholic cantons of Switzerland Christian democracies still survive. Holland and the Netherlands preserve their hard-won immunities: the Tyrolese retain their local privileges: the Hungarians live tranquilly under the laws of S. Stephen: in the States of the Church § municipal self-government prevails to an extent to which the Italy of the present day is a stranger. In England the old medieval liberties, for the vindication of which our forefathers in the previous century counted not their lives dear, had broadened down from precedent to precedent. But these beams of freedom only serve to render more visible the darkness of the house of bondage in which the rest of the European peoples languished.

So far, then, as the political order is concerned, it may be confidently affirmed that the Renaissance was not "a new birth unto liberty." Let us now see if that title can be justly claimed for it in literature, and especially in poetry—that highest department of literature,—which,

* Burke, "Thoughts on French Affairs" ("Works," vol. iv. p. 568).

† "It is not easy to conceive governments more mild and indulgent than these Church sovereignties."—*Ibid.*, p. 562.

‡ Stigand's "Life of Heine," vol. i. p. 7. Mr. Stigand is of opinion that "in the history of humanity nothing can be found to equal the uninventive grossness and dulness of the majority of the German courts of the last century." "In bestiality and immorality of debauchery, however," he admits, "they may lay claim to some originality."

§ Burke, in his Third Letter on a Regicide Peace ("Works," vol. v. p. 367), in passing a glowing eulogium upon Pius VI., expresses particular admiration of the "free, fertile, and happy city and state of Bologna," and not without reason. Local self-government in the Pontifical States, resulting, as it did from historical events, differed widely in the several provinces, but, upon the whole, it was considerable.

as has been profoundly observed, springing as it does "from man's whole feelings, opinions, activity, may be called the music of his whole manner of being, and is historically the test how far music or freedom existed therein."* Here too the growth and fruit of the new idea is best traced under the bright skies of Southern Europe, where it ripened soonest and flourished most luxuriantly.

The greatest name in Italian literature is that of Dante. It is, in some respects, the greatest in all literature. No poet is so intensely real.† His is a Muse of Fire, ascending the brightest heaven of invention,‡ and bringing thence the essence, the very form of things, to be burnt into his pages ineffaceable, imperishable, for ever. He is a true seer, and his intensity is the outcome of the clearness of his sight. The words of the Hebrew poet, "Credidi propter quod locutus sum," may aptly be applied to him. No mists of doubt, no clouds of sensual passion, no vapours of pedantry, interpose to shut out from him the vision. He

can deem
Of God, of the world, of the soul,
With a plainness as near
As flashing as Moses felt
When he lay in the night by his flock
On the starlit Arabian waste.

But this unfettered freedom of spiritual insight is not due merely to the high endowments of his passionately earnest nature. It results also from the intellectual atmosphere in which he lived. He has been called "the spokesman of the Middle Ages." And so he is, both as to the thought they lived by and as to the conditions under which it was uttered. He is but one, indeed, of a vast multitude whose song fills those far-off centuries, all of whom, differing as much in the measure

* "Poetry, were it the rudest, so it be sincere, is the attempt which man makes to render his existence harmonious, the utmost he can do for that end: it springs therefore from his whole feelings, opinions, activity, and takes its character from these. It may be called the music of his whole manner of being; and historically considered, is the test how far music or freedom existed therein."—Carlyle, "Miscellanies," vol. i. p. 315.

† This has been happily expressed by Lord Macaulay: "The great source," he writes, "of the power of the Divine Comedy is the strong belief with which the story seems to be told. . . . When we read Dante, the poet vanishes, we are listening to the man who has returned from the 'valley of the dolorous abyss': we seem to see the dilated eye of horror, to hear the shuddering accents with which he tells his fearful tale."—"Works," vol. vii. p. 611.

‡ O for a Muse of Fire, that would ascend
The brightest heaven of invention!

First Chorus in "Henry V."

of their natural gift as in the vehicle chosen for its expression, are alike in this, that the stamp of freedom is upon their work. Their insight, be it more or less powerful, is unclouded; whether they employ the simple metres used by S. Francis and his brethren in their divine songs, or practise the intricate elaboration found in some of the noblest medieval Latin poems—compositions for many of which a very high rank may be claimed—"a grace beyond the reach of art" is upon their work. It speaks the thought of the singer, is the true utterance of his own life, all the truer for his entire absence of self-consciousness, his complete self-surrender—as of the nightingale or the linnet—to his strain.

It is just this character of truth which is wanting in the age succeeding that of Dante. The new spirit which arises is not one of creation but of imitation. Men ceased to draw their inspiration from God, the Soul, Nature, and turned instead to the literature, first, of ancient Rome, and then of ancient Greece. Far be it from us to attempt to pluck a single leaf from the laurelled brows of the poet of Vaucluse, but his chief glory is, not that he was the first to feel the influence of the new idea, but that he remained so much under the dominion of the old.* In proportion as he reflects the rising spirit of classicism, he is frigid and tasteless. It is only when he is distinctly medieval that he is original and true and touching. In him the old and the new order met; after him the new order triumphed; but who remembers even the name of any Italian poet for the next century,—we might almost say for the next two centuries? Of writers of Italian prose in this period, the greatest is undoubtedly Messer Giovanni Boccaccio, the elegance of whose "*Decameron*" we have no wish to deny. But liberty can be claimed for him only in the sense of libertinism; in no other sense, surely. And the taint which is upon his pages, infects ever more deeply the writers who come after him, as classicism extends its sway, and

* Julius Cæsar Scaliger writes: "*Primus [Petrarca] ex lutulenta barbarie os cælo attollere ausus est,*" the "*colum*" being the Heathen Parnassus. Mr. Lander, in a paper printed in "*Last Fruit off an Old Tree*," from a note to which we quote this passage, shows how little good Petrarch got from the ancient seat of the muses. We must reckon this paper of Mr. Lander's by far the most judicious criticism on Petrarch which we possess in English. What can be better than the following on Sonetto XX. "*Here are Phœbus, Vulcan, Jupiter, Cæsar, Janus, Saturn, Mars, Orion, Neptune, Juno, and a chorus of angels, and only fourteen lines to turn about in*"; or, the brief comment upon some very beautiful lines in the "*Triumph of Death*," of which a very beautiful translation is given: "*He who the twentieth time can read unmoved this canzone, never has experienced a love which cannot be requited, and never has known a happy one.*"

with the language which "Dante had created as a thing of power, and which Petrarch had polished as a thing of beauty,"* the principles and standards of those great masters are abandoned too. It is as though a mist had arisen from the valley of the shadow of death, in which the ancient Pagan world lay buried, shutting out the beauty of the heavens, the sun, and the moon and the stars, in whose light previous generations had rejoiced. Saints and angels are no longer seen, but in the gloom there arises the foul spirit of the old idolatry. The place where it had dwelt centuries ago is swept and garnished; and it returns in sevenfold strength. It is hard to conceive of a lower depth of foulness, of more disgusting impurity than is to be found in some of the new Latinists, foremost in the "revival of letters." The authors of classical antiquity deemed most licentious, pale their ineffectual fires before their modern imitators. The grossest verses of Catullus, the uncleanest utterances of Petronius, are almost pure compared with passages which might be cited from Pontanus and Pacificus Maximus.† The present writer has no pretension to speak magisterially upon a question of comparative obscenity. But some who have given special attention to that subject are of opinion, that never was the gift of articulate speech so abused, for the purposes of the vilest sensuality, as in Italy at the period of which we speak. The things said then were the genuine expression of the things done then. "*Traditi in passionibus ignominiae*" is the true description of these Patriarchs and Apostles of the Renaissance. And it will be well if the gospel of "Humanism" and "Sensuousness" so perseveringly preached among us by their nineteenth century disciples, does not issue in the practice of the worst of their turpitudes, and induce a wide-spread revival of their abominable and unutterable iniquities.

The only sense, then, in which liberty can be predicated of the humanists, in their palmyest Medicean days, is the sense of unbridled licentiousness, which we take to be the deepest slavery. And in truth servitude is the chief note of Renaissance literature from first to last. No subsequent writers in Italy have sinned so deeply in the same way as the new Latinists. But all are to a greater or less extent—to an extent great indeed when least—under captivity to pedantic traditions. Even in Tasso and Ariosto the traces of the

* Symonds' "Revival of Learning," p. 55.

† It will be sufficient to mention the volume called "*Quinque Illustrium Poetarum Lusum in Venerem*" in support of this assertion. Mr. Symonds has some, on the whole, just remarks on this subject in Chapter VII. of his "Age of the Despots." See especially a note at page 411 of that work.

fetters of classicalism are only too apparent. Whether either of them possessed "that self-springing invention which we find in a few great poets,"* is a question difficult to determine. But it is certain that neither of them could have exercised it, in the conditions under which they wrote. And throughout Europe it is the same. Everywhere, as the spirit of "classicalism" advances, nature gives way to art, creation to copying, life to mechanism. In Spain, it achieves an easy triumph at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the old national poetry, instinct with the spirit of ancient liberty, of which the crowning glory is the famous Romance of the Cid, "yields to the influence of Italian models, and Castillejo is obliged to give place to Boscar and Garcilasso."† In France, Renaissance literature culminates in the drama of the seventeenth century,—a frigid plagiarism of antiquity, which, not even the great genius of Racine or Corneille, tied and bound by the arbitrary and artificial rules of a system radically vicious, could inform with Promethean fire. No better illustration could be given of the truth of Buffon's dictum—far truer than he deemed—*jamais l'imitation n'a rien créé*. Of Germany, we need not speak. From the "*Niebelungen Lied*" to the new era heralded by Lessing and introduced by Goethe, Teutonic literature is a blank. In England, happily, our greatest poet, on the whole, undoubtedly, the world's greatest poet, had written before the sway of the new ideas was established among us. Heine has observed that it was a piece of right good fortune that Shakespeare came at the right time, while the popular belief of the Middle Ages, though destroyed in principle, still lived in all its enchantment in the heart of men, and upheld itself in their manners, customs, and intuitions.‡ It was, perhaps, a not less piece of good fortune (or something more) that Shakespeare "knew little Latin and less Greek," and that so the rôle of imitation was closed against him. The rules of classicalism he knows not of, nor is his mental horizon bounded by the master-pieces of antiquity. "Nature's child," he "looks not at, but straight into a thing, so that he constructively comprehends it, can take it asunder and put it

* Hallam's "*Literary Hist. of Europe*," part ii. chap. v. s. 28. Mr. Hallam goes further than we care to do, and decides this question in the negative. He writes:—"Tasso did not possess much of the self-springing invention which belongs to great poets, and which, in this higher sense I cannot concede to Ariosto. He not only borrows freely, and, perhaps, studiously, from the ancients, but introduces frequent lines from earlier Italian poets, &c."

† Trench's "*Sacred Latin Poetry*," Int., p. 20. Second edition.

‡ "*Shakespeare's Mädchen*," p. 3.

together again, the thing melts into light, as it were, under his eye, and anew creates itself before him."* Of intellectual freedom he is our supreme example, and for two centuries well-nigh the last example, among English poets. It is only, indeed, in a limited sense, as Mr. Matthew Arnold has recently well pointed out, that Milton can, with any justice, be claimed as a product of the Renaissance.† In external form, his great epic conforms to its rules, but, in substance, it is no mere reproduction of antiquity. His inspiration comes, not from the Aonian mount, but from Oreb or Sinai, and there is much felicity in the epithet of "Protestant schoolman," which M. Scherer has applied to him.‡ In his earlier poems, "*L'Allegro*," "*Il Penseroso*," "*Lycidas*," Renaissance influence is more strongly traceable. But, even here, as the judicious critic last quoted observes, he has but "passed by the way of Italy," and is still "a true Son of the North," "pure but not too rigorous, grave but not fanatical, wholesome and virginal, gracious and yet strong."§

Milton is, to some extent, in English literature historically considered, what Petrarch is in Italian. Each marks the dissolution of the old idea, and the firm establishment of the new. Our true Renaissance period is from the middle of the seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth. During those hundred and fifty years the régime of imitation in English poetry is well nigh absolute. We can point to a crowd of more or less successful versifiers,—

The mob of gentlemen who wrote with ease ;

but that ease comes from art not nature ; their muse moves in the measured pace of the minuet, not with "steps of virgin liberty." The two greatest names among them are those of Dryden and Pope : great names, indeed, and conspicuous among the glories of English literature ; but still to be ranked in the second order of poets, not the first. Sir Walter Scott held that the distinguishing characteristic of Dryden was "the power of reasoning and of clothing the result in appropriate language." Hallam justly observes that this praise is insufficient, and vindicates for him also the merit of "rapidity of conception and readiness of expression."|| It may be

* Carlyle, *Miscellanies*—"Works," vol. iv. p. 152.

† "Nor is it true to say that Milton summed up in himself all the higher influences of the Renaissance. The disinterested curiosity, the humanism of the Renaissance, are not characteristics of Milton—of Milton, that is to say, when he is fully formed and has taken his ply."—"Nineteenth Century," p. 849, December, 1877.

‡ "*Études Critiques sur la Littérature*," p. 178.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

|| "*Literature of Europe*," part iv. c. v. s. 38.

added that he was, when he chose, a great master of rhythm. In Pope we have the perfection of mastery of form: he, "as it were, engraved ideas." *

There is no writer from whom so many of these sparkling epigrammatic sentences, which are the staple commodities of quotation, are introduced into conversation. He has always a masculine fancy: more rarely imagination. But you look in vain [to him or to Dryden] for the truths which come from a large heart or a seeing eye; in vain for the thoughts that breathe and the words that burn; in vain for those flashes of truth, which, like the lightning in a dark night, make all luminous, open out unsuspected glories of tree and sky and building, interpret as to ourselves, and body forth the shapes of things unknown.†

It was not until the European mind cast away forever the fetters of Renaissance traditions that Byron, Shelley, and Wordsworth became possible in England, that Goethe was possible in Germany, or Alfred de Musset in France. The words of the old world were as dead as its political order; dead, and buried under mountains of worthless forms which the great tempest of Revolution was to sweep away, with so much else.

Down came the storm! In ruins fell
The outworn world we knew.
It passed, that elemental swell!
Again appeared the blue.

We pass on to what the nomenclature of the present time calls, in its vague way, "art," meaning thereby generally the arts of design. In them, as in the whole of the intellectual province which the Greeks termed *μουσική*, beauty is inseparable from truth and truth from liberty; and here, as is generally supposed, is the especial field of Renaissance emancipation. It would be easy to accumulate authorities who put forward this view. But it will perhaps be sufficient to quote Mr. Symonds, who does not hesitate roundly to affirm that "the study of Greek resuscitated a sense of the beautiful in art."‡ Is this true? The inquiry is not of an abstract kind. The evidence it depends upon is before men's eyes. Let us look at that evidence as existing works of architecture, sculpture, and painting present it.

The architectural monuments (we are not speaking of ruins) at present to be found in Europe, with the exception of the Pantheon, that unique relic of Roman Paganism, a few

* "The Poetical Works of Alexander Pope," by A. W. Ward. Int. Memoir, p. li.

† F. W. Robertson, "Lectures and Addresses," p. 146.

‡ "Revival of Learning," p. 112.

Byzantine structures, and the churches of the basilica form found in Rome, in Ravenna, and in the Patriarchate of Venice, may, with sufficient accuracy, be distinguished as medieval and neo-classical. The former are the product of one idea, the progressive expansion of which may be traced from the rude and inchoate Romanesque through all its diversities of manifestation in the different regions of Europe. The latter are imitations, more or less exact, of antique models, selected at the fancy of the copyist or his patron, and cannot be referred to any one type nor be said to evidence that growth which is never absent from intellectual life. Mr. Ruskin, indeed, allows of a kind of development of Renaissance architecture and distinguishes between three varieties of it,—the Early Renaissance, the Roman Renaissance, and the Grotesque Renaissance.* The distinction, doubtless, rests upon good grounds, but it is unnecessary here to consider it. It is sufficient for our purpose to look at the architecture of the Middle Ages, and at that of the Renaissance period, as a whole. Are beauty and freedom absent from the former, and do they characterize the latter?

Upon this question we unhesitatingly avow ourselves to be of one mind with the accomplished critic just mentioned, who, surveying the arts of design from the loftiest standpoint, has delivered to the world his message concerning them in earnest and noble words, from which we gladly borrow. Mr. Ruskin has pointed out with perfect truth that in the principal schools of the ancient world, the Greek, the Ninevite, the Egyptian, servitude is the note of architectural ornament, inasmuch as "the execution or power of the inferior workman is entirely subjected to the intellect of the higher."† But, as he goes on to show, "in the medieval system of ornament this slavery is done away, Christianity having recognized, in small things as in great, the individual value of every soul." And he deems it, not unjustly, "the principal admirableness of Gothic schools of architecture that they thus receive the results of the labours of inferior minds, and out of fragments full of imperfection, and betraying that imperfection in every touch, indulgently raise up a stately and unaccusable whole." From this proceeds the copiousness and variety of medieval architecture, its "perpetual change both in design and execution,"‡ the "strange disquietude of the Gothic spirit that is its greatness."§ And from the same source comes the naturalism of this architecture; "that is to say, the love of natural objects

* "Stones of Venice," vol. iii. p. 3.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 158.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

for their own sake, and the effort to represent them frankly, unconstrained by artistical laws."* Nor is it amiss to notice here how powerfully the condition of freedom in which the workman in medieval buildings laboured, reacted upon himself.† The thoughts of his heart, grave or gay, simple or fantastic, found expression in his work. The architectural monuments of the Middle Ages which still adorn Europe were wrought by free and intelligent artists, and truly symbolize the dominant principles in the lives of their builders. Faith in the Unseen, aspiration towards the Infinite, are written on "the features which were the distinctive creation of the Gothic schools; in the varied foliage, and thorny fretwork, and shadowy niches, and buttressed pier, and fearless height of subtle pinnacle and crested tower, sent like 'an unperplexed question up to heaven.'"‡

Far other are the characteristics of Renaissance architecture. We are not, indeed, concerned to deny the merit of particular buildings. We cheerfully own the grandiose magnificence of St. Peter's, and the imposing proportions of the rival pile which Sir Christopher Wren has reared among ourselves. We are not insensible to the voluptuous charm of the Madeleine at Paris, to the richness of material and elegance of detail of Santa Maria della Salute at Venice. We do not doubt the excellence, after their kind, of many of the works of Palladio and Galeazzo Alessi, of François Mansard and Inigo Jones. But these structures differ as widely in motif from such piles as the Abbey Church and Hall of Westminster, the Cathedral of Amiens, and the Duomo of Pisa, as a play of Shakespeare differs from a play of Racine. The Renaissance architects, like the Renaissance poets, worked in chains, the iron whereof entered into their soul. For truth, they have a parade of science; for imagination, "correctness": cold and earthly, they are satisfied with the observance of their self-imposed rules; grace and fancy are ruthlessly sacrificed to Procrustean forms. The note of servitude is upon the neo-classical architecture, even more fully than upon the architecture of the ancient world. The designer no longer creates; he copies, adapts, contrives; technical skill is the highest accomplishment of the artisan, sunk into an animated tool, "a mere machine, with its valves smoothed by heart's blood instead of oil, the most pitiable form of slave."§ *Exitus acta probat.* "Renaissance architec-

* "Stones of Venice," vol. ii. p. 181.

† See a powerful passage on this subject in Mr. Ruskin's "Lectures on Architecture," p. 134.

‡ "Stones of Venice," vol. ii. p. 206.

§ Ruskin's "Lect. on Architecture," p. 134.

ture is the school which has conducted men's inventive faculties, from the Grand Canal to Gower-street; from the marble shaft and the lancet-arch, the wreathed leafage and the glowing and melting harmony of gold and azure, to the square cavity in the brick wall."*

Such is, in substance, the base captivity into which the Renaissance has reduced the architecture of Europe. In sculpture its servile worship of antiquity has produced even more fatal effects, inasmuch as it has brought this, the most chaste and ideal of the arts of design, under bondage to vulgar sensuousness and grovelling materialism. Originally employed in Christendom merely in the way of architectural decoration, sculpture received, in the true "golden days" of Italy, the period of her free cities, a development, no less important than that experienced by her literature. And for three centuries the progress of this art "obeyed the impulse which Nicola Pisano primarily gave" and "followed the principle which he first struck out."† What those principles were his bas-reliefs on the Duomo at Lucca, in the Pisan Baptistery, on the shrine of S. Dominic at Bologna, and the fountain with which he adorned Perugia, the most valuable possession of the city, as its magistrates judged, remain to tell us. How faithfully that impulse was followed is abundantly shown by the works of his son Giovanni, of Andrea Pisano and Orcagna, of Lorenzo Maitani and Giacomo della Quercia, of Luca delle Robbia and Matteo Civitali, of Ghiberti and Donatello, to mention only a few great names from the illustrious series of his successors. All these consummate artists, while working in one spirit and true to one idea, developed the gift which was within them with a noble audacity, an untrammelled freedom of conception, which is the secret of their grandeur and their pathos. "The style of these masters," Mr. Symonds remarks, "was distinguished by a fresh and charming naturalism, and by rapid growth in technical processes. . . . The revived interest in antique literature widened their sympathies and supplied their fancy with new materials; but there is no imitative formalism in their work . . . vitalized by the imagination of the artist, and presented with the originality of true creative instinct."‡ New

* "Stones of Venice," vol. iii. p. 2.

† Lord Lindsay's "Christian Art," vol. ii. p. 101.

‡ Symonds' "Renaissance and Italy,"—the *Fine Arts*, p. 178. The whole of this chapter is worth careful study. It is one of the best in Mr. Symonds' book. Of course we differ widely from Mr. Symonds, both as to his general point of view, and as to many particular theories which he broaches. Thus we consider him deplorably in error in dating "the æsthetic Renaissance"—taking the word in the sense of the revival of the old classical spirit—"from

ideas make their way in the library much sooner than in the studio. The fine arts are eminently Conservative. Sculpture and painting held out against the spirit of classicalism in Italy far longer than literature. It was not until Michael Angelo had passed away that the triumph of the Renaissance spirit in plastic art was complete. Keenly alive as that great genius was to the beauties of the antique, it was upon the teachings of nature, far more than upon those of any master-pieces of the ancient world that he formed himself. "Absorbed in his own conceptions, he worked from within outwards." * In him, after half a century of barrenness, medieval sculpture culminates. After him, in the place of fancy, invention, the reaching after something beyond the actual, we have the servile copying of the living model, or the equally servile imitation of the Apollos, Mercuries, and Fauns of antiquity, utterly unmeaning and untrue parodies of an extinct past. †

And, as in sculpture so in painting, the effect of the Renaissance was to fetter art by pedantry and unreality, and to render it oblivious of its glorious tradition—a tradition reaching back to the very first days of Christianity, when the Catacombs, which served as the cradle of the infant Church, were also the earliest repositories of Catholic art. In the Pastor Bonus, the Madonna, the symbolic paintings which we find there, touching confessions of the faith, which the rude artists often sealed with their blood, ‡ we have the germs of the pictorial art of Christendom. From the age of the Catacombs to the thirteenth century few relics of Christian painting remain

Nicola Pisano, with the same certainty as from Petrarch that of Humanism" (p. 101). It would be far more correct to parallel Petrarch with Donatello in sculpture, and with Boticelli in painting. The parallel, indeed, must not be pressed too closely; still it is upon Donatello and Boticelli in their respective arts, as upon Petrarch in literature, that the shadow of revived paganism first distinctly falls. It is, in truth, only a shadow. But previously, we may say, the purely Christian motif of the great Italian masters is unclouded. Those earlier masters indeed enlarged their artistic range, and refined their artistic sense, by drawing from every fresh source which opened out to them. But what they thus acquired they assimilated into the old medieval idea, not overlaying that idea with foreign accretions, still less, contemptuously casting it away, as the men of the Renaissance did.

* Perkins' "Tuscan Sculptors," vol. ii. p. 7.

† Mr. Perkins, at the close of the first volume of his admirable work, gives the following summary of the history of Tuscan sculpture:—"The artist had first spoken, because he had something to say; then perceiving that he might say it better, he reached a more perfect stage. Lastly, he arrived solely at beauty of surface, and thought died; upon the death of which vital principle, technical perfection also expired, and nullity remained."—"Tuscan Sculptors," vol. i. p. 266.

‡ "Formules matérielles et permanentes de leurs actes de foi, d'espérance et de charité," as M. Rio happily says ("L'Art Chrétien," Int., xxxiv.).

to us ; but the frescoes discovered of late years in San Clemente sufficiently show that the old ideals were lovingly followed, and received such expansion as the times allowed. It is in the culminating age of medieval liberty that the greatest advance is made, when the genius of Cimabue "solved the problem how to reconcile respect for traditional types with the liberty of individual inspiration."* Who can gaze unmoved at his venerable Madonna of the Rucellai, so pensive and pitiful in her serene, unearthly beauty, as she turns

The star-lit sorrows of immortal eyes

upon the generations of her worshippers? Six centuries have passed away since she was brought forth with shouting and carried to her New Church, the Quarter through which she passed thenceforward to be known as Joyful; † and there she still hangs, the type and fount of the development of Christian art, as of Christian doctrine. ‡ From Cimabue, and his greater disciple Giotto, taken, like the Hebrew monarch, "as he was following the ewes great with young ones," to feed the people "in the innocence of his heart, and to conduct them by the skilfulness of his hands," § the tradition is uniform, and it is a tradition of liberty. Whether we turn to the school of Sienna or of Florence, of Umbria, or Milan, or Ferrara, we find the painter, whatever period of development his art may have reached, boldly opening fresh paths, as his genius prompts, but ever drinking in his inspiration from Truth and Nature. What man can look at Orcagna's Triumph of Death, the Angel Choirs of Beato Angelico, the Madonnas of Fra Francia and Fra Bartolommeo, the S. Michael of Perugino, or Raphael's S. Catherine, and doubt the perfect freedom with which these masters worked, their undimmed inner sight discerning the thing in its wholeness || which their hands were to body forth?

All medieval art leads up to Raphael. ¶ He is its supreme product. All Renaissance art leads down from him. Mr.

* Rio, "L'Art Chrétien," vol. i. p. 183.

† "Il Borgo Allegro."

‡ See J. H. Newman's Sermon on the "Theory of Development in Christian Doctrine," the fourteenth of his Oxford University Sermons.

§ "Et elegit David, servum suum, et sustulit eum de gregibus ovium ; de post fetantes accepit eum.—Pascere Jacob, servum suum, et Israel, hereditatem suam. Et pavit eos in innocentia cordis sui, et in intellectibus manuum suarum deduxit eos.—" Psalmus lxxvii. 70-72.

|| It is an aphorism of Fuseli, "He alone can conceive and compose who sees the whole at once before him."

¶ "The medieval principles lead up to Raphael ; the modern principles lead down from him."—Ruskin, "Lectures on Architecture and Painting," p. 215.

Ruskin ventures to fix the very moment in the centre of his artist life when he broke with the old free traditions of the Christian schools, and bowed his neck to the yoke of pagan antiquity.* Whatever may be the value of this theory, it is certain that in the later works of Raphael there is a loss of purity, a mannerism, an unreality, which, even if we did not know the story of his life, would tell their own tale only too clearly. And what shall we say of the fate of pictorial art in Italy for the three centuries after his death? Ranke pronounces, in his calm judicial way, that,

with one exception,† the scholars of Raphael were wholly degenerate. While they endeavoured to imitate him, they lost themselves in artificial beauty, theatrical attitudes, affected graces; and their works bear sufficient evidence of the total want of warmth or sense of beauty in the soul which conceived them. The scholars of Michael Angelo did no better. Art had lost all comprehension of her object; she had discarded the ideas which she had formerly taxed all her powers to clothe with forms; she retained nothing but the externals of method. . . . Some traces of inspiration remained in the Venetian school alone.‡

By-and-by, it is true, painting again essayed to return to the ancient paths. But classicalism had destroyed her freedom, her simplicity, her purity and truth. The Carracci, Domenichino, Guido Reni, are as inferior to the old masters in originality as they are superior in technical execution. There is ever "something forced and fantastic about them," § and after them, as Kugler truly observes, there is the completest degeneracy, and the art of painting is degraded to the lowest mechanical labour.

What we have said of painting and sculpture has been confined to Italy advisedly; for, so far as these arts are concerned, that land of beauty stands forth as the representative of Europe, testifying only too clearly that the Renaissance was

* "The great change which clouds the career of medieval art was effected, not only in Raphael's time, but by Raphael's own practice . . . He died at thirty-seven; and in his twenty-fifth year—one half-year only past the precise centre of his available life—he was sent for to Rome to decorate the Vatican for Pope Julius II.; and having until that time worked exclusively in the ancient and stern medieval manner, he, in the first chamber which he decorated in that palace, wrote upon its walls the Mene, Tekel, Upharsin of the arts of Christianity. And he wrote it thus: on one wall of that chamber he placed a picture of the World, or kingdom of Theology, presided over by Christ, and on the side-wall of the same chamber he placed the World, or kingdom of Poetry, presided over by Apollo; and from that spot, and from that hour, the intellect and the art of Italy date their degradation."—"Lectures on Architecture and Painting," p. 213.

† It is hardly necessary to observe that the "one exception" is Giulio Romano.

‡ Ranke's "History of the Popes," vol. i. p. 337 (Mrs. Austin's translation).

§ Ibid., p. 342.

in no sense a "new birth unto liberty." Mr. Ruskin has admirably observed, "Art is nothing but a noble and expressive language, invaluable as the vehicle of thought, but in itself nothing."* The effect of the Renaissance upon this language was to restrict it to the ideas of a dead world. It held out antiquity to the artist as a sort of dictionary, where phrases ready made were to be found; and the result is, that there is as much freedom in the conceptions thence derived as in schoolboys' verses tessellated together from a "Gradus ad Parnassum." As in politics and in literature, so here also, the Renaissance was a spirit of slavery, a veritable Goddess of Dulness, at whose

felt approach and secret might
Art after art goes out, and all is night.

There is one exception, and only one—unless, indeed, saltation and cookery are to be reckoned among the fine arts—and that exception is just where we might expect to find it in a period of servitude. The art of music put forth marvellous developments during those three centuries of enslavement. The music of the Middle Ages was a fitting accompaniment of their life. Grave, earnest, heart-stirring, the melodies of the old modes, so austere beautiful, were true Tyrtæan strains, worthy of freemen. But when freedom had departed, and the deadening régime of classicalism oppressed a weary and heavy-laden world, the great masters of the modern school arose, and made of musical sound an instrument potent to cheer, to tranquillize, to subdue, welcome as sleep to weary eyes, as the springing well to the parched throat; nay, it may be said, without hyperbole, able

to create a soul
Under the ribs of death.

From Palestrina to Carissimi, from Pergolese to Bach, from Gluck to Mozart, from Handel to Haydn, the heavenly secret was whispered down. No generation lacked gifted souls, who caught and recorded, for the perpetual joy and solace of mankind, the "outpourings of eternal harmonies" the "echoes from our home," which fell upon their trembling ears. Thus, in an age of the world becoming ever more and more sensual and material and slavish, the spiritual liberty of man is not left without witness. The source of deep and pure emotion, of sublimity and beauty, opened to him in music, is an imperishable vindication of his divine birthright, of

the glories he hath known,
And that imperial palace whence he came.

It remains that we pursue our inquiry in the domain of "Science." Was the Renaissance there a new birth unto liberty? And here, once more, we are under the necessity of defining. It is the fashion of the day to narrow the application of the term science to physics, as though there were no sciences except the physical, as though the physical sciences, dealing as they do merely with the "beggarly elements" of the external universe, were not in truth the lowest and least noble of all. Let us here record our protest against this deep degradation of so high a word. For ourselves we use it to denote the logical apprehension of the facts as underlain by principles, which relate to any department of human knowledge.* But as all facts are from the One God,† who is the Maker, Guardian, Worker, Perfecter of all, and bear the impress of His Unity, so each science being but the classification of this or that set of facts, or, to speak more accurately, of particular aspects of those facts, is intimately connected with—nay, in some sense is dependent upon—all the rest.‡ Each is "a partial view or abstraction, by means of which the mind looks out upon its object," "a form of knowledge enabling the intellect to master and increase it," "an instrument to communicate it readily to others." "And as all taken together form one integral subject for contemplation, so there are no natural or real limits between part and part: one is ever running into another: all, as viewed by the mind, are combined together, and possess a correlative character one with another, from the internal mysteries of the Divine Essence down to our own sensations and consciousness, from the most solemn appointments of the Lord of all down to what may be called the accidents of the hour, from the most glorious seraph down to the vilest and most noxious of reptiles."§

Thus do we deem of the sciences, rightly figured in the phrase which still lingers among us, although with small rem-

* "Scientia est ordinatio depicta in anima universitatis et diversitatis causatorum," as an unknown medieval writer expresses it. See Mr. Brewer's Preface to Roger Bacon's "Opera quedam hactenus inedita," lxx.

† "All that exists is from Him, and if evil is not from Him, as assuredly it is not, this is because evil has no substance of its own, but is only the defect, excess, perversion, or corruption, of that which has substance."—J. H. Newman, "Idea of a University," Dis. iii. sec. 7. It is a commonplace of the schools, "Omne ens in quantum ens, est bonum."

‡ So Roger Bacon: "Omnes scientiæ sunt connexæ et mutuis se fovant auxiliis, sicut partes ejusdem totius, quarum quælibet opus suum peragit, non solum propter se sed pro aliis; ut oculus totum corpus dirigit, et pes totum sustentat, et de loco ad locum deducit; et sic de aliis. Unde pars extra totum est sicut oculus erutus, vel pes abscissus; et sic erit de partibus sapientiæ; nam nulla consequitur sui utilitatem sine alia, cum sint partes ejusdem sapientiæ totalis."—"Opus Tertium," c. iv.

§ J. H. Newman, "Idea of a University," Dis. iii. sec. 2.

nant of its true meaning, as a circle. And surely at the very centre of that circle must be placed theology, the science of God, as much transcending all other sciences as the Infinite transcends the Finite, the Creator the Created. If there are any facts about God, the apprehension of those facts must, without controversy, take the first place among the subjects of human knowledge. This was the place theology held in the Middle Age. That it was indeed a science, and the queen of sciences, no one doubted, and the great works which remain to us testify sufficiently with what vigorous originality it was cultivated. One colossal intellect after another toiled in building up the mighty fabric of the School divinity, the chief of all, the Angelic Doctor, appearing, as was congruous, in the age of Dante and Giotto. It is not necessary here for us to dwell upon the "immense learning" and "acute knowledge"* with which these mighty masters pursued their profound speculations. In no other age of the world, probably, could they have accomplished the task to which they set themselves, for in no other age of the world would they have worked with the same freedom of light. Their method was the most exact and careful application of human reason to the truths of revelation. Evidential theology, as it is called, entered but little into their system, for the age in which they wrote accepted the primary facts of grace with as little misgiving as the primary facts of nature. The existence of God and His revelation of Himself were no more doubted than the existence and mortality of man. The Divine Law supplied first principles, which all men accepted. And from these the whole system of divinity and morals was deduced by a proof as strict as that by which the propositions of the several books of Euclid result from the definitions, postulates, and axioms. For, strange as it sounds in these days, with the old Schoolmen "that God was the basis of all truth," "the foundation of all science," "was not a piece of pious rhetoric, but a scientific axiom. Necessary truth is unchangeable, they said, simply on account of His immutability: His All-holy Nature is the source of morality, His Eternal Word the sanction of certainty."† In this spirit they pursued their labours in every department of human thought, freely using in their search after truth every instrument proper for its discovery: observation, induction, deduction, abstraction, speculation: ever breaking fresh ground and everywhere reaping abundant harvests.

* See Coleridge's "Table Talk," p. 338.

† Dalgairns' "Holy Communion," p. 45. Whether or no it be literally true that such language is to be found in the scholastics, they undoubtedly recognize man's knowledge of necessary truths as in reality dependent on the Immutability of God's Nature.

One of the first effects of the "Revival of Letters" was to bring scholasticism into discredit. To "the empty-headed pedants and conceited rhetoricians who had eaten out all that was valuable in their lives in the successful attempt to acquire a correct Latin style,"* the vigorous living medieval Latinity of S. Anselm, S. Thomas, and S. Bonaventure, was a rock of offence. The methods and doctrines of the masters of the medieval schools soon shared in the discredit which was cast upon their diction. Their exactness was vilified as verbal hairsplitting, their profound speculations as idle subtilty, by "an age of conceited, self-sufficient half-learning, of meretricious eloquence, of inflated, arrogant littleness."† And the sciences which they had most highly esteemed and most carefully cultivated suffered earliest and most deeply. The doctors of the Church were deserted for Cicero. Great ecclesiastics shunned, and bade others shun, the reading of the Sacred Scriptures as fatal to "taste." The holiest things were travestied under Pagan disguises.‡ The Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul were described as *Dii titulares Romæ*. Our Lady of Loretto became *Dea Lauretana*. Nay, most horrible profanity of all, upon the Eternal God Himself was bestowed the designation of an evil spirit, and the Most High, "Whom to know is life, and joy to make mention of His name," was spoken of as *Jupiter Optimus Maximus* and *Regnator Olympi*.

The greatest name among the scholars of the Renaissance is that of Desiderius Erasmus. Whatever estimate we may form of his enigmatical character, it is impossible to read his "Colloquies" or his "Praise of Folly" without feeling that he was a man of genius, and so very different from the animated bookcases§ whom his age delighted to honour. In his writings are the materials for most correctly appreciating the philosophical tendencies of the great intellectual movement in which he played a far more important part than he was aware of. It is especially noteworthy how far his mind was removed from—nay, how radically it was opposed to—the fundamental positions of the Catholic theologian. We find in him no real recognition of the truth that the Christian religion rests upon dogma, and that dogma is necessarily based upon authority; that the fact once established of the existence of a Divine Voice, its utterances are their own sanction, and need not that any man should testify of them. On the contrary, he

* See Farrer's "Essay on Greek and Latin Verse Composition," in "Essays on a Liberal Education," p. 237. † *Ibid.*

‡ On this subject see Symonds' "Revival of Learning," p. 396.

§ "He is a bookcase, not a scholar" (Talmud).

subjects not only the grounds of faith but the doctrines of faith to the individual judgment, and claims for it a right to give sentence upon the dicta of the living Oracle of God.* It is unnecessary to remark how entirely the place thus asserted for human reason differs from the office assigned to it by the Catholic Church, which accounts its function in theology to be merely that of judging of her claims to the obedience of men, of examining her gifts, of scrutinizing her notes, which are the credentials of her divine mission. It is equally unnecessary to point out that no theological system can possibly endure which rests upon such a foundation of sand as is here substituted for the rock of Peter. Of course the principle of scepticism and negation laid down by Erasmus did not receive its full development until many generations after him, although some of his immediate disciples went far beyond him, the boldest and most consistent of them being, perhaps, Zwingli.† But the adherents of the new learning were everywhere conspicuous for a contempt of the great masters of the medieval schools, a contempt carried so far that the very name of the Subtle Doctor was degraded into "a byword for invincible stupidity."‡ Everywhere "the litteræ humaniores of the

* This comes out with great clearness in his Preface to his Edition and Translation of the New Testament, where, as Mr. Brewer has well observed, "he proposes to himself to explain the text of Scripture exclusively by the rules of human wisdom, guided by the same principles as are freely applied to classical authors; to subvert the authority of the Vulgate, and to show that much of the popular theology of the day . . . was founded entirely upon a misapprehension of the original meaning and inextricably entangled with the old Latin version; . . . to set aside all rules of interpretation resting merely on faith and authority, and to replace them by the philosophical and historical." "Who does not see," Mr. Brewer goes on to demand, "that the authority of the Church was displaced, and the sufficiency of all men to read and interpret for themselves asserted by the New Testament of Erasmus?" (Brewer, "Calendar of State Papers," vol. ii. p. 1, pref. clxv.) It may be observed in passing that recent scholarship has fully vindicated the superior purity and fidelity of the Vulgate version, and justifies the assertion that the Greek text, which lies at its basis, rests upon better evidence than that of any critical edition yet produced. The worthlessness of Erasmus's work was pointed out by Bentley a century and a half ago. See F. Law's very able dissertation on "The Latin Vulgate as the Authentic Version of the Church."

† Zwingli, as Ranke points out, studied at Basle, where Erasmus's influence was so potent. "It was just the dawn of the revival of classical literature, and its substitution for the scholastic learning of the Middle Ages. Zwingli, like his teachers and friends, espoused this cause, to which he steadily adhered."—Ranke's "Hist. of the Reformation in Germany," vol. iii. p. 62—Eng. trans.

‡ Archbishop Trench, in his "Study of Words," has traced the pedigree of "dunce" from Duns Scotus in two very scholarly and interesting pages. See p. 133, fifteenth edition.

student encroach upon the *divinarum rerum cognitio* of the theologian,"* the result being in the south of Europe the prevalence of a cynical paganism, and in the north the foundation of a multitude of jarring sects, with contradictory and ever-changing symbols, constant only in their implacable hatred of the Catholic religion and of one another.†

This was the effect of the Renaissance upon theology—to discredit it, and, in effect, to strike it out of the circle of the sciences, all of which thence suffered, although in different degrees. The moral and metaphysical, which we vaguely term philosophy, were affected first and most deeply. The close tie which had bound them to theology was severed, and they had to seek elsewhere for the home that they had hitherto found in the household of faith. At first philosophy transferred its allegiance to Antiquity, under the guidance of the neo-Platonists of Italy. But (as Mr. Lewes observes) "this new authority was altogether human, yet without any deep roots in the life of the nation, without any external constituted power, consequently very liable to disunion and disruption, and certain to give way before the necessary insurgence of reason insisting on freedom."‡ It did give way, indeed, but freedom was not the result. Philosophy escaped from the bondage of Classicalism only to fall under the yoke of Materialism, and to issue in Nihilism.

It would be hard to find an example more forcibly illustrating the power of inveterate tradition than the popular notion which still regards Lord Bacon as a master of physics, and the inventor of a new method for arriving at natural truths. It should not, indeed, ordinarily excite surprise in these days of ephemeral literature, and speech as empty as it is fluent, that the multitude of those who talk glibly or write magisterially, *ad populum*, should have little

* Symonds' "Revival of Learning," p. 52.

† Thus Lamennais' "Essai sur l'Indifférence," c. vi. "Plusieurs de ses disciples," he writes, "secouent le joug de fer qu'il [Luther] prétendoit leur imposer. Opposant leurs opinions à ses opinions, leur orgueil à son orgueil, ils bravent ses fureurs et morcellent son empire. De nouvelles sectes s'élèvent, se divisent aussitôt, et se subdivisent à l'infini. On enseigne toute et l'on nie toute doctrine, la confusion de l'enfer n'est pas plus grande, ni son désordre plus effrayant" (p. 203).

‡ Lewes's "Hist. of Philos.," vol. ii. p. 90. It is perhaps almost unnecessary to remark that we are speaking in the text of the school of philosophy which represents the *Zeitgeist* of the Renaissance period. The old Christian principles and method of speculation were still followed by high authorities, some of whom, such as Suarez, Lugo, and Petavius, are worthy successors of the greatest of the schoolmen. But the general stream of European thought was flowing in another direction, and it is with that general stream that we are at present concerned.

knowledge—and that little usually obtained at second-hand—regarding the great names with which they are so insolently familiar. But the works of Lord Macaulay are in every one's hands, and his famous essay—now for forty years before the world—might reasonably have been expected to be fatal to Lord Bacon's reputation as the author of induction. If* any facts about Lord Bacon are clearly established, they are these: that he never invented anything; † that he was strangely ignorant of the achievements of the principal physicists of his own day; and that such knowledge as he did possess was exceedingly inexact. The few isolated truths he is supposed to have discovered may, without exception, be found in the writings of his far greater namesake, whence there is good reason for presuming them to have been "conveyed." It is, indeed, Roger Bacon—the Franciscan Friar of the thirteenth century—who should be regarded as the "pioneer of modern discovery," ‡ the precursor of those inventions which are so triumphantly claimed as the result of the "new philosophy" § of King James the First's Lord Chancellor. It is absolutely certain that the progress of the physical sciences, of which the modern world makes such proud boasting, by no means dates from the revival of letters: it is a simple matter of chronological fact, that "nearly all the inventions whereby we yet live as civilized men," come down to us from the Middle Ages.||

* Macaulay remarks: "Not only is it not true that Bacon invented the inductive method; but it is not true that he was the first person who correctly analyzed that method and explained its use. Aristotle had long ago pointed out the absurdity of supposing that syllogistic reasoning could ever conduct men to the discovery of any new principle, had shown that such discoveries must be made by induction, and by induction alone, and had given the history of the inductive process, concisely indeed, but with great perspicuity and precision.—"Works," vol. vi. p. 228.

A later writer on Bacon (the latest we believe), Mr. Abbott, endeavours, quite unsuccessfully, as it seems to us, to answer Lord Macaulay's strictures, and to draw a distinction between Old Induction and New. See his edition of Bacon's "Essays," Int., p. lxxv.

† Except perhaps his rules for induction, of which it is unnecessary to speak, as by common consent they are acknowledged to be worthless.

‡ See Mr. Brewer's Preface to "Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera quædam hæctenus inedita," vol. i. p. xlvii. At p. lxxxii. Mr. Brewer justly remarks: "So far as the prize is to be given to mere invention, Roger Bacon has superior claims to Lord Bacon." The principal treatises contained in Mr. Brewer's first volume, viz., the "Opus Minus" and the "Opus Tertium," as well as the "Opus Majus," published by Dr. Jebb in 1753, were written at the command of Clement IV.

§ Catalogued by Macaulay in a justly celebrated passage in the Essay, from which we have quoted (p. 222). Now, of course, the catalogue should be largely extended.

|| "Mr. Taylor promulgates many strange articles of faith. . . . He still calls the Middle Ages, during which nearly all the inventions and social

Our mediæval forefathers laboured, and we have entered into their labours, as they in their day reaped what the generations before them had sown. The stream of physical knowledge flows on steadily through the centuries, viresque acquirit eundo. One discovery is almost of necessity the parent of another. Here, as elsewhere, it is true that we are the heirs of all the ages.

It may, then, be securely asserted that Lord Bacon did nothing to merit the praise still commonly bestowed upon him, of having emancipated the study of physics by the introduction of a new method. Nor is it true that such emancipation was wrought by Renaissance ideas. The real effect of the Renaissance upon the natural sciences was to degrade and fetter them by excluding from them the consideration of final causes,* and restricting their purpose to the satisfaction of the needs of man's lower nature. And Lord Bacon's work was to bring all the nobler sciences into captivity to physics thus degraded; in other words, to materialize them. To this end and aim his great intellectual powers and high literary gifts were consistently directed. "Natural philosophy," he affirms to be the "great mother of sciences"; "all the rest," he holds, "if torn from this root, can receive little increase." The "improvement of the conditions of human life," or, in other words, the increase of physical comfort and enjoyment, he states to be the sole end which his Instauration of Philosophy has ever in view.† His contempt for the teaching of the schools, with which, it may be observed, he was but slenderly acquainted, rests upon its supposed barrenness of the production of works for the "use and benefit of man's life."‡ The lowest of the sciences, viewed in their lowest aspect, are exalted by him to the highest place; nay, practically, to the sole place, for the others are recognized only as they subserve these; while the very chief of all—the *divinarum rerum scientia*—without which all the rest are but senseless, is tacitly excluded.

Lord Bacon is the founder of a long tradition of materialism. We are far from saying that he foresaw the natural and necessary consequences of his teaching. We gladly think he

institutions, whereby we yet live as civilized men, were originated or perfected, a "millennium of darkness," on the faith chiefly of certain long-past pedants, who reckoned everything barren because Chrysoloras had not yet come, and no Greek roots grew there."—Carlyle's "Miscel.," vol. ii. p. 328.

* Lord Bacon has, we think, somewhere a very characteristic observation, that "final causes are like vestals, consecrated to God and barren."

† See a well-known passage in his "Redargutio Philosophiarum."

‡ "Advancement of Learning," book i.

did not; indeed, could not. But it is absolutely certain that Hobbes and Spinoza, Locke and Hume, Descartes and Condillac were intellectually his children.* Faust has expressed for us what their teaching amounts to—

Und sehe das wir nichts wissen können—

To know that nothing can be known, is the legitimate outcome of Lord Bacon's doctrine. The history of mental and moral speculation from his time is in the main—we gladly recognize signal exceptions—a career of barren negation,† issuing in the conclusion accurately expressed by a recent author (*ridentem dicere verum, quid vetat*) "that the wondrous All is matter, and that all matter is atoms; that in the last analysis a pig and a martyr, a prayer and a beef-steak are just the same, atoms and atomic movement."‡ Is this to remove restrictions from the true development and right exercise of the human faculties? To make a *tabula rasa* of all the dearest hopes and loftiest aspirations of the human race; to banish the idea of God, and with it, of necessity, the ideas of virtue and duty from the world; to bind man fast in the misery and iron of inexorable physical laws; to shroud his vision in the darkness of absolute all-embracing doubt; in a word, to make of him, according to Cabanis' doctrine, "a digesting-tube, open at both ends,"§ — is this a "new birth unto liberty"? Surely death rather. "Sine adjutorio, inter mortuos liber, sicut vulnerati dormientes in sepulchris," is the true description of the freedom which Renaissance philosophy has conferred upon man. Well may we exclaim with the dying Roland, "O Liberty, what things are done in thy name!"

Our task is well-nigh ended, and perhaps we ought here to

* See Cabanis, "Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme," vol. i. pref. p. x. and p. 28, for some very just observations on this point.

† We are speaking of the most influential, we may, indeed, say of the dominant, school; but we would not have it inferred that we regard mediaeval philosophy as being alone sufficient for the wants of these times (such a view would, in our judgment, be a calamitous error), or that we undervalue the legitimate conquests of the modern mind.

‡ "New Republic," vol. ii. p. 60.

§ We do not find this phrase in Cabanis: we think we have met with it somewhere in Dr. Brownson's writings; and it seems to us correctly to sum up the "Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme." Mr. Lewes, however, remarks: "I do not think that he meant what he is supposed by his antagonists to have meant" ("Hist. of Philos.," vol. ii. p. 394). In reply to which we would ask, Did Cabanis himself ever repudiate that meaning? His protestations towards the end of his preface appear to us, in effect, to admit it.

offer an apology for the vast extent over which we have travelled in accomplishing it. Our apology lies in the fact that such wide expatiation was unavoidable for even the most superficial discussion of the question which we have proposed to ourselves. How superficial our discussion has been we well know, nor are we careful to answer the reproach of "sketchiness" to which we have laid ourselves open. That, too, is a necessary condition of the attempt to handle so great a subject in a review article,—a subject involving not only all that we have touched upon, but much more, and demanding for its complete elaboration the labour of years, as well as learning of an encyclopædial character probably not possessed in these days by any man. If what we have written at all adumbrates the true view about this matter (as we feel confident it does, however faintly), we are content. "The best in this kind are but shadows." It is enough for us to have shown, in any degree, that neither in politics nor in literature, in art nor in science was the great spiritual revolution which we call the Renaissance a new birth unto liberty. What it was, one of the keenest intellects of our own times—the Mephistophiles of modern literature—has told us. The work of Luther Heine reckons to have been the emancipation of the flesh; in "the revived love for Grecian art and science" he sees a reaction against Christian spiritualism; the whole movement—one in all its diversities of expression—he characterizes as a revolt against the religion which had ruled the world for a thousand years.* And he is right. That was the work of the Renaissance; and it is precisely this character of revolt which is written upon it that has won for it the reputation of an emancipatory movement. But not every rebellion issues in liberty. Rebellion against true authority is a certain step to slavery. Even the Eternal God works according to "that law eternal which Himself hath made to Himself";† and for man there is no liberty except in obedience to the highest laws of his being. Men must be either "servi peccati" or "servi justitiæ."

The sensual and the dark rebel in vain,
Slaves by their own compulsion.

The very rule of faith which was rejected in the name

* "De l'Allemagne," vol. i. pp. 44, 201, 215.

† Hooker, "Ec. Pol.," book i. c. 2, sec. 5. We understand Hooker to mean what is better expressed by S. Thomas:—"Lex aeterna summa ratio in Deo existens; ratio divinæ sapientiæ secundum quod est directiva omnium motuum et actionum" ("Sum. Th.," I. 2, q. 93, art. 1). The word "made" is obviously out of place in speaking of a law eternal in the Divine mind.

of freedom is in truth the "lex perfecta libertatis." It is a remark of de Tocqueville's—hackneyed indeed, but as true as it is hackneyed, "Si un peuple veut être libre, il faut qu'il ait des croyances, et s'il n'a pas qu'il serve."

One word more of explanation would seem to be necessary; nay, to be due to ourselves. We should be sorry if, from what we have said of the last three centuries, it were inferred that we are of those who mistake remembrances for hopes, and dream of the resuscitation of an extinct past. Not so. We are not ignorant that the past never returns. All the works of man, like man himself, tend to dissolution. The sentence of death has passed upon them, "The old order changeth, giving place to the new"; and that by a beneficent necessity, "Lest one good custom should corrupt the world." Rightly has the great German poet spoken of the "loom of time," and the web that is woven therein, tangled mass of confusion, as it seems to us, whereof we can distinguish but the merest fragment, and that too, per speculum et in ænigmate, is in truth,

The garment of life which the Deity wears.

It is well observed by F. Newman, "The course of events, the revolution of empires, the rise and fall of States, the periods and eras, the progresses and retrogressions of the world's history, not indeed the incidental sin, over-abundant as it is, but the great outlines and the results of human affairs, are from His disposition,* 'of whom and through whom and for whom are all things.'" Nor can the practical lesson thus derivable be better expressed than in the words of Hooker:—

Therefore, although there seem unto us confusion and disorder in the affairs of this present world, Tamen quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat, recte fieri cuncta ne dubites; let no man doubt but that everything is well done, because the world is ruled by so good a guide as transgresseth not His own law, than which nothing can be more absolute perfect and just. The book of this law, we are neither able nor worthy to open and look into. The little thereof which we darkly apprehend, we admire; the rest, with religious ignorance, we humbly and meekly adore.†

And let it not be said that this is optimism. It is not optimism but faith. The optimistic view of human history that finds expression in the modern cant of progress—the most loathsome and fatal, perhaps, of all the varieties of cant which vex the world—is very different from this. It is not true that there is a constant advance of mankind in virtue and happi-

* J. H. Newman's "Idea of a University," Discourse iii.

† Hooker's "Ecc. Pol.," book i. c. ii.

ness, as in secular knowledge and the material arts of life. The right conception of the history of human society is that of a perpetual struggle, the "double"* and outcome of the conflict waged in each individual heart. The spiritual order, which is the conscience of the world, is ever doing battle with the Paganism innate in human nature, the very essence of which is to "worship and serve the creature more than the Creator."† The Renaissance was in the main a triumph of Paganism—a triumph destined to endure through a few brief centuries of the world's history. Why such triumph was permitted we know not, as we know not why evil was suffered to arise, nor why it is suffered to exist. But we know that while in the physical order the rule of necessity serves to show God's liberty, so in the moral order, by man's liberty is manifested God's necessity or providence;‡ we know that the laws by which the course of nations as of individual men is guided both arouse and counterbalance freewill, without restricting moral responsibility or affecting the recompense awarded by the Divine Judge to human works. This, we know, and it is enough. Enough, but not more than enough; for what other solution of the enigma of human life can render the burden of existence tolerable? What but this makes us to differ from the filthy Yahoos of the most terrible of satirists? What but this upholds us from a lower grovelling than that of the "long series of extinct worms" to which certain physicists of the day, "whose glory is in their shame," proudly trace back our pedigree, through "twenty-two distinct stages of evolution"?§

* *Ecclus.* xlii. 25.

† *Ep. S. Pauli ad Romanos*, c. i. v. 25.

‡ See Coleridge's "Table Talk," p. 250, where this thought is expressed in other words.

§ Haeckel's "Anthropogenia," p. 399, quoted in Elam's "Winds of Doctrine," p. 158. Pope little dreamed how literally the "science" of the next century would adopt his words:—

"How much, egregious Moore, are we
Deceived by shows and forms!
Whate'er we think, whate'er we see,
All human kind are worms."

See his "Verses to Mr. John Moore, Author of the celebrated Worm Powder."

ART. IV.—CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.—PART II.

The Creed of Christendom. By W. G. GREG. Introduction to the Third edition.

Principles of Political Economy. By J. S. MILL. Sixth edition.

De la Richesse dans les Sociétés Chrétiennes. Par CHARLES PÉRIN. Second edition. 1868.

Report on Poor Laws in Foreign Countries. Accounts and Papers. 1875. Vol. lxxv.

WE propose in this article to discuss some of the mistaken views as to charity. To put order into the discussion, we will consider in succession four leading errors. The first says, charity is demoralizing to the lower classes; the second, that it injures them by reducing wages; the third, that it is needless, as we can so much better help them by accumulating wealth and increasing our income; the fourth, that we can so much better help them by a handsome expenditure on luxuries for ourselves.

Let us now look at the first of these errors. Charity, it is said, is demoralizing. The giver looks to the apparently beneficial effects of relief, the hunger satisfied, the bare feet shod, the empty home refurnished; and thinks, because he no longer sees the unpleasant externals of poverty, that all is well; when, in reality, he has done mischief, which is none the less mischief, because not immediate and obvious, but indirect and veiled. For, by the example of aiding those in distress, he teaches the poor to harbour the expectation that they too, when their turn of misfortune comes, will find help; and thus he saps the foundation of industry, prudence, and foresight, fosters insubordination and idleness, fosters reckless expenditure and luxurious consumption, and (it is sometimes added) fosters also reckless multiplication. Consequently, by following his feelings, rather than his reason, or by blindly obeying the precepts of antiquated religions, he is a most active agent in spreading and perpetuating the misery which he fancies he is relieving. And, as if this were not enough, he strikes a tremendous blow at family life; and, instead of a parent being filled with a keen sense of the responsibility of bringing up and helping on his children, he quickly learns the lesson of abandoning them to the care of the so-called benevo-

lent; and, when sickness, distress, or old age comes upon him, these children, as is only natural, abandon him with equal readiness to these mischievous intermediaries. And these theoretical propositions are confirmed by abundant experience, so that we might take as the motto for any work on almsgiving the dictum of M. Cherbuliez: "*L'indigence est historiquement aussi bien qu'en théorie un produit de la bienfaisance*,"* which we may render: Both in theory and in fact misery is the result of charity.†

* Apud Corbière, "*Économie Sociale*," ii. pp. 357-358.

† Similarly Signor Fano (in Sir A. Paget's "Report on Poor Relief in Italy; Accounts and Papers." 1875. Vol. lkv. p. 459): "Misery increases in proportion to the relief which it finds, and misery and relief are alternately cause and effect." This, we think also, is the view of Mr. Greg. We say "think," because, as, in our last article we had occasion to remark, the oracular language of this writer is somewhat difficult for ordinary readers to interpret. In the Introduction, dated 1873, to the third edition of the "*Creed of Christendom*," he notices how the obligation of almsgiving has been recognized in theory and in practice by Christians, and is to this day nearly as prevalent and influential as ever. Then he tells us: "Yet nothing can be more certain than that all this is very wrong, and does infinite mischief." But then he immediately begins (as Lord Lyttelton notices in the *Contemporary Review*, June, 1875) to "hedge." He says, "*the more literally the precept*" ("*Give to him that asketh of thee*") "*is obeyed, the more harm does it do*. No conclusion has been more distinctly or definitely proved than that nearly all charity, popularly so called,—more especially all indiscriminate almsgiving—is simply and singularly noxious." (The italics here are ours: in the following citations they are the author's.) However, the main drift of his remarks seems evidently to attack all almsgiving; at any rate, in "civilized" countries. "The form which charity has a tendency to assume in societies, so complicated as all civilized societies are growing now, is such as to drain the practice of nearly all its incidental good, and aggravate its peculiar mischiefs. The almsgiver has not his kindly feelings called forth by personal intercourse with the poor; he *subscribes*, he does not *give*; and charitable endowments and bequests are ingenious contrivances for diffusing the most wide-spread pauperism. The consentaneous voice of modern benevolence and statesmanship alike is crying out against almsgiving as a mischief and a sin. Every one conversant with the question, all true lovers of their fellow-men,—all earnest and practical labourers in the field of social improvement, in the precise measure of their experience agree that, in all schemes and efforts for rectifying the terrible evils of our crowded civilization, the most ubiquitous and insurmountable impediments arise out of the practice of indiscriminate almsgiving and systematic charity. Nor is it in England only that almsgiving is bad. It is bad everywhere; it is bad even in the East; it is very bad in Italy; it is worst of all, perhaps, in Spain. Everywhere it *creates* a special class of the worthless and the vicious, who soon become the criminal. *It is of its essence to do this*" (pp. lxi.—lxiv.). In the text we shall see what to think of this view of almsgiving. Here we have rather to direct attention to the remarkable knowledge of facts and theories claimed by Mr. Greg; to his intimate acquaintance with the social state of the East, of Italy, and of Spain, and with the causes of this state; to his knowledge not merely of some of the views on almsgiving of modern statesmen and philan-

Such is the enemy's position against which, before making our formal attack, we will cast a few light weapons. First, let us look what consequences would seem logically to follow from such a theory; how the greater part of our hospitals and asylums and other charitable institutions would have to be closed, how the Gospel would have to be publicly burnt as a dangerous book, and the Sisters of Charity suppressed, and the names of all great almsgivers from Zacchæus to S. Vincent of Paul, to be held up to public execration,* and the rising generation to be taught to suppress those feelings of compassion and generous self-sacrifice for the poor and suffering which have been thought to be among the noblest parts of our nature, and, as they pass by Lazarus lying at the gate, to feel a righteous indignation at his improvidence, and to tell him in plain English that his misery serves him right, or, as a variation to accost him more politely with the French "*Aide toi-même et Dieu t'aidera.*" And then some of the foregoing objections to almsgiving seem to be in contradiction with what our modern social teachers have taught us. If we learnt our lesson aright, we thought that marriage was a contract which, like a business partnership, should be dissoluble at the option of either party; that, in the young, should be fostered a spirit, not of reverence, but of liberty and independence; that, in short, the "family life," as commonly understood, was a mischievous "survival" of an earlier "stage of evolution"; and then, if almsgiving strikes a blow at family life, this is a fact *in favour of* and not against almsgiving. Moreover, if the greatest temporal happiness of the greatest number is the desirable aim of all social institutions, and if idleness is more pleasant than industry, we cannot quite understand how it is any *objection* to almsgiving that it enables multitudes to live in idleness.

Let these points, however, be passed over, and coming to more serious argument, let us make the issue clearer by two preliminary remarks. First, we do not deny that when material aid is given to the poor *without* the observance of those conditions which we set forth at length in our former paper (DUBLIN REVIEW, Oct., 1877, pp. 377—385), when, namely, the moral reform of the poor is *not* sought after, or when the gift

thropists, but of the *consentaneous voice* of all, and of what *all* right-minded and experienced social reformers think hereon; and lastly, to his amiable implication that every one with knowledge, good sense, and good-will, does, in fact, take his view, that is, that any one who does not, as regards almsgiving, adopt the anti-Christian view of the liberal economists, is either a dunce, a fool, or a knave.

* Cf. Corbière, "*Economie Sociale*," ii. pp. 358—359.

is considered as a disgrace, or when the relievers of the poor are *not* lovers of the poor, or when there is *absence* of circumspection and generosity, or of organization and permanence, or, lastly, when the help is *not* derived from a free gift, but from a compulsory tax, in such cases truly enough some or all of the evils urged above may be generated; and the past and present effect of the English poor-law may be cited as an example. But the truth that spurious charity, conducted in defiance of Christian principles, is likely to cause demoralization is hardly a proof, or even a presumption, that genuine Christian charity will do the same. Our second preliminary remark is, that even where the conditions for the efficacy of charity are observed, we will concede that some of the above-named evils may be caused in individual and exceptional cases. But these evils are altogether outweighed by the benefits, notably the benefit of moral reform, caused by true Christian poor-relief; which, in this point, does but possess the common feature of all human institutions or bodies, of which the most beneficial, as educational establishments, or the medical profession, or the civil government are sure, exceptionally and *per accidens*, to do mischief, though the sum of mischief done is altogether outweighed by the sum of good.

Having said thus much in introduction, let us now give our formal answer to the objection of demoralization. It presupposes the truth of the two propositions, that the mass of misery is due to the fault of the sufferers, or, at least, to the fault of their family, and that the anticipation of relief fosters such faults. Now we contest both of these propositions. And first, as to the causes of misery, we can refer back to our previous article, where we discussed them at length. Of the sixteen heads there given, the greater number are of such a character that the misery coming from them cannot be attributed to the fault of the sufferers or of their parents. Are we to reproach a man because he is starving in the midst of a famine, or because a hostile army has destroyed all his property, or because he is ruined by an unjust lawsuit or treacherous friend, or because his substance, in spite of all his efforts, decays through excessive taxation, or through long and forced absences on military service; or, again, because he is turned out of house and home to make room for sheep or game, or because he is thrown out of work by a commercial crisis for which he is not in the least responsible, or by a change in fashion, or by the invention of machinery or new processes of production, or by the overwork of others, or by the employment of women and children; or, further, because he is rack-rented by an unscrupulous landlord, or because his

wages are reduced to a minimum by an unscrupulous employer, by whom, moreover, when worn out by overwork he is ruthlessly dismissed? In such cases as these, the argument from demoralization falls to the ground, and we see an immense field lying open for almsgiving without danger of demoralization, as is plain. But driven from one half of his fortress, the enemy may all the more desperately defend the other, and urge that it is equally plain that, at least in many cases, misery is due to the vice and improvidence of the lower classes; that we ourselves have expressly given these causes as two of our heads of causes of misery; that, moreover, accidents affecting individuals and the congestion of population, can, as far as causing misery, be reduced to vice and improvidence; and that in such cases, at any rate, charity demoralizes. But even here we will not suffer that odious charge to remain unanswered.

To gain an *à fortiori* argument, we will put aside all cases where the vice and improvidence of the poor can be clearly attributed to the shameful acts or omissions of the rich, or where the previous revenue of the sufferers has been such as to allow no savings to meet accidents or sickness, or where the fall from a higher station of life and the humiliation of being reduced by one's own vice or folly to be supported by others is, in itself, a terrible punishment, and would have to be admitted as a sufficient deterrent from vice or folly, even though lavish almsgiving averted material suffering, or made it speedily to cease. Putting aside these cases, we take those where the sufferer is one of the lower classes, and is in want through his own fault, his indigence being the result of his past misconduct. And here we deny that Christian charity applied to such a one fosters idleness, improvidence, and neglect of family duty. As to the individual himself, it can hardly be seriously maintained that he is encouraged in vice by the efforts to reform him, by advice, exhortation, consoling words, or by material relief that may cease if he relapse into vicious habits. Rather, his fall into destitution and material misery may have benefited him as giving an occasion upon which watchful and loving Christian charity has seized, in order to change whatever may be amiss in his life. This may be admitted, but then it can be said that the evil is not asserted to affect the individual who is helped, but others who, by the spectacle of this man, saved with his family from the extremes of suffering, compassionated, consoled, set up again, are encouraged in idleness, vice, and improvidence, as they no longer fear their ill effects. But even this statement will not hold ground; in other words, it is not true to say that help

given to those who are in misery through their own fault, will, when the conditions for the efficacy of charity are observed, have the effect, except perhaps in a few individual cases, of encouraging idleness, vice, improvidence, and neglect of parental and filial duties. The appeal is to the effect on others of the spectacle of charity. Now, first of all, it may well be questioned whether the spectacle of charity exercised as we have described, and as seen in the private charity of modern France, is, in itself, likely to "encourage" in misconduct. Are the vicious encouraged unless relief allows them to continue unmolested in their vices? Are not the improvident and reckless more likely to be rendered quite wild and desperate, instead of prudent, by all hope of relief in case of ruin being cut off? And this argument from demoralization goes too far, or rather, is a terrible weapon, which those who use it may find turned against themselves. If the irremissibility of hell is to be brought on earth, and, in order to keep men industrious and frugal, the terrible spectacle is needed of unforgiven, unhelped victims, then, not to speak of the danger of driving multitudes to despair, there is the question why this terrible principle should be applied only to almsgiving. Let no doctor attend those sick through their own fault, as by gluttony or debauchery, or even carelessness; let no surgeon dress the wounds inflicted in a duel or quarrel, or preventible accident; let no lawyer help one whose affairs are in disorder through his own imprudence or negligence.* The inscription over the gate of Hell would, with a slight alteration, be fit for earth: "Leave hope behind, all ye who once fall here!" Again, consider whither, in another direction, this argument from demoralization leads us. If the anticipation of the comparatively small gifts received as alms demoralizes, how much more the anticipation of the large gifts habitually expected by the rich from living or dead relatives! Let those who are so clamorous as to the idleness of the poor, and would cut off from them all unearned gifts as demoralizing, look to themselves and answer, if they can, the proposal, that in order to prevent the demoralization of the children, the relatives and the friends of the rich—to prevent their being "encouraged" in idleness, improvidence, and neglect of family duties, no one be allowed to receive by gift or inheritance more than the bare necessities of life.†

* See Corbière, "*Économie Sociale*," ii. pp. 356—364, 397, 398.

† *Ad rem Liberatore*, "*La Chiesa e lo Stato*," 1871, p. 332: "È curioso in vero questo zelo dei progressivisti moderni contro l'oziosità della classe indigente. Nessun predicatore, nessuno scrittore di ascetica o di morale ne ha mostrato mai altrettanto. Senonchè l'ozio è vizio non solo pel povero, ma

And finally, as our chief and main argument, we say that it is irrational to look only at one part of Christian doctrine and practice without considering the rest and the relation of this part to the whole. The Church teaches and performs other things besides almsgiving, and what concerns us here is her teaching as to labour, as to frugality, and as to family life. By the example of her Founder and her saints, she has honoured even the lowest kinds of labour. She teaches that both rich and poor are bound to work, the one in order to administer his riches according to God's will, the other lest he diminish the bread of those who are unable to work, and in order that he himself may become an almsgiver. Self-sacrifice is the common law for both, and the rich man squandering his riches in luxury, and the able-bodied poor man not using his ability, but eating in idleness the bread of the true poor, are both thieves from the Christian point of view.* And how the Christian teaching and practice has exalted family life, and ever urged the greatness and gravity of the mutual obligations of parents and children, of husbands and wives, is too well known to require proof or illustration! Now, where these doctrines are being impressed upon the people, and where the distribution of alms is, as it should be, in the hands of the Church, she is not afraid that her compassionate treatment of the fallen individual will have a demoralizing effect upon the rest; who rather will be incited by another brother having fallen into need, to labour more and consume less—to be even yet more industrious and parsimonious, so as to come to his assistance. And these remarks give us also the answer to those melancholy cases where the sufferer is innocent, and the guilty cause is out of reach, namely, the cases of foundlings, deserted wives, and neglected aged parents. The law, indeed, here should be very strict both in theory and execution. But whatever the law, Christian charity does not shrink from helping such unfortunate persons for fear of encouraging fresh desertions, knowing well that the remedy for such evils is given by Christian teaching, and not by exposing the innocent victims to the

anchè pel ricco. Anzi più per questo secondo; giacchè se è incitamento a pravità, lo è massimamente per quelli, che hanno più mezzi a sbizzarirsi e pascolare le passioni. L'obbligo poi di lavorare fu imposto a tutti da Dio. *In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane*, è gastigo e comando dato a tutto il genere umano, nella persona di Adamo. Perchè dunque strepitare tanto contro l'ozio del povero, che si sciurina qualche ora al sole, dopo aver mendicato un tozzo; e non trovare una sola parola di biasimo contro l'ozio dei ricchi, che marciscono nei solazzi, e consumano la vita in giuochi, in balli, in teatri, in lunghi sonni, dopo la non breve gozzoviglia di lautissime mense?"

* See Ratzinger, "Geschichte der Kirchl. Armenpflege," p. 7, seq.

extremes of misery. This last-named remedy for human vice and folly is indeed stupid as well as cruel; and we might as well object to all mitigations of the horror of war, all care for the sick and wounded, lest we encourage nations to go to war. The great mass of those who abandon their wives, or children, or parents, must *first* have sunk into moral degradation before they would begin to calculate whether others would take care of the abandoned; and what must be remedied is this previous degradation. Again, though in many cases they would feel a certain satisfaction if those whom they abandoned were well cared for, this does not at all prove that they would forego such abandonment if this care was withdrawn. A terrible illustration of how such abandonment may not be foregone can be taken from imperial Rome, where one great source of the supply of slaves was in deserted children, and speculators went round by night to select the finest of these children to be reared as gladiators, eunuchs, or prostitutes.* What further discouragement to the desertion of children could the economists have wished?

We hope now to have given, at any rate, some sort of answer to the charge that Christian charity demoralizes. But here we may be met by an appeal to "facts." It may be said that it is "abundantly evident" that almsgiving does increase misery; and we may be referred to the dogmatic utterance of Mr. Greg, cited above, that almsgiving is "bad everywhere," "very bad in Italy," "worst of all perhaps in Spain." Now, into this matter we at present decline to enter; for to treat it fitly an entire history of Christian charity would have to be written, and elaborate evidence collected as to the moral, social, and economical condition of Catholic countries. Here we will only urge most strongly that in any such discussion there must be a strict observance of the logical rules of reasoning and evidence. Let us illustrate this from the Report of Sir A. Paget in the Blue-book on foreign poor relief.† In this Report, treating of Italy as distinct from Rome, he gives figures showing how in the various Italian provinces the means provided for the relief of the poor are least precisely where the misery of the population in modern times has always been the greatest, and how the most prosperous regions have the largest charitable endowments compared with the population. From this can be drawn the conclusion that large charitable endowments do not *always* cause misery, and that the absence of them does not

* Allard, "Les Esclaves Chrétiens," 1876, pp. 353-360.

† "Accounts and Papers," 1875, vol. lxx. p. 460.

always avert misery. But were some charitable person more zealous than wise to say that these Italian statistics show that misery was always in inverse proportion to charitable endowments, this would be a rash generalization liable to be overthrown by a *single* contrary example, though it was in some obscure corner of South America or in some remote period of history. But these statistics do confute, or at least render improbable to an extreme degree, the statement of Signor Fano, mentioned in the same report, that profusion of charity is in *Italy* one of the chief causes of misery.

In the same report Sir A. Paget points to the case of Rome as favouring Signor Fano's theory; and speaks of the "lavish almsgiving" at Rome, of "the wide diffusion of its squalid indigence," of the "magnitude of its many-sided mendicity." First, supposing this statement true, it will not favour the said theory. For the coexistence in a single case of vast almsgiving and vast destitution is not even the smallest presumption that the latter is caused by the former. And even supposing the reverse of what seems to be the case, and that throughout Italy misery in each separate locality was more instead of less prevalent in proportion to the local charitable endowments and almsgiving, this would be no *proof* that the endowments and alms were the *cause* of the misery; for the misery might be due to other causes, and the charitable aid admirably apportioned to the local varieties of distress.* And then, in judging of the truth of the above statements as to Rome, we must remember, as regards the credibility of the witness, that whereas there is no ground, of which we are aware, for suspecting him of bias

* We commend this very obvious remark to the notice of Mr. Barron, the reporter on Belgian poor-relief, and Mr. A. S. Harvey, commenting thereon in the *Contemporary Review*, Jan., 1876, p. 269. The Belgian poor-relief, indeed, as far as granted and administered by the State, we are called upon rather to denounce than to defend. But, whoever may profit by it, we must stand up for the principles of right reasoning in these matters. Now, supposing the fact true (and we see no ground for supposing that it is not true), that in Belgium destitution is greatest where relief is greatest, notably in the rich manufacturing districts, while in Luxembourg there are scarcely any charitable funds or distress, this does not show that the relief causes the destitution. Rather the destitution may have called forth the relief, and itself be due to other causes. That this is the case we think might be easily shown. If Luxembourg is antiquated, rural, and religious, the absence of misery is amply explained without attributing it to the smallness of relief. If in the manufacturing districts economical and political Liberalism has for years had full sway, the most abject degradation and destitution of the lower classes could be amply explained without attributing it to the abundance of relief. We can refer to what we have said on the causes of misery in our former article, especially under the fourteenth head, on neglect or oppression of dependents.

in his previous statement on endowments, his known hostility to the former Papal Government makes him untrustworthy as to any observation of facts likely to throw discredit on that government. And this applies also to Signor Fano.

Obvious as are such principles of reasoning and observation when stated by themselves, it is nevertheless not easy to keep to them closely in the midst of a heated argument. Yet keep to them we must if our argument is to be valid; and Catholics, who have the whole truth on their side, cannot be too careful never to violate these rules of logic, lest they forfeit the claim to insist on their observance.

We now come to the second charge against almsgiving, that it injures the lower classes by reducing wages; either directly, by enabling the recipients of alms to work for less than those who are not similarly subsidized, thus bringing down the general rate of wages; or indirectly, by fostering an increase of population, and thus increasing the candidates for the wage-fund. Now first of all we may notice whither this view would lead us. To rear destitute orphans and deserted children becomes an injury to the poor, as these fresh competitors for hire will be likely (if the said view is true) to reduce the rate of wages. Similarly, to give help to a workman who is sick, or has met with an accident, is a crime against his fellows. But this by no means only applies to charitable service and charitable funds. Good doctors and good nurses become the enemies of the working classes; and a labouring man with a balance at a savings-bank, or a share in a co-operative society, or a laboriously-acquired bit of garden-land, inasmuch as he receives a certain revenue from these sources, is able to take less wages, and consequently (according to the said theory) reduce the general rate.* And secondly, we say, this charge against almsgiving presupposes that the bulk of the poor are workers for hire, and further, that wages are regulated by competition. But these conditions have been absent in the greater part of the world in the greater part of historical times; and thus the objection is inapplicable to almsgiving as existing in most places and times. And as to those exceptional times and places where the unorganized workmen have bid one against another for employment, and unscrupulous employers have taken advantage of this to reduce wages to the lowest point, we might be content to answer that so hateful a disorder could well be expected to turn the best institutions into mischief, and that

* This analogy is admitted by Schaeffle, who urges the objection in question against almsgiving,—“*Nationalökonomie*,” § 291. Third edition.

instead of declaiming against almsgiving a prompt remedy should be put to this disorder. But even here there could be copious almsgiving without producing the evil effects alleged; for (not to speak of the immaterial gifts of counsel and consolation, of friendship and sympathy), the material gift, when consisting not of bare necessities, but of what the poor family would otherwise have entirely gone without, does not enable an unscrupulous master to reduce the wages of the recipient. The home may be made decent, the children kept clean, the whole family enabled to take an occasional holiday, the sick given delicacies, and many similar material benefits conferred, which otherwise would not have been obtained at all. In such cases, then, there is no need to suppose that almsgiving must be exercised in the stupid fashion of the English allowance system, when the parish authorities supplemented wages out of the poor-rates, with the apparent consequence of reducing wages in proportion to the amount thus added, so that the farmers shifted a portion of their expenses on to the rate-payers, and the labourers gained nothing.* Such an abuse could hardly have occurred but for the neglect, among other things, of two notable conditions of Christian charity, the freedom of the gift, and the exercise of circumspect generosity by the giver.

Having answered the two errors which say that charity is mischievous, we come now to the two which say that it is needless. These two last both start from a common assumption, though differing in the conclusions they draw from it. The true way, it is said, of benefiting the labouring classes is not by doling out alms, which only increase their idleness and helplessness, but by giving them the opportunity of helping themselves by honest industry. So the "*bon bourgeois*," of whom Mgr. Dupanloup tells us ("*Charité Chrétienne*," p. 25), and who, when a lady collecting for some charity reproached him with never giving to the poor, answered, "*Madam, in never giving to the poor I exercise the highest philanthropy: I teach them the law of labour.*" So far the two views we are considering keep together; but on the further question of how labour is to be given to the working classes, they part company, and the one tells us to save, the other to spend. The first, which may be called the view of the liberal economists, is the most specious of the two, and shall be answered first. They say that industrial accumulation, namely, the accumulation of capital, or means of production, is the true mode of doing good to the labouring classes, as these can thereby

* See Mill, "*Political Economy*," bk. ii. ch. xii. § 4.

obtain good wages and constant employment. Now, let no one think it is our wish to prove that this industrial accumulation is bad; or, indeed, to say anything in its praise or dispraise, except only to show that it is not a substitute for almsgiving or similar help to the poor. This only is to the point. And to the point then let us come, and say (a) that this mode of helping by offering work gives, first of all, no direct or immediate help to those who need it most—to the sick and injured, and to those too young or too old to work; and then, (b) that although it may be quite true that by accumulating the means of production the demand for *labour* is increased, this by no means implies necessarily that there is a corresponding increase in the demand for *labourers*, for the extra demand for labour can be met by those who already, from the Christian point of view, work hard enough and long enough, working harder and longer; and (c) that even, if extra “labourers” are wanted, this may only result in the employment of women, with the consequent ruin of home life, or of children, with the consequent ruin of education or of the joyous spring-time of childhood; and (d) that, therefore, this alleged cure for misery, while it can hardly hinder, can certainly prodigiously “encourage” the improvidence, idleness, and luxury of the working classes, the most prolific immediate causes of misery. Further, (e) this view idly supposes the existence of abstract general “labourers” capable of turning to anything, whereas, in reality, there are no such beings, but masons and hodmen, tailors and cotton-spinners, colliers and farm hands, and the rest; and different employments are separated by barriers that for a time, and in some cases permanently, are insuperable. The weaver, for example, cannot be made on a sudden, perhaps never at all, into a ploughman or a navvy, nor the shipwright into a shoemaker; and, consequently, when in a given trade a multitude are thrown out of work through the introduction of machinery, or through the reckless speculations of the employers, they receive no help, because in other trades, through the accumulations of philanthropic *bons bourgeois* and others, there is an increased demand for labour; and such demand, instead of benefiting them, is much more likely to result in overwork of other workmen, and in the employment of women and children. Again, (f) this view idly supposes the existence of a “wages fund” that is certain in any case to be divided among the “labourers”; whereas, in reality, the whole result of the accumulator’s highest philanthropy may be, besides a continuous and most satisfactory increase of his own revenue, to put more money into the pocket of one or several employers, who may increase

their consumption in proportion, and the labouring classes, or rather the industrial hired workmen, as a whole gain nothing. Moreover, (*g*) if the labouring classes as a whole, gain, precisely those may get more who were already well paid, and may spend ill the extra gain, while the poor and weak, and uncombined and downtrodden, gain nothing; so that the effect of this grand substitute for Christian charity, supposing the lower classes get by it anything at all, is like indiscriminate alms in money, with no security that the deserving poor shall receive, or that what is received shall be well spent. And (*h*) in the state of society which has perhaps been most general in the world, where, namely, the bulk or a large body of the people are not hired labourers, but peasant owners or small tenants, or petty traders and handicraftsmen on their own account, this mode of relief (or rather of pretending to relieve) is inapplicable. Lastly (*i*), we may notice how this plan does nothing for the union of classes, for mutual love and gratitude, and personal familiarity between rich and poor; for the spirit of contentment, for the fulfilment of religious duties—some of the most valuable results of true charity. But we will not press this argument, as these things have perhaps neither value in exchange, nor value in use, for the economical mind.

In answering the error of the economists, we have, in fact, answered that other error which equally recommends giving labour as a substitute for giving alms, only that as regards the further question of how labour is to be given, it recommends expenditure instead of accumulation. We might then dismiss this error as disproved *à pari*; but as some of our readers may wish this strange delusion both fully stated and fully answered, we will try to do both. It is, indeed, a consoling doctrine for the rich, and establishes a delightful harmony between virtue and pleasure. Instead of that gloomy teaching being true, that there is need of self-denial in order to benefit others, we find that we can benefit them far more by indulging ourselves. The grander our house, the more numerous our servants, the more delicate our table, the costlier our wine; the more lavishly, in short, we spend our money upon our own luxuries and amusements, the better friends we are to the poor, since we increase the demand for labour, and consequently the amount of wages at the disposal of the needy. "We give them, therefore, the means of living at the same time that we procure for them the work which preserves them from the vices of idleness. Thus luxury generates poor-relief without there being any need to resort to self-sacrifice; and, moreover, procures it for the destitute in such

a way as not to humble their pride ; making them gain it under the form of wages instead of giving it them under the form of alms."* But to this view there are many objections. First of all, in so far as professing to help the distressed by increasing the demand for labour, and thus giving employment to the lower classes, it is liable to the nine objections already urged against the error of the economists, and to those objections we refer back. And, secondly, this view has a peculiar absurdity of its own ; and it is this, that as a rule the luxurious expenditure recommended does not increase the demand for labour, or if for a short time it does so, it causes a more than proportionate diminution of the demand subsequently. We have said, "as a rule," because there is, indeed, a case where the popular view has some truth as far as demand for labour is concerned. This is where the owner of a hoard of gold or silver, or precious stones, brings them forth from their hiding-place, and not wishing to use them for his personal adornment, uses them to purchase other luxuries, as silk dresses or wine. To get his enjoyment he needs the co-operation of others, and must pay for this co-operation. He will cause a fresh demand for labour in order to produce the silk dresses and wine ; there may be no corresponding diminution of the demand for labour on the part of others ; nor when the hoard is all spent, and his silk dresses and wine are ready, will the temporary increase of demand for labour be atoned for by this demand sinking below the point where it stood before the hoard was opened. As far then as an increase of the demand for labour is a benefit to the lower classes, there has been a temporary benefit and no subsequent loss. But it will scarcely be denied that such a case is exceptional and unimportant. And, indeed, it is by no means certain that there will be no corresponding decrease of the demand for labour on the part of others. For if the hoard be composed of the commodity used for money, as gold in England, it may pass into the currency instead of being used for adornment, and may cause a fall in the value of money ; twelve sovereigns may be wanted where ten did before ; and against the gain and increased demand for labour on the part of the owner of the hoard, must be set the loss and decreased demand for labour on the part of other owners of gold. Let this suffice as to the exceptional case of the unlocking of a hoard. In other cases there is either no increase at all of demand for labour, or it is dearly purchased by a subsequent decrease.

Let us remember that an increase of the demand for labour

* Apud Périn, "*De la Richesse*," ii. p. 399.

means an increase of the sum offered for the payment of hired labourers. Now, if a man takes to drinking champagne instead of water, it is quite true that he will employ perhaps twenty men instead of one, in providing himself with drink, and here there is a presumable twentyfold increase of the sum he offers for the payment of hired labourers. But his means are not increased by his change of habits, and the question arises, from whence will he obtain the means of paying this larger sum? Now, supposing his income is fixed, there are only two courses open to him. We are justified in making this supposition; for if his income was increasing, this would mean that as regards a portion of it he was accumulating, and so far, no doubt, the demand for labour (though not necessarily for labourers) would, as we have seen, be presumably increased; but, so far also, the case would not be that of luxurious consumption which we are considering, but of industrial accumulation which we have already dealt with. Supposing, then, his income to be fixed, first, he may make a corresponding diminution of his consumption in some other quarter, or spread the diminution over several sources of expenditure, as books, horses, or theatres. But in this case, as is pretty plain, he presumably lessens his demand for labour on one side as much as he increases it on another side; and different workmen, but not more workmen, are wanted. We say "presumably," because certain modes of luxurious expenditure may give more employment than others, as expenditure on domestic servants instead of on wine or lace; from whence it follows that the effect of luxurious expenditure upon the demand for labour may be modified or intensified according to the particular kind of expenditure. But this does not seem to affect much the general argument, as we may fairly set off against one another the modifications or intensifications in individual cases. The second and only other course open to the man whose conduct we are considering, and who, with a fixed income, increases his consumption, is to change his productive property into means of consumption, or, as it is sometimes expressed, to eat into his capital. The essence of such a change is best seen from a few simple illustrations. A great landowner might leave his lands untilled, and employ his workmen for a year in digging artificial lakes or making ornamental plantations; or he might get from the land all that it would give, and consume this produce, neglecting to replace the fertilizing elements which he had withdrawn from the soil. Similarly, a great mill-owner might change his mill-hands into domestic servants, or he might spend upon himself the entire annual proceeds of the mill, without first

setting aside a portion of these proceeds to repair his buildings and machinery, and to be a fund for replacing them when worn out, or for defraying the loss from periodical accidents. In such cases, the result may be first of all a simple transfer (as in the previous case) of demand for labour; that is, a certain number of workmen are withdrawn from keeping up the capital of the individuals in question, and instead of repairing the machinery and buildings, or providing new ones to replace those worn out, or preparing the soil for future crops, they have been employed in ministering to the immediate gratification of the employer. For a time, all may seem well, and there may even be an increase in the demand for labourers, if more, for example, are now employed in digging the lake than last year in cultivating the farm. But when the industrial cycle is completed, and the time for renewing production comes round, it is found that during the preceding period the means of production have been dwindling away, and that of the labourers' toil during that period, either no traces remain as of the wine that has been drunk, or clothes worn, or personal services (as of valet or groom) rendered, or else the results, though durable, as marble halls or terrace walks, cannot serve to help on fresh production. And thus, as there is a diminution of the productive resources of the community, there is a diminution of the possible fund for the payment of hired labourers; and the more extravagant the previous consumption, the more contracted the present limits of possible demand for labour.

We should now have said enough on this point of demand for labour,* were it not that an error, which is widespread and oft-

* Although some of Mr. Mill's statements on this point are open to the charge of obscurity or error, the following passage may perhaps serve as illustration and explanation of what we have said in the text:—"The proposition for which I am contending is, in reality, equivalent to the following, which, to some minds, will appear a truism, though to others it is a paradox; that a person does good to labourers, not by what he consumes on himself, but solely [?] by what he does not so consume. If, instead of laying out £100 in wine or silk, I expend it in wages, the demand for commodities is precisely equal in both cases; in the one, it is a demand for £100 worth of wine or silk, in the other, for the same value of bread, beer, labourers' clothing, fuel, and indulgences; but the labourers of the community have, in the latter case, the value of £100 more of the produce of the community distributed among them. I have consumed that much less, and made over my consuming power to them. If it were not so, my having consumed less would not leave more to be consumed by others; which is a manifest contradiction. When less is not produced, what one person forbears to consume is necessarily added to the share of those to whom he transfers his power of purchase. In the case supposed, I do not necessarily consume less ultimately, since the labourers whom I pay may build a house for me, or

recurring, is hardly answered satisfactorily till we have shown not only that it is an error, but why it is so prevalent. Now, we will not charge the human race with a liability to think luxury a substitute for almsgiving; but only with a liability to think that one who spends much, whatever be the moral effect of his conduct, does at least materially benefit those around him. In this form the doctrine is very different from the error on poor relief which we are combating. It is partly true; and, as far as untrue, its prevalence can easily be accounted for. Now, as we have seen, it is partly true as far as the unlocking and spending of a hoard is concerned. In other cases, the "benefit" in one place and one time is in visible connection with the luxurious expenditure, while the injury spread, perhaps, over many places, or coming later in time, does not show on its face its connection with the previous extravagance. And further, the spendthrift is not likely to consume all his property himself. Whether through generosity or carelessness he may give largely to others, not only to his equals, but also to his dependents; or, as Mr. Mill has noticed ("Polit. Econ.," bk. i. ch. v. § 5, note), he may be largely plundered by others. And thus his consumption by no means equals his expenditure, but a portion of the latter is simply a transfer of wealth to others.* These naturally see in him

make something else for my future consumption. But I have, at all events, postponed my consumption, and have turned over part of my share of the present produce of the community to the labourers. If, after an interval, I am indemnified, it is not from the existing produce, but from a subsequent addition made to it. I have therefore left more of the existing produce to be consumed by others; and have put into the possession of labourers the power to consume it.

"There cannot be a better *reductio ad absurdum* of the opposite doctrine than that afforded by the Poor Law. If it be equally for the benefit of the labouring classes whether I consume my means in the form of things purchased for my own use, or set aside a portion in the shape of wages or alms for their direct consumption, on what ground can the policy be justified of taking my money from me to support paupers? Since my unproductive expenditure would have equally benefited them, while I should have enjoyed it too. If society can both eat its cake and have it, why should it not be allowed the double indulgence? But common sense tells every one in his own case (though he does not see it on the larger scale), that the poor rate which he pays is really subtracted from his own consumption, and that no shifting of payment backwards and forwards will enable two persons to eat the same food. If he had not been required to pay the rate, and had consequently laid out the amount on himself, the poor would have had as much less for their share of the total produce of the country, as he himself would have consumed more."—"Principles of Polit. Econ.," bk. i. ch. v., § 9.

* An exaggeration of this truth is seen in the "Report on the Crisis of 1857," by the common councilmen of New York, cited by Mr. Ruskin, in the *Contemporary Review*, May, 1873, pp. 934, 935:—"Another erroneous idea is, that luxurious living, extravagant dressing, splendid turns out, and fine

their benefactor, while the poor workmen, who may at last lose employment through his having lessened the wealth of the country, are perhaps ignorant of his name and existence, or, if knowing him, cannot see any connection between his previous orgies and their present penury.

Enough now has been said, we think, to enable us to lay down that luxurious expenditure, except accidentally and temporarily, diminishes rather than increases the demand for labour; and that even if it did increase the demand for labour this would be no remedy for misery. But, further, such expenditure, as M. Périn well observes, is disastrous to the moral dispositions of the working classes. "Think of the anger and hatred aroused in the breasts of the poor at the sight of luxury displaying all her splendours and enjoyments at the very moment when the workmen are bowed down under the weight of misery. Think, too, of the fine lesson to the lower classes, and admirable remedy for misery given by this greed for the delights of life—a greed whose last and most striking outward sign is luxury. Think whether, by such lessons, they will gain that spirit of order and moderation, that frugality and attachment to hard work which alone are efficacious preservatives against misery?"* Instead, then, of being a remedy against destitution, luxurious expenditure fosters the moral and material causes of destitution, and not only injures, but also insults and derides the unhappy sufferers.

Let this much suffice against the two errors which would make Christian charity needless. We saw before that the charges against charity could be refuted; and now we have seen that these vaunted substitutes for charity are rather mockery than relief of the poor. But even to these substitutes

houses, are the cause of distress to a nation. No more erroneous impression could exist. Every extravagance that a man of 100,000 or 1,000,000 dollars indulges in, adds to the means, the support, the wealth of ten or a hundred who had little or nothing else but their labour, their intellect, or their taste. If a man of 1,000,000 dollars spends principal and interest in ten years, and finds himself beggared at the end of that time, he has actually made a hundred, who have catered to his extravagance, employers and employed, so much richer by the division of his wealth. He may be ruined, but the nation is better off, and richer, for a hundred minds and hands with 10,000 dollars apiece, are far more productive than one with the whole." These excellent councilmen forget, amid much else, that only a portion, perhaps a comparatively small portion, of the spendthrift's wealth has been transferred to others, while the other portion—the food and drink, the tobacco and perfumery, the clothes and furniture which he has personally consumed or worn out—is gone, and the sole permanent result which he can show for all this expenditure is—himself!

* Périn, "*Richesse*," ii. pp. 399, 400.

we must do justice, and we will suggest two arguments—the one for the use of the economists who bid us save, the other for the use of the anti-economists who bid us spend for the general benefit. First, then, we grant to the economists that if the end of life is the production of wealth, the heaping up of material products, the complete development of all the productive resources of a nation, then, truly enough, Christian charity misunderstands and thwarts this end. For on this principle man is an instrument for the production of wealth, just as a plough is an instrument for breaking up the soil. Consequently, as soon as a man ceases to be a fit instrument, either actually or prospectively, he becomes burdensome instead of useful. Therefore, while on the one hand all fine and healthy children should be carefully reared, as we now rear the healthy offspring of horses, and cattle, with a view to their future use; on the other hand, the weak and sickly, the deformed and maimed, should be promptly made away with. If, indeed, they could vegetate without requiring help, there would be less objection to permitting them to live, though even then there would be no rational ground for their cumbering the earth, and delaying to give up to agriculture and manufactures the valuable chemical substances contained in their bodies. But when, in fact, they require valuable food, clothing, fuel and lodging, and worse still, the labour and attention of others who might all the while have been producing wealth, their existence becomes an intolerable burden. The same reasoning applies to those who, having been able-bodied, become permanently disabled through accident, sickness, or old age; and as soon as it is quite plain that from any given person no more work can be expected, or work so little as not to pay for his subsistence, let him know that his part is played out, and that it is time for him to leave the scene. And this may be said also to those workmen who, having learnt a trade and become fit for nothing else, are thrown permanently out of work through some technical change. These too, if not strong enough to earn their subsistence by common unskilled labour, must no longer burden society by their presence. How these sound and simple principles are set at naught by that combination of foolish sentimentalism and economical ignorance called Christian charity, is unfortunately too evident to require proof; and indeed a positive boast is made of the vast amount of wealth and of labour bestowed on the care of various kinds of *incurables*, as though this frightful waste of productive power, instead of deserving censure, gave a claim to admiration.

Such is the argument which we offer to the economists to

make what use of they wish. We will not attempt to answer it; and indeed, if we admit the aforegiven view of the end of life, it seems quite unanswerable. And now let the anti-economists receive the gift of an argument in their turn. Let them urge that whatever may be said to the contrary, the plain fact is incontestable that the poor are supported by the rich, as a moment's consideration will show to economists, and perhaps even to Christian sentimentalists. For if the rich, that is those who, in virtue of the sacred and inviolable rights of property, own the mass of the lands, the buildings, the machinery, and raw materials in the country, were to reduce their consumption to the bare necessities of life, and draw from their property only enough to keep themselves permanently supplied with these necessities, the mass of the population would starve. The fields of the great estate of the rich man would lie untilled, except a patch in a corner to grow potatoes and oats for the abstemious owner, and for perhaps one solitary labourer. The owner of the coal-mines of half a county would only have those few tons of coal raised that would suffice to purchase for himself and one or two coal-miners the necessities of life. The great foundry-owner or mill-owner would only use one single foundry, or one portion of one single mill; and of all the ships of the great shipowner, but one with scanty freight would set sail. The result, as is obvious, would be that the greater part of the nation would be without employment, and without means of subsistence. For we naturally suppose the presence of the just and orderly government of civilized society; so that if hunger drove any of the starving multitudes outside to break through the ring-fence of the great landowner, and till the soil themselves for their own support, or forcibly enter and work for their own profit the mills, or foundries, or ships, the police or the military would promptly interfere to prevent or punish such an outrageous violation of the sacred rights of property. And therefore it is quite true to say that the so-called self-indulgence of the rich, denounced by short-sighted ascetics and doctrinaire economists, is needful not merely for the comfort and prosperity of the poor, but for their very life and support.

Such is the argument; and we do not quite see how the economists *could* answer it. For ourselves we will not attempt any formal answer, but will leave our rich and luxurious friends with their argument, only warning them that if they use it they must take the consequences, and may perhaps find that as one consequence their appeal to the sacred, inviolable, and self-evident rights of property may seem to their poor

countrymen to be wanting in sincerity and force, and that a just and orderly government (conducted naturally by persons of property having some stake in the country) may grow somewhat difficult to maintain. And we may suggest to them, in consideration of the weakness of human nature, and the prevalence of illusions, and the depravity of the age, that perhaps it would be wise to forego for a time the exercise of some of their august rights, and although cherishing as firmly as ever within their hearts the indisputable truth that they have a right to do what they like with their own, yet outwardly act as though they thought that the possession of wealth was an office to which many and stringent duties were attached, and as though they were convinced that the best, if not the only, answer to schemes of forced communism, was the free communism of Christian charity.

And now, in conclusion, we have to make a necessary but mournful reflection. The errors we have been considering may indeed be stated with such plausibility as to deceive many excellent and well-intentioned persons, though, for all men, natural reason and common humanity, and for Christians, at any rate, the teaching of their religion, give help against being deceived. But we fear also, that these errors have often their source, not in intellectual weakness, but in a perversity of will, and that their prevalence is an indication of society suffering from something worse than a mere scientific mistake. The Christian doctrine, with its terrible warnings against the rich, with its exaltation of poverty, and with its teachings on mortification, is intolerable to the pride of rationalism and to the sensuality of materialism. The presence of the poor is a perpetual protest against the doctrine that the end of man is to be found in this present life, whether in intellectual development or in the pleasures of the senses, and that there is no future squaring of accounts, no reward or retribution to come. The poor man then is a constant offence to the rationalists or materialists, and all the more so, because their mode of accounting for his existence and dealing with his misery is so feeble and unbecoming, compared with the theory and practice of Christian Charity. Moreover, they well apprehend the convincing argument in favour of the Catholic Church, to be drawn from the spectacle of her works of mercy and loving care for the poor; and, with detestable sagacity hinder, by force, if they are able, if not, at least by calumny and sophistry, the action of her charity. F. Liberatore has well pointed out,* how the hostility of political naturalism towards Catholic

* "La Chiesa e lo Stato," p. 324, seq.

almsgiving comes from hatred of the poor and hatred of religion. And among the many reasons which all the faithful, and especially the weak and the poor, have for gratitude towards the Sovereign Pontiff, not the least is the solemn condemnation which he pronounced against the error that liberty of almsgiving was opposed to the principles of the best political economy. "Atque etiam impie pronunciant, auferendam esse civibus Ecclesiæ facultatem 'qua eleemosynas christianæ caritatis causa palam erogare valeant,' . . . fallacissime prætexentes, commemoratam facultatem . . . optimæ publicæ œconomiae principiis obsistere" ("Quanta Cura," 1864).

We have done with the more purely theoretical errors as to Charity. In another article we hope to consider one great practical error, namely, the incursion of the civil power into the field of poor relief; and we hope to show the mischief of that incursion, and to disprove the arguments used in its defence.

ART. V.—ARUNDEL CASTLE: THE FITZALANS AND HOWARDS.

1. *The Lives of Philip Howard, Earl of Arundel, and of Anne Dacres, his Wife.* Edited from the Original MSS. by the DUKE OF NORFOLK, E.M. London: Hurst & Blackett. 1857.
2. *The History and Antiquities of the Castle and Tower of Arundel; including the Biography of its Earls, from the Conquest to the Present Time.* By the Rev. M. A. TIERNEY, F.S.A., Chaplain to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk. 2 vols. London: G. & W. Nicol. 1834.
3. *A History of the Western Division of the County of Sussex, including the Rapes of Arundel and Bramber.* By JAMES DALLAWAY, M.B., F.A.S., Prebendary of Ferring and Rector of Slynfold. Vol. II. Part the First. London: Printed by Bensley & Son. 1819.

A GREAT thinker, whose loss the State as well as Catholicity in these countries had to lament, now nearly a generation ago—Frederick Lucas—once remarked: "The English Peerage is safe for many centuries." The prediction seemed a daring one even then, but many a rude storm has passed over the world since, and yet the Peerage stands where it did, and is likely yet to remain. Many causes have contributed to the preservation of this and other ancient institutions among us, under however great an alteration of form,

especially the double character which belongs to it, of sharp separation on the one hand, but openness on the other. It is open to generous and lofty ambition; whilst it gives a clear and determinate rank. But deeper reasons are found in the nature of the English people, which has ever loved the past, and with whom the chief charm of rank is less its elevation than the bond by which its associations unite the present with the former ages of our history; and this, if we mistake not, is equally felt where the English race has been even rudely severed from its past, for example in the United States—witness authors like Washington Irving and Prescott. The same feeling is now intensified by what at first sight might have been expected to operate in a contrary direction,—by the immensely increased means of locomotion which enables all classes of the community to visit the scenes of remote historical glories, and to read the annals of their country in monuments that leave on the imagination a livelier impress than books can ever give.

Among such scenes the little borough town of Arundel and its fortress, which we shall endeavour to describe in this article, holds one of the foremost places. It has something to connect it with Alfred and with Harold, with the fierce Norman barons who won for William the Norman his crown, with the picturesque adventures of the Empress Maud, and, centuries after her, with the imprudence and the wrongs of Mary Queen of Scots. You cannot understand Arundel, its grey towers and its deep woods, unless your memory can light up their image with many a recollection drawn from the dark political struggles of the Plantagenets, Tudors, and Stuarts; across the silence of above two centuries that has followed upon the day when the stern soldiers of the Parliament passed through its shattered gates. But it is not war, after all, that furnishes the main interest of the study before us. The tremendous conflict of religion, that characterizes so long a period of English history, though not precisely finding a centre in Arundel, still caught up as it were into its whirlwind, in the person of one of its earls, as noble a victim as any who were added to the ranks of the martyrs in that miserable age. In our own days, too, a page of church-history is being written there, happier indeed and more peaceful, but scarcely less glorious, in works that will survive to far-distant generations.

Let us endeavour, at the outset, to give those readers who have not visited Arundel some idea of its character as a locality. Arundel stands at the extremity of the Sussex Downs. The station at which we alight, on the London,

Brighton and South Coast line, is at the foot of an eminence called the Causeway Hill, which commands an excellent view of the castle, town, and surrounding country. Conceive yourself then on a road just descending the slope of a woody hill. On your left, at the foot of the hill, is the station, and in striking and immediate contrast with it, what appears at first sight merely an old and rather picturesque farm-house. If familiar with mediæval architecture, the traveller will, however, be struck with something particular about the buttresses, string-courses, and general look of this old cottage, notwithstanding its modern stabling, as it stands in its steep green fields, with cows grazing about. The farm-house, called by the quaint name of Calceto, is in fact the remains of an ancient monastery of Augustinians, founded far back in the Middle Ages, by Adeliza, queen of Henry II. It was of course dismantled at the dissolution, but the square church-tower was left standing. It is capped by a modern peaked roof, and turned into a dwelling-house, and a very pretty as well as a very easy study in water-colours it would make for a young artist. At the foot of the Causeway Hill, the road goes along a level alluvial plain for a considerable distance, intersected by the river Arun. Green meadows then stretch far to the right; the road crosses first the railway, and next the river, protected on either side by thick rapidly-growing plantations of fir and trees of that class, to strengthen the banks. A short mile from the foot of the hill we behold rising on a steep, long, thickly-wooded ridge to the right, the stately castle of Arundel; its ruined keep, where still waves the banner of Howard and Fitzalan, but which has been in its present state of desolation since the Cromwellian wars; its Norman gateway, still perfect; its modern palatial abode, dating only from the first part of the century, though much of it is a refacing of the massive walls of a remote date. This recent building, however, looks venerable from the ivy which has spread all over it, amidst which the windows shine in the sun. Still looking to the right, are woods fringing Swanbourne Lake, a sheet of water of that crystal clearness always seen in the chalk formation, and other woods meeting it on the opposite side, where there is a remarkable white cliff, with a little hotel, "The Black Rabbit," at its foot. In front and to the left the view from the Causeway Hill commands the town of Arundel, the few steep streets of which are built on the slopes of the same eminence on which stands the castle. The spire of the Protestant church and of the stately cathedral, as it may almost be called, built just opposite by the present Duke of Norfolk, are in themselves examples the most suggestive

of changes stretching over centuries, and of revolutions we see at present going on before our eyes. Again woods and green meadows terminate the prospect, to the outward eye, though the observer to whom it is familiar will constantly be tempted to enlarge on what is still beyond. In fact a few days might well be spent in mastering all that the place has to offer of beautiful views or striking associations. It is therefore necessary, for the purposes of a single paper, to limit our range, which shall include little more than the castle itself, and the fortunes of the great families who have successively held it, particularly of the Fitzalans and the Howards.

It would be difficult to show a fortress better adapted for defence, previously to the introduction of modern artillery, than Arundel Castle, standing on such an elevation as it does. Swanbourne Lake, with the river in front, at the base of its precipitous hill, on one side ; whilst its lofty keep, in the Norman style, on an artificial mound, and earthworks, of which there are very remarkable remains, behind, protect it in the inland direction. These remains, however, might escape the traveller, if his attention were not directed towards them. They consist of a kind of embankment, or *vallum*, no doubt British, which has been cut through to make the London road, a short distance from the Catholic church, and close to what is called the "Duke's Gate." One point of it is in the field to the left ; the other inside the gate to the right ; both shaded by trees. At a period not extremely remote, the sea, though now nearly four miles off, must have approached the castle very nearly. The wooded cliffs near the Black Rabbit give to the most untutored eye the idea of the heights surrounding a small circular bay, represented by the flat rich meadows watered by the Arun. There is no doubt that formerly all that tract would be flooded in the winter, and old people still tell of the times when it was possible to get round almost the whole of Arundel in boats. But there, as well as in most parts of England, a process of drying up, by drainage and other causes, seems to have gone on, which, indeed, has not yet been completed ; and remains of the once far wider waters exist only in Swanbourne Lake, and in two or three reedy pools or marshes in the neighbourhood of the town. To return, however, to the castle. We climb the ascent of the High-street, nearly one side of which is occupied by a part of the castle-wall, built of grey granite, well contrasting with the prevailing tint of the old red-brick houses of the town. Reaching the first level of the hill, we arrive at a noble gateway, the work of Sir Gilbert Scott, and pass up a short drive between grounds planted with trees in rich variety to the entrance

archway, which passes under a tower, planned, with the rest of the modern part of the edifice, by Charles Howard, Duke of Norfolk, second of that name. The tower has an air of grandeur from its loftiness and solidity. Through it we gain the quadrangle, the great features of the two longer sides being the chapel and baronial hall, and the library, joined by the main staircase and principal gallery. The side of the quadrangle opposite the latter is occupied by the ruins of the keep, on its stately mound, with flight of steps leading to the Norman turret, still perfect, which of old formed the chief access to the castle. The mixture, in such close proximity, of the shattered fragments of the chivalrous past with the artificial architecture of an age of refinement and security, has a singularity about it that is not unpleasing. At any rate, it is a pleasanter association for the heir of the Fitzalans to behold the ruins of the fortress destroyed "in honour's cause," in a struggle with successful rebellion, than, as in some of the palatial homes of England—as, for example, Newstead Abbey—for their lords to look upon the desolate churches, the destruction of which made way for their elevation.

Entering the gallery by the great staircase, the visitor in Arundel Castle will perhaps be not so much struck by any extraordinary splendour as by that air of antique wealth which, as one of the old Greek poets has remarked, gives a peculiar grace to the abodes of real historical families.* We are reminded of the old Roman *atria*, with their *imagines* of the great soldiers and statesmen who adorned such a clan as that of the Fabii or the Scipios, comparing which with the Howards and their allies, it may be truly said of these English races, as one of the very last of Roman writers† said of the great houses of his own day—*splendor similis et non inferior virtus est*. Look at the pictures and ornaments of the gallery, or of the rooms which open upon it. Here is a shield won by a Fitzalan in a tournament at Florence in the days of the Medici. There are antique busts of Roman emperors, associated, for us, with the splendid curiosity which induced an Earl of Arundel, in the Stuart days, to form his celebrated collection, by means of accomplished agents sent into Italy, and so to render to art services second only to those afforded to history by the marbles named after him Arundelian. Yonder, and elsewhere too, is the poetical face, still almost boyish, of "the murdered Surrey," who in the few short years of his early

* Ἀρχαιοπλούτων δεσπότων πολλή χάρις.—Æsch., "Agam.," 1010.

† Macrob., "Sat.," i. 1.

manhood added a new measure to our language, and that measure the one which Milton took for the third great epic of the world. We compare not Surrey with Milton; but let it be remembered that the former was the first English poet who wrote in blank verse, and that it would be something if we could similarly tell who it was in the far-distant centuries who first delivered to Homer the mighty instrument of the hexameter. Look at yonder marked face, that seems to say from the canvas, "I left my name upon history; ask who I am, and then read about me when you go home." That is the first Duke of Norfolk, the fifth descendant from the sage judge who began this famous line in the thirteenth century. He looks bold, sagacious, and well-versed in the ways of the world; his features are full and sanguine; you can read in them the qualities that won him his high place in the dark, stormy times of the Wars of the Roses. Clad in armour, like so many others of greater or less celebrity, is the Earl of Arundel, the great collector already mentioned—a noble portrait by Vandyke, and as speaking to the eye as the word-portrait by which Clarendon has delivered his likeness down to all time.* His hand rests on the shoulder of his grandson, a bright, fair-haired youth, who lived to be one of the glories of his house, not, indeed, in the battle-field, nor yet on the scaffold, but as wearing with equal merit the white robe of S. Dominic and the purple of the Roman cardinal—the first Cardinal Howard, whose dignity our own days have beheld restored in another ecclesiastic of the same house, who has laid his sword upon the altar, and taken instead the chalice and the crosier.

Another priceless Vandyke is a portrait of Charles I., which we have seldom looked at without being reminded of that very striking scene in the novel of "*Woodstock*," where Cromwell suddenly comes in sight of the picture of his murdered sovereign:—

"That Flemish painter," he said—"that Antonio Vandyck—what a power he has! Steel may mutilate, warriors may waste and destroy—still the king stands uninjured by time; and our grandchildren, while they read

* "It cannot be denied," says the historian, who was no friend to the Earl of Arundel, "that he had in his person, in his aspect and countenance, the appearance of a great man, which he possessed in his gait and motions. He wore and affected a habit very different from that of the time, such as men had only beheld in the pictures of the most considerable men; all which drew the eyes of most, and the reverence of many, towards him, as the image and representation of the primitive nobility, and native gravity of the nobles when they had been most venerable."—Clarendon, "*Hist. Reb.*" i. p. 99.

his history, may look on his image, and compare the melancholy features with the woful tale. It was a stern necessity—it was an awful deed!"—"Woodstock," ch. viii.

In the same room with this hangs a very striking portrait of Richard III., different indeed from the notion of that king which was once popular, but far more in keeping with the real facts of his history,—a face youthful, nervous, vindictive, and crafty, the hand eagerly fidgeting with the ring; and in excellent opposition near this is Elizabeth of York, with calm and sweet expression, ill-matched, for her own happiness, with the selfish Tudor.

Of a different class, but extremely interesting in every respect, is a portrait by Holbein, of Mary Fitzalan, Duchess of Norfolk, and mother of Philip, first Earl of Arundel of the Howard line. Among the more modern portraits an excellent Gainsborough deserves especial mention, representing Edward, Duke of Norfolk, who, in the last century (he died in 1777), was the principal collector of the Library, which forms so important a portion of Arundel Castle. And to come to recent English history, the late Lord Lyons, maternal grandfather to the present Duke of Norfolk, has a place, so well earned by wise counsel and brave deeds, among the chieftains of a race like the Howards, distinguished as much in naval warfare as by land. We shall further notice only a small but very choice collection of Prouts and Copley Fieldings, the latter especially valuable where they are, as giving the untrained eye such an insight into the peculiar types of the Down scenery of Sussex in view of which the Castle stands.

The picturesque idea which Sir Walter Scott (to quote him once more) gives us of the library at Waverley-Honour, "a large Gothic room, with double arches and a gallery, containing such a miscellaneous and extensive collection of volumes as had been assembled together during the course of three hundred years by a family which had been always wealthy," comes to one's mind on entering the stately library of Arundel Castle. It is a room of 117 feet long by 35, with a sort of arcade on either side of cedar-wood, on which is supported a gallery, with brass railings, reached by a spiral staircase at each end, the whole divided by two deep recesses, one of which served, in times that already look distant, for the family chapel. The bookcases are protected by doors with brass trellises. The ceiling is of carved cedar-wood, the general effect, though rather dark, savours at once of "the studious cloister" and the magnificence which befits the baronial mansion. Without entering into details too minute, it will pro-

bably interest the reader if we offer some notices of the arrangement and general character of the collection. Supposing that we enter it on the side nearest the great gallery, on our right are the departments of English history, county history, English, French, and Italian literature; on our left, classical literature, miscellaneous history and heraldry, travels, scientific works, and bibliography. Ascending the spiral staircase, at the nearest end of the gallery, are works on art, at the opposite end, biblical and patristic literature. The sides of the gallery contain more miscellaneous works, except that nearly one half of the western side is filled with a rich collection of controversial literature, English and French, and with devotional literature, such as might be expected to have accumulated in a family like that of the ducal Howards. The era of James II. is particularly well represented. The art-collection is also very valuable, more especially in the department of architecture, and in that of portrait engravings. The county histories form a rich division, as also the pamphlets of the age of the Stuarts and the transition-period that followed. The classical literature, with the scientific, belongs principally to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and is consequently less valuable to the student who seeks for modern discoveries than to him whose researches are directed rather to the history of these respective branches of learning. It is from an ignorant forgetfulness of their great utility for this latter purpose, that many such collections have been mutilated or dispersed by those who ought to have been better acquainted with the nature of the trust reposed in them. A part of the classical collection came originally from the library of Huet, Bishop of Avranches. Taken as a whole, independently of the interest attaching to such departments of literature as we have mentioned, it will not escape the reader that Arundel Castle library represents, quite intact, the sort of studies which had an attraction for educated Catholic society in England of the highest rank in the first half of the eighteenth century, when Pope was the great poet who came from it, and when Alban Butler was the worthier representative, in dark and evil days, of deep historical learning, such as even Gibbon had the sense of justice to praise; and of faith, and practical wisdom, and devotion no less deep than his learning. It may be ranked among the services that the house of Howard have rendered to the cause of Catholicism, that this great light of religion in his own times, and for those who have come after him, was fostered by that house; for we read in his life by his learned relation, Charles Butler, that the education of Edward Howard, heir of the duchy of Norfolk,

who died in 1767, was entrusted to Alban Butler. We believe ourselves correct in concluding, from sundry references we have met with in Butler's "*Lives*," that this excellent chronicler of the deeds of the saints in all ages was much indebted in his researches to this very library of Arundel Castle we have been describing. We do not know whether it is to Alban Butler, or to some other ecclesiastic of his own college, connected with Arundel, that the Castle library is indebted for a curious collection of MS. theological treatises, compiled at Douay about the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century. Among them are notes of a course of lectures by a Douay professor of note in his day, to whom we find a reference in Butler—the Rev. Charles Witasse.

The archives of the house of Norfolk, whilst containing many precious documents, of which some of the most interesting have been used by Tierney in his "*History of Arundel*," are perhaps rather less rich than might have been expected, considering the historical importance of the family for so many generations. This is partly accounted for by the many political storms through which they have passed, partly, perhaps, from the dispersion of the original line of the Howards into so many diverse branches. Among all, however, that are extant in the possession of the ducal stock, the MS. lives of Philip Earl of Arundel, and of his Countess Anne, published some years ago by the late Duke of Norfolk, are to the Catholic student by far the most valuable, as illustrating the history of the Catholic Church in England, the manners of the times, and the characters of personages of singular mark and excellence, such as ought to be described as examples for all time. To these we shall presently refer more at large, in the course of the following outline of leading points of interest connected with the families which have successively held the honour of Arundel—Montgomeries, Albinis, Fitzalans, and Howards, though of the first three, important as they are, we can only treat by way of introduction.

These families are all connected with each other. The Howards became Earls of Arundel through the marriage of Thomas, the fourth Duke of Norfolk, with the heiress of Fitzalan in the 16th century; the Fitzalans by the marriage of John Fitzalan with Isabel de Albin in the thirteenth; the Albinis by the forfeiture of Robert de Belesme, son of Roger Montgomery, in the eleventh. But the line of Fitzalan was already related to that of Montgomery by the marriage of its founder, Alan Fitz-Fleald, a follower of the Conqueror, with a grand-niece of Roger, the first Earl of Arundel. There were three earls of the name of Montgomery, five Albinis,

fourteen Fitzalans; and the present Duke of Norfolk is the fourteenth Earl of Arundel of the house of Howard, the thirty-sixth in line of succession from the first.

Roger de Montgomery, one of the principal advisers and companions-at-arms of William the Conqueror, commanded the centre at the battle of Hastings, and was rewarded for his pains with the earldom of Chichester and Arundel, the most illustrious title he could receive, as those possessions had previously been held by Harold, and probably by King Alfred before him. But they formed by no means the only territorial reward that was acquired by this great soldier. He held seventy-seven manors in the east of the county of Sussex, almost all Shropshire, and other lordships in half the counties of England. His career is marked by an important share in the conflict between Robert Duke of Normandy and William Rufus, and by the conquest of Powisland in Wales, under the grant of the latter sovereign, of which the name of Montgomeryshire bears witness to the present day. A thorough example of the medieval warrior, Roger de Montgomery, after his many achievements in arms and policy, took the religious habit towards the close of his life, in the abbey which he had founded at Shrewsbury. He died in 1094. His honours were successively inherited by his two sons, Hugh and Robert de Belesme, the former an ally of Mowbray Earl of Northumberland in his struggle to dethrone William Rufus, and afterwards of Hugh Lupus, Earl of Chester, in the cruel chastisement of the Welsh in Anglesea. As for Robert de Belesme, every reader of the Norman period of English history will remember his name, whose only virtue was bravery, and who was a type of the savage ferocity which the Norman character could exhibit even in persons who, unlike him, redeemed it in some degree by the more prevailing element of chivalry. He was imprisoned by Henry I. in Wareham Castle, where he died in 1094; the king seized his manors and estates in Sussex, and left them to his widow, Queen Adeliza, by whom they were conveyed to her second husband, William de Albini. William de Albini's place in English history is one of importance. He afforded hospitality, at Arundel Castle, to Queen Adeliza's step-daughter, the Empress Maud, and was the author of the truce which led to the final arrangement between Stephen and Henry. He was the chief among the lay nobles of the great embassy sent by Henry II. to Pope Alexander III. to solicit a legatine commission for the Archbishop of York, after the Constitutions of Clarendon, and was engaged in other conspicuous affairs, both diplomatic and military, in that reign. Of the other Earls of Arundel, of

the family of Albini, we shall only notice William, great-grandson of the last-mentioned, who was one of the barons at Runnymede. His name was inserted at the head of Magna Charta, and he was one of those who bound themselves, on the part of the king, to obey the twenty-five conservators of the public liberties charged with carrying out its provisions. Isabel, great-granddaughter of William de Albini and Queen Adeliza, married John Fitzalan, lord of Clun, and their son, also named John, succeeded to the castle and earldom of Arundel, which continued for many generations in the line of the Fitzalans, and were transmitted by them to the Howards. It may well be said that for centuries no remarkable transaction took place in the course of English history in which these two great families had not some share. Take, for example, John Fitzalan, first Earl of Arundel of that name. For some time a confederate of Simon de Montfort, he reconciled himself with the king, and fought at the battle of Lewes, where he was made prisoner. Richard, the third earl, was conspicuous in the wars of Edward I. in Wales and Scotland, at Carnarvon, Falkirk, and Carlaverock. A Norman-French poem on the siege of the last-mentioned place gives us the following vivid picture of him.

Richard le Conte de Aroundel
 Beau chivaler et bien amé,
 I vi je richement armé
 En rouge au lyon rampant de or.

We wish he had not been one of those nobles who signed the disobedient reply to Pope Boniface VIII.'s letter prohibiting Edward's invasion of Scotland. The fourth earl, Edmund Fitzalan, whose marriage with the heiress of Warren, Earl of Surrey, added a splendid title and quartering to the house of Norfolk, joined in the overthrow of Piers Gaveston, and in passing sentence on that favourite; and with the rest, also witnessed his execution. The earl was not three-and-twenty when this happened. Yet he sided with Edward II. in his subsequent trouble, and sat as one of the judges at the trial of the Earl of Lancaster, for which he suffered the vengeance of Roger Mortimer, and was himself beheaded, without trial; "the only man of rank," says Hume, "who had maintained his loyalty." His son, the fifth earl, Richard Fitzalan, whose first wife was a daughter of Hugh le Despenser; and his second, Eleanor Plantagenet, daughter of Henry Earl of Lancaster, had a career as full of events as a life in Plutarch. The most memorable of these is the battle of Creci, where, as Constable of the forces, he led the second battalion of the English

army. His son and successor, Richard, the sixth earl, was one of the most conspicuous figures in the troubled reign of Richard II., distinguished in naval command, but still more as a great party leader. It is hardly necessary to mention that he, with the Duke of Gloucester, presided at the trial of Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk, was one of the council of inquiry, who held the supreme power extorted from the king by a combination formed at Arundel Castle, in which the Earl's brother, Fitzalan, Archbishop of Canterbury, the Earl of Northumberland, and others of the great nobles took part, and that he shared the fall of the Duke of Gloucester, when the king's party again prevailed. His own trial, among the judges at which were John of Gaunt and the Earl of Derby (afterwards Henry IV.), is described in some pages where the picturesque character of the facts has almost enabled Holinshed to rival Froissart. He was executed on Tower Hill, whither went with him to see execution done, six great lords; among these Nottingham, Kent, and Huntingdon, on horseback, "with the fierce bands of Cheshire men, furnished with axes, swordes, bows and arrowes, marching before and behind them." The high-minded energy shown by this earl in his inflexible resistance to the weak favouritism of Richard II. not only overawed the imagination of the king, but powerfully impressed the minds of the multitude. More than one chronicler records that after his death Richard was sorely troubled by strange dreams, in which he thought the earl appeared to him and put him in terrible fear. And the common people came to visit the place of his sepulture, from the idea they had formed of his holiness. There is certainly much to show that Richard, Earl of Arundel, had in a very high degree the spirit of the ages of faith. It was he who established the College of the Holy Trinity at Arundel, to take the place of the old priory, the monks of which had fled to their present abbey in Normandy during the wars of Edward III., and who built for it the beautiful "Fitzalan Chapel," which, even after all the ruin it has undergone from fanaticism and spoliation, forms so splendid a memorial alike of ancestral honour and of piety. In the year in which Richard Fitzalan began that college he was formally associated by the Abbot and Convent of Titchfield Abbey with the brotherhood of the house, and with him the soul of his countess Elizabeth, and of his parents, the Lord Richard and the Lady Eleanor, were to share their prayers. In his will, a very remarkable and characteristic document, after making decent arrangements for his funeral, he strictly charges his executors not to employ either armed men, horses, hearses, or

other extravagance (*bobaunce*) beyond what he ordained. He left bequests to complete his favourite college, and to the priory of Lewes, to Chichester Cathedral, and to the Abbey of Fécamp, to purchase the manor of Bury, to be settled on the college; to the Duchess of Norfolk (grandmother to his son-in-law the Duke of Norfolk, of the line of Mowbray), a cross of gold with an *Agnus Dei* of enamelled gold, adorned on one side with the coronation of Christ by the Jews, and on the other with the figures of S. Francis, and seventeen pearls. To his heir he bequeaths the Bible in two volumes, a pair of Decretals in French, a pair of Paternosters in gold, with other jewels and relics in a white coffer, bound with silver, and adorned with gilt lions, *a demorer perpetuellement de heir en heir seigneurs d'Arondelle en remembrance de hoy et de s'alme*. Space will not permit our further enlarging on this will, though it affords many other particulars illustrating in a very interesting manner the home life of a great English noble in the fourteenth century.

A Greek historian would have found in the fortune of Thomas Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel, son of the last-mentioned, an example of avenging Nemesis. He fled to the Continent from Richard II. after his father's death, but returned to side with the Duke of Lancaster, who delivered over to his custody, and to that of the youthful Duke of Gloucester, the captive sovereign, who had shed the blood of their fathers. This earl commanded in Wales against the Duke of Montmorency and the French who came to aid Owen Glendower, and also in France in Henry V.'s reign. He married a Portuguese princess, Beatrix, of whom there is a superb tomb in the Fitzalan Chapel, and built a gate in Oswestry, called the Beatrice Gate, in her honour. At his death the earldom of Arundel passed into a collateral branch, one of whose alliances added to it the title of Maltravers. Among these later Fitzalans we may mention John, ninth earl of his family, who was of great note in the French wars of the reign of Henry VI., was made Duke of Touraine by the Regent Bedford, and died of his wounds received at the siege of Gerberoy. He was buried at Beauvais, but is commemorated by an exquisite cenotaph in the Fitzalan Chapel at Arundel. His brother William, Earl of Arundel, married a sister of Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick, "the king-maker"; his political acts seem to have been vacillating, but he earned the praise of posterity as the patron of Caxton, whom he zealously encouraged in the midst of difficulties to translate and publish the "*Golden Legend*," as the good printer has himself gratefully recorded in his preface. He also gave the

manor of Aynhowe, in Northamptonshire, to Magdalene College in Oxford, on condition of a mass called the Arundel Mass, being kept at an altar called Arundel Altar, in the college chapel, for the souls of himself, his son, and their successors. His son and grandson, successively Earls of Arundel, though conspicuous in the courts of the first Tudors, do not otherwise need any long notice here. Of these the first, Thomas, married a sister of Queen Elizabeth Woodville; the second, William, attended Henry VIII. at the Field of Cloth of Gold, and later, was one of the judges at the trial of Queen Anne Boleyn. His only son, Henry, was the last Earl of Arundel of the line of Fitzalan, and had a career very characteristic of his times. Like many, however, in the annals of Arundel, it is so interwoven with the general history of England as hardly to require more than a brief recapitulation in a paper like this. Under Henry VIII. he was for seven years governor of Calais, and served as Marshal in the expedition to Boulogne. In Edward VI.'s reign, as a member of the Council of Regency, he broke the power of the Protector Somerset, in favour of the Earl of Warwick; was again reconciled to the former, but was involved in his fall by the enmity of the same Warwick, now Duke of Northumberland. The conspiracy for Lady Jane Grey afforded him an opportunity of avenging himself on Northumberland, whose scheme he apparently favoured, whilst keeping Mary informed of what was going on. When the time arrived for crushing the plot, it was the Earl of Arundel who took the initiative for that object in the council, who was commissioned to carry the great seal to Mary, and who effected the arrest of Northumberland. He was Lord High Steward in Queen Mary's reign, and for some years in that of Elizabeth; entertained that queen at his house of Nonsuch, so famous in the chronicles of that age; was even one of the Queen's many rejected suitors; was a member of the Westminster commission for trying Mary Queen of Scots, but favoured the pretensions of Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk (his daughter's widower), to marry her, for which he too sustained a long imprisonment, and took no part in public affairs afterwards. With him expired the Fitzalan family in the male line; but the marriage of his heiress, Mary Fitzalan, with the Duke of Norfolk, above-mentioned, still continued it in the female.

Our subject thus leads us to consider such particulars in the history of the House of Howard as are most interesting in connection with Arundel, but some preliminary sketch of its earlier fortunes seems necessary. As is well known, the

primordia of this celebrated family are buried in the darkness of antiquity. Some antiquarians have referred it to the Saxon Hereward, others to Auber, Earl of Poissy, one of the companions-in-arms of the Conqueror; but, in general, it would seem to have been one of those which suddenly appear at a remote epoch in the field of history, and which, as their earlier movements are without record, must be presumed to have been all along of an importance which caused their emergence not to create any surprise. They have been historical, at all events, from the thirteenth century; towards the close of which Sir William Howard, of Wigenhall, in Norfolk, attained the high office of Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, and was summoned to Parliament among the judges by Edward I. and II. Sir Robert Howard, his descendant in the fifth generation, married the daughter of Thomas Mowbray, Duke of Norfolk, which alliance laid the foundation of the greater fortunes of the race; for their son, Sir John Howard, first raised to the peerage by Henry VI., and otherwise favoured both by that sovereign and Edward IV., became afterwards one of the principal adherents of Richard III., was by him created Duke of Norfolk and Earl Marshal in 1483, and, less than two years after, led the van at the battle of Bosworth, where he was slain. Of his son Thomas, the second duke, it is sufficient to remind the reader that, as Earl of Surrey, he commanded at the battle of Flodden, where his son, Edmund Howard, led the right wing, and that he was the grandfather of Queen Katharine Howard and of Queen Anne Boleyn. A minor fact about him is less generally known, that the tomb under which he was buried in Thetford Abbey had been designed by himself, assisted by Clarke, master of the works at King's College, Cambridge, and Wassell, a free-mason of Bury St. Edmund's.* We see from this that, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a great English nobleman had studied the art of design, and it is the first example of a taste which was shown, at periods very widely apart, by other chiefs of the same house. His eldest son, Thomas, third duke, whose first wife was Anne, daughter of Edward IV., by his second, a daughter of Edward Stafford, Duke of Buckingham, was the father of Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey. Their place in English history, the son as the last victim of the gloomy, suspicious cruelty of Henry VIII., the father as only saved from it by the tyrant's death, need not be here reviewed. Yet, on the character of Surrey we are more tempted to linger, partly from the romance attaching to his name,

* Cooper's *Ath. Cant.*, i. p. 24, col. 2. Quoted in J. F. Furnivall's "Education in Early England." (London: Trubner & Co., 1867.)

partly from the important position he holds in literature, as one of our earliest writers of the sonnet, and the first poet who introduced blank verse into the English language. He would seem, in his earlier years, to have been a somewhat thoughtless youth, whose high rank and whose genius might equally be pleaded in his excuse. He was placed in the court at the early age of nine, as cupbearer to King Henry VIII., and from the age of fifteen was about that monarch's person. The spirit of poetry was not long in manifesting itself in him, and he associated it, as is familiar probably to many who have never read a line of his poems, with a lady of the illustrious house of Fitzgerald, earls of Kildare, and since dukes of Leinster, whose father, Gerald Fitzgerald, ninth earl of Kildare, died a prisoner in the Tower in 1534. But it may perhaps take away from the romance of the story to state the fact, that the fair Geraldine was but a child of six years old when the youthful and chivalrous poet adopted her as his lady-love. It was the fashion of the later medieval period, which was then closing, to attach poetry in this way to some idealized person, if not to a mere creation of the fancy. Such was Beatrice to Dante, such Laura to Petrarch, less the objects of everyday affection than types whose grace, beauty, and bright surroundings in the actual world served them as materials which, like the painter, they could heighten into something more brilliant than any experience could exhibit. The youthful Surrey was a soldier as well as a poet. He had looked on war in his father's campaign on the Scottish border, and Henry VIII.'s in France. We are tempted to quote the following sonnet of his, somewhat rugged as it is—"the stretched metre of an antique song"—because it is of biographical interest in this connection, and gives an idea of the pathetic rather than the playful aspect of his poetical character. It is addressed to the memory of a dear friend and follower of his, Thomas Clere, who belonged to a Norfolk family of that name, and was a kinsman of Anne Boleyn's. He died, aged twenty-eight, from a hurt received in defending Surrey himself from danger, in an encounter at the gates of Montreuil. Clerémont, in the second line of the sonnet, refers to the Norman origin of Clere's family, and Shelton, in the fifth, was the name of a lady to whom Clere had been attached, the daughter of Sir John Shelton, of Norfolk.

EPITAPH ON CLERE.

Norfolk sprung thee, Lambeth holds thee dead ;
Clere, of the Count of Clerémont, thou hight ;
Within the womb of Ormond's race thou bred,
And saw'st thy cousin crownèd in thy sight.

Shelton for love, Surrey for lord thou chase ;*
 (Aye me ! whilst life did last that league was tender !)
 Tracing whose steps thou sawest Kelsal blaze,
 Landrécy burnt, and battered Boulogne render.
 At Montreuil gates, hopeless of all recuse,†
 Thine Earl half dead, gave in thy hand his will ;
 Which cause did thee this pining death procure,
 Ere summers four times seven thou couldst fulfil.
 Ah, Clere ! if love had bootied, care, or cost,
 Heaven had not won, nor earth so timely lost.

The first earl left two sons, of whom the elder, Thomas, succeeded his grandfather as fourth Duke of Norfolk, and by marrying the heiress of Fitzalan, as already mentioned, added the earldom of Arundel to the titles of Howard. Into the vexed historical questions concerning the grand interest of his life and the cause of his tragical end—his engagement to Mary Queen of Scots—we do not propose to enter, but shall indicate what appears to us the general view to be taken of his career. The duke's misfortunes seem to have been principally due to a false position : his was such in more ways than one. He was by birth the great chief to whom the Catholic party would naturally look up, but then he was by education a Protestant, even the pupil of Foxe, and in a letter to his son, written in view of the scaffold, he emphatically expresses himself as a Protestant by conviction. But this notwithstanding, there was in him a certain element of goodness, tenderness, and thoughtfulness, of which one sees examples enough in the present day, which may have given him, more than he was himself aware, a leaning towards Catholicism, in which direction his hereditary principles were continually leading him to act. Add to all this, not so much, we take it, the ambition which is so unsparingly attributed to him, of marrying a queen, because that was an alliance, after all, by no means extraordinary in his case, nor regarded in that light by his contemporaries, as the effect which all the circumstances of the time when he presided at the conference at York must have had upon his imagination. Mary was a being in whom concentrated the whole romance of the age ; and we may well believe that the duke inherited something of the character as well as the ill fate of the noble Surrey, rather than the more powerful qualities of his remoter ancestry. There was, besides, evidently in him a hesitation, often to be remarked in re-

* *Chase*, chose.

† *Recuse*, recovery. [We quote this sonnet from Mr. Morley's selection of "Shorter English Poems" (Cassell, Petter & Galpin), not having the original at hand.]

flective minds, which caused him to omit the moment when openness might have saved him from danger, or decisive action enabled him to master it. In short, he was no match for the policy, the passion, and the faith also, that swayed the stormy waters into which he was thrown, though, in happier times, the points in which his genius failed him would never have been noticed, or have been noticed only as indicating that liberalism so often allied with much that is "sweet and commendable in the nature," but which cannot stand in actual conflict with hostile powers. To whatever extent he shared in the conspiracy which brought him to destruction, he personally, as a Protestant, could only have acted either on sentimental motives unequal to a step like that, or in support of a cause of which he inherited only the traditions, and not the conviction.

With the attainder and death of Thomas Howard, the title of Duke of Norfolk disappeared for three generations. That of Earl of Arundel was allowed to be retained by his son Philip, in whom the true glory of the house of Howard may be said to centre, dying as he did for the faith, after languishing ten years in the Tower.

We rest with pleasure on the brief but most touching and edifying record of his virtues and sufferings, less known to the world than they deserve to be, however cherished by those who owe it to such as him that the failing spark of Catholicity in these realms was not utterly extinguished. The record we speak of is an ancient document, preserved in the archives of Arundel Castle, and regarded, as it well may be, as among the most precious possessions of its lords. It was published some years ago by the pious care of the late Duke of Norfolk; and we believe we shall be doing a service to our readers, if we reproduce, in the language and the thoughts of our own times, some of the most interesting particulars of that brief and impressive memorial.

Philip Howard, twenty-third Earl of Arundel, was born at Arundel House, in London, in 1557, the son of Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk above-mentioned, by his first wife, the Lady Mary Fitzalan. He was baptized at Whitehall, with all the splendour of ceremonial that might be expected from the recent alliances of the Howards with the blood-royal. A gold font was used on the occasion, which had always been reserved for the baptism of the princes. One of the sponsors was King Philip II. of Spain, the husband of Queen Mary, a circumstance the more remarkable, because, on the very day on which the Spanish monarch conferred this honour on the family of Howard, he set out on his journey for France, to

fight the battle of St. Quentin, but never again set foot in England. Notwithstanding this beginning, the early education of the young Philip Howard was of a Protestant character, his father having conformed to the prevailing religion, in which he also died. He sent his son to Cambridge, but, with a happy inconsistency, of which probably he was not aware at the time, placed him under Catholic influences, the tutor chosen for him being Gregory Martin, a scholar of note in his day, and who soon declared himself a Catholic. The youthful Surrey, however, destined though he was to rank with confessors and martyrs, did not immediately resume the faith of his fathers, and the commencement of his career afforded little foreshadowing of the future, beyond the high spirit he exhibited in common with many a noble youth. He was even led to a considerable extent into the dissipation that surrounded him; and this, notwithstanding his father's having caused him to enter the married state at a very early age, as was not unusual at that time. His bride, also, as we shall see, one of the great ornaments of the race with which she became connected, was Anne Dacre, daughter of Lord Dacre, "of the North."

On quitting the university, Earl Philip followed the court, and was conspicuous among the nobles who rivalled each other in the magnificent hospitality with which they entertained their capricious and exacting sovereign. Indeed the splendour of the receptions which the young chief of the Howards gave to Elizabeth, whilst it failed to save him from her wrath when he crossed her will, seriously embarrassed even his ample revenues. He incurred her displeasure for two reasons: one was the simple fact of his being married, which was always disliked by Elizabeth in those whom she was inclined to favour; the other, that he was suspected, and truly suspected, of intending to reconcile himself to the Catholic Church. The intention had been one of slow growth in his mind. In his first year at court, a deep and silent impression had been made upon his mind by a discussion at which he happened to be present, in the Tower of London, between the illustrious Jesuit, F. Campian and certain Protestant ministers. He was then about twenty-four years of age, and for such an early time of life, his character must have had wonderful depth. He says of himself:—"He resolved to become Catholic, long before he could resolve to live as a Catholic, and thereupon he deferred the former, until he had an intent and resolute purpose to perform the latter." Whilst such deliberation, or rather such delay, is not to be held out as an example—remembering the old maxim: *nescit tarda molimina spiritus*

sancti gratia, still the result showed that, in Philip Earl of Arundel's case, the slow growth was but caused by the roots being very deep. His final decision to become a Catholic connects itself in a striking manner with the ancient castle we have attempted to describe. "The which [resolution], being aided by a special grace of God, he made walking one day alone in the gallery of his castle at Arundel; where, after a long and great conflict within himself, lifting up his eyes and hands to heaven, he firmly resolved to become a member of God's Church, and frame his life accordingly; yet, kept it secret, neither making his lady, nor any other person living, acquainted therewith." We believe we are correct in stating that the existing gallery at Arundel, though certainly, as we see it, not older than the beginning of the present century, is formed by the same ancient walls between which the noble confessor paced when he formed this momentous resolution.

He had not long arrived at this conclusion, before he was enabled to persuade his brother, Lord William Howard, whom he greatly loved (and who, by the way, lived to be memorable in story and song, as "Belted Will Howard," ancestor of the Earls of Carlisle), to join in it. The question then presented itself to the brothers, what was to be the next step? Were they to avow themselves Catholics in England, and at once? They decided rather to go abroad; which, perhaps, may surprise some readers who do not sufficiently bear in mind what the state of England was at the time. Instead of the coldness of friends, and other difficulties which, at the present day, constitute the comparatively light and easy cross converts have to endure, in those days even the noblest had to expect the possibility of vexatious examinations before the Council, of heavy fines, of imprisonment for years in unhealthy dungeons; and, in the end, perhaps, even an ignominious death. If the Apostles, when persecuted in one city, were allowed by their Divine Master to flee into another, the converts of the Elizabethan age might well have looked with longing eyes to France, or Belgium, or Italy, or Spain; or, above all, to Rome, and say, with the heathen poet, yet with a truth, of which he was unconscious:

*Felix, exsilium cui locus ille fuit !**

The two brothers, having made preparations to embark for the Continent, sent a servant on before to a port they had chosen on the coast of Sussex. He was apprehended by the agents of the government, and subjected to severe examinations, in the hope of obtaining evidence against his master.

* Ovid, "Fasti," i. 540.

Not long after, in 1584, the Earl of Arundel was reconciled to the Church by a Jesuit father, named Weston, who had suffered imprisonment for the faith, in various places, for seventeen years. From that date the Earl changed the whole course of his life, and began the career which won for him a confessor's or a martyr's crown.

Soon afterwards, Arundel again decided on attempting to escape to the Continent, but first wrote a letter to the Queen, explaining and justifying both his conversion and intended expatriation. This document, which has fortunately been preserved, gives us a vivid insight both into the character of Elizabeth and the sort of trials a Catholic nobleman who had a conscience must have experienced in living at court in those days. As with so many others who have merited that title in the heraldry of heaven, which may perhaps one day be recognized in favour of Philip Howard of Arundel, it was humiliation and crosses that led him to deep thoughts of what he was called to. The Queen had begun to show him marked aversion, turning away her face from looking at him, speaking of him with bitterness day by day, and patronizing even those whom she had hated, if they became his adversaries. Then had followed his examinations before the Council and partial arrest for many weeks. The memory of his own family history for three generations could hardly escape being recalled to his mind by these ominous mutterings of the coming storm. His great-grandfather had been attainted by Act of Parliament, in the absence of colourable matter for a regular trial; his grandfather had been condemned, in the judgment of one of his greatest enemies, merely because he was held to be an unfit man to live in a commonwealth; and his father had lost his head with as little proof of any disloyal intention or deed. It was plain that what had happened to his ancestors might happen to himself, and that his innocence afforded him no sufficient security against it. He was of that religion which Elizabeth and her councillors held to be odious and dangerous to the State, and at the same time it was his own greatest trouble that hitherto he had not lived according to the rule of that which he assuredly believed was the truth; a failure in his duty towards God, which he thought might have been a principal occasion of his late punishment. He had therefore resolved to take the course that would save his soul from shipwreck, whatever might become of his body, and had since found much greater repose of mind. He had resolved also to bend himself wholly, as near as he could, to persevere, without doing any act repugnant to his faith. This resolution, as might have been expected, had soon made him a marked man

in the court. When the sovereign was hearing a sermon in Westminster Abbey with all her nobility, the Earl of Arundel had to walk by himself in one of the aisles. Another day, when the Queen was hearing a Lenten sermon in the chapel at Greenwich, the Earl was forced to stay all the time in the presence chamber. In short, an open, plain discovery of himself was inevitable, if he wished to escape these vexations. And then, if he avowed himself a Catholic, came the watchful and jealous eye of the Queen's Government over recusants, and the continual searches made in their houses for priests, servile abjection to his enemies, and daily peril to his life. He was not willing to encounter this, if it could be helped, and yet he was "resolute and unremoveable to serve God in such sort as he had professed." He had, therefore, decided to quit the realm, though it were to live in extreme poverty and loneliness abroad. This was a cause always ill thought of in those days, and in contemplating it the earl makes an appeal to the heart and reason of the Queen to ask those about her who hated him most what they would have done if they had been placed in his circumstances, their house so fatally assailed in successive descents, themselves of a religion under the ban of the State, hardly treated, and long put under restraint, looked upon by the men in power as unfit to live, unable to do any act of their religion without the danger of incurring felony. He calls God to witness that he would not have taken this course could he have stayed in England without danger of his soul and peril of his life, concluding with an appeal which possibly may have sometimes passed across the mind of the Queen years after, as she sat silent on the ground, waiting in despair for her miserable end.

It was scarcely to be expected—perhaps under the circumstances not even to be wished for—that the Earl would have been allowed to escape into exile. The ship on which he embarked was boarded by a pretended pirate, who entrapped from him a letter to his sister, Lady Margaret Sackville, and then avowed himself the agent of the Government to bring him back. He was committed to the Tower, and examined before the Council on sundry matters, particularly a letter alleged to be written by him to his Norfolk agent William Dix, containing a passage to the effect that he would land in Norfolk with forces to trouble both Queen and Government. This letter was forged, emanating, it would seem, from Walsingham's office, and was made no further use of. In May of the following year, 1586, he was indicted before the Star-chamber, on three points, principally, a correspondence with Cardinal Allen, his attempt to leave England, and his con-

version to Catholicism. On these grounds he was fined £10,000, and ordered to be imprisoned during the Queen's pleasure. Accordingly, at the age of twenty-seven, he was finally consigned to that living tomb, the Tower of London. There, in 1589, he underwent a fierce examination, conducted by Burleigh and three other members of the Privy Council, one of them a bitter enemy of the Earl's, Lord Hunsden. Its character may be judged of by the last-mentioned noble's calling the prisoner "a beast and a traitor," and saying that he himself would gladly be his executioner, if there were no other to perform the office. "The sooner the better, if it pleases God," was his reply. This was followed by his indictment for treason before a commission in Westminster Hall. The articles charged against him partly related to the identical actions for which he had already been sentenced by the Star-chamber, more particularly, an intention, in leaving the kingdom, to join the Duke of Parma with an army levied in the Low Countries to invade England; his being styled in Rome Duke Philip of Arundel, which was supposed to point to his being chosen king of England, now that Mary Queen of Scots was dead; and new charges, that he had engaged one Bennett, a priest, to say every Sunday a mass for the success of the Spanish Armada, and invited certain Catholics to join in twenty-four hours' prayer for the same intention. The trial was of an imposing description. The Earl of Derby was Lord High Steward, and twenty-three other peers sat on the commission. A MS. in the Norfolk archives enables us to form a vivid idea of the principal personage of the scene. "The Earl [of Arundel] coming into the hall, being in a wrought velvet gowne, furred with martins, laid about with golde lace, and buttoned with golde buttons. A black sattin doublet, a payre of velvet hose, and a long high hatte upon his head. A very tall man looking somewhat swarthy coloured." The accusation about the mass said for the Spanish Armada was witnessed to by the unhappy priest above-mentioned, though he had previously written in the most penitent manner to the Earl and to his countess acknowledging his own falsehood and cowardice. The Earl met it by a simple denial. The other point of the twenty-four hours' prayer was explained to have referred to prayers asked for against a great danger reported at the time to be impending on the Catholics. It was believed that a massacre of them was intended, and certainly, in the midst of the popular excitement, which made the sight of the scaffold so welcome to the fierce multitude, it is not surprising such a rumour might have become current. It is, however, rather curious that no one seems to have been struck with the

singularity of constituting prayers to be matter of treason. One is reminded of that scene in the days of the Heptarchy, when the heathen Adelfrid, king of Bernicia, slaughtered 1,200 of the monks of Bangor because they assembled to pray for their countrymen engaged against him in the field of battle. "Though unarmed," he said, "if they pray they also fight against us." It is hardly necessary to add that the Earl of Arundel was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. The impression in his favour must have been strong, when even Burleigh and Hatton advised Elizabeth to spare his life. She did in truth spare his life, but cruel indeed was her mercy, as she intended it. He was kept for nearly eleven years in the Tower, with the sentence of death always impending over him, so that on no morning could he rise without the consciousness that he might that day have to lay his head on the block. She had devised for her youthful and noble victim a torment like that of his in ancient fable, over whom hung the rock ever ready to crush him :

jam, jam lapsura, cadentique
Imminet assimilis.

It is pleasing to see how the very means adopted by the powers of evil for their detestable ends are turned by heroic virtue to purposes of good. No sooner did the Earl find himself delivered back to his prison-cell to wait for his doom, than he arranged a regular scheme of life to be persevered in throughout. He rose always at five, spent every morning four or five hours in prayer and meditation, to which he afterwards added the Divine office ; again in the afternoon three or four hours of devotion, and spent the rest of his time, except a little for exercise, in writing or translating books of piety, and in spiritual reading. His favourite works were the writings of Louis of Granada, S. Jerome, and the historians of the early Church, especially Eusebius. He fasted three days every week, at first strictly ; afterwards his health obliged him so far to lessen this great severity as to eat meat at his single meal on one of the days. Sometimes he refrained from all sustenance on very special vigils. His time was as exactly arranged as if he had been a hermit in the desert, instead of a prisoner in the dreary Tower of London. He appears to have been often visited by the Lieutenant of the Tower, from whom, however, he sustained much unkind treatment, but with him and others always endeavoured to give conversation a turn that might convey some holy or profitable thought. As is well known, he cut with his own hands on a stone in the wall of his chamber the following inscription, in bold and

well-formed capitals, a cast from which may be remarked in one of the rooms at Arundel Castle :—

Quanto plus afflictionis pro Christo in hoc sæculo, tanto plus gloriæ cum Christo in futuro. ARUNDELL, June 22, 1587.

In this way month passed after month, year after year, till the welcome hour of his deliverance was at hand. Its first approach was strange and sudden. One day, whilst sitting at dinner, he became all at once very ill, rose from table, and suffered severely from sickness and dysentery. From that hour, in spite of every remedy, he wasted away, and in about two months after he died. There was suspicion of poison in the case, as is even recorded on his epitaph, and some thought that the poison had been administered by his cook, under the influence of a former servant of his, who had at one time been employed by the Crown in some vexatious suits against him. The Earl had earnestly endeavoured to have the cook removed, but in vain. The history of the Earl's last hours is one of the most touching narratives to be found in the records of the saints. We shall but notice a few of its most interesting features.

As his end drew near, he wrote letters to the Queen and Council, entreating that he might be allowed to see his wife and children. This he had asked at the close of his trial, but the Court made no answer. Now, after ten years, a reply was sent by word of mouth from the Queen, that if he would but once go to the Protestant church, his request should not only be granted, but his honours and estates restored to him, with all the favour she could show. The Earl thanked the messenger, but said he could not accept her Majesty's offer on that condition, and that he was only sorry he had but one life to lose in that cause. When we read of propositions of the kind thus made to martyrs in the very sight of their crown, our indignation is apt to lose itself in our sense of the stupidity that could lead the persecutor to imagine they could be accepted. But, after all, instances are not wanting to shew that the crown is not yet won, merely because it is in sight, and that the temptations of flesh and blood have been sometimes so strong that they have overpowered faith at the very verge of triumph. An irreversible issue depends on that moment, when an exquisite and final proof is applied to the soul, which has either to take its place among the saints, or to lose for ever the fruit of all it has hitherto achieved. This trial once over, nothing remained but a most tranquil and beautiful dying scene. The Lieutenant of the Tower himself came to ask his prisoner's forgiveness for all he had made him suffer.

It was most willingly accorded, but the Earl, raising himself on his pillow, gave this officer a very few grave and kind words of warning, not in future to use his power to add affliction to affliction on those in his charge. He reminded him that God, "who with His finger turneth the unstable wheel of this variable world," might some day bring him also as a prisoner to that very place where he was now keeping others. These words, however natural under the circumstances, might well be looked on as prophetic, when, within seven weeks after the Earl's death, they were fulfilled, the Lieutenant falling into disgrace, and being committed as a prisoner to the same fortress, where he had exercised a harsh rule for so many years. As the Earl grew weaker, and could no longer rise from his bed, he gave up, in obedience to his physician, the recitation of the Divine office, but never omitted his beads to the very end; and these, with such psalms and prayers as he knew by heart, and the invocation of the holy names of Jesus and Mary, occupied the hours of his last night on earth. His biographer gives the following vivid picture of his departure from this world :—

The last minute of his last hour being now come, lying on his back, his eyes firmly fixed towards Heaven, and his long lean consumed arms out of the bed, his hands upon his breast laid in cross one upon the other, about twelve o'clock at noon, in which hour he was also born into this world, arraign'd, condemn'd, and adjudg'd unto death, upon Sunday, the 19th of October, 1595 (after almost eleven years Imprisonment in the *Tower*), in a most sweet manner, without any sign of grief or groan, only turning his head a little aside, as one falling into a pleasing sleep, he surrender'd his happy soul into the hands of *Almighty God*, who to his so great glory had created it.—("The Life and Death of the Earl of Arundel," p. 121.)

The remains of the holy martyr (for surely, speaking popularly, we may so call him) rest beneath the Fitzalan chapel at Arundel. The companion-life of his countess, the Lady Anne Dacre, by the same author from whom we have taken the materials for the foregoing sketch of Earl Philip's sufferings, if less tragic, is not less interesting or instructive to the Catholic reader who desires to acquaint himself with the manners which were still fresh from Catholic times, and with characters of heroic virtue. The Countess Anne, belonging to the northern Catholic house of Dacre, though in her childhood brought up a Catholic, was for a time withdrawn from the practice of the religion by coming under the power of the fourth Duke of Norfolk as her guardian, he having married her mother, the Lady Dacre. Yet, on reaching her twenty-sixth year, she was converted by the study of a book on the

danger of schism. She was then residing at Arundel Castle, where she spent most of her life, and her reception into the Church had to be effected with much contrivance and secrecy. When it became known, she was informed against by the inhabitants of Arundel, and, as time went on, underwent the usual amount of vexation and losses, besides imprisonment, from the tyranny of the Government. To give a single instance of the sort of humiliations even the first lady in England, if a Catholic, had to sustain under Elizabeth : Whenever the Queen came to Somerset House, the Countess was ordered to withdraw from Arundel House, her London residence in the neighbourhood of that palace, as if the very presence of a Catholic a few hundred yards off contaminated the air.

Her life presented a vivid idea of the special virtues likely to be called into action by these circumstances. The heathen poet made his exiled princess say :

Haud ignara mali, miseris succurrere disco.

Of the Countess of Arundel's many noble characteristics, liberality in almsgiving was one of the most prominent, and that not merely the liberality which sits at home at ease, contented with the simple process of giving, but one which combined such aid with actual personal offices of kindness to the infirm and sick, however repulsive might be their sufferings. She assisted the Church, particularly the Society of Jesus, on a grand scale ; and all this again was united with that vigilant economy, which is an invariable feature in the lives of saints who have been placed in charge, either of households or communities. And it was economy, not of that paltry kind which never goes beyond details, and is therefore necessarily incomplete and inefficient, but one based on that spirit of system which a great mind always loves, and which may be depended on to produce astonishing results in a short time. By it, in spite of splendid charity, she cleared off debts in a few years of an amount that would have appalled most persons so placed. The same general pervading principle of order was carried through all she did ; for example, the regulation of the hours, both of her own day and of that of her household, from which she never departed. All this was seen to give her great personal influence, and her domestics often became remarkable for the practice of the virtues she inculcated, several also entering religion. She herself, though not quitting the world, lived, after her husband's death, under a vow of chastity. Like S. Paula and other holy widows, of whom the early Church affords many examples, and, living in the world, she knew how to

converse with sense and judgment, and to exhibit that difficult combination, the profound humility, which might have been expected in the cloister, and the dignity of manner which befitted the court, and inspired the respect of all of every degree who approached her. Her whole life is an example of what an historian, anything but friendly to the Catholic Church, has called "the silvery loveliness of character," which Catholicism has so often produced.

Her only son was Thomas, twenty-fourth Earl of Arundel, an important personage in the two first Stuart reigns, but of greater celebrity in the history of art, from his collections, made at great cost in Greece and Italy—statues, busts, gems, and inscriptions. Rubens, certainly in language in which just praise runs into profanity, styled him "an evangelist to the world of art." He patronized the early genius of Vandyke and of Inigo Jones; he brought Hollar into England; in philology may be named among those indebted to his encouragement, Francis Junius, his librarian; in science, Oughtred the mathematician, preceptor to his son—names of great note in their day. As for antiquities and learning generally, he was the friend of Cotton, Spelman, Camden, and Selden. And where art comes in contact with public administration, he was a member of the commissions for the rebuilding of St. Paul's and of Whitehall. Nor did these tastes interfere with his attainment of great eminence in the political world. He was entrusted with some considerable embassies by James I. to the States-General and to the Empire; greatly revived the importance of the office of Earl Marshal; was general-in-chief of Charles I.'s northern expedition in 1639; and presided at the commission to try the Earl of Strafford. All these dignities, in that age, would certainly prepare one to expect he had not persevered in the faith, in which his mother, the Countess Anne, had brought him up, and, in fact, he unhappily conformed to the established religion at about the age of thirty, yet, it may be presumed, not without misgiving, for he brought up three of his grandsons, who came under his care, as Catholics. One very characteristic portrait of him at Arundel Castle has already been noticed. There is another of him, in the same collection, of which the "motive" is not very intelligible. He is represented with his countess, a terrestrial globe between them, on which the Earl is measuring a distance with compasses, one of the limbs of which rests on the island of Madagascar. The Countess seems to be in tears, or with a very mournful expression. We believe there is an idea that the picture is intended to convey a design the Earl had had of distant emigration at the beginning of the Stuart troubles; but

this explanation has a very mythical air. Besides, neither emigration nor conquest was directed to those regions at the time. At a later period, Maryland was the Pennsylvania of the Catholics. To return, however, to our subject. The Countess Aletheia's tender and noble character deserves greater development than we are able to give it; but we cannot withhold the striking inscription under Hollar's engraving of her portrait, 1646: *Alatheæ Thomæ com. Arundel, uxori unicæ et unicè dilectæ peregrinationum omniumque fortunarum fidæ et indefessæ comiti*. ["To Aletheia, the one wife and the one beloved of Thomas Earl of Arundel, of his travels and of all his fortunes, the faithful and unwearied companion."] Of their children, the most noted were Henry Frederick, twenty-fifth Earl of Arundel, and William Howard, Viscount Stafford. The latter, beheaded in the pretended plot of Titus Oates, was another example of a Howard who died for the faith really, though on the false charge of treason. The former, as Lord Mowbray, was constantly engaged on the King's side, from the beginning of the Civil War till 1646, when he went to attend the deathbed of his father at Padua. It was in 1643 that Arundel Castle underwent the siege by the Parliamentary forces under Sir William Waller, which left it in ruins. In the next generation the Duchy of Norfolk was restored in the person of Thomas Howard, eldest son of the last-mentioned, after an interruption of three descents. Dying unmarried at Padua, he was succeeded in 1677 by his brother Henry, sixth Duke of Norfolk, of whom the chief points of interest are the following:—In 1664 he had accompanied the Austrian Count Lesley's embassy from the Emperor Leopold to Constantinople, of which there is a picturesque "relation" extant by John Burbury; and five years later, was himself appointed ambassador from England to the Emperor of Morocco, which mission, however, though he embarked for it with a splendid train, he seems never personally to have discharged. By the advice of Evelyn, he made a present to the Royal Society of the library of his grandfather, the twenty-fourth Earl of Arundel, and to the University of Oxford of the "Arundelian Marbles." In the vehement controversy which was agitated in the Catholic body about 1667 on the subject of vicariate jurisdiction, he sided against the views of the regular clergy, and in favour of leaving things as they were, relying on the then quietude of the penal laws, which the moderate party dreaded to awaken by tightening the connection with Rome, though not very many years after they had indeed a rude awakening in the Titus Oates plot. All this was characteristic of that spirit of timid seclusion and shrinking inactivity which was beginning to creep over the

Catholic body, and which lasted through that dreary period which intervened between the Restoration and the days of Catholic emancipation.

A younger brother of the sixth Duke was Philip Cardinal Howard, the second, and not the least illustrious of the English members of the Sacred College since the Reformation. Of him recently appeared a copious and interesting memoir by a religious man of his own order,* a worthy example of that school of research into the post-Reformation history of Catholicism in England, adorned by names like Dodd, Butler, Milner, Tierney, and Oliver, and which is being so wisely revived in the present day by the labours of the English Province of the Society of Jesus. Cardinal Howard had been educated under the Dominicans at Cremona by the care of his grandfather, the great Earl Thomas of Arundel; and early in life joined that order, greatly to the Earl's displeasure, as Evelyn, who witnessed him in tears at what he called the undutifulness of his grandson, has recorded in a remarkable entry of his diary. The Cardinal, who, after the Restoration, was for some time Lord Almoner to Queen Catharine of Braganza, founded a convent of the Dominican order at Bornheim in Flanders, and another in Rome for English Dominicans. He was raised to the purple in 1675 by the title of *Sta. Maria supra Minervam*, and was commonly styled the Cardinal of Norfolk, also holding the dignity of Cardinal-Protector of England. He died at Rome in 1644, and is buried in his own church of the Minerva. There seems to have been but one opinion among all who knew him as to the "singular humanity and benevolence" of his character.

With the generation that followed Earl Henry Frederick of Arundel, the house of Norfolk divides off into three branches.

First, that of his eldest son, above-mentioned, from whom descended three dukes,—Henry (d. 1701), Thomas (d. 1732), and Edward (d. 1777); the second, that of Greystock, descended from his son Charles, of which there were two dukes,—Charles (d. 1786), and another Charles (d. 1815); the third, the branch descended from his son Bernard, and now in possession, of which the present duke is the fourth.

The period of about a century and a half from the time of the Cardinal of Norfolk to that of Catholic Emancipation, presents little or nothing of that stir and brilliance which has passed before us in the earlier annals of the house of Howard.

* "*Life of Philip Thomas Howard, O.P., Cardinal of Norfolk, &c., compiled from original manuscripts. With a sketch of the Rise, Mission, and Influence of the Dominican Order, and of its Early History in England.*" By Father C. F. Raymund Palmer, O.P. London : Richardson & Sons.

For the Catholics of England it was a time of universal depression and inaction, in which the sword of the penal laws was only sheathed, because their object had been almost completely effected. We are, however, far from saying that it is a period undeserving of study; on the contrary, the history of the long intermittent agitation, which culminated in 1829, and of the relations of Catholicism in England to the Protestantism around it, whether in society, in literature, or in politics, has yet to be written, and would be full of instruction, and, too, often of warnings, to thoughtful minds, though it would require skilful composition to make it attractive to the general reader. We shall merely notice, in this division of our subject, a few leading particulars, as it were the index to chapters in such a history; for instance, the action taken by Henry, seventh Duke of Norfolk, in favour of William III.; and later, it would appear, like so many politicians of that day, on the Jacobite side; the negotiations in 1719 with a view to certain concessions from the Holy See as a condition for some liberty held out to Catholics by George I., in which the Government was represented by Secretary Craggs ("the statesman, yet friend to truth," of his epitaph by Pope), and the Catholic party by Dr. Strickland, afterwards Bishop of Namur, and by Thomas, eighth Duke of Norfolk; again, the Catholic element in London society, when Pope was the star of English literature, and Norfolk House, under the "reigning" Duke Edward and his Duchess Mary [Blount], "was the centre," according to Charles Butler, "of whatever was great and elegant in either communion," and whose friendship for Frederick Prince of Wales led (strange to say, considering the well-known and lamentable discord of the royal family) to a kindly feeling towards Catholics on the part of George II., as well as to very friendly relations between him and Norfolk House.

The hereditary taste of the Howards for architecture was shown by Duke Edward on a splendid scale, both in the reconstruction of Norfolk House and the double restoration of Workosop Manor; and still more by Duke Charles, second of that name, in the building of the modern part of Arundel Castle, upon very extensive studies of his own, the latter certainly to be numbered, like those of Horace Walpole and Walter Scott, among the examples which anticipated the great Gothic *renaissance* witnessed by the generation now passing away.

The mention of such pursuits leads us naturally to conclude this outline with the name of one who, whilst imitating, and on a far grander scale, the noble tastes of so many of his ancestors, has but devoted them to add to the splendours with

which the Catholic faith has again dawned upon our land. We well remember some eloquent words uttered on the occasion of the present Duke of Norfolk's attainment of his majority. After speaking of the anticipations formed from the good sense and signs of character he already showed, that he would prove equal to his exalted position, the late Mr. Hope-Scott, with that true and natural feeling which always checks the excessive expression even of merited praise, went on to say: "We do not forget that he is now entering on a path strewn with the broken weapons and defaced armour of many a youth who has commenced life with hopes as high and promises as bright as his whom we are assembled to congratulate to-day." Since that day, he who was then a youth entering an untried and difficult path, has held for nine years the place of leader of the Catholics of England. We all know how he has corresponded to his great responsibilities. What special destiny may be in store for him in the future we know not, but of this we feel assured, that it must, in some form or other, be one indicating in an unusual way the Divine favour; and that the union which lately received the blessing of the aged and saintly Pontiff will be attended with all happiness to the united Houses of Howard and Hastings.

ART. VI.—THE WINTER CAMPAIGN.

The Times.—November 1st, 1877—January 21st, 1878.

WHEN, in October, we reviewed the progress of the war between Turkey and Russia, the Turks had on all points but one been upon the whole successful in their defence, and, except at the Aladja Dag, the Russian attack had everywhere signally failed. Since then the tide of fortune has on all sides turned against the Turks. In Asia they have lost Kars, in Europe, Plevna and the army of Osman Pasha. We propose here to continue our study of the war from the point where we left off; to endeavour to discover how far the Russians have been successful, and to what causes they owe their successes, and to form an accurate judgment on the present position of affairs. We write at a critical time, on the morrow of the Russian occupation of Adrianople. The air is full of rumours as to the policy of England and the

Continental Powers, and at any moment we may receive from the East news of political events that may materially alter the position of the belligerents with respect to each other. At such a moment we must rather review the events of the past, than attempt any forecast even of the immediate future. But such a survey will have its uses, whatever course events may take, for it is rarely that men in general have either the leisure or the inclination to form for themselves a connected summary of even the most recent events, and without this it is impossible to understand either their importance or their consequences. With most men the morning paper of Tuesday drives into oblivion nearly all they read on Monday, and they only remember here and there some striking event which has more particularly attracted their attention and impressed their memory. Besides, the daily papers, dealing as they do with the momentary present, do not and cannot do more than present a series of isolated, detached, and necessarily imperfect pictures of passing events, and it is only when these events are viewed in the light of their antecedents and surroundings that their real significance becomes manifest.

When, early in October, we reviewed the diplomatic history of the outbreak of the war, and its progress during the first campaign, the position of affairs was, upon the whole, eminently favourable to the Turks. Zimmerman's army in the pestiferous Dobrudscha had been reduced to helpless inaction, without having been able even to approach either Varna or Silistria; Mehemet Ali's army on the Lom had effectually covered the Quadrilateral, had converted Rasgrad into a fifth fortress, and had, by frequent and successful attacks, now on one point, now on another, forced the Russians to watch Rustchuk and Rasgrad, and cover Biela and Tirnova with a large army, which otherwise would have reinforced their armies before Plevna. In the Schipka, Suleiman had recovered all but the summit of the pass, and though he could not drive the Russians from it, his force was so strongly intrenched that neither could they successfully attack him; and thus the one gateway they had opened in the Balkan range was effectually closed against them. At Plevna, Osman had repulsed attack after attack, inflicting fearful losses on the Russo-Roumanian army, and, by capturing Dubnik, to the south-west of the town, he had opened communication with Orkanie by the road which runs from Plevna through the Orkanie pass to Sophia. Chefket Pasha's* army, operating on the Sophia road, was able

* While Chefket Pasha commanded the army which held the Sophia road, an English association petitioned Lord Derby to demand that he should be deprived of his command, on account of his alleged share in the Bulgarian

to pass two large convoys into the place, and thus to replenish Osman's almost exhausted magazines. In Asia, the Turkish armies had suffered a serious defeat on the Aladja Dag, and Ghazi Mouktar was retiring on Kars; but it was generally believed that it was too late in the season for the Russians to obtain much advantage from their victory. In Armenia the winter generally begins early in November, and on its elevated valleys and plateaux the cold is so severe, that even ordinary travelling is impossible. It was expected, therefore, that before the middle of November the severity of the weather would put an end to the Russian operations in Asia, and that before December the winter would have also begun in the Danube valley, and that the Russians would be forced by the ice and snow to raise the siege of Plevna. In an ordinary season this would have occurred, and the Turkish position would be now intact, and Plevna and Kars would be free at least until next year.

It has been said that the elements fight for Russia. In 1812 and 1854-55, the severity of the winter destroyed for her hostile armies; in 1877-78, an exceptionally mild season has saved her own from otherwise certain ruin, and has enabled the Grand Dukes, though still at the cost of enormous suffering to their men, to carry on a winter campaign both in Armenia and in the Danube valley. In both they have obtained signal successes, and the storming of Kars, the fall of Plevna, and the seizure of the Schipka Pass will make 1877 long a famous year in the military annals of Russia.

After Mouktar's defeat on the Aladja Dag, he retired slowly upon Kars. The Russians, as usually is the case with them after a battle, seemed exhausted by their efforts, and unable to attempt an immediate pursuit. Several battalions which they had cut off and might have captured, had they been sufficiently active, succeeded in escaping, and rejoined Mouktar. The Turkish general did not stop at Kars; after having seen

atrocities; and Lord Derby forwarded the petition to Turkey. No such demand was ever before made. Pellissier, who commanded the French army that acted with our own in the Crimea, had done some terrible things in Algeria, yet no one in England objected to a man who had smoked a whole tribe, with its women and children, to death, holding command, so long as he was a good officer. Even if Chefket is guilty, the demand was impertinent; but there are English gentlemen who, with a knowledge of the man, assert that whatever wrong the irregulars did, was done because they were quite beyond his control, and that at Batak he freely exposed his life to save women and old men from them. Chefket should not, therefore, be condemned without a hearing, on the authority of an *ex parte* statement in Mr. Baring's report, and a phrase in Lord Derby's despatch of September, 1876.

that the great fortress was well provided for a siege, he continued his retreat to the Soghanli Dagh—the range of heights covering Erzeroum, where, in the previous June, he had awaited the first advance of Melikoff, and from which he had successfully rolled back the tide of invasion to the frontier. Ismail Pasha, with his Kurdish army, rejoined Mouktar before he reached Erzeroum. He had heard of the battle of the Aladja Dagh in his camp near Zaryagla, in Transcaucasia, on Russian territory, and thirty miles from his own frontier. Had Ismail been more active, the Russians could never have assembled the force that overwhelmed Mouktar, but he now in some degree redeemed his error by making a splendid forced march round the Russian left wing, past Bayazid, and, by difficult mountain roads, to the neighbourhood of Erzeroum. The inactivity of the Russians did not last long; by the middle of October they had invested Kars, and Heimann's corps pressed on to the Soghanli Dagh, from which Mouktar was driven in the first week of November. Surprised by the Russians, the Turkish outposts were driven in before any preparations could be made for an effective resistance. The Turkish army withdrew into Erzeroum, which, since the commencement of the campaign, had been converted into a first-class fortress, and armed with a powerful artillery. As the main body of the Grand Duke Michael's army was before Kars, Heimann was not strong enough to invest Erzeroum; he established himself close up to the eastern forts, and having succeeded so easily in forcing the position at Deve Boyun, on the Soghanli Dagh, he concluded that the Turkish army was thoroughly demoralized, and therefore resolved to attempt a *coup-de-main* against the city. The proposal originated with a certain Colonel Tarnaieff, of the staff, who led the attack. At midnight, on November 9th, with three battalions, supported by seven others under General Tugukasoff, he fell upon the Azizi forts to the east of the place. One fort he carried at the first rush, but the others repelled the stormers. The firing roused all Erzeroum; Mouktar at the head of a few battalions and a host of armed citizens fell upon the Russians; the lost fort was retaken, and Tarnaieff's men were driven back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. After this, no serious attack was made on Erzeroum, and Heimann contented himself with sending out flying columns of Cossacks to effect a very imperfect investment by cutting off an occasional convoy, or capturing from time to time a Turkish estafette in the plain.

The successful resistance of Erzeroum, and the knowledge that

Kars was provisioned for at least ten months, gave the friends of Turkey good reason to hope that Armenia would remain unconquered. On the 14th snow fell heavily, and the position of the Russians became an anxious one, badly supplied as they were from a distant base by snowy mountain roads. A few days later, on the morning of Monday, the 19th, came the astounding news, that, without opening a single trench or battering down a single stone of the Turkish works, the Russians had taken Kars by storm and escalade, on the night between Saturday and Sunday, November 17th-18th. Only one English correspondent—the representative of the *Daily News*—witnessed the storming, and his straightforward narrative bears the stamp of accuracy and truth,* and contrasts very favourably with the loosely-written and boastful accounts of Melikoff's exploit given by the *Golos* and the *St. Petersburg Gazette*. The correspondent of the *Daily News* all but declares that the Russian success was won by treachery among the Turkish officers, and, read between the lines, his letter gives evidence enough to prove this. Who the traitor was will, perhaps, never be known, but he must have been either the commandant or some prominent officer of his staff. Kars is built upon the eastern side of a huge mass of abrupt volcanic rocks, through a deep chasm in which flows the Kars river. The citadel towers up to the height of 450 feet on the crags above the stream. To the north and west of the town, hills, crowned by a double line of forts, form an all but impregnable barrier. It was on these hills that Moravieff lost 7,000 men in a single morning, when he tried to storm the place in 1855, when Kars was only defended by light earthwork redoubts. In the plain to the east of the town is a great intrenched camp, formed by three forts connected by lines of intrenchments with each other and with the works on the hills. At eight on the evening of the 17th, the full moon shining through a slight haze, and enabling objects to be distinguished up to 500 yards, the Russians hurled 15,000 men against the forts of the intrenched camp, and the works on the almost precipitous Kara Dag (Black Hill) to the north-east of Kars. Meanwhile a false attack was made on the hills to the westward. Before morning all the forts had fallen, the citadel had surrendered without firing a shot, half the garrison were prisoners, the other half was attempting a flight which was soon stopped by the Russian pursuit. Only some of the cavalry escaped. How was all this

* The correspondence referred to appeared in the *Daily News* of December 18th, and contained an excellent sketch map of Kars. There is a good model of the town and forts, and the adjacent country, at Whitehall, in the rooms of the Royal United Service Institute.

accomplished? Undoubtedly by the free use of the golden key.

That attempts at bribing some one were made, says the *Daily News* correspondent, and had a chance of being brought to the desired end, I positively know, but I cannot tell whether the goodwill of an important traitor has really been secured, and if so, whether he was able to fulfil his promise. But I am quite in the dark with regard to the individual who may have entered into the black bargain. The European doctors here account for the disaster which so suddenly befell the Turks by stating that the troops, especially the Arabs and Kurds, were in a despondent state of mind, badly clad and fed, and never paid, and had moreover a dislike to fighting the battles of their Sunit masters. Yet these worthies, whose disposition could be no secret for the commander and his council, had been called forth in insufficient numbers to defend the most important, the most vulnerable points of the fortress. However that may be, these circumstances can neither cast blame on the Russian Commander-in-Chief nor impair the valour of his soldiers. On the contrary, the skill of a general is only brought into higher light if he be able to facilitate victory by diplomatic means.

How the treachery was carried out is plain enough. To give up Kars to the Russians without firing a shot was impossible, but to so arrange the garrison that the points not attacked would be strongly manned, the points attacked almost un-garrisoned, was easy enough. On the western hills, which cannot be held once the city is taken, and which are most difficult of attack, thirty battalions, or three-fourths of the garrison, were kept uselessly inactive. This left very few men to defend the points the Russians wished to seize. Let us hear the *Daily News* correspondent again:—

The Turks seem to have stuck to the queer idea that the Tehorak Tepe fortifications (on the west) would become the principal object of the enemy's attack; whether because the valiant Kamaroff, the conqueror of Ardahan, stood in its vicinity, with his old solid troops, or for some mysterious yet unrevealed grounds; in short, they had massed there the bulk of their forces, some thirty battalions. The not less inaccessible Karadagh was likewise only manned by a few feeble battalions of demoralized and disaffected Shia-Arabs from Mesopotamia and Irak. At all events, these foolish arrangements are, at least, worth a minute investigation, in order to ascertain why the commander and his counsellors ordered so strange a disposition of their forces, which numbered well nigh 20,000 combatants. The impregnable citadel, on the contrary, had no infantry garrison at all, and was merely defended by a company of artillerymen. It is obvious that such a garrison is fully equal to the task of defending a fortress like Kars, even against double that number of the best soldiers in the world.

Of the surrender of the citadel, which was only garrisoned by a few gunners, he says :—

This strong pile of masonry, containing the arsenal and depots of costly Peabody, Martini, and Winchester breechloaders, many Krupp cannon, together with an enormous amount of ammunition, provisions, and other military stores, fell, without a serious blow, into the hands of the victorious Russians. In looking from my window at that almost perpendicular crag, frowning some 150 yards high over the Kars river, crowned with a series of solid fortifications, I am astonished, and I am at a loss to understand, how it could have been so easily conquered, and why it was not more valiantly defended. *I am sure that a single battalion of first-class soldiers might have kept it for months in the teeth of the most powerful army.* At the time of its inglorious fall, some battalions of the 40th Division had climbed the not less rocky sides of the Karadagh Hill, and took, after a short but sharp struggle, at the point of the bayonet, the massive castle-like fort on its top. Its partner, the Arab Tabia, of equal strength, surrendered only at dawn of day, almost without offering a serious resistance.

We would gladly believe, if we could, that Kars was captured only by the prowess of Melikoff's troops, for it is better for a nation that its armies should be defeated rather than sold ; but the facts give only too much reason to believe that it was treason placed the key of Eastern Asia in the hands of Russia. With the fortress, Melikoff captured such a supply of stores, that Kars became a second base for his army. The news of the conquest was flashed by telegraph to Cabul on the Sunday morning, to prove to the Emir of Afghanistan that Russia, and not England, was the more powerful of the two nations between whom the Empire of Asia is divided—a message of some significance for the future of our Indian Empire.

Within a month after the treason of Kars, Plevna fell, reduced, not by treachery, but by famine. In the middle of October, Mehemet Ali, who had given up the command of the army of the Lom (on account of the continual opposition he met with from his lieutenant, Ahmed Eyoub), was appointed to command an army which was to be assembled at Sophia for the relief of Plevna. This army did not yet exist ; there were only a few detachments in the Balkan passes and a small garrison at Sophia to form the nucleus of it. At the same time Suleiman was given the command on the Lom. On October the 24th the Russians before Plevna took Dubnick, and on the 29th Teliche, and thus completed the investment of Osman's army. Mehemet Ali's small force was quite unable to attempt anything towards raising the siege. The nominal strength of the proposed army was to be 100,000 men, but it

was not till the end of November that he had 25,000 under his command.* The Russians detached a corps against him, and he did all that was possible in his position. He inflicted two bloody repulses upon them at Nevesich and Kamarli, but they succeeded in taking Orkanie and Etropol, and so prepared the way for a subsequent march on Sophia, and effectually covered the siege of Plevna. Suleiman Pasha was to have co-operated by attacking the Russians on the Lom. He ought to have accomplished something against the extended line opposed to him, stretching from Rustchuk to the front of Osman Bazaar; but he made isolated attacks, instead of adopting a combined plan; he brought on engagements in which his attack was too serious for a mere reconnaissance, too weak for a successful battle; and when he won, he lost time, and never followed up his advantage. In fact, on the Lom he lost whatever reputation his useless attacks on the Schipka had left him. He seems to be only able to plan a single action, to be incapable of taking a wide field of operations into his mind at once. Thus his assault on Elena on December 4th was well planned, and well executed by his subordinate, Kerim Pasha, who took eleven guns and some hundred Russian prisoners, but, having taken Elena and struck a weak part of the Russian line, he did nothing more, and evacuated the place on hearing that Plevna was taken.

Plevna fell on the 9th of December. Osman Pasha, his provisions being exhausted, and his men worn out with exposure and want, made a last desperate effort to break through the besieging lines. He mustered about 30,000 bayonets, against at least 100,000 of the Russo-Roumanian army. In his sortie on the night of the 9th he carried the nearer works of the Russians in the Vid Valley, and was breaking his way towards the Widin road, when he was surrounded by the reinforcements hurried from all sides towards him, and saw the town from which he had sallied occupied by the Russians. Wounded at the head of his men, he gave up the hopeless enterprise, and surrendered. For five months he had held Plevna against four-fold odds. In the face of the enemy he had converted a circle of low hills into a fortress, by digging a double circle of trenches, and erecting at intervals a small redoubt, usually 150 feet square, and therefore garrisoned by only one or two com-

* In the middle of November a London paper, which is on the whole friendly to the Turks, published a letter from Sophia, giving a full account of the strength, or rather the weakness, of Mehemet's army. The news must have been welcome to the Russians, who would of course receive it from the London embassy. It was just the time when Gourko was preparing to attack Etropol and Orkanie.

panies. Even the famous Gravitz redoubt was of this kind. Theoretically the works were weak—could not well be weaker—but, manned by brave men with rapid-firing rifles, they became impregnable to all but famine, and cost the Russians a siege of five months and the loss of nearly 50,000 men shot down in action, and probably of nearly as many by exposure and disease. Osman is undoubtedly the hero of the campaign, the best general it has brought to the front. Of his dogged courage and his engineering and tactical skill there can be no doubt. Military critics say he might perhaps have done better had he made his improvised fortress at Loftscha, a few miles to the southward. There he would have equally menaced Biela and Tirnova, and the nature and position is stronger, and lying nearer the Balkans, would not have been invested by the Russians as easily as Plevna, which lies detached from the mountains and well out into the plain of Bulgaria. It is, however, easy to be wise after the event. Osman accomplished at Plevna what no soldier in Europe would have thought possible a year ago, and had the other Turkish generals done but half as much, the Russians would now be all north of the Danube—perhaps of the Pruth.

The fall of Plevna brought Serbia into the field. That chivalrous little state waited till it supposed all danger was over, and then came on to share the spoil. Milan and his friends were held back neither by gratitude for the wonderful forbearance with which the Turks had evacuated the conquered territory without claiming a rood of its land, a stone of its fortresses, a single piastre of indemnity. The one condition of this generous peace was a renewal of allegiance, and on the 16th of January in this present year the envoys of the Prince of Serbia at Constantinople “renewed in the most formal manner the expression of loyal fidelity of the Prince and people of Serbia to the august person of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan.”* This solemn pledge has been disgracefully broken at the first opportunity, and we feel a certain satisfaction in knowing that, though they have taken Nish by storm, the Servians have suffered at least two disastrous defeats at the hands of the small force detached by the Turks to check their advance.

The fine weather which had enabled the Russians to maintain the siege of Plevna broke just a week after the surrender. On the 16th and 17th rain fell heavily; on the 18th the rain changed to sleet, and on the 19th the sleet changed to snow. At the same time a tempest swept the Danube valley; the

* Blue Book, Turkey, 1877, No. XV., p. 205.

telegraphs were destroyed, the roads blocked up with snow-drifts: terrible must have been the sufferings of the Turkish prisoners, who, badly clad and weak with hunger, were exposed to the fury of the storm on their march to Sistova. Many a brave man who had survived the siege perished in the snow. What the Russians suffered may be judged from one incident—a transport train was stopped by the snow-drifts in an exposed situation at Cetroceni, near Bucharest. In one night forty of the horses and twenty-nine of the men were frozen to death. Day after day Bulgaria was swept with snow and sleet. The Danube froze sufficiently to carry away two Russian bridges, but not firmly enough to make a bridge of ice to replace them. Transport began to break down. The armies of the Czar, losing each day hundreds by cold and exposure, were not allowed to rest in the positions they had won. To stand still was impossible. They should either return to Roumania, or hurl themselves against the Balkans, and against the Balkans they were hurled, to carry them at any cost. Had the Turks held the passes, and they might easily have held them, the Russian armies would have been ruined even after Plevna. But the Council of War at Constantinople, like the old Austrian Aulic Council at Vienna, was interfering at every step with the conduct of the operations in the field. At the most critical moment, the two best generals Turkey still possessed, Mehemet Ali and Ghazi Mouktar, were recalled from Sophia and Erzeroum, and for some days we heard only of continual changes, the incompetent Suleiman being finally appointed to command at Sophia, and the worse than incompetent Ahmed Eyoub being given the important command of Adrianople. Troops were rapidly transferred by sea from Varna to Constantinople, for the defence of Adrianople and the capital, only a small force being left to hold the Lom, but so badly was this transport managed, notwithstanding the presence of Hobart Pasha's fleet in the Black Sea, that a Russian cruiser picked up and took to Odessa a Turkish steamer with a whole battalion of Nizams on board. Before Suleiman reached Sophia the fate of the place was sealed. In the last days of the year Gourko's columns turned the Turkish position at Kamarli; the Turks, covered by Baker Pasha's division, retired on Sophia, which they had to evacuate in the first week of the new year, Suleiman rallying his army about Ichtiman, where the Balkan chain bends southward to join the Despoto Dag (the ancient Rhodope), and the semicircle of mountains cuts off the Isker valley, in which Sophia stands, from Roumelia. Between Ichtiman and the Shipka is the Trojan pass. After the fall of Plevna, Skoboleff's corps occu-

pied Trojan, with orders to force the pass at the first opportunity. On the night of the 6th, Skobeleff made a reconnaissance of the pass. He found that it was too strong to be forced in front, and in the march two officers and nearly fifty men were frozen to death. Next day he turned the pass by a neighbouring mountain path. In no case do the Turks seem to have understood that no pass can be securely held, unless the minor paths and passes on either side are either occupied or rendered impracticable. At the Schipka, at Etropol, at Orkanie, at Kamarli, and at Trojan, the manœuvre by which Xerxes two thousand years ago forced Thermopylæ, has been repeated with as much success as if it was a new invention in tactics, for which the defenders could not be expected to be prepared. The Trojan being thus forced, Skobeleff and Mirsky, with at least 20,000 men, the vanguard of a force of three or four times that strength, descended upon the main road from Adrianople to Tatar Bazardjik, Ichtiman, and Sophia; thus at once Suleiman's force at Ichtiman was cut off from Adrianople, and the Schipka was threatened in the rear. The troops at the Schipka should have withdrawn on the 9th; they waited till the 10th, when Skobeleff, having established himself in their rear, Radetzki attacked from Fort St. Nicholas, and the Turks, taken in front and rear, after a desperate conflict, in which the Russians acknowledge they lost 5,000 men, laid down their arms. Thus 20,000 men were lost to Turkey at one blow, and the way to Adrianople left open to 100,000 Russians. Why was not the Schipka army saved by a timely retreat? There is good reason to believe that the Russians obtained their success—a success which caused the collapse of the Turkish defence—by what some have called a misunderstanding on the part of the Turks, but what we feel more inclined to call bad faith on the part of Russian statesmen and generals. When Russia refused the mediation of England at the end of the year, she suggested that our government should advise the Turks to apply for an armistice directly, to be concluded in the field, adding, that till Turkey thus acknowledged her defeat, nothing could be done in the way of negotiation, and that as soon as the armistice was demanded the generals in the field would be ordered to suspend their operations. On the morning of the 9th the Turkish generals received orders from Constantinople to suspend all operations, as an armistice was being negotiated. The Turks, therefore, remained inactive at the Schipka, and were cut off by the Russian advance. But why did not the Russians send similar orders to their generals? They did send them, but we have it under Prince Gortchakoff's hand in the Blue Books laid

before Parliament on the 17th instant, that the orders were sent, not by telegraph, but by post, a means of despatch by which they would take eight days to reach Bulgaria, fifteen to reach Armenia. The Schipka having been secured, the Grand Dukes declared that they could grant no armistice till preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon. Thus time was gained to reap the fruits of the treachery of the 9th. Suleiman's position at Ichtiman was untenable, once the Schipka was in Russian hands; and while we write he is endeavouring to make a march to the seacoast of Roumelia, in order to save his army, while Gourko is pressing him on one hand, and Mirsky on the other.* The western column of the Russians has seized Philippopolis, the eastern has occupied Adrianople, from which Mehemet Ali, to whom at the last moment the command was given, wisely withdrew the garrison to assist in the defence of the lines which cover the capital. Meanwhile the negotiations for peace continue; Austria makes feeble efforts to break from the triple alliance; England, which might at any moment determine her action by showing a bold front, gives her little support, and as yet speaks in an uncertain voice. Turkey wavers between a last struggle at Constantinople and Gallipoli, *and an alliance with the conquerors*, an alliance long predicted by men who knew the East as the certain consequence of the abandonment of Turkey by the Western Powers. Into these matters we need not enter here; all we could say would be mere conjecture. We must confine ourselves to certain events in the campaign.

First, we are struck by the singular mismanagement which, once Plevna was taken, allowed the Russians to win their way through the Balkans at this season of the year without any adequate resistance. The blame of this must mainly fall upon the Council of War at Constantinople, a body which has no real right to exist, and which has done nothing since the war began but mischief. It has been the centre of a network of intrigues, by which generals have been displaced, superseded, or appointed to commands according as one or the other cabal was in the ascendant. It has been well said that the best testimony to the good character of the Turkish people is that their empire has existed so long in spite of Constantinople. If it survives the war, the saying will be more true than ever. It is lamentable that this system has enabled a man like Suleiman Pasha to obtain command after command, while better men, like Osman, Mouktar, and Mehemet Ali, were given only minor

* Suleiman has since succeeded in bringing the greater part of his army down to the coast, the best thing he has been able to do since he was put in command.

posts. Had either Mehemet or Mouktar held from the first the supreme command in Europe, and been allowed to choose their own subordinates, the story of the winter campaign would have been a very different one.

Next, coming from the past to the present, we feel sure that while we write in this fourth week of January, the position of the Russian armies in Europe, victorious as they are, is a very anxious one. With a river behind them, on which there is only ice enough to destroy all bridges and make traffic impossible, between them and this river a waste of snow that they have few sledges to traverse, and which the first thaw will convert into a morass, with a cold so intense that men die of it every night; with the fortresses of the Quadrilateral intact, Constantinople impregnable, the Russian army is not safe, and further resistance is not impossible. We do not regret that Turkey asked for mediation in December; the document in which the good offices of England were requested was so well worded, that it merely forced Russia in some degree to show her hand, but we do regret that she is negotiating for an armistice. Instead of deputing Mehemet Ali to go to the Russian head-quarters at Loftscha, he should have been told to go to Ichtiman, and march as much of the army as he could save over the Despoto Dag to Salonica, thence to be transferred by sea to the Dardanelles and Constantinople. By this means Constantinople would be more than sufficiently garrisoned. It would be prudent at the same time to occupy Gallipoli with 15,000 Turks, and have a few ironclads in the Dardanelles to assist in the defence. These measures being taken, the Turks could let the winter, that now at last has fairly begun, waste the Russian armies, as it would have done to better purpose had it come six weeks ago. The story of Diebitch's march on Adrianople in 1829 ought to be always a warning to Turkey: only a few attenuated battalions reached the city. Had it resisted, they would have been destroyed; had the Turks at Constantinople refused to treat, even after the capitulation of Adrianople, Diebitch's army would equally have been destroyed; but a panic at Constantinople, and a hurriedly-concluded treaty, saved the armies of Russia, who, though more successful than they are now, were, nevertheless, on the brink of ruin. Every one who has studied Von Moltke's history of the military events of 1828-29, knows this. We trust that there are some men at Constantinople who know it, and that they will be able to make their voices heard at this supreme crisis in the Parliament, and in the wretched Council of War at the Seraskierate. Assuredly the Russians awaited the result of the negotiations for the armistice as anxiously as the Turks.

The losses on both sides in this uninterrupted campaign of

nine months must have been enormous. The war has already lasted longer than the German invasion of France, and it has caused an amount of suffering far beyond what has resulted from any campaign since 1812. The losses in battle, though fearful in amount, are really among the lightest which will have to be added together to make up the terrible whole. The Turks have lost far more in prisoners than in killed and wounded, on account of the wholesale capitulations of Ardahan, Nicopolis, Kars, Plevna and the Schipka, which in all have placed 100,000 prisoners in the power of Russia; probably about 40,000 represents the loss in killed and wounded. The Russian losses in battle, thanks to their habit of recklessly hurling solid masses against earthworks defended by the rapid fire of the breechloader, have been singularly heavy. Up to the 1st of January they acknowledge a loss of more than 80,000 men since the beginning of the campaign. Now it is notorious that they understate their losses, for in some serious actions they have stated their loss at ten or twelve men, or, as in the case of some of the earlier actions in Armenia, at a minimum of "one Cossack"; but taking their loss at 80,000, we must add, at the least, an equal number for deaths by exposure, cold, and disease, and this is a very low calculation, for armies in the field often lose twice, thrice, or four times as many men from disease as from wounds. This makes the aggregate Russian loss 160,000 men; it is probably higher, and it is not unlikely that 200,000 is nearer the truth. This is a measure of the suffering which has been endured by the armies in the field; but beyond these there is the wide sea of suffering that has overflowed both the belligerent empires, falling in some degree upon every town and village, for from all, how many of the bread-winners have been taken, some for awhile, some for ever. The *Times* correspondent at St. Petersburg, writing on December 18th, gave us a glimpse of the misery endured by a single district. We may quote it here, merely premising that the district in question, judged by its population, forms rather less than the 13,000th part of the empire of the Czar.

My figures, says the writer, are taken from the report of a benevolent society formed for the purpose of aiding the families of poor soldiers. The field of activity which this society has chosen is a *Volost*, or small district containing fifteen villages. The number of inhabitants amounts to 6,000, forming 833 peasant families, or homesteads (*dvory*) as they are commonly called. Of these 830 families, 118 had to furnish recruits, and many of them are consequently in a state bordering on destitution. The degree of poverty varies according to the size of the family and other circumstances. A careful inspection of all the homesteads showed that nineteen of them had neither labourers nor horses, and were accordingly utterly incapable of sup-

porting themselves. Among the families which were not completely deprived of their male adults, eighteen were in "a very doubtful condition" and twenty-one in extreme poverty. In five houses, for instance, it was found that there were no cattle, and that one labourer had to support from five to eight persons. But the saddest cases of all were those in which the families had been driven from their homes as soon as the recruit was taken. Of such cases there were thirteen. This fact will surprise many who know something of Russian peasant life, for it is in flagrant contradiction to commonly-received conceptions. It is generally supposed that when two brothers, with their families, live together, and one of them is taken as a recruit, the household remains undivided. So it is, doubtless, as a general rule, but these thirteen cases show that this rule has its exceptions. The expulsions resulted, we are informed, not from any unnecessary egotism and hardheartedness, but simply because the brother who remained found it physically impossible to feed the absent brother's family as well as his own. The unfortunate ones who were thus expelled found shelter and food in the houses of charitable neighbours, but in many cases the worldly means of these good Samaritans were not at all in proportion to their charitable disposition. In ten of these improvised houses of refuge there was only one adult labourer, and in four of them there was no horse, which is as necessary to the peasant as a saw and chisel are to the carpenter. The general result of the whole investigation was that out of the 118 families who had to give recruits, 72 required assistance.

I have no reason to suppose that the inhabitants of this district are in exceptionally unfavourable conditions, but they are very exceptional in having a benevolent society to assist them in their hour of need. How many thousands of villages are there which have no rich, benevolent people to help them, and no one to tell their tale of suffering! The Russian peasant is generally a little deficient in some of the qualities which we include among the cardinal virtues; but he has, as his champions tell us, virtues of his own, and among these the habit-of giving alms is, perhaps, the most prominent. The *Muzhik*, it is often said, will never drive away the hungry suppliant from his door. If this be true, we may form some notion of the misery and destitution which exist among the rural populations, when peasants expel from their homes their own near relatives, and compel them to live on the charity of neighbours almost as poor as themselves.

But in another way the suffering caused by the war has been exceptionally severe. By the policy of the Czar it has been made a deadly feud between races and religions. It has been pitiful to read day after day in the correspondence of the various papers, how the whole Turkish population of Bulgarian villages and towns broke up their homes and fled before the advancing enemy, scared by well-authenticated news of wholesale pillage and cruel massacre, perpetrated not by the Russians so much as by the Bulgars under Russian protection. In Sistova, Biela, and Tirnova, there was a sack of the town, but

no lives were lost; but south of the Balkans, during Gourko's raid in the summer, deeds were done, with even the mention of which we cannot sully our pages, and Bulgar and Cossack committed crimes which throw into the shade all that the Bashi-Bazouks ever did, even taking Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet as sober history. Now that the Russians have crossed the Balkans in force, we read day after day heartrending accounts of the winter flight of thousands of Turkish families in Roumelia, scared from their homes by the advance of the armies of the Czar. The scenes of this war help us to realize what the barbarian invasions of the 5th century must have been, and the Russians have justified the comparison by barbarous deeds. At Plevna, according to the *Daily News*, they committed the deliberate cruelty of forcing Turkish men, women, and children, helpless non-combatants as they were, into Osman's lines, in order to make the daily consumption of food greater, and produce famine more rapidly. In Asia there is only too much reason to believe that 2,000 wounded men, taken at Kars, in violation of the received laws of war and of humanity, were marched through the snow to Erzeroum and 1,200 perished on the way. Moreover, it appears from Russian papers, that all Circassians taken fighting for Turkey are sent to Siberia. Russia drove these men from their homes, she allowed them to become Ottomans, and now, when they are defending their new homes in the Balkan peninsula, she treats them as rebels to be doomed to the living death of Siberia.

Bulgaria was, according to Mr. Forbes, of the *Daily News*, a land of plenty and comfort when the Russians entered it; wasted by war, and eaten up by hostile armies, it must be now all but a desert. The Bulgars have suffered heavily at the hands of their Muscovite friends. A foe of Russia sometimes loses by enmity with her, but a friend of Russia invariably suffers for the alliance. It is terrible to think how much during these nine months of war Russ and Turk, Serb, Bulgar, and Roumanian have had to endure, and all not to right any wrong, but on an empty pretext of humanity, to which the deeds of Russia give the lie; to spread wider in Eastern Europe and Western Asia the iron rule of the Czar. It is terrible to look back on such a war, but we know that it is more terrible to look forward to the results of a peace dictated by the Russian armies, for such a peace can only mean more undisguised trampling out of God's truth, more widespread trampling out of man's just freedom, and the wide sowing of the seed of future strife from the Ganges to the Rhine.

ART. VII.—AN EXAMINATION OF MR. HERBERT
SPENCER'S "PSYCHOLOGY."—PART V.

IN the April number of this REVIEW (1877) I concluded my examination of the first volume of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Psychology," which I contended left "the arguments for the radical distinctness of intellect from sensation not only unimpaired but reinforced."

This second volume contains the three remaining parts of his work, namely, Parts VI., VII., and VIII.

Part VI. is entitled "*Special Analysis*," and is occupied about "Reasoning," "Perception," "Relations," and "Consciousness."

Part VII. is entitled "*General Analysis*," and is occupied with an examination of different metaphysical systems and an exposition and defence of the author's own system of "transfigured realism."

Part VIII. is headed "*Corollaries*," and is concerned with the classification of psychical powers, with the development of conceptions, and with emotions and sentiments, considered as preliminaries of the science of sociology.

PART VI.

This sixth part Mr. Spencer, as I have just said, entitles "SPECIAL ANALYSIS." In it he treats of quantitative and qualitative reasoning, and professes to consider reasoning in general, though, as we shall see, he omits the most important facts and considerations, and exhibits a failure to appreciate the process of inference, whence misrepresentation of that process necessarily follows in his attempted exposition of it.

He then proceeds to consider classification, naming and recognition, the perception of objects, of space, of time, of motion, of resistance, and perception in general. This is followed by chapters on relations of similarity, cointention, coextension, connature, and likeness, together with their opposites. Then follows a consideration of sequence and of consciousness in general, and the whole part concludes with a statement of what Mr. Spencer considers to be the legitimate results of what has preceded.

The first eight chapters are here alone considered. In it, as we shall see, he proceeds from considering reasoning as

the mere association of sensible images occasioning a perception of the likeness or unlikeness between relations; and he confounds together in hopeless confusion the deductive ratiocination with the direct perception of intuitive truth. His whole theory of reasoning is thus vitiated.

CHAPTER I.—LIMITATION OF THE SUBJECT.

The contents of this short chapter may be thus summarized :—§ 274. The analysis must be limited to "thoughts," "emotions" not admitting of further interpretation than that already given. § 275. It is most useful to begin with the most complex and involved thoughts.

The author starts by observing that "unless he is warned against doing so, the reader will expect to find in the following chapters analyses of states of consciousness of all orders. The phenomena presented by the emotions, as well as those presented by the intellect, will be assumed to fall into the scope of the inquiry. A resolution into their components, not only of thoughts, but also of sentiments, will be looked for."

He contends, however, that since "thoughts," "no matter how simple or how complex, contain more or less definable and nameable elements, having connexions that may be described with distinctness, while 'sentiments' have their limits and contents very faintly marked and entangled,—the latter (i.e. sentiments) had better be passed over," "as not admitting of further interpretations than those reached synthetically" in the first volume. This haziness, he reminds us, is a necessary consequence of the "genesis of emotions," as traced by him in §§ 214 and 247 (in Parts IV. and V. of vol. i.) to the fundamental sensations of brutes.

But in a Psychology we most certainly ought to find analyses of all orders of mental activity, of complex feelings and emotions no less than of thoughts; nor indeed is it possible to consider the treatment of the emotions in the portions of the first volume above referred to as other than most meagre and unsatisfactory, the intellectual emotions being entirely ignored. As I have before contended, in a Psychology not only is it indispensable for completeness that all our mental activities should be considered, but it is surely desirable in the present day, when so much scepticism is expressed as to our knowledge of objectivity, that we should start from a subjective basis. So to do, however, requires that we should at once consider our intellectual actions in the order of reflection, and therefore our highest activities, our reflex self-con-

sciousness, our will and our noblest emotions, require to be brought before our notice at an early stage of our inquiry.

As we have again and again urged, Mr. Spencer has, in the first volume, ignored the intellect altogether, taking no notice of our highest intuitions, such as those of truth, beauty, and goodness. Similarly, with regard to emotion, he gives, as I have already said, "what is possibly a true, and is certainly a very ingenious, account of brutes' emotions," but he takes no notice of the loftiest human feelings, such as love, apart from sexual feeling, the pleasures of intellectual contemplation, and the emotion which accompanies the judgment of moral approbation and reprobation, or the longing for the Beatific Vision. I am convinced that no clustering of brutal feelings, however complex, can account for such emotions; but, however that may be, it is certain that Mr. Spencer has not sought to account for them, for he gives no evidence of ever having contemplated them. Some philosophers contend that such higher emotions in which the intellect and often the will (as in aspirations) plainly bear a part, should be classified under the head of Will rather than under that of Emotion, but this is not the place for such a question to be considered.

CHAPTER II.—COMPOUND QUANTITATIVE REASONING.

The following is a short statement of the contents of the several sections of this chapter:—§ 276. We must begin with the most composite type of compound quantitative reasoning. § 277. Example of an intuition that ratios which are severally equal to certain other ratios that are unequal to each other, are themselves unequal. § 278. This intuition is embodied in the axiom that "ratios which are equal to the same ratio are equal to one another," and this is one concrete form of the axiom, "relations which are equal to the same relation are equal to each other." § 279. This last axiom is the foundation of all mathematical analysis, § 280, and is reached by an intuition of the equality of two relations between relations. In this chapter he begins by saying, that "Of intellectual acts, the highest are those which constitute conscious reasoning—reasoning called conscious, to distinguish it from the unconscious or automatic reasoning that forms so large an element in ordinary perception." There is much to object to even in this initial sentence. That conscious acts are higher than unconscious, I, of course, most readily admit, but that the term "reasoning" should be applied to any unconscious activity (except as a figure of speech, and such does not appear to be Mr. Spencer's intention), seems to me a contradiction in terms. That complex associations of sensations, of

sensations with imaginations, and of both these again with emotions in more and more complex clusters and clusters of clusters, may take place unconsciously is most true, as also that such complex associations supply the material and conditions for the exercise of conscious reason. But such automatic action may go on where intellect is altogether absent, as in brutes, constituting that simulation of reason which may be called, by a figure of speech, "sensuous inference." Such creatures have all the antecedent conditions of intellectual action save the one essential one of having an intellect to act. But *reasoning* is *not* the highest kind of human intellectual action; the highest kind is not the indirect and mediate act of inference (i.e. reasoning), the highest kind of intellectual action is the direct and immediate act of intellectual intuition, as when we see that always and in all places ingratitude is and must be vicious, or that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same sense. Mr. Spencer proceeds to observe that we must set out with the most composite type of compound quantitative reasoning, and the example of such which he selects is (§ 277) that of an engineer who has constructed an iron tubular bridge "just strong enough to bear the strain it is subject to," and who being required to construct another one double the span of the first, infers that the depth or thickness of the second must be more than double the depth or thickness of the former. He thus concludes from knowing that the weights of masses of similar material similarly shaped are as the cubes of their linear dimensions, while their strengths vary only as the squares of such dimensions. He adds, "to present the reasoning in a formal manner, he sees that the

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Sustaining force} \\ \text{in the small tube} \end{array} \} : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Sustaining force} \\ \text{in the large tube} \end{array} \right\} :: 1^3 : 2^3$$

whilst at the same time he sees that

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Destroying force} \\ \text{in the small tube} \end{array} \} : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Destroying force} \\ \text{in the large tube} \end{array} \right\} :: 1^3 : 2^3.$$

Whence he infers that as the destroying force has increased in a much greater ratio than the sustaining force, the larger tube cannot sustain itself; seeing that the smaller one has no excess of strength."

He then adds that the ratios between the sustaining and destroying forces are known to be unlike "through the intermediation of two other ratios to which they are severally equal," and he continues: "The ratio between the sustaining force *equals* the ratio $1^3 : 2^3$. The ratio between the destroying force *equals* the ratio $1^3 : 2^3$; it is by implica-

tion seen, that the ratio between the sustaining forces is unequal to the ratio between the destroying forces. What is the nature of this implication? or rather, what is the mental act by which this implication is perceived? It is manifestly not decomposable into steps. Though involving many elements, it is a single intuition; and if expressed in an abstract form amounts to the axiom, ratios which are severally equal to certain other ratios that are unequal to each other, are themselves unequal." He concludes: "I do not propose here to analyze this highly complex intuition, I simply present it as an example of the more intricate acts of thought which occur in compound quantitative reasoning,—an example to which the reader may hereafter recur if he pleases."

As I shall probably take advantage of this permission, and as this, his initial example, for several reasons requires careful attention, I must devote to it what may appear an excessive amount of space, and I crave the reader's indulgence for a prolixity which seems indispensable in order to avoid giving admission to principles and implications, the results of which would, in my judgment, be fatal to a correct comprehension of what reasoning is.

In the first place, as I have already said, ratiocination is an indirect process, which, by the help of a middle term, draws out latent and implicit truth into clear explicit recognition. Such a power of dragging forth into consciousness of latent and implied universal propositions, is a characteristic of man's psychical power as compared with that of brutes. On the other hand, beings higher than ourselves must be able to dispense with reasoning more and more in proportion to their higher intellectual power, and in God there can be no such process whatever. Similarly, human intellects of exceptional power or acuteness may directly intuit truths (as notably mathematical truths) which less gifted natures can only reach by a prolonged reasoning process.

It may be, then, that the engineer here supposed may intuit the answer to the constructive problem simultaneously with the apprehension of its terms. On the other hand, he may with great rapidity have run through a process of reasoning without explicit recognition of the process traversed. That the latter is the course supposed, seems manifest from the terms Mr. Spencer uses. He says, "whence he *infers*," and speaks of "the final *inference* drawn," being seen by "*implication*," the "*implication* perceived," &c.

Now, if the engineer has gone through a reasoning process, that process must be capable of expression in the syllogistic

form; and it seems to me that it may be expressed as follows:—

- | | | | |
|---|-------|---|--|
| 1. Masses of similar
shape and ma-
terial | } are | { | things the weights of which
are as the cubes of their
linear dimensions. |
| The two bridges | | | masses of similar shape and
material. |

Therefore the two bridges are things the weights of which are as the cubes of their linear dimensions, or, in other words, the weight of the first bridge is to that of the second as the cube of the linear dimensions of the first is to the cube of the linear dimensions of the second.

2. The cube of the linear dimensions of the first is to the cube of the linear dimensions of the second as 1 to 8; but the weight of the first, etc.: therefore the weight of the first is to that of the second as 1 to 8; that is, the weight of the second bridge is eight times that of the first. In a precisely similar way, substituting squares of linear dimensions for cubes, and sustaining power for weight, it may be proved that the *sustaining power* of the first bridge is to the sustaining power of the second as 1 to 4, or that the second will bear up only four times as much as the first. The syllogisms, however, being obvious after the above have been inspected, it is unnecessary to give them; therefore,—

3. Four times as much as the first bridge will bear is the greatest quantity the second will sustain; but four times a little more than the weight of the first bridge is four times as much as the first bridge will bear;* therefore, four times a little more than the weight of the first bridge is the greatest quantity which the second will sustain.

4. A bridge which is capable of sustaining only four times a little more than the weight of the first bridge is incapable of supporting eight times the weight of the first bridge; but the second bridge is a bridge which is capable of sustaining only four times a little more than the weight of the first bridge; therefore, the second bridge is a bridge which is incapable of supporting eight times the weight of the first bridge.

* The minor, results from the supposition made, that the first bridge is just strong enough to bear a strain resulting mainly from its own weight, *i.e.* that the greatest amount it will bear, and a little more than its own weight, are equals. For multiples of equals by the same number are equals; but, if the greatest amount it will bear and a little more than its own weight are equals, four times as much as it will bear, and four times its own weight, are multiples of equals by the same number.

5. A bridge capable of supporting the weight of the second bridge is capable of supporting eight times the weight of the first;* but the second bridge is not capable of supporting eight times the weight of the first; therefore, the second bridge is not capable of supporting the weight of the second bridge; *i.e.*, it cannot support its own weight.

Whence, finally, we have the obvious syllogism:—A bridge which cannot support its own weight must be strengthened by the addition of more material; the second bridge is a bridge which cannot support its own weight; therefore the second bridge must be strengthened by more material.

Thus may be done what Mr. Spencer says he does not propose to do—namely, "to analyze this highly complex intuition." And I submit that it is by such a chain of (implicit, though not explicit) reasoning that the conclusion has been arrived at, rather than by a comparison of ratios, though if it be reached in the latter manner then there will be no more difficulty than in the other case in throwing the process of reaching it into the syllogistic form. That it can be so is, in fact, shown at once by the very use of the words "implication" and "inference," for they denote the arrival at a conclusion by premisses and the explicit or implicit use of that wonderful and formal word "THEREFORE," which expresses the whole force of the illative process.

But Mr. Spencer is singularly hazy in his terminology. He asks, "What is the mental act by which this implication is perceived? It is manifestly not decomposable into steps. Though *involving many elements* it is a single intuition." If by "this implication" he means "*the conclusion*," then, of course, that is at once seen to be true, and necessarily true, from what has gone before; it is not, of course, decomposable into steps. In the reasoning—

All A is B

C is A

∴ C is B

The conclusion ∴ C is B is not decomposable, and is at once seen to be necessarily true. If by "this implication" he, on the other hand, means "*the process*," then that must be decomposable into steps. But Mr. Spencer says expressly that "the mental act by which this implication is perceived" "is a single intuition," and "amounts to the axiom" before cited. How a "mental act" can "amount to an

* For, by Syllogism 2, the weight of the second bridge is equal to eight times that of the first, and a bridge capable of supporting a certain heavy object is capable of supporting another to which it is equal.

axiom" is not clear, though, of course, the intuition of an axiom is a mental act. But no intuition of an axiom by itself, however complex, will solve the constructive problem given in the example, and if it be made use of to reach the solution of that problem, then it must be made use of by a process of reasoning ending with a proposition containing the word "therefore," and must be capable of expression syllogistically. Thus I deny entirely that the reasoning here supposed rests on a perception of the relation between ratios; no such perception would enable the precipient to arrive at the conclusion by reasoning without at least an implicit syllogistic process, though it might lead a mind of exceptional power directly to intue the answer in the very terms set before it without making use of reasoning at all—namely, by an act of pure and direct intellectual intuition.

Next (p. 8, § 278) he states that the foregoing intuition (viz. that "Ratios which are severally equal to certain other ratios that are unequal to each other are themselves unequal") is embodied in an axiom to the effect that "relations which are equal to the same relation are equal to each other," which latter axiom is, he says, taken for granted in the Eleventh Proposition of the Fifth Book of Euclid, which he quotes in full. He then separates the equimultiples (taken in the proposition), and considers the argument concerning them by itself, adding that the conclusion involves the above-give axiom about "relations." He meets, successfully I think, a supposed objection that equality has not been asserted between the ratios of the multiples; but as to another objection he appears to me to fail.

This latter objection is to the effect that a "relation" is a "thing," and that his axiom as to "relations" is but one form of the primary axiom, "things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other." He passes by the objection, however, with the remark (p. 12), that if true, the criticism but serves to bring out more clearly that it is the *relations*, and not the *things related*, which are made the objects of thought: "in the intellectual process by which relations that are equal to the same relation, are perceived to be equal to each other, if the concepts dealt with are the relations, and not the objects between which the relation subsists." But, *of course*, it is not here the objects which are considered, for the very simple reason they are not even given, and on that very account the relations cannot be thought of in their character of actual relations, since relations can only be known through some knowledge of their terms. Evidently, then, in this axiom

relations are only regarded in their character of things. Thus his axiom, instead of being important, is of the most trivial character. But surely it is no wonder that in the proposition cited, it is "relations" which are considered, since the proposition itself is "ratios which are the same to the same ratio are the same to each other," and it is, therefore, expressly occupied about "ratios," or one kind of "relations." He adds, that his axiom (about relations) "underlies important parts of geometry," and refers to the first and other propositions of the sixth book of Euclid. But these propositions also concern "ratios" which are a species of that genus of "things" which are called "relations." No wonder then that his axiom is indeed implied in such propositions.

He goes on (p. 13, § 279) to contend that his axiom is much more important still, and "is the foundation of all mathematical analysis." He gives an example by working out the equation, $x^2 + 2x = 8$, and says that its successive transformations are linked together by the assumption that the relations between the two sides of the equation are alike in each step, there being a relation of equality in each, and therefore he contends that the axiom "relations that are equal to the same relation are equal to each other" is the warrant for the assumption that there is equality in the final as in the initial stage of the equation. But this contention I venture entirely and absolutely to oppose. It seems to me evident that at each stage, as it is reached, the two sides of the equation are seen to be equal by comparison with the preceding stage *only*, and that there is no comparison whatever of any two relations with a third. We see that as $x^2 + 2x = 8$, so $x^2 + 2x + 1 = 9$. We see that there is equality in each case, because "the sums of equals are also equals," and not at all because the relation in the first step is seen to be equal to the relation in the second step through the equality of these two relations to any third relation.

Mr. Spencer seems to feel some misgiving as to his own reasoning in this matter. He says (p. 15): "It is true that in this case the relations dealt with are relations of equality; and the great simplification hence resulting may raise a doubt whether the process of thought really is the one here described." It may, *indeed*, do so! He proceeds to endeavour to meet the objection hence arising, by saying, "How is the relation between the two sides of an equation, when reduced to its final form, known to be a relation of equality? Only through its affiliation on the original relation of equality, by means of all the intermediate relations. Strike out in the foregoing case the several transformations which link the first

and last forms of the equation together, and it cannot be inferred that x equals 2. If, then, this relation is known to equal the first only because it is known to equal the penultimate relation, and the penultimate relation to equal the antepenultimate, and so on; it is clear that the affiliation of the last relation on the first, involves this axiom—relations that are equal to the same relation are equal to each other." But, I repeat, not so! Each transformation is separately seen to be equal by comparison with its predecessor *only*. Our author adds: "It must be admitted that in cases like these, when this general axiom is applied to relations of equality, it seems a superfluity." I venture to think that it not only "seems so," but *is*, in fact, a cumbrous superfluity. But he further says: "Nevertheless, I think the arguments adduced warrant the belief that the mental process described is gone through; though, perhaps, almost automatically." I can only add that neither in my mind, nor in the minds of those I have consulted, can such a process be discovered at all.

Lastly, he considers (p. 16, § 280) the axiom itself, how it becomes known, and what is its character. He says, the "relations" referred to in the axiom must be compared in "couples," because the first and third cannot be compared without the intermediation of the second, and thinking of them serially would not bring the first and third into immediate connection. "By the premisses it is known that the first and second relations are equal, and that the second and third relations are equal. Consequently, there are presented to consciousness, two relations of equality between relations." The process gone through he thinks is as follows: "The first and second relations, contemplated as equal, form together one concept; the third and second, similarly contemplated, form together another concept; and in the intuition of the equality of these concepts, the equality of the terminal relations is implied; or, to define its nature abstractedly, the axiom expresses an intuition of the equality of two relations between relations." I do not believe, nor do I find that other (very competent) thinkers believe, that any such cumbrous process—one, the very conception even of which is difficult to grasp—is gone through in intuing the axiom referred to. The mind intues the absolute axiom about the equality of "things which are equal to the same thing," and sees that it is not only true, but *must be* so everywhere and always; and it intues the like of "relations," as a species of the genus "things." There is no need whatever to think here of the relations *as relations*, the truth of the proposition is manifest without any such advertence. Mr. Spencer concludes the

chapter by saying that what have here been treated of are really "*ratios*," but that he has spoken of them under the larger term "*relations*," in order that he might be able to bring them "under the same category" as that in which he places "other acts of reasoning," *i.e.*, to aid that interpretation of the reasoning process which he advocates.

It should be remarked as a very noteworthy fact, that in this analysis of what he deems the "highest" kind of "intellectual acts," he takes no notice whatever of our intuition of the "principle of identity," though it underlies every reasoning process. This great mental fact is as yet ignored by Mr. Spencer.

It seems to me that in the actual mental process we convert, not, as Mr. Spencer seems to do, things into relations, but rather relations into things. Thus, in the expression $3 : 6 :: 18 : 36$, we consider the *relations* $3 : 6$ and $18 : 36$, as respectively "halves," we then recognize that all halves are equal (*i.e.* all halves), and thus, that the relation between 3 and 6, and that between 18 and 36 are both equal.

In solving an equation (such as just above referred to) where we have nothing but mathematical unfolding to do, we simply compare each line with the line before. Nevertheless, of course where we have to perform an operation (addition, subtraction, or whatever it may be) on both sides simultaneously, we then proceed by the axiom, "the sums of equals are equals."

CHAPTER III.—COMPOUND QUANTITATIVE REASONING (CONTINUED).

This chapter consists of the three following sections:—
§ 281. An intuition of the equality of two relations is implied in every step of quantitative reasoning. § 282. This is exemplified by the Proposition "The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal," and by analyzing "Proposition xxxii." § 283. Each step in an algebraic argument is of the same nature.

In this short chapter Mr. Spencer seeks (p. 19, § 281) for "some more general cognition" than his axiom about "relations," since the latter can have no concern "with most geometrical truths." And he says that since such more general cognition must be involved in the kinds of reasoning already exemplified, it will be best to continue the analysis commenced. He continues: "If, then, ceasing to consider in its totality the complex axiom," "we inquire what are the elements of thought into which it is proximately decomposable, we at

once see that it twice over involves a recognition of the equality of two relations. Before it can be seen that the relations $A : B$ and $E : F$, being severally equal to the relation $C : D$, are equal to each other, it must be seen that the relation $A : B$ is equal to the relation $C : D$, and that the relation $C : D$ is equal to the relation $E : F$. And this is the intellectual act of which we are in search." But I cannot admit the correctness of this analysis, which seems to me to contain a great fallacy. It is, of course, a truism that before we can conclude that the relations between any concrete things represented by $A : B$ and $E : F$ are equal, we must be sure that the relations in each case are really equal to the intermediate relation represented by $C : D$; but Mr. Spencer is analyzing the abstract "axiom" into "the elements of thought, into which it is decomposable." And the axiom itself, "relations which are equal to the same relation are equal to each other," is not decomposable into any perceptions of concrete reality, however it may be advisable or necessary to bring it home to some minds by concrete examples. There is most certainly contained in it no intuition of the equality of relations other than the abstract ones which are supposed to be both equal to some third, and which are thus clearly seen to be equal to each other. If this is, as he says it is, the "intellectual act" of which he has been "in search," then his conception has evidently been gained simply through confusion of thought between the analogies of an abstract axiom and the analysis of its concrete application to one particular case. And a conception so gained cannot but be misleading in its subsequent effects. He adds: "An intuition of the equality of two relations is implied in every step of quantitative reasoning." And he proceeds (p. 20, § 282) to seek it out in the field of geometry.

He first selects the proposition: "The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal to each other." He then observes, that in order to prove this, a concrete example is taken, and that when the equality is proved in it, it is at once seen to follow that "that holds in one case holds in all cases." "What is the nature of this cognition?" he asks. "It is a consciousness of the equality of two relations—on the one hand, the relation between the sides and angles of the triangle ABC ; and, on the other hand, the relation between the sides and angles of another isosceles triangle, of any isosceles triangle, of all isosceles triangles." He affirms that this perception is "a simple intuition," and rightly so affirms, if by that phrase he here means a direct perception of an inferred truth. I would suggest, however,

that the perception is not properly described, as "a consciousness of the equality of two relations;" but as the perception of an absolutely and necessary coexistence, the universality of which is made manifest by an example. This perception once gained, we do not revert to the concrete A B C, save for the purpose of demonstration; but we simply conclude that there is a necessary coexistence between equal sides and equal angles in any and every possible triangle. I do not, therefore, at all admit, or believe, that this cognition is "a consciousness of the equality of two relations."

He then proceeds to claim that this intuition of the equality of two relations "constitutes each of the steps by which the special truth is reached," which he endeavours to show by analyzing the 32nd proposition. He does so in a similar manner to that already described, attributing each step to a perception of the equality of a present to a past relation. Of course it is possible to throw the theorem into such a form, but I contend that here (as before, with respect to the isosceles triangle) what is really perceived is not the resemblance between relations, but necessary and universal coexistences, made manifest by a concrete example. There is not merely, as he says, a perception of likeness or equality between relations, but of absolute and universal objective necessity.

Lastly (p. 24, § 283), he returns to equations, and contends that a perception of the validity of the successive transformations is also due to an intuition in each case of the equality of relations. But, although the process *may* be so described, what is really attended to in working out an equation, is not any equality of relations, but that in each transformation the same change be effected on each of the sides of the equation. This attention is not given in order that the relation between the two sides in one step may be equal to the relation between the two sides of a preceding step, but, in order that that equality may continue to be preserved which is essential to the successful solving of the equation. The mind does not even advert to the fact that there is a relation of equality between the two sides in the preceding step—though, of course, it recognizes the fact when for any reason (*e.g.*, to suit Mr. Spencer's argument) attention is called to it. It attends to the preceding step only for the purpose of making a similar change on each side of it. What *does* underlie these and all the other intellectual processes adverted to by Mr. Spencer, is the PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY. It is the fact that that principle would be violated were the steps in the different valid processes of reasoning denied, which really establishes their irrefragable truth. But, as before said, this great principle is by Mr. Spencer entirely ignored.

CHAPTER IV.—IMPERFECT AND SIMPLE QUANTITATIVE REASONING.

This chapter consists of the following sections: § 284. In imperfect quantitative reasoning, though the primary relations are those of inequality, yet the secondary relations are mostly those of equality as evidenced by geometry and, § 285, by algebra; § 286. The axiom "things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other" expresses an intuition of the equality of two relations, and an intuition of the inequality of two relations is implied in such perceptions as "if $A > B$ and $B > C$, then $A > C$," or if $A > B$ and $B = C$, then $A > C$; § 287. In intuitions in which four magnitudes are involved, (such as "the sums of equals are equal," &c.); the compared relations have no common term and so it is the more manifest that an intuition of the equality or inequality of two relations is involved; § 288. These two groups of intuitions are respectively related to proportions of three and four magnitudes, though these latter differ from the former in their complete quantitateness.

Mr. Spencer begins this chapter (p. 26, § 284) by observing most truly that "ability to perceive equality implies a correlative ability to perceive inequality," and, that while "there is but one equality, there are numberless degrees of inequality." From this he deduces the consequence that while "*perfectly* quantitative reasoning proceeds *wholly* by the establishment of equality between relations" in *imperfectly* quantitative reasoning some of the magnitudes standing in immediate relation are neither directly equal nor the one equal to so many times the other, or some of the successive relations which the reasoning establishes, are unequal.

He illustrates this in geometry from the proposition: "Any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third side," which he states at length, and side by side with it, he places a statement of relations of equality and inequality which he declares to be involved in its successive steps.

The first step is the perception that the angles at the base of a particular isosceles triangle $A D C$ are equal, because the angles at the base of all isosceles triangles are equal. This, Mr. Spencer interprets into a perception of "a relation equal to a previously-established relation," and, of course, it may be so expressed, but it may also, and, I believe, more rationally be expressed thus: isosceles triangles have the angles at their base equal, $A D C$ is an isosceles triangle, therefore, the angles at the base of the triangle $A D C$ are equal.

Similarly the angles $A D C$ and $A C D$ being equal, and

the angle B C D greater than the angle A C D, the resulting consequence that the angle B C D is greater than the angle A C D is interpreted by Mr. Spencer as being an "intuition of the equality of two relations of inequality, which have one term in common, and the other terms equal." But to my mind, this is a very cumbrous and indirect intuition, whereas the simple intuition that if one thing is equal to another, either must be greater or less than whatever the other is greater or less than, amply suffices. It is things themselves, and not anything so complex as the "equality of two relations of inequality" to which the mind adverts. Similarly I regard Mr. Spencer's explanation of the whole proposition as a cumbrous and involved (and, in so far, a distorted) representation of it.

He adds: "though the magnitudes dealt with are unequal, yet the demonstration proceeds by showing that certain relations among them are equal to certain other relations: though the primary relations (between quantities) are those of inequality, yet the secondary relations (between relations) are those of equality. And this holds in the majority of imperfectly quantitative arguments. Though, as we shall see by and by, there are cases in which both the magnitudes and the relations are unequal, yet they are comparatively rare; and are incapable of any but the simplest forms." The application of these remarks will appear later, but I may here observe that Mr. Spencer throughout misuses the term "*equality*," which means "*exact resemblance as to quantity*." He, however, makes it mean exact resemblance of any kind—an abuse of language!

In the next section (p. 28, § 285), he applies his view to mathematical analysis as exemplified in the inequation:—

$$\begin{aligned} a + \frac{x^2}{\sqrt{y}} &< a + x\sqrt{y} \\ \frac{x^2}{\sqrt{y}} &< x\sqrt{y} \\ x^2 &< xy \\ x &< y \end{aligned}$$

And he assumes an intuition at each step of relations of inferiority, as in the equation before referred to he assumed an intuition of the equality between relations. To this I reply, as I replied before, that the advertence at each step is merely to the preceding step, and not to the relations between relations. Indeed, that there is not such advertence, is manifest from the fact that the validity of the inequation can be fully seen without any perception of the fact (to which Mr. Spencer

advert) that, in the original form of the inequation, the second quantity bears a greater ratio to the first quantity than it does in the form which follows, seeing that when equals are taken from unequals, the remainders are more unequal than before.

Next (p. 30, § 286), Mr. Spencer goes on to say that, though much has already been incidentally implied with respect to simple quantitative reasoning, it will be convenient to consider apart arguments of this simple kind, whether axioms or truths nearly allied to axioms. And he proceeds to analyse the axiom, "things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other," which he declares to express an intuition of the equality of two relations, saying: "When A and B are united together in the single concept—a relation of equality; and when C and B are united with another such concept; it becomes impossible to recognize the equality of these two relations of equality, which possess a common term, without the equality of the other terms being involved in the intuition."

In the first place it may well be asked, how can Mr. Spencer talk of some concepts of relations as equal to others? He says, the concept $(A = B)$ = the concept $(C = B)$, and here the symbol $(=)$ means (is like) and can mean nothing else. But how is it like? Plainly, because both are concepts of equality. But what real "*equality*" exists? Clearly an equality resulting from the same term, B, occurring in each, and from no other cause,—from there being, in fact, but three terms. But in other places Mr. Spencer endeavours to represent these as four terms.


But, apart from this criticism, it may be remarked that we have here again the analysis of a mental operation into another which is much more complex than the one analyzed. That "things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other" is a simple truth directly evident; but if it is to be analysed at all, it can only be so into the yet more simple principle of identity. If any two things, X and Y, are in any respect equal, they may be represented as identical as regards this abstract matter of resemblance, by the symbol $A = A$; and if any other two things, Z and Y, are similarly equal in the very same matter, their resemblance may be similarly represented. If, therefore, Z did not equal X in the matter abstracted, then A would not equal A, and the principle of identity would consequently be violated.

Mr. Spencer illustrates his position thus: "Suppose A to represent a standard measure preserved by the State; and let a surveyor be in possession of a measure, B, which is an

exact copy of the original one, A. Imagine that in the course of his survey the measure B is broken, and that in the meanwhile the building containing the standard measure A has been burnt. Nevertheless, by purchasing another measure, C, which had also been made to match the standard A, the surveyor is enabled to complete his work, and knows that his later measurements will agree with his earlier ones. By what process of thought does he perceive this? It cannot be by comparing B and C, for one of these was broken before he got the other; nor can it be by comparing them serially—B, A, C, and C, A, B, for two of them have ceased to exist. Evidently, then, he thinks of B and C as both copies of A; he contemplates the *relations* in which they respectively stood to A; and in recognizing the sameness or equality of their relations, he unavoidably recognizes the equality of B and C." It appears to me, however, that the process is simpler than that described. I believe that the mind adverts, not to the "equality of the relations," but to the equality of the things themselves; not to the equality of the relation AB with the relation AC, but to the equality of B and C with A, whence, from the principle of identity, the equality of B and C follows.

Incidentally it may be remarked that Mr. Spencer says (p. 32): "that the mind may retain an accurate resemblance of a *relation* when it is unable to retain an accurate remembrance of the *things* between which the relation subsisted." Surely such a remembrance of a relation as a relation is something more than a repetition of faint sensations!

He then proceeds to consider another type of intuition, namely, one "between two relations of inequality having a common term. Thus, if A is greater than B, and B greater than C, then A is greater than C."



"The relation A to B being given as a relation of superiority, while that of C to B is given as a relation of inferiority, it is known that the relation A to B is greater than the relation C to B; and as the term B is common to the two relations, the intuition that the relation A to B is greater than the relation C to B cannot be found without involving the intuition that A is greater than C."

Mr. Spencer can, of course, simply mean that A is greater than B, and B is greater than C; and this appears to show plainly that the mind adverts, not to the *relations* but to the

things, i.e., not to the relations as related, but to the things as related. In the same way may be treated his other example: "If A is greater than B, and B is equal to C, we know that A is greater than C."

He then passes (p. 34, § 287) to consider cases in which not three but four magnitudes are involved, such as equals added, subtracted, multiplied, or divided, by equals or unequals; and he says that, "in this second series, the relations being perfectly independent and distinct, the mental processes into which they enter are more readily analyzable." And here, since the intuitions are avowedly occupied with binary groups of things the relations between which are expressly declared, it does seem more as if the mind was occupied about the relations of the relations themselves, and, of course, the intuitions can be so expressed. Nevertheless, I contend that even here what is adverted to is not relations as relations, but things themselves as related.

Lastly (p. 35, § 288), he observes: "These two groups of intuitions have a common root with those which proportions express." Thus the equality of things equal to a same third thing may, he says, be written

$$A : B :: B : C,$$

and the equality of the sums of equals:

$$A : B :: A + C : B + D;$$

A and B and C and D being supposed equal pairs. It is true that these axioms may be served up in this fashion, but so to serve them up is to present them in a cumbrous and involved fashion compared with their ordinary presentation. Moreover, in addition to being cumbrous and involved, they are explicitly much less complete.

$$A : B :: A + C : B + D$$

expresses a particular fact with regard to the equal pairs A and B and C and D, but it does not directly express that always, and in all cases, the "sums of equals are equal."

CHAPTER V.—QUANTITATIVE REASONING IN GENERAL.

This chapter has the following sections: § 289. The intuitions, out of which quantitative reasoning is built, must be exclusively those of coexistence, connature, and coextension. § 290. The successive forms which quantitative reasoning assumes presented in ascending order. § 291. It may be seen, *à priori*, that quantitative reasoning must consist in the establishment of the equality or inequality of relations.

Herein, Mr. Spencer terminates what he has to say about

quantitative reasoning, beginning (p. 37, § 289) by the remark, that "quantitative reasoning involves the three ideas—coextension, coexistence, and connature;" and that its "germ, the simple intuition of the equality of two magnitudes, necessarily involves all these ideas." To this section I have no special opposition to offer.

He then (p. 40, § 290) proceeds to present over again in serial and ascending order the successive forms of quantitative reasoning, as he has before exhibited them, beginning with the simple perception of the equality of two magnitudes. Since I have already considered his arguments in this matter, as he has before (and first) stated them, I will not again restate my criticisms, but merely say a few words. He asserts (at p. 46) that the theorem, "the angle in a semicircle is a right angle," may be more correctly analyzed as follows:—

DEMONSTRATED CASE.		ANY OTHER CASE.	
(The relations constituting the angle in the semicircle)	A	(The relations constituting the angle in that semicircle)	C
(coexist with)	:	(coexist with)	:
(The relations constituting a right angle)	b	(The relations constituting a right angle.)	d

And adds, "such seems to be the more correct analysis of those kinds of quantitative reasoning, in which the antecedents are not homogeneous with the consequents." Now it is, of course, *possible* to represent every conceivable statement as a statement about relations, but so to do is often a cumbrous and inconvenient mode, and one which misleads us as to which really are the matters the reasoning mind in fact adverts to.

Finally (p. 48, § 291), he endeavours to show that it may be seen, *à priori*, that the process of quantitative reasoning must consist in the establishment of the equality or inequality of relations. But, indeed, it may be seen at once that, not only every process of quantitative reasoning, but every act of intuitive perception may be expressed as the perception of the relatedness of relations. I may express the perception that a hat is too small for me by the phrase that "the relations of the hat, as regards extension and figure, and the similar relations of my head are disparate." In fine, then, though to suit any given purpose the process of quantitative reasoning may be expressed as Mr. Spencer expresses it, not only it need not be so expressed, but so to express it is to take a cumbrous and round-about road, which the mind, as a fact, does not habitually traverse.

Mr. Spencer remarks, in the course of his exposition, that

there can only be argument when magnitudes are so circumstanced as not to be directly comparable; but how many propositions are there not in Euclid in which it would be quite possible (as in the fifth of the first book) simply to measure the angles of the diagram given? But the argument is needed, not to show that the particular angles are equal, but that every conceivable pair of angles at the base of a truly isosceles triangle must always and everywhere be exactly equal.

CHAPTER VI.—PERFECT QUALITATIVE REASONING.

The contents of this chapter may be thus shortly expressed: § 292. In quantitative reasoning, coextension is no necessary element, but we are occupied with the coexistence or non-coexistence of things, attributes or relations that are connatural with other things, attributes or relations, and "coexistence" is a form of equality of relations. § 293. Coexistence or non-coexistence of attributes, and simultaneity or non-simultaneity of changes, are cases of the equality or non-equality of two relations. § 294. To these only are applicable Mills' axioms of the syllogism—"things which coexist with the same thing coexist with one another," &c. § 295. Perceptions of unconditional sequence are also reached by intuitions of the equality of relations.

Here (pp. 50—53, § 292) Mr. Spencer introduces a new application of the "equality of relations," namely, by applying it to the coexistence of attributes—since of two attributes invariably coexisting, if we see one we know we shall find the other, and thus the relation to time of one is equal to the relation to time of the other. But here, again, I must protest that though the coexistence of attributes *may* be thus looked at, it is not thus that it is looked at either by ordinary men or by philosophers.*

He follows this up (p. 53, § 293) by observing that reasonings which predicate time-relations only, "exhibit in a large group of cases that same necessity often ascribed exclu-

* He observes (p. 52), by the way: "The true interpretation of equality is *indistinguishableness*. Distances, and sizes, and weights we call equal when no differences can be discerned between them." I should rather say that two objects are seen to be equal, not by a negative but by a positive process, such as that each is mediately or immediately but positively seen to be equal to some other object or objects. The heights of the mountains on the other side of the moon are *indistinguishable*, but they are not therefore *equal*. "Equality" is not a negative but a positive attribute. I may here refer to my former observation that Mr. Spencer makes an abuse of language in the use he makes of the term "equality," which instead of meaning exact resemblance of any kind, means only exact resemblance *as to quantity*.

sively to quantitative reasonings;" and adds: "this group of cases is divisible into two sub-groups"—one of disjointed relations involving four phenomena, the other of conjoined relations involving only three.

The first sub-group includes "cases in which, from certain observed attributes of objects, we infer the presence of certain other attributes that are inseparable from them. When, on feeling pressure against an outstretched limb, I conclude that there is something before me having extension; when, on seeing one side of an object, I know that there is an opposite side, were it not that perpetual repetition has consolidated these cognitions into what may be termed organic inferences, it would be at once seen they stand on a like footing with those in which the equilateralness of a triangle is known from its equi-angularity, when the coexistence of them has once been recognized." . . . "The mental act implied is an intuition of the equality of two relations," thus:—

(Tangible substance)	A	}	=	{	a (This mass of rope)
(Universally, or necessarily, coexists with)	:				: (coexists with)
(Limiting surfaces)	B				b (Two ends, which uncoiling it will disclose.)

But I deny that Mr. Spencer's above formula expresses a case in which, "from certain observed attributes of objects, we *infer* the presence of certain other attributes"; for there is no word expressing *inference* in it, no "Therefore." It really expresses the equality of two pairs of relations all four of which are known, but if one were not known save by a mental process dragging it out from implicit to explicit recognition (*i.e.*, by an *inference*), then the path the mind would implicitly follow would be a syllogism, and, in this instance, one in which the major premiss is a conclusion reached by simple enumeration, as follows:—Tangible substance is that which has limiting surfaces in all directions. This mass of rope is tangible substance. *Therefore* this mass of rope is that which has limiting surfaces in all directions. We *cannot* have an intuition of the equality of two relations unless all the four terms are already explicitly known; but an inference is a process by which one term becomes explicitly known; therefore no process of inference can possibly be expressed by a statement of the equality of two relations.

A word now as to his expression "organic inferences," which appears to me to show no slight confusion of thought.

An organic process of the highest order, a "feeling," can never, by any process of repetition, be "consolidated" into a process of a fundamentally different kind—an intellectual perception. Feelings may, by varied repetitions, be consolidated into clusters and clusters of clusters of strong and faint feelings associated in the most complex manner, and such associations of images in brutes simulate inference and constitute a process which may, by a figure of speech, be not unaptly called "organic inference." Feelings so combining may also, as in man, give rise to intellectual perceptions of a low or high order of abstraction and generality, but they themselves are not such perceptions.

In Mr. Spencer's second sub-group, he tells us, the fact predicated "is either the coexistence or non-coexistence of certain things, as determined by their relations to some third thing, or else the simultaneity or non-simultaneity of certain events, as determined by their known relations to some third event"; and he illustrates his position, as before, by symbols.

Now, of course, each of the terms "simultaneous with," "before," and "after," expresses a relation; and if we say that we saw A before we saw B, inasmuch as we saw A before breakfast and B after it, we, of course, express two relations; but this is not *reasoning*, but a mode of statement of certain facts. If we *reason*, e.g., as to a MS., and say that a given one is of or before the ninth century, because of the form of its letters, we mean:—"Whatever MS. has a certain form of letters is of or before the ninth century; this MS. has a certain form of letters, *therefore* it is of or before the ninth century." Here, as before, I contend the mind does *not* advert to the two relations of simultaneity or antecedence between the abstract style of letters and the letters of the particular MS., with the ninth century respectively, though subsequently the facts may, of course, be so expressed; and I therefore deny that *reasoning* about coexistences, or about antecedence, or consequence of attributes, is intued as the equality or non-equality of two relations.

In the next section (§ 294, p. 58) he turns aside to consider John Stuart Mill's syllogistic axioms ("Things which coexist with the same thing coexist with one another," and "A thing which coexists with another thing, with which other thing a third thing does not coexist, is not coexistent with that third thing"), and affirms that they are applicable to no cases save Mr. Spencer's second sub-groups of perfect qualitative reasonings. He objects against Mr. Mill's view first (1) that these axioms "refer positively or negatively to one time only; whereas the syllogism, as involving in its major premiss an

appeal to accumulated experiences, refers to *two* times." But this is surely but a quibble, the syllogism often includes all time, past, present, and future. "All men" are not only at present "mortal"! (2) He objects that "the entities presenting parallel coexistences may have been every one annihilated. How, then, can the mental act by which the predication is effected be formulated in an axiom which involves *three co-existent terms*?" But it is enough that a law of coexistence be established such that *if* there is A there is also B. If all men but Socrates were annihilated, it would not be one bit the less true that "all men are mortal," *i.e.*, that mortality is an attribute of humanity. Finally (3) he objects against Mr. Mill a good *argumentum ad hominem* respecting his (Mill's) quibble about "same," and says with effect that the attributes of Socrates are no more "*the same*" as the attributes of "all men" than the diseases of two successive men can be said to be the same, and Mr. Mill has said they cannot be really the same. Therefore, Mr. Spencer contends, the syllogism must have four terms—(1) the attributes of all men; (2) mortality; (3) Socrates; and (4) his attributes. But I venture to think that the answer to all this is the simple one that, in this matter, both Spencer and Mill err together, and that the attributes of all men and of the man Socrates (as a man) are *the same*, and also that two different men can have successively the same disease or hold the same office, *i.e.*, exactly alike—the same for all purposes of argument, though not, of course, numerically identical. But even if the mortality of Socrates be not that of another man, *e.g.*, of Plato, the mortality (or rather, on the supposition we are considering, "the mortalities") of all men will include that of Socrates.

He then returns from this parenthetical discussion, and (p. 62, § 295) affirms that perceptions of unconditional sequence are also "reached by intuitions of the equality of relations"; but he does not argue out the position, so that it is sufficient here to observe concerning this point *quod gratis asseritur gratis negatur*, but though I deny that such perceptions are so reached, I, of course, am far from denying that where they have been once reached they may be so *expressed*.

CHAPTER VII.—IMPERFECT QUALITATIVE REASONING.

This chapter is composed of the following sections:—§ 296. The negations of the conclusions of imperfect qualitative reasoning can be conceived with greater or less difficulty. § 297. It is distinguished from perfect qualitative reasoning by the relative indefiniteness of its intuitions. § 298. These reasonings are reached by intuitions of the likeness or unlikeness of

two relations. § 299. Analogical reasoning differs from syllogistic, by the much smaller degree of likeness of the terms, but is also reached by observing the likeness between two relations. § 300. Inductive reasoning is also carried on by the comparison of relations and an hypothesis in an incipient induction. § 301. Reasoning from particulars to particulars is also an intuition of the likeness (or unlikeness) of relations.

Mr. Spencer begins (p. 65, § 296) this chapter by observing that while "the conclusions of perfect qualitative reasoning are of such kinds that their negations cannot be conceived," while those of the imperfect kind can, yet that "the approximation of the two is so close that some members of the second class may readily be mistaken for members of the first." Next (p. 66, § 297), he remarks on "the relative indefiniteness of its intuitions" which distinguishes imperfect from perfect qualitative reasoning—the compared relations being "no longer considered as *equal* or *unequal*, but as *like* or *unlike*." This change is due to the increasing complexity of the conditions of the circumstances compared, as is evidenced by language since complex things, "exhibiting at once the attributes, size, form, colour, weight, texture, hardness" are not said to be *equal* or *unequal*, but *like* or *unlike*.

He then (p. 68, § 298) observes "this premised, it will at once be seen that these cases of imperfect qualitative reasoning, commonly given in Treatises on Logic, as illustrating the process of thought, said to be expressed by the syllogism, severally exhibit intuitions of the likeness or unlikeness of relations." He gives, as an example, "All horned animals are ruminants; this is a horned animal; therefore this animal is a ruminant," and, he adds: "the mental act indicated is a cognition of the fact that the relation between particular attributes in this animal, is like the relation between homologous attributes in certain other animals." He symbolizes it thus:—

(The attributes constituting a horned animal)	A			(The attributes constituting this a horned a animal)
(coexist with)	:	is like	:	(coexist with)
(The attributes constituting a ruminant animal)	B			(The attributes constituting this a ruminant b animal).

That I may the better guard against involuntary misrepresentation, I here add Mr. Spencer's comments in full. He

says: "That this formula—the relation between A and B, is like the relation between a and b—represents the intuition, will, from our present stand-point, be obvious. Only in virtue of the perceived *likeness* between A and a—the group of attributes involved in the conception of a horned animal, and the group of attributes presented by this particular animal—can any such inference be valid, or even be suggested. Further, the attributes implied by the term 'ruminant,' can be known only as previously observed or described; and the predication of these, as possessed by the animal under remark, is the predication of attributes *like* certain before-known attributes. Once more, there is no assignable reason why, in this particular case, a relation of co-existence should be thought of between these attributes and those signified by the words, 'horned animal,' unless as being *like* certain relations of co-existence previously known; and whether the thinking of this relation can be otherwise accounted for or not, it is clear that the predication cannot otherwise have any probability, much less certainty. To state the case with greater precision. Observe, first, that as the unseen attribute predicated cannot, on the one hand, be supposed to enter the mind save in some relation to its subject; and that as, on the other hand, the relation cannot be thought of without the subject, and the predicated attribute being involved in its terms; it follows that the intuition which the inference expresses must be one in which subject, predicate, and the relation between them, are jointly represented. Observe next, that while subject and predicate are separately conceivable things, the relation between them cannot be conceived without involving them both; whence it follows that only by thinking of the relation can the elements of the intuition be combined in the requisite manner. Observe, lastly, under what form this relation must be thought. Since the subject is recognized as *like* certain others previously known with which it is classed; and since the attribute predicated is conceived as *like* an attribute possessed by these previously-known members of the class; and since the relation between the subject and the predicated attribute is proved, by the truth of the predication, to be *like* the relation subsisting in these previously-known members of the class; it must be by recognizing the relation as *like* certain previously-known relations, that the conclusion is reached."

Now I venture to affirm the direct contrary, and say "it *cannot* be by recognizing the relation as like certain previously-known relations, that the conclusion is reached." For, in the first place, the relations cannot be seen to be like till the pre-

dicare supposed unknown has become known, and I am convinced that no one would in such a matter compare the relations, but would advert to the fact that the creature investigated was a member of the group "horned animals," and as *therefore* probably sharing in another attribute, possessed by all of them, previously known. This is the simple path—as it appears to me—the line of least resistance which the mind spontaneously follows. Again, there is no perceived "*likeness*" between A and a, and B and b, but A and a are *the same*, as also are B and b, though the horns of ruminants generally are, of course, not the same as the horns of the animal considered, yet the abstract "hornedness" is the same with respect to both, and the same with the "rumination" of both. Far from such "*likeness*" being necessary to the validity of the inference its existence would be simply fatal to it; what is necessary to the validity of the inference is the "*sameness*," without which there would be more than three terms, and this is Mr. Spencer's fundamental error. He then proceeds (p. 70) to compare this species of reasoning with "that species of mathematical reasoning which is confessedly carried on by comparison of relations," namely, proportion. Now I have before admitted that reasoning may be *expressed* in the relational form, and what therefore has been admitted as to quantity may be admitted as to quality, without weakening the contention that the mode of expression so admitted is a forced and unnatural one. He concludes by justly observing that what applies to positive reasoning applies also to negative reasoning, and he refers (p. 73) to "cases where an inference is reached, not by a single intuition of the likeness or unlikeness of relations, but by a connected series of such intuitions," which, he says, conform to the general type given by him in sections 282 and 284, and I similarly here refer to my previous criticism of those sections.

He then (p. 73, § 299) treats of analogical reasoning, saying (p. 76), "that ordinary syllogistic deductions differ from analogical ones simply in degree," but if the view of the syllogism which I maintain be correct, there is not a difference simply of degree, but a thorough difference of kind between it and an assertion of analogy, for in the latter there are really four terms, and such an assertion is the assertion of a certain proportion or resemblance between two of the terms, and I fully admit that here a certain resemblance between relations is asserted.

In the following section (p. 77, § 300) Mr. Spencer considers induction, which he assimilates to deductive reasoning, saying, "Both kinds are seen to be carried on by comparison

of relations ; and the contrast between them is seen to consist solely in the numerical preponderance of the premised relations in the one case, and of inferred relations in the other." But, as I believe that syllogistic reasoning does not consist of a comparison between relations, for the reasons before adduced, so I believe that, for the same reasons, induction does not consist of a comparison between relations, although of course the process can be so expressed.

Finally (p. 84, § 301), he considers reasoning from particulars to particulars, which he represents as the starting-point from which both induction and deduction diverge. An apparently common origin, however, may be possessed by things essentially different, and just as sensible phenomena generally are the occasions which call into action intellectual power, so associations of images (in which so-called "reasoning" from particulars to particulars may at least often consist) are the occasions for eliciting both deductive and inductive reasoning. But neither in sensible association nor in either reasoning is the psychical advertence directed to the relations. In brutes the association is between the *sensations* (e.g. the aspect of sticks and the feel of blows), not between "relations." The attention of the reason is to the "properties" considered as "properties," and not to the phenomena considered as "relations."

He concludes as follows : "The verification thus furnished of the general view set forth is complete. For it is manifest that while, by the multiplication of experiences, the known and unknown relations, instead of being respectively one and one, become many and many, and so originate deduction and induction, the act of thought by which the inference is reached, remains fundamentally similar." Having contested Mr. Spencer's reasoning all along the line, I must now deny his conclusion, and distinguish once more between mere passive association (even though resulting in spontaneous actions) and intellectual activity of any kind ; again distinguishing between that "intellectual" activity which directly apprehends self-evident truths of all kinds, and that peculiar intellectual activity called "inference," which educes implicit truth into explicit recognition, and is expressed in the word "therefore."

CHAPTER VIII.—REASONING IN GENERAL.

This important chapter contains the following sections :—
§ 302. The views both of the importance and of the triviality of the syllogism may be reconciled by regarding logic as the science of objective existence and not of the laws of thought.
§ 303. The utmost analysis of reason shows a perception of

likeness or unlikeness of relations as its universal *process* § 304. The syllogism fails to express the simplest and most complex "ratiocinative acts." § 305. This is sought to be shown by examining a syllogism. § 306. Really an induction precedes every deduction, which is thus a comparison of relations. § 307. The special results before reached may be thus harmonized as parts of one whole; the doctrine, as it applies to all orders of reasoning, is a true generalization, explaining all the phenomena. § 308. Ordinary speech gives confirmatory evidence of this analysis. § 309. The conclusion that every ratiocinative act is the indirect establishment of a definite relation between two things by the process of establishing a definite relation between two definite relations, may be reached even *à priori*.

In this very important chapter—important because so much depends on the truth of the views contained in it—Mr. Herbert Spencer seems altogether to confound those two kinds of intellectual activity, which were distinguished by Aristotle as *νοῦς* and *λόγος*, the *intellectus* and *ratio* respectively of the later Peripatetics, and which may be called—the former, direct intellectual apprehension, the latter, inference. The clear perception of this confusion affords a clue to elucidate the intellectual tangle which Mr. Spencer has here produced for his readers.

At the beginning of the chapter (p. 86, § 302) Mr. Spencer refers to the two views of the syllogism noticed by Mr. Mill—one, that it is the normal mode of discovering and proving truth; the other, that it is a useless frivolity. This divergence he proposes to reconcile by affirming that the syllogism refers not to dependencies of "thoughts" but of "things." He says, "Logic formulates the most general laws of correlation among existences considered as objective; while an account of the process of reasoning formulates the most general laws of correlation among the ideas corresponding to these existences." But now, in the first place, though logic is, I contend, the science of the laws of thought and not of things,* yet the "syllogism" is neither so all-important as one school is said to affirm it to be, nor so trivial as it is deemed by the other. It really represents the process of deductive reasoning, but, as we all know, our knowledge is mainly increased by induction. Again, logical forms are valid or invalid in themselves, quite apart from their material contents, and therefore the science of those forms must concern thoughts *primarily*.

* It is, of course, true that the laws of thought are also the laws of things.

Nevertheless, as unless our concepts correspond with objective reality, conclusions, however validly arrived at logically, are of no practical utility, the forms must concern things, things *secondarily*, i.e. the laws of thought must be in harmony with the laws of objective existence.

Mr. Spencer proceeds to endeavour to prove, by reference to Professor De Morgan's quantified syllogisms, Professor Boole's mathematical method, and Professor Jevons's logical machine, that objects and attributes, not thoughts, are the matters really referred to in logic. But, the fact that these processes can be applied to things (as they, of course, can be) by no means proves that the logical processes involved do not primarily refer to thoughts. Such logical terms as "Babara," and "Celarent," manifestly refer to thoughts but they are also applicable to things. The movements of a syllogistic machine may serve as well as written characters to symbolize processes of thought. He says, "the machine having been set to represent objects and attributes in certain relations, evolves certain necessarily-accompanying relations, such as would otherwise be ascertained by actual examination of the objects and attributes." But it matters not what it is set to represent, it will work equally well, and, according to the laws of thought, whatever the object may be, only the result will not be objectively true, unless the propositions used as premisses conform to objective reality.

He then (p. 90) contends that his view of logic may be reached *à priori*, inasmuch as there must be a science of "universal objective correlations." If so, it does not follow, as he says it follows, that such a science would be "logic," it would be a science of objective being, an "ontology." I therefore venture to affirm the direct contrary to what Mr. Spencer affirms, and to say that logic is the science of the laws of thought, and refers to things only secondarily.

But, surely, in a "Psychology" we must employ logic, and here, at any rate, it must be treated as a science of thoughts, seeing that as yet we have not got to the proof that external objects have any existence. We must begin with the subjective, now that idealism has been formulated, and the laws of logic would be equally true and valid were all objectivity done away with and the subject alone left.

He then (p. 93, § 303) proceeds to confound inference with intuition. He says: "There appears to be among logicians a general agreement that a certain abstract truth, said to be involved in every syllogism, is recognized by the mind in going through every syllogism; and that the recognition of this abstract truth, under any particular embodiment, is *the*

real ratiocinative act;"* and he adds, "neither the *dictum de omni et nullo*, nor Mill's axiom about 'marks of marks' . . . can, I think, be rightly held capable of expressing the ratiocinative act. . . . Each of them generalizes a large class of cognitions; he does not by so doing approach any nearer to the nature of the cognitive act . . . contemplate all the axioms. . . . Every one of them is a rational cognition . . . become known by similar intellectual acts. But, if so, how can the addition of a new one to the list answer the question—what is the common nature of these intellectual acts?"

But the *dictum* referred to was not intended, and is not supposed to answer the question as to what is the nature of reasoning in general, but only of a special kind of reasoning to which Mr. Spencer expressly refers, *i.e.*, ratiocination; that indirect process by which an implicit truth is explicitly recognized by the aid of a middle term. He goes on (p. 94): "The distinction drawn in the foregoing section between the science of logic and the theory of reasoning, at once opens a way out of this secondary perplexity. We can admit that these logical axioms express universal truths, without admitting that they are axioms tacitly asserted in drawing valid inferences." . . . If logic "has for its subject-matter objective relations among terms, the natures of which are ignored . . . it is clear that there will be some *universal* necessity of correlation—some axiom. Such an axiom is, therefore, to be accepted as expressing absolute dependencies in the *non-ego*, which imply answering absolute dependencies in the *ego*—not, however, absolute dependencies in the *ego* that are recognized as such in reasoning."

But it seems to me that Mr. Spencer confounds the "ratiocinative act," that peculiar mental process expressed by the term "therefore," with the direct apprehensions of truth, in which the term "therefore" has no place, such as—*e.g.*, "the whole is greater than its part." The "distinction drawn" by Mr. Spencer between logic and reasoning (which really consists in calling logic reasoning, and applying the term logic to ontology), does not really aid in the least either to explain "the ratiocinative act," or the genus—intellectual action—whereof ratiocination is a species.

Moreover, with respect to the axioms referred to, it is always contended, as Mr. Spencer justly says, that they are "involved in every syllogism," not that they are always explicitly referred to by the mind in reasoning syllogistically, and though they may be "not recognized as such" (*i.e.* explicitly), "in

* The italics here are mine.

reasoning" they can be always recognized as having been latent in ratiocination, when the mind adverts to the matter.

He concludes: "The utmost that any analysis of reason can effect is to disclose the *act of consciousness* through which these and all other mediately known truths are discerned; and this we have in the inward perception of likeness or unlikeness of relations. But a truth of this kind does not admit of axiomatic expression, because the universal process of rational intelligence cannot become solidified into any single *product* of rational intelligence."

But if the mind can truly recognize the process, then the expression of that process is a product of rational intelligence; and since by the hypothesis the recognition is true, there may be a conformity between the process and the product, though not, of course, identity, which no one would think of affirming.

The utmost analysis of *reason* seems to me to show an act of apprehension of truth, and that such an act may be of two kinds: direct—as in axiomatic truths; indirect—as in those perceived by reasoning, which latter genus of truth is further subdivisible into the species induction and deduction, the latter being ratiocination.

In the next section (p. 95, § 304) he proceeds, strangely enough, to test the value of the syllogism,—the vehicle for expressing deductive inference and nothing else,—by seeing whether it will serve to express every rational process. He says: "We shall find that the simplest deliverances of reason, as well as the most complex deliverances, have alike the form which the syllogism fails utterly to represent." This is a remarkable instance of the solemn way in which Mr. Spencer every now and then enunciates a truism as if it was a profound and recondite truth. "Fails to represent" "the simplest deliverances of reason." I should think so! It would be odd indeed if "*a judgment*," and still more so if "*a simple apprehension*," were expressed by a syllogism.

He goes on impressively: "For how are we to express syllogistically the data for the conclusion, that 'things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other'?" How, indeed! He tells us: "Each of these truths is reached by an intuition of which the theory of reason, as logicians present it, gives no account whatever." But sane logicians give the same account of it as the author criticised (namely, that they are "intuitions of reason"), the origin of those intuitions, however, is another matter. Mr. Spencer would say that they are inherited brute sensations, which I contend is an absurd account of them, and can only be received by those who know

not what they really do think, when they think on intuition. He continues: "All the various simple axioms, quantitative and qualitative, treated of in the preceding chapter, are extra-syllogistic; and if so, one of two things is inevitably implied,—either that there is a kind of reasoning formulated by syllogism, and another kind of reasoning so entirely different that syllogism cannot formulate it, or else that syllogism does not formulate reasoning at all." This is really amazing. It is amazing that a writer on logic should not know the doctrine so widely received that there is one "kind of intellectual operation formulated by syllogism,"—namely, the indirect or "inference" (*ratio*, or *λογος*), and another kind of intellectual apprehension,—the direct (*intellectus*, or *νοϋς*).

But even more surprising still is the passage which follows. Therein he argues: "If it be urged that these axiomatic truths are truths recognized by the simplest order of reasoning, and that syllogizing represents reasoning of a developed order, the defence serves but to bring on a still more serious attack." As to this attack we will see by and by. But how profound must be Mr. Spencer's ignorance of the system opposed to him, the universal tradition of the schools, since he does not know that what he imagines would be the *defence* adopted by his opponents would really be regarded by them as a most self-evident absurdity. Axiomatic truth recognized by the "simplest order" of intellect, and "syllogizing" by a "developed order"! Why, it is precisely the reverse! Ratiocination is the consequence of the feebleness of our intellectual power, which compels us so often to adopt the round-about road of inference instead of the direct path of intuition. The logicians whom Mr. Spencer controverts without having read, or at any rate understood, have always represented that, as intellect gains in power, its ratiocinative province becomes reduced, and its intuitive province enlarged; so that in the highest intellectual natures there can be no such thing as reasoning, all in them being direct and perfect intuition.

And now for the "more serious attack," which "serious" attack has an undeniably droll aspect. He tells us (p. 96), again with impressive solemnity: "For the syllogism can as little express the most involved deliverances of reason as it can express its simplest deliverances;" and he refers to his before-given example (§ 277) of the tubular bridge, saying that it "cannot, however violently dislocated, be brought within the syllogistic form."

To this I have already sufficiently replied by simply bringing it within the syllogistic form."

He then proceeds (p. 97, § 305) to directly examine the syllogism which he declares to be a "psychological impossibility." He takes as his example :

"All crystals have planes of cleavage.

This is a crystal ;

Therefore,

This has a plane of cleavage" ;

and, in reply to the objections he starts, as to the how and the why of the order followed, he says : "There is one answer, and only one. *Before consciously asserting that all crystals have planes of cleavage, it has already occurred to me that this crystal has a plane of cleavage.* Doubtless it is the registered experience I have had respecting the cleavage of crystals which *determines* me to think of this crystal as having a plane of cleavage." But in this single passage Mr. Spencer concedes all that logicians need demand. The "registered experience" is, really, the universal proposition—the major premiss. And if this "*determines*" the thought of "this crystal" having a plane of cleavage, it does so only on the principle of the *dictum de omni et nullo*. He goes on to say : "But that registered experience is not present to my mind *before* the special predication is made, though I may become conscious of it subsequently." Present to my mind explicitly,—"*no*"; implicitly,—"*yes*." The whole process of ratiocination, as has again and again been said, is the making of implicit truths into that which is explicitly recognized.

No one, however, is so absurd as to contend that people ordinarily reason syllogistically ; it is enough to affirm that valid ratiocination can always be thrown into a regular syllogistic form.

In the next section (p. 100, § 306), Mr. Spencer returns to his "theory of reasoning," and considers an objection which might have been made to his representation of the reasoning process (a comparison of relations), as well as to the syllogism—namely, that we think of the particular instance in each case before we think of the class. He says : "On the presentation of some object (*a*), there is suggested to the mind some unperceived attribute (*b*), as possessed by it. This act is simple and spontaneous ; resulting, not from a *remembrance* of the before-known like relations (*A : B*), but merely from the *influence* which, as past experiences, they exercise over the association of ideas." It is, of course, true that as the rational nature of man supposes animality, so reason in him, supposes sense, (as its starting point), and the association of images as the basis for intellectually perceived dependencies of

things. Associated sensations and images, simple intellectual apprehensions and judgments, are all anterior to ratiocination, but, though they precede and lead up to it, no number of them will constitute deductive inference, which is a peculiar process, and the work of a special faculty necessary to an inferior order of intellect like our own. Judgments which, as all know, must precede ratiocination, may, of course, be repeated as affirmations of "relations;" and as a syllogism is made up of judgments, so it may in a sense be represented as a statement of relations, but this in no way invalidates either the infallibility or the peculiarity of ratiocination, nor is it at all true that in the process the mind adverts to relations, and compares them as relations, and when he says "the possibility of the inference depends on their being so thought of" all he really seems to mean (incredible as it appears), is the obvious truism that judgments must precede syllogisms.

In the next section (p. 103, § 307), he takes a retrospective "glance at the series of special results that have been reached," and he reminds his readers of what he has contended for in the foregoing chapters from his treatment of perfect quantitative reasoning down to reasoning by analogy. As I have contended with him all along this line, it would be an undue strain upon the reader's attention to here recapitulate what I have before said.

He then passes to his two genera of forms of reasoning (1), with three terms, and (2), with four terms, and their subordinate species.

The former he represents by the formula:—

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & B & \\ : & \text{is equal} & : \\ A \} & \text{or unequal to,} & \{ C \\ & \text{greater or less than} & \end{array}$$

The latter he represents by the formula:—

$$\begin{array}{ccc} A \} & \text{is equal or unequal to,} & \{ C \\ : & \text{greater or less than,} & : \\ B \} & \text{like or unlike} & \{ D \end{array}$$

That much reasoning may be thus expressed I have before conceded, while denying that such expression expresses the course which the mind naturally follows. Above all, such formulæ do *not express* at all the process of deductive ratiocination which is absolutely incapable of expression without the introduction of the term "therefore."

As to certain inferences of his second genus, he observes: "if A be but a fiftieth part less than B, it is at once inferable

that a half of A is greater than a third of B. Neither a general principle nor a particular experience can be quoted as the ground for this conclusion. . . . We may aptly term it a *latent* inference, . . . while the species of reasoning thus exemplified is obviously effected by comparison of relations, and so conforms to the theory above set forth, it does not conform to any of the current theories."

But I do not think that a logician of the school opposed by Mr. Spencer would have any difficulty in classing the reasoning in question, and showing that it conforms to the received theory. Indeed, in spite of what Mr. Spencer says, "general principles"—namely those of mathematics—are involved in it, and could be drawn out syllogistically, as well as in the instance of the "tubular bridge," before cited from Mr. Spencer. To minds of ordinary mathematical competency the simpler of such general principles are intuitive truths. Mr. Spencer concludes this section by the assertion that, as his doctrine applies to all orders of reasoning, "it fulfils the character of a true generalization." If, however, what has been here contended is true, it does not properly apply to reasoning generally, and will not at all apply to some, *e.g.*, deductive inference; while, to say the least, it is difficult to see how the simplest of intuitions, that upon which all reasoning seems to hang, can be the expression of the similarity of relations. This simplest intuition is the principle of identity, A is A,—an ultimate foundation of all our reasoning, the consideration of which, Mr. Spencer has, as yet, strangely neglected altogether to notice.

In the next section (p. 111, § 308), Mr. Spencer considers ordinary forms of speech, as giving confirmatory evidence of the truth of his views. These phrases are "*ratio*" and its derivatives. Analogy, (as expressing a "likeness"); parity, equality; *cæteris paribus*, parallel, similarity, similes, proportion.

Whatever etymology may have to say to this matter, I do not care to contest this point. Likeness and unlikeness are primary intuitions; but, because we are ever comparing things, it by no means follows that the mind is constantly comparing relations as such. Likeness and unlikeness of relations in these cases exist, of course, but it is not, once more, to the relations, but to the things related that the mind ordinarily adverts.

Lastly (p. 114, § 309), Mr. Spencer seeks to show that his view as to ratiocination can be reached *a priori*. In the first place, he says: "it may be demonstrated in two ways, that every inference involves an intuition of the likeness or unlike-

ness of relations." It does so, but it *is* more, it is a perception of one truth being involved as a necessary consequence in two other truths, and, as has been again and again said, cannot be expressed without "therefore."

These two "ways" are each, he says, "based on the very definition of reason, considered under its universal aspect." Since every rational proposition is a predication, *i.e.*, expresses some relation, which can only be thought of as belonging to some class of relations, "*reasoning* is a classification of *relations*." I reply, once more, that reasoning is thus not adequately represented; every brick-house is a heap of bricks, but it is also more. Every judgment expresses a relation, and all reasoning consists of judgments, and of relations between judgments, but relations of a certain and definite kind, to omit reference to which in defining reasoning, is to omit the Prince of Denmark from the logical Hamlet.

His second argument is as follows (p. 115): "Not only does the kind of proposition called an inference assert a relation, but every proposition, whether expressing mediate or immediate knowledge, asserts a relation. How, then, does knowing a relation by reason differ from knowing it by perception? It differs by its *indirectness*. A cognition is distinguishable as of one or the other kind, according as the relation it embodies is disclosed to the mind *directly* or *indirectly*. If its terms are so presented that the relation between them is immediately cognized—if their co-existence, or succession, or juxtaposition is knowable through the senses; we have a perception. If their co-existence, or sequence, or juxtaposition is not knowable through the senses—if the relation between them is mediately cognized; we have a ratiocinative act. Reasoning, then, is the *indirect establishment of a definite relation between two things*."

Now, here again, the same objection applies as in his first argument, namely, the incompleteness of his account of reasoning; it is what he says, but it is also much more. But, in addition to this defect, the passage just quoted exhibits the most striking fallacy of all—namely, an account of reasoning from which all consideration of *reason* is omitted. There is no distinction drawn between a sensible perception and an intellectual one; whatever is not "knowable through the senses," is represented as "a ratiocinative act." But the truth that two straight and parallel lines will never meet, though prolonged to infinity, is certainly not "knowable through the senses," and yet is not "a ratiocinative act." The same may be said of the proposition "A is A," "a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same sense," and

"ingratitude can never be a virtue." These are neither sensible perceptions nor ratiocinations, but direct cognitive acts of the intellect. Mr. Spencer's account of reasoning may usefully be applied to the understanding of the "organic inferences" of brutes; but that self-conscious knowledge which knows truth, its necessity, and the fact that it knows it, is not even adverted to by Mr. Spencer. He continues: "But now the question arises, by what process can the indirect establishment of a definite relation be effected? There is one process, and only one. If a relation between two things is not directly knowable; it can be disclosed only through the intermediation of relations that are directly knowable, or are already known," *e.g.*, two mountains compared by their respective heights above the sea, &c. "Hence, every ratiocinative act is the *indirect establishment of a definite relation between two things, by the process of establishing a definite relation between two definite relations.*"

But *reasoning* is very inadequately represented by the phrase "the establishment of relations"; it is much more, it is the conscious intellectual recognition of a truth as a necessary consequence of truths antecedently known. The "establishment" of relations other than artistic (using the word in its widest sense) is the work of the Divine mind only. Our intellects can *recognize* relations established between things and between relations, and when we examine "reasoning" we find that the "recognition" of the relations between relations is involved in it, but it is not to these that the mind adverts, but to that necessary dependence which it is enabled to recognize from propositions formed and arranged according to the laws of logic—that is, according to the formal laws of thought.

I contend, in opposition to Mr. Spencer, that it may be shown *à priori*, that reasoning does not and cannot consist in the recognition of a relation between relations, for reasoning consists in the evolution from the implicit to the explicit condition of a new relation. To reason is to acquire new explicit truth from other truths already explicitly known, and all these must be expressible as judgments—the antecedent judgments. Every A is B, and C is A, express indeed relations between A and B, and A and C respectively, and then relations are compared; but reasoning is not the act of comparing them or of recognizing that they are like or unlike, but that from their juxtaposition there arises necessarily and infallibly another new proposition of a quite peculiar kind, namely, "therefore C is B." It is not even that the comparison of the relations between A and B

and between A and C respectively, reveal a new relation between C and B, but that this new relation is seen to be involved in, and to necessarily flow from, the preceding propositions, as expressed by the special term so often referred to.

At the end of these eight chapters, we must then (as it appears to me), recognize the fatuity of Mr. Spencer's attempt to reduce the reasoning process to even an intellectual, reflex comparison of relations as such—*a fortiori* then he fails to reduce it to that sort of automatic action which he seems alone to recognize. For Mr. Spencer attempts to explain reasoning by considering only its lower kinds. The apprehension of truth as *true*, of related things as relations recognized *as* relations, he altogether ignores. As to reasoning, it has, like every other human intellectual act, its sensible and material substratum. Associations of images serve as a basis for the associations of ideas, and organic inferences for reasoning. Comparisons of relations are no doubt implied and latent in the reasoning process—materials employed by and in it, just as perception makes use of sensations as materials; but just as past sensations weakly resurging into consciousness do not constitute thought, so no association of related groups of them, or clusters of clusters of them, whether harmonizing or conflicting, constitute reasoning. Mr. Spencer enunciates truth, but not the whole truth, and he does not, as yet, even touch upon the more important truth, I mean he does not notice or attempt to explain the power of the intellect to recognize the true as true, and to discriminate between intellectual truth directly and intuitively known and ratiocinative truth known only indirectly through that logical process required by the infirmity of our intellectual nature, and symbolized by the one formal inferential word "THEREFORE."

M.

ON SOME RECENT COMMENTARIES ON THE SYLLABUS.

By PÈRE DESJACQUES.

Translated from the "Etudes," November, 1877.

Exposition historique des Propositions du Syllabus. Par l'Abbé VERDE-
REAU, curé de Romenay (diocèse d'Autun). Paris: Palmé. 1877.

Le Syllabus Pontifical; ou, Réfutation des Erreurs qui y sont condamnées.
Par M. l'Abbé LÉONARD FALCONI, bénéficié du Vatican. Traduit
de l'Italien par E. J. MATERNE, curé de Flostoy. 3e édition. Paris :
Palmé. 1876.

Le Syllabus, Base de l'Union des Catholiques. Par le R. P. PETITALOT, de
la Société de Marie. Paris : Bray & Retaux. 1877.

Les Droits de Dieu et les Idées modernes. Par l'Abbé FRANÇOIS CHESNEL,
vicaire-général de Quimper. Henry Oudin. 1875-77.

L'Eglise et l'Etat dans leurs Rapports mutuels. Par le R. P. LIBERATORE,
de la Compagnie de Jésus. Traduit de l'Italien sur la 2e édition par
un docteur en théologie du Collège romain, professeur de grand
séminaire. Paris : Palmé. 1877.

[It has often appeared to us, that English Catholics do not commonly attach such importance to the Syllabus, as is attached to it by their brethren on the Continent. And one very probable reason for this fact (if fact it be) will be found in the circumstance, that England (thank God!) has indefinitely less practical experience than most Continental nations, of the internecine political conflict, between Christianity on one side, and those irreligious principles on the other which assail the very foundations of civil society. But, however this may be, we think we shall do good service by placing before our readers a specimen of the great stress laid by foreign Catholics on Pius IX.'s immortal Act. We have translated, therefore, a considerable portion of an article contributed by F. Desjacques to the "Etudes" of last November.]

WHEN God inspires those to whom He has delegated His authority in the Church to define a dogma or to condemn errors, it is not in order that the light may be hidden under a bushel, but that it may be set on the candlestick, to shine before all men. He Himself so appoints, that its rays shall go forth through means fitted to the times : at one time it is by miracles ; but oftener by a concurrence of events, prepared long before by divine wisdom, or arising suddenly as by the impulse of human passion ; but always one part of the work is left to the free co-operation of men, not only in themselves receiving the grace offered, but still more in causing it to be received by a greater number.

The Syllabus has been one of these lights set up by Providence in the midst of the world. That famous document might have remained unnoticed, or fallen at once into oblivion, like other Acts of the Holy See. It contained nothing new. All the errors brought together there had previously fallen under the condemnation of Pius IX. without exciting public opinion. What would be known now of the Syllabus, if it had been let pass without protest during these thirteen years? It would have served for the guidance and direction of the Episcopate, which was its chief object. Theologians would have quoted it in their lectures and in their books, as they cite the list of propositions condemned by Innocent XI. or Alexander VII. But it would have been unknown to the mass of the faithful; it would have remained utterly unheard of by those, who neglect to hear the teaching of their pastors, while they preserve the Faith and even practise the most essential duties of their religion. And so, despite the thunders of the Vatican, the great heresy of modern times would have gone on spreading its venom through the Church.

God would not permit this to be. He had willed that the Syllabus should not be a passing gleam in the stormy night, but a beacon with an undying flame to show to the voyager the rocks that are to be avoided and the port for which he is to make. No miracle was needed for this; the hatred of His enemies was enough. No one has forgotten what a stir was made in the world by the publication of the Syllabus; how governments tried to stop its way; how it was denounced in the parliaments of Paris, Florence, London, Brussels, and Berlin, in every existing parliament, as an outrage against modern liberty; how the press cried out against it day after day, declaring with torrents of false and abusive language, that civilization was threatened by a frightful danger; how several Catholics stigmatized the courageous decision of the Holy Father as imprudent or inopportune, either because they were alarmed by the outcry, or because they found their own liberalistic tendencies checked. Is it not to be wondered at, that the word of an old man, a sovereign without power, despoiled even then of a part and since of the remainder of his states, should have echoed so long throughout the world? How can we explain why this agitation lasts still, after so many years; how it is that, in legislative assemblies and public meetings, in newspapers and reviews, in books and pamphlets, there is constantly repeated that unpopular and little understood word, the *Syllabus*?

It is the means appointed by Providence, to make it better known and more widely accepted. A voice stopped by nothing would lose itself in space; obstacles make it echo. When the Sovereign Pontiff spoke firmly and strongly, the docile children of the Church signified their respect and submission by silence. But they threw off their reserve, when they saw his doctrinal authority violently attacked by some, and abandoned and almost betrayed by others. Protests of absolute adhesion and obedience came from all sides and under all forms to the foot of the Pontifical throne; addresses written collectively by the clergy and faithful; letters from writers who, in offering their works to the Pope, bound themselves to follow and to defend, his infallible decisions; ardent words read aloud

in the name of bands of pilgrims, who crowded unceasingly to the Vatican; speeches warmly applauded in Catholic congresses; addresses pronounced by fearless orators among the discussions of stormy meetings: such proofs of the faith and obedience of true Christians were poured out before Pius IX. during less unhappy times than these, and above all in the glorious days of the General Council; they still continue, and in his captivity they are his consolation.

Even the tepid and indifferent have been stirred by the agitation amongst the rest. How many, who would have found it insupportably tedious to read a long catalogue of eighty propositions formulated in concise abstract terms, became curious to know what was contained in this notorious work, and asked that they might be made acquainted with its sense and its general drift!

At this favourable crisis, brought about by Divine Providence for the propagation of the Syllabus, the Catholic press had its work to do. First of all, of course, it belonged to the Holy Father and the Episcopate with him to interpret the Pontifical words. Then it was for theologians to settle among themselves the dogmatic value of this work of the Holy See, and the precise meaning of each of the propositions that it censures: a work which, requiring long consideration, is still slowly going on. But a wide field for action is left to those writers, who have the means of addressing the public, and who wish to serve the Church. It is their task to satisfy the reasonable desires of those who wish to understand the Syllabus; to reply to the insults and the sophistry of those who attack it; to popularize authentic statements, learned refutations, and theological commentaries; and above all to receive deep into their own minds the truths on which the Vicar of Jesus Christ insists; to take his judgments as the rule of their theories, their estimates, and their leanings; and, as if they were flying from the plague, to eschew those errors which he has condemned. Many have valiantly done their duty. Not to speak of the numerous articles in favour of the Syllabus published by religious reviews and newspapers,—the list is already long of those books, large and small, which are devoted to the work of explaining it or putting its teaching in practice. Before now some of them have been commended in the "*Etudes*." Not being able to notice all the others, we shall only point out four or five of the most recent and the most worthy to be known; perhaps they may suggest the idea of some other still more useful work on the same subject.

One can look upon the Syllabus either in a general manner or in detail; and comment on it all together, or study only a portion. M. l'Abbé Verdereau takes it as a whole, dividing his work into three parts. In the first he examines the doctrinal authority of the Syllabus. Is it merely an authentic list of all the condemnations pronounced until then by Pius IX. against contemporary errors? Or is it something more, a new promulgation and a confirmation of the previous Acts to which it refers? We know that theologians are divided on this point. M. Verdereau decides upon and adopts the latter theory, as it has been supported in these pages by

Father Dumas.* In the second part of his book he translates the Syllabus as many others have done before him ; but, moreover, opposite each condemned error, he places the contradictory proposition which is to be received as true. This last work, beyond doubt a valuable one, required a most delicate hand. It was easy to slip into faults there ; and we should not like to say for M. Verdereau that he has escaped them all. The third part of the "Exposition Historique" justifies the title of the work. There we find details of the circumstances which led up to each of the Pontifical Acts mentioned in the Syllabus. No doubt these details throw some light upon the censured propositions ; but they can only be clearly understood, when they are carefully compared with the text of the original documents from which they are derived, and with the principles of theology and philosophy.

This last point, that is, the doctrinal interpretation, has been ably treated by the Abbé Falconi in a series of articles, first published in the Roman religious weekly paper, "Il divin Salvatore," and afterwards in a volume which has gone through several editions. The learned author takes the propositions of the Syllabus one by one, and briefly demonstrates their falsehood by solid vigorous arguments. It is a proof of the merits of this little work, and of the need of it that existed, that the translation made in Belgium from the third Italian edition was successful, and quickly reached a third edition itself, notwithstanding that it was full of mistakes.

* [The opinion, here first mentioned, must not be confused with quite a different theory which has been started in England. According to this latter theory, the Syllabus is not an *authentic* catalogue of certain condemnations, which Pius IX. had issued before its promulgation ; but on the contrary an *unauthentic* catalogue made by some anonymous writer, and no official Act of the Holy Father's at all. Considering Pius IX.'s repeated public attributions of the Syllabus to himself and to the Holy See—we find it very difficult to understand how it is, that more than one excellently intentioned Catholic can have persuaded himself to acquiesce in this theory. But it is not one of those to which F. Desjacques refers.

The two opinions, between which—according to F. Desjacques—theologians are divided, are these. Some hold that Pius IX. did no more in the Syllabus, than declare distinctly and unmistakably that the eighty errors therein recited had already been condemned by him *ex cathedrâ*. Others hold that—in addition to this—the Syllabus contains a *second* condemnation *ex cathedrâ* of those errors. According to either of these opinions—as we need hardly point out—absolute interior assent is due from every Catholic to the Syllabus : every Catholic is bound to regard the eighty errors as having been infallibly condemned ; and is bound also to regard that doctrine concerning the Pope's civil principedom to be infallibly true, which is contained in the Six Acts enumerated by the Syllabus.

We may add however that there is a third view, which we are disposed to regard as nearer the truth than either of those mentioned by F. Desjacques. The bearing of this view is, that on one hand the Syllabus is strictly an *ex cathedrâ* utterance ; while on the other hand several of the errors censured therein had not been condemned strictly *ex cathedrâ*, by the earlier Pontifical Acts on which it is based. —ED. D. R.]

There was still needed something of a similar kind, but shorter and at the same time more complete and more fitted to French taste. This has been attempted by Father Petitalot; and we believe his book is destined to do much good. It considers the Syllabus as *the basis of Catholic unity*; a happy and most true idea, which has won for him the congratulations of the Holy Father. "In fact," we read in the letter written to the pious author on behalf of His Holiness, "Catholic unity could not last, unless all the faithful think the same thing, speak the same thing, and take their stand together on the common ground of the same ideas and the same feelings: an end which is impossible to attain, if all do not submit with docility to the same infallible teacher, and do not take care to do it, the errors opposed to sacred doctrine. On the other hand, the Syllabus,—a brief enumeration and condemnation of certain modern errors, in which is hidden the poison of all the old ones,—is a most fitting and most efficacious means of preserving souls from the contagion of those errors, and binding them more closely to the truth. The Holy Father, therefore, has judged that you were not mistaken in calling the Syllabus the basis of Catholic unity."

We may notice before passing on, that in this letter the Syllabus is not only called the *enumeration*, but the *condemnation* of modern errors; which appears to favour the opinion adopted by M. l'Abbé Verdereau, as to the doctrinal authority of the document.

We must now make known by a few words the book of the learned Marist. Here the propositions of the Syllabus are grouped in as many chapters as there are paragraphs in the official text; an arrangement which allows one a better view of its general design. The longer paragraphs are subdivided. The reader will be glad to find (opposite the translation) the Latin text, which does not appear in the two books of which we have already spoken; but he will regret to see cut short the full title of the Syllabus, which has its own importance. This seems to have been an oversight. Each group of propositions is preceded by a few lines giving a summary of them or marking the change of subject; then comes a short historical explanation, if there is occasion for it, and invariably a doctrinal commentary. This commentary, which is an exposition of dogma or a refutation of error, is taken either from the Allocutions and Apostolic Letters of Pius IX., referred to in the Syllabus, or from the teachings of theology and canon law, or the principles of reason. Frequently the author uses the same arguments as the Abbé Falconi, but the turn which they take in his hands makes them his own. In his style he seeks to attract by a free lively manner; sometimes a little in contrast with the gravity of the subject, but well calculated to rouse and sustain the attention of those readers who might be repelled by a more didactic style. Had I to choose between the book of the Abbé Falconi and that of Father Petitalot, I would give the first to a priest, the second to a man of the world.

Another larger, wider, and more profound manner of interpreting the Syllabus is that followed by M. l'Abbé Chesnel in his work entitled "*Les Droits de Dieu et les Idées modernes.*" If we read it attentively,

and seek to discover the bond that unites the long list of propositions condemned by Pius IX., we shall find that in general they express the great error of our times regarding the nature of civil society and its relationship with the Church; in a word, for the most part they concern liberalism. Without an effort one could even bring all of them under this point of view. Atheism and pantheism, naturalism and rationalism, the pretension of human science to absolute independence and indifference on matters of religion: these are the premisses of which liberalism is the consequence; imbued with such doctrines, society has endured with repugnance the yoke of God and of His Christ; and aspired to be secularized. Errors touching morals infect the very source of civil law and of the law of nations. As for Christian marriage, it is a region long coveted by the secular authorities, and it was sacrilegiously usurped when they became inspired with the maxims of the Revolution.

Thus the Syllabus is, before all things, the condemnation of liberalism. Therefore an almost complete commentary on the Syllabus may be formed by a doctrinal refutation of this error; a laying down of the principles of social law; an explanation of what the State is and what the Church is; what is the origin, the nature, and the end of these two societies; what are their rights, their limits, their duties; at what points they touch each other, and in what relationship they are placed confronting one another. The work of the Abbé Chesnel is the realization of this idea.

After having laid down, with ample proofs, the sound doctrine of social law, the Abbé Chesnel had only to set forth some definitions of the last Œcumenical Council and the propositions condemned by the Encyclical of 1864 and the Syllabus; and enough was done to show how the teaching of the Church on these important subjects is both reasonable and necessary to public prosperity. This he has done in the penultimate chapter of the first volume. The last chapter, summing up the fundamental principle of the whole work, completes his argument against liberalism by comparing it with paganism. The two false systems touch each other at their source. Paganism refused to believe in the doctrine of creation; liberalism puts aside the rights of the Creator. But there is this difference between the two: viz. that the Pagans worshipping the false divinities of their nations, *idola gentium*, at least looked upon religion as the foundation, the bond, and crown of social order; while the creed of the Liberals is essentially irreligious. Paganism is idolatry become a national religion. Liberalism is impiety penetrating all public order; it is national irreligion. . .

There is a book which M. l'Abbé Chesnel quotes with praise, and from which he has frequently borrowed ideas. It is Father Liberatore's "*L'Eglise et l'Etat*," of which a good French translation, from the last Italian edition has just been published. The points of doctrine briefly set forth by the Vicar-general of Quimper in an elementary form in his second volume, are treated with greater length and profundity by the learned Italian publicist. He divides his subject into three books. In the first he explains the position of the Church with regard to the State. To the false idea of it given by Liberals of all shades of opinion, he opposes that held by Catholics. The State is distinct from the Church,

and subordinate to her. It cannot separate from her, proclaiming liberty of conscience and of worships ; it is bound to afford her the protection of its laws, and to make its sword serve for the defence of the Kingdom of God and of the spiritual order. The second book is directed against the error which declares the secularization of the State, and its independence of the Church and of the supernatural order. Naturalism in politics effaces the true notion of right, it debases the royal authority, and ruins the institutions of free government. By usurping the paternal rights, it carries corruption and confusion into the family ; in fine, having no other end but enjoyment and riches, it degrades and brutalizes society. The third book sets forth the rights of the Church in relationship with the State. She has of herself, and independently of the State, the right to possess temporal goods and to form associations ; to exercise her ministry ; to publish and carry out her laws ; without the Government having power to fetter her action by challenging them as erroneous, or by imposing upon her the conditions of the "placet" and "exequatur." She has the right to institute and to maintain public works of benevolence and charity, to exact the observance of Sundays and festivals as days of rest, to teach, and to watch over education. The last chapters contain a treatise on the force and nature of concordats ; a refutation of the difficulties raised by politicians against the dogma of Papal infallibility ; and three dissertations, one on the right of the clergy not to be subjected to military service, another on ecclesiastical immunities, and the third and last on the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. The whole work is a refutation of the errors of liberalism, so many times censured by Pius IX. By recounting successively after each chapter the condemned propositions of which it treats, it could easily be shown that it forms a doctrinal and polemical commentary on nearly the whole of the Syllabus.

An important service is being rendered to society by those who labour to defend the dogmatic decisions of the Holy See, and to give to men's minds a clear knowledge of them. That error, which leads individuals out of the path of salvation, ruins nations also ; and only the truth can save them. The remedy for our evils lies in those infallible condemnations, which tear the mask from false doctrines and make them explicitly known. If the remedy be applied, if the warnings of the Holy See penetrate the intelligence of men, little by little will ideas be reformed, and through ideas all the rest. But if the teaching of the Holy Father be unknown, or misunderstood, or cast disdainfully back, the errors stigmatized by it will continue their dread work. By perverting the reason, they will more and more corrupt morals, and change into deeds. Sooner or later events will justify the Church, showing that she blessed by her severity. They will be the clearest and most eloquent commentary upon the Syllabus.

Already they are speaking loudly enough for those who understand or have a will to hear them. Statesmen, who have despised the paternal advice of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, and wanted to do without God—what fruits have they reaped from their proud policy ? They would not suppress the secret societies denounced so many times by the Holy See : now the in-

fernal network of those societies is spread throughout the whole world, and, according to the avowal of the Prime Minister of a great empire, they hold diplomacy in check. They have secularized marriage, reducing the sacrament to the level of profane things; and divorces go on multiplying, the conjugal tie is relaxed, the family disorganized. They invented their false principle of non-intervention, expressly to let the Church be despoiled and the Pontifical States robbed; and the world, shaken to its foundation, seems unable to steady itself again. To free themselves from the Divine law, they placed in numbers the origin of authority; and universal suffrage, handled by unprincipled politicians, pushes society towards an abyss. They adore their false liberties like so many idols—liberty of conscience, liberty of thought and of the press, liberty of worships: and the conscience of the people turns with every breath of opinion, the reason of the people is a chaos, and adventurers improvising ridiculous creeds cast the majesty of religion to the winds. They have broken with a sacrilegious hand the bond which God himself formed between Church and State: the Church rides fearlessly above every revolution, stayed by Divine promises; but the State, like a vessel about to overturn, knows no longer how to rule the waves of popular passion. Carrying audacity to yet greater lengths, they assumed to the State supremacy over the Church; but they have come across Catholic conscience, standing before them like an impassable wall. All their talk of liberty has not kept them from going back to the persecutions of Julian the Apostate; and when fines, confiscation, imprisonment, exile, every kind of trial has been resorted to in vain, behold them obliged to confess that their war against Jesus Christ, what they hypocritically call their struggle for civilization, has been a failure. Like the tyrant whose example they followed, they in their turn will be obliged to cry out, "Thou hast conquered, Galilean!"

TWO PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS BY DR. WARD.

[The two following papers were contributed respectively to the May and the October numbers of the "Nineteenth Century," and are here reprinted by permission of the Editor.]

THE INFLUENCE UPON MORALITY OF A DECLINE IN RELIGIOUS BELIEF.

I agree with the Dean of St. Paul's, that the wording of our question is unfortunately ambiguous; and I think that this fact has made the discussion in several respects less pointed and less otherwise interesting than it might have been.

For my present purpose, I understand the term "religious belief" as including essentially belief in a Personal God and in personal immorta-

lity. Less than this is not worthy the name of religious belief; and, on the other hand, I will not refer to any other religious truths than these. I am to inquire therefore, what would be the influence on morality of a decline in these two beliefs.

But next, what is meant by "morality"? I will explain as clearly as brevity may permit what I should myself understand by the term; though I am of course well aware, that this is by no means the sense in which Sir J. Fitzjames Stephen, or Mr. Harrison, or Professor Clifford, understands it.

I consider that there is a certain authoritative Rule of life,* necessarily not contingently existing, which may be regarded under a twofold aspect. It declares that certain acts (exterior or interior) are intrinsically and necessarily evil; it declares again that some certain act (exterior or interior), even where not actually evil, is by intrinsic necessity, under the circumstances of some given moment, less morally excellent than some certain other act. Any given man, therefore, more effectively practises "morality," in proportion as he more energetically, predominantly, and successfully aims at adjusting his whole conduct, interior and exterior, by this authoritative Rule. Accordingly, when I am asked what is the bearing of some particular influence on morality,—I understand myself to be asked how far such influence affects for good or evil the prevalence of that practical habit which I have just described; how far such influence disposes men (or the contrary) to adjust their conduct by this authoritative Rule.

These explanations having been premised, my answer to the proposed question is this. The absence of religious belief—of belief in a Personal God and personal immortality—does not simply *injure* morality, but, if the disbelievers carry their view out consistently, utterly *destroys* it. I affirm—which of course requires proof, though I have no space here to give it—that no one except a Theist can, in consistency, recognize the necessarily existing authoritative Rule of which I have spoken. But for practical purposes there is no need of this affirmation: because in what follows I shall refer to no other opponents of religion, except that antitheistic body—consisting of Agnostics, Positivists, and the like—which in England just now heads the speculative irreligious movement. Now it is manifest on the very surface of philosophical literature that, as a *matter of fact*, these men deny in theory the existence of any such necessary authoritative Rule, as that on which I have dwelt. A large proportion of Theists accept it, and call it "the Natural Law";† an Agnostic or Positivist

* To prevent misapprehension, I may explain that, in my view, those various necessary truths which collectively constitute this Rule are, like all other necessary truths, founded on the Essence of God: they are what they are, because He is what He is.

† The Natural Law more strictly includes only God's *prohibition* of acts intrinsically evil, and his *preception* of acts which cannot be omitted *without* doing what is intrinsically evil. But we may with obvious propriety so extend the term, as to include under it God's *counselling* of those acts which, as clothed in their full circumstances, are by intrinsic necessity the more morally excellent.

denies its existence. It is very clear that he who denies that there is such a thing as a necessarily existing authoritative Rule of life, cannot consistently aim at adjusting any, even the smallest, part of his conduct by the intimations of that Rule; or, in other words, cannot consistently do so much as one act, which (on the theory which I follow) can be called morally good.

Here, however, a most important explanation must be made. It continually happens, that some given philosopher holds some given doctrine speculatively and theoretically, while he holds the precisely contradictory doctrine implicitly and unconsciously; insomuch that it is the latter, and not the former, which he applies to his estimate of events as they successively arise. Now the existence of the Natural Law,—so I would most confidently maintain,—is a truth so firmly rooted by God Himself in the conviction of every reasonable creature, that practically to leaven the human mind with belief of its contradictory is, even under the circumstances most favourable to that purpose, a slow and uphill process. In the early stages therefore of antitheistic persuasion, there is a vast gulf between the antitheist's speculative theory and his practical realization of that theory. Mr. Mallock has set forth this fact, I think, with admirable force, in an article contributed by him to the "Contemporary" of last January. When antitheists say,—such is his argument,—that the pursuit of truth is a "sacred," "heroic," "noble" exercise—when they call one way of living mean, and base, and hateful, and another way of living great, and blessed, and admirable*—they are guilty of most flagrant inconsistency. They therein use language and conceive thoughts, which are utterly at variance with their own speculative theory. If it be admitted (1) that the idea expressed by the term "moral goodness" is a simple idea, an idea incapable of analysis; and (2) that to this idea there corresponds a necessary objective reality in *rerum naturâ*;—if these two propositions be admitted, the existence of the Natural Law is a truth which irresistibly results from the admission. On the other hand, if these two propositions be *not* postulated, then to talk of one human act being "higher" or "nobler" than another, is as simply unmeaning as to talk of a bed being nobler than a chair, or a plough than a harrow. Whether it be the bed, or the plough, or the human act, it may be more *useful* than the other article with which it is brought into comparison; but to speak in either case of "nobleness," is as the sound of a tinkling cymbal. Or rather, which is my present point, the fact of antitheists using such language shows, that their practical belief is so far essentially opposed and (as I of course should say) immeasurably superior to their speculative theory. To my mind there is hardly any truth which needs more to be insisted on than this, in the present crisis of philosophical thought: when antitheism successfully conceals its hideous deformity from its own votaries, by dressing itself up in the very garments of that rival creed which it derides as imbecile and obsolete. I heartily wish I had space for setting forth in full and clear light the argument on which I would here insist.

* Pp. 177-8.

I may refer, however, to Mr. Mallock's article, for an excellent exposition of it from his own point of view ; and, in particular, I cannot express too strongly my concurrence with the following remarks :—

"All the moral feelings (he says) at present afloat in the world depend, as I have already shown, on the primary doctrines of religion ; but that the former would *outlive* the latter is nothing more than we should naturally expect : just as water may go on boiling after it is taken off the fire, as flowers keep their scent and colour after we have plucked them, or as a tree whose roots have been cut may yet put out green leaves for one spring more. But a time must come when all this will be over, and when the true effects of what has been done will begin to show themselves. Nor can there be any reason brought forward to show why, if the creed of unbelief was once fully assented to by the world, all morality—a thing always attended by some pain and struggle—would not gradually wither away, and give place to a more or less successful seeking after pleasure, no matter of what kind."

I would also recall to Sir J. Fitzjames Stephen's remembrance an admirable statement of his, which occurs in the work on "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." "We cannot judge of the effects of atheism," he says, "from the conduct of persons who have been educated as believers in God, and in the midst of a nation which believes in God. If we should ever see a generation of men, especially a generation of Englishmen, to whom the word 'God' has no meaning at all, we should get a light on the subject which might be lurid enough."*

So far I have used the word "morality" in that sense which I account the true one. But a different acceptation of the word is very common ; and it will be better perhaps briefly to consider our proposed question, in the sense which that acceptation would give it. Morality then is often spoken of, as consisting in a man's sacrifice of his personal desires for the public good ; so that each man more faithfully practises "morality," in proportion as he more effectively postpones private interests to public ones. I have always been extremely surprised that any Theist can use this terminology ; though I am well aware of course, that many do so. To mention no other of its defects, it excludes from the sphere of morality precisely what a Theist must consider the most noble and elevating branch thereof—viz. men's duties to their Creator. Constant remembrance of God's presence, prayer to Him for moral strength, purging the heart from any such worldly attachment as may interfere with His sovereignty over the affections—these, and a hundred others, which are man's highest moral actions, are excluded by this strange terminology from being moral actions at all. Still in one respect there is great agreement between the two "moralities" in question, for under either of them morality very largely consists in self-denial and self-sacrifice.

Now, if it be asked in what way morality, as so understood, would be affected by the absence of religious belief,—I think the true reply is one, which has so often been drawn out that I need do no more than indicate it. Firstly, apart from Theistic motives there is no sufficient moral leverage ;

* Second edition, p. 326.

men would not have the moral strength required for sustained self-denial and self-sacrifice. Secondly and more importantly, if Theistic sanctions were away, no theory could be drawn out explaining why it should be *reasonable* that a man sacrifice his personal interest to that of his fellows.

On this matter I am glad that I have the opportunity of drawing attention to a very fine passage of Mr. Goldwin Smith's, published in the "Macmillan" of last January.

"Materialism has in fact already begun to show its effects on human conduct and on society. They may perhaps be more visible in communities where social conduct depends greatly on individual conviction and motive than in communities which are more ruled by tradition and bound together by strong class organizations; though the decay of morality will perhaps be more complete and disastrous in the latter than in the former. God and future retribution being out of the question, it is difficult to see what can restrain the selfishness of an ordinary man, and induce him, in the absence of actual coercion, to sacrifice his personal desires to the public good. The service of humanity is the sentiment of a refined mind conversant with history; within no calculable time is it likely to overrule the passions and direct the conduct of the mass. And after all, without God or spirit, what is 'humanity'? One school of science reckons a hundred and fifty different species of man. What is the bond of unity between all these species, and wherein consists the obligation to mutual love and help? A zealous servant of science told Agassiz that the age of real civilization would have begun when you could go out and shoot a man for scientific purposes; and in the controversy respecting the Jamaica massacre we had proof enough that the ascendancy of science and a strong sense of human brotherhood might be very different things. 'Apparent dire facies.' We begin to perceive, looming through the mist, the lineaments of an epoch of selfishness compressed by a government of force."

In fact, even in the present early stage of the English antitheistic philosophy, if its adherents are directly asked what is man's reasonable rule of life, I know of no other answer they will theoretically give except one. They will say that any given person's one reasonable pursuit on earth is to aim at his own earthly happiness—to obtain for himself out of life the greatest amount he can of gratification. No doubt they will make confident statements, on the indissoluble connection between happiness and "virtue." Still, according to their speculative theory, the only reasonable ground for practising "virtue" is its conduciveness to the agent's happiness.

Now let us suppose a generation to grow up, profoundly imbued with this principle, carrying it consistently into detail, emancipated from the unconscious influence of (what I must be allowed to call) a more respectable creed. What would be the result? Evidently a man so trained, in calculating for himself the balance of pleasure and pain, will give no credit on the former side to such gratifications as might arise from consciousness of conquest over his lower nature, or from the pursuit of lofty and generous aims. These, I say, will have no place in his list of pleasures: because he will have duly learned his lesson, that there is no "lower" or "higher" nature; that no one aim can be "loftier" than

any other ; that there is nothing more admirable in generosity than in selfishness. On the other hand, neither will he include, under his catalogue of *pains*, any feeling of remorse for evil committed, or any dread of possible punishment in some future life ; for he will look with simple contempt on those doctrines, which are required as the foundation for such pains. His common-sense course will be to make this world as comfortable a place as he can, by bringing every possible prudential calculation to bear on his purpose. Before all things he will keep his digestion in good order. He will keep at arm's length (indeed at many arms' lengths) every disquieting consideration, such, e.g., as might arise from a remembrance of other men's misery, or from a thought of that repulsive spectre which the superstitious call moral obligation.

It is plain that duly to pursue the subject thus opened would carry me indefinitely beyond my limits ;* and I will only therefore make one concluding observation. If the term "virtue" be retained by those of whom I am speaking, it will be used, I suppose, to express any habitual practice, which solidly conduces to the agent's balance of earthly enjoyment. I am confident that,—should this be the recognized terminology, and should the new school be permitted to arrive at its legitimate development,—there is one habit which would be very prominent among its catalogue of "virtues." The habit to which I refer is indulgence in licentiousness—licentiousness practised no doubt prudently, discreetly, calculatingly, but at the same time habitually, perseveringly, and with keen zest.

THE SOUL AND A FUTURE LIFE.

MR. HARRISON considers that the Christian's conception of a future life is "so gross, so sensual, so indolent, so selfish," as to be unworthy of respectful consideration. He must necessarily be intending to speak of this conception in the shape in which we Christians entertain it ; because otherwise his words of reprehension are unmeaning. But our belief as to the future life is intimately and indissolubly bound up with our belief as to the present ; with our belief as to what is the true measure and standard of human action in this world. And I would urge that no part of our doctrine can be rightly apprehended, unless it be viewed in its connection with all the rest. This is a fact which (I think) infidels often drop out of sight, and for that reason fail of meeting Christianity on its really relevant and critical issues.

Of course I consider Catholicity to be exclusively the one authoritative exhibition of revealed Christianity. I will set forth therefore the doctrine to which I would call attention, in that particular form in which Catholic teachers enounce it ; though I am very far indeed from intending to deny,

* I have treated it at somewhat greater length in an article which I contributed to the DUBLIN REVIEW of last January, pp. 15-21.

that there are multitudes of non-Catholic Christians who hold it also. What then, according to Catholics, is the true measure and standard of human action? This is in effect the very first question propounded in our English elementary Catechism. "Why did God make you?" The prescribed answer is, "To know Him, serve Him, and love Him in this world, and to be happy with Him for ever in the next." And S. Ignatius's "Spiritual Exercises"—a work of the very highest authority among us—having laid down the very same "foundation," presently adds, that "we should not wish on our part for health rather than for sickness, wealth rather than poverty, honour rather than ignominy; desiring and choosing those things alone, which are more expedient to us for the end for which we were created." Now what will be the course of a Christian's life in proportion as he is profoundly imbued with such a principle as this, and vigorously aims at putting it into practice? The number of believers, who apply themselves to this task with reasonable consistency, is no doubt comparatively small. But in proportion as any given person does so, he will in the first place be deeply penetrated with a sense of his moral weakness; and (were it for that reason alone) his life will more and more be a life of prayer. Then he will necessarily give his mind with great earnestness and frequency to the consideration, what it is which at this or that period God desires at his hands. On the whole (not to dwell with unnecessary detail on this part of my subject) he will be ever opening his heart to Almighty God; turning to Him for light and strength under emergencies, for comfort under affliction; pondering on His adorable attributes; animated towards Him by intense love and tenderness. Nor need I add how singularly—how beyond words—this personal love of God is promoted and facilitated by the fact, that a Divine Person has assumed human nature, and that God's human acts and words are so largely offered to the loving contemplation of redeemed souls.

In proportion then as a Christian is faithful to his creed, the thought of God becomes the chief joy of his life. "The thought of God," says F. Newman, "and nothing short of it, is the happiness of man; for though there is much besides to serve as subject of knowledge, or motive for action, or instrument of excitement, yet the *affections* require a something more vast and more enduring than anything created. He alone is sufficient for the heart who made it. The contemplation of Him, and nothing but it, is able fully to open and relieve the mind, to unlock, occupy, and fix our affections. We may indeed love things created with great intenseness; but such affection, when disjoined from the love of the Creator, is like a stream running in a narrow channel, impetuous, vehement, turbid. The heart runs out, as it were, only at one door; it is not an expanding of the whole man. Created natures cannot open to us, or elicit, the ten thousand mental senses which belong to us, and through which we really love. None but the presence of our Maker can enter us; for to none besides can the whole heart in all its thoughts and feelings be unlocked and subjected. It is this feeling of simple and absolute confidence and communion, which soothes and satisfies those to whom it is vouchsafed. We know that even our nearest friends enter into us but

partially, and hold intercourse with us only at times; whereas the consciousness of a perfect and enduring presence, and it alone, keeps the heart open. Withdraw the object on which it rests, and it will relapse again into its state of confinement and constraint; and in proportion as it is limited, either to certain seasons or to certain affections, the heart is straitened and distressed."

Now Christians hold, that God's faithful servants will enjoy hereafter unspeakable bliss, through the most intimate imaginable contact with Him Whom they have here so tenderly loved. They will see face to face Him, Whose beauty is dimly and faintly adumbrated by the most exquisitely transporting beauty which can be found on earth; Him Whose adorable perfections they have in this life imperfectly contemplated, and for the fuller apprehension of which they have so earnestly longed here below. I by no means intend to imply, that the hope of this blessedness is the sole or even the chief inducement which leads saintly men to be diligent in serving God. Their immediate reason for doing so is their keen sense of His claim on their allegiance; and, again, the misery which they would experience, through their love of Him, at being guilty of any failure in that allegiance. Still the prospect of that future bliss, which I have so imperfectly sketched, is doubtless found by them at times of invaluable service, in stimulating them to greater effort, and in cheering them under trial and desolation.

Such is the view taken by Christians of life in heaven; and surely any candid infidel will at once admit, that it is profoundly harmonious and consistent with their view of what should be man's life on earth. To say that their anticipation of the future, *as it exists in them*, is gross, sensual, indolent, and selfish, is so manifestly beyond the mark, that I am sure Mr. Harrison will, on reflection, retract his affirmation. Apart, however, from this particular comment, my criticism of Mr. Harrison would be this. He was bound, I maintain, to consider the Christian theory of life *as a whole*; and not to dissociate that part of it which concerns eternity, from that part of it which concerns time.

And now as to the merits of this Christian theory. For my own part I am, of course, profoundly convinced that, as on the one hand it is guaranteed by Revelation, so on the other hand it is that which alone harmonises with the dicta of reason and the facts of experience, so far as it comes into contact with these. Yet I admit that various very plausible objections may be adduced against its truth. Objectors may allege very plausibly, that by the mass of men it cannot be carried into practice; that it disparages most unduly the importance of things secular; that it is fatal to what they account genuine patriotism; that it has always been, and will always be, injurious to the progress of science; above all, that it puts men (as one may express it) on an entirely wrong scent, and leads them to neglect many pursuits which, as being sources of true enjoyment, would largely enhance the pleasurable of life. All this, and much more, may be urged, I think, by antitheists with very great superficial plausibility; and the Christian controversialist is bound on occasion steadily to confront it. But there is one accusation which has been brought against this

Christian theory of life—and that the one mainly (as would seem) felt by Mr. Harrison—which to me seems so obviously destitute of foundation, that I find difficulty in understanding how any infidel can have persuaded himself of its truth: I mean the accusation that this theory is a *selfish* one. There is no need of here attempting a philosophical discussion on the respective claims of what are now called “egoism” and “altruism”: a discussion in itself (no doubt) one of much interest and much importance, and one moreover in which I should be quite prepared (were it necessary) to engage. Here, however, I will appeal, not to philosophy but to history. In the records of the past we find a certain series of men, who stand out from the mass of their brethren, as having pre-eminently concentrated their energy on the love and service of God, and pre-eminently looked away from earthly hopes to the prospect of their future reward. I refer to the Saints of the Church. And it is a plain matter of fact, which no one will attempt to deny, that these very men stand out no less conspicuously from the rest, in their self-sacrificing and (as we ordinary men regard it) astounding labours, in behalf of what they believe to be the highest interests of mankind.

Before I conclude I must not omit a brief comment on one other point, because it is the only one on which I cannot concur with Lord Blachford’s masterly paper. I cannot agree with him, that the doctrine of human immortality fails of being supported by “conclusive reasoning.” I do not, of course, mean that the dogma of the Beatific Vision is discoverable apart from Revelation; but I do account it a truth cognizable with certitude by reason, that the human soul is naturally immortal, and that retribution of one kind or another will be awarded us hereafter, according to what our conduct has been in this our state of probation. Here, however, I must explain myself. When Theists make this statement, sometimes they are thought to allege that human immortality is sufficiently proved by *phenomena*; and sometimes they are thought to allege that it is almost intuitively evident. For myself, however, I make neither of these allegations. I hold that the truth in question is conclusively established by help of certain premisses; and that these premisses themselves can previously be known with absolute certitude, on grounds of reason or experience.

They are such as these: (1) There exists that Personal Being, infinite in all perfections, whom we call God. (2) He has implanted in His rational creatures the sense of right and wrong; the knowledge that a deliberate perpetration of certain acts intrinsically merits penal retribution. (3) Correlatively, He has conferred freedom on the human will; or, in other words, has made acts of the human will exceptions to that law of uniform sequence, which otherwise prevails throughout the phenomenal world.* (4) By the habit of prayer to God we can obtain augmented strength for moral action, in a degree which would have been quite incredible antecedently to experience. (5) Various portions of our divinely

* I shall not, of course, be understood to deny the existence and frequency of miracles.

given nature clearly point to an eternal destiny. (6) The conscious self or ego is entirely heterogeneous to the material world: entirely heterogeneous, therefore, to that palpable body of ours, which is dissolved at the period of death.

I do not think any one will account it extravagant to hold, that the doctrine of human immortality is legitimately deducible from a combination of these and similar truths. The antitheist will of course deny that they *are* truths. Mr. Greg, who has himself "arrived at no conviction" on the subject of immortality, yet says that considerations of the same kind as those which I have enumerated "must be decisive" in favour of immortality "to all to whose spirit's communion with their Father is the most absolute of verities."* Nor have I any reason to think that even Mr. Huxley and Mr. Harrison, if they could concede my premisses, would demur to my conclusion.

* See his letter in the "Spectator" of August 25.

Notices of Books.

De Ecclesiâ et Cathedrâ: an Epistle. By the Hon. COLIN LINDSAY.
Vols. I and II. London: Longmans. 1877.

ANY one that will construct for us "The Book of the Church," must know, when he has gone forward but a little way in his undertaking, how great and perilous, and, for that very reason, how fascinating is the enterprise he has begun. Milton, designing to write of Paradise lost and regained, promises to "justify the ways of God to men." But that he, or another Protestant with gifts more splendid than his, should succeed in the Divine Apology, was not, and never will be, conceivable. To interpret the prophets is itself the task of a prophet; and what is History, what, above all, is the Church, but an unfolding series of decrees made in Heaven, and then shadowed forth in this lower world, taking form and substance, and life, and so coming to their fulfilment? The prologue is traced out in the story of Adam's fall, with its twofold meaning, the true historical, and the experienced personal; and after the Fall comes the Promise that is the one master-key to all the labyrinthine courses of this world's action. Now, to whom has the mind of God been thus far revealed? Not, certainly, to any Greek or Hebrew, nor yet to those that have broken Christian truth into pieces and made a thousand shivers of the first larger fragments. "The history of the world," says Schiller, "is nothing but the judgment of the world." But it is only the Spirit of God in His Church that can pass sentence on the ages, their culture and science and morals, their exalted glories, and their irretrievable disasters. History is a drama, taking in Heaven and Earth; the entanglement and the tragedy of it must be sought in the discord between the secular and the spiritual, not as mere conflicting influences, but as rival policies. From first to last, Holy Scripture would have us gaze fixedly on the light that is gathered to a focus in the City of God, and the darkness that has its throne and its power in the kingdom of the Adversary,—of Satan.

Prophecies are fulfilled but slowly, and often (for the time at least) secretly. The seven seals in the Apocalyptic vision were opened one by one. And if the real events themselves do not hasten, no wonder that it is a matter of centuries to grasp their significance. S. Augustine, indeed, may write his "*De Civitate Dei*" at the moment when Rome is visibly the subject of a superhuman destiny, and is changing its character that it may be fitted for its mediæval and modern conquests. But with what amount of truth can we say that past ages have entered into and thoroughly realized the new encompassing creation, the imperial society and sovereignty that

God has established "in the last days"? The Reformation, as it actually took place, would not have been possible unless Germans, and French, and English had as good as forgotten that there was a divine order to be revered. And if the modern world is to escape the anarchy which threatens it from so many sides, there is only one road open,—the principle of tradition, of historical and even divine continuity, of prophetic anticipation and providential (or, as the case may be, miraculous) accomplishment must win recognition from Europe and mankind. In a word, the will of God, as revealed to us, is that rational order and undying growth shall be possible only where Christendom exists in honour. The Church or Anarchy—these are the plain alternatives.

At such a time, every study that can throw light on the Church's nature, prerogatives, or jurisdiction claims from us a hearty welcome. Nay, it is likely that divine grace will insensibly move Catholics to meditate upon the supernatural Empire in which they are living, and to make its very existence a reason for their loyalty and their faith. Events, too, have given us an insight into the meaning of Scriptural words that were dark to men in earlier times. Moreover, is there not a multitude, growing in number every day, whom the disintegrating power of Protestantism shocks and terrifies as it breathes upon the forms of beauty, the venerable creeds, the solemn and heretofore so steadfast temples of truth, and dissolves them into a dream? For these, and their like, the abiding Church, with its majestic unity of life and thought, its security through the past and its promise of endurance into the future, is the one hope still left. They desire nothing better than to be shown that they may believe. To them we recommend, as furnishing this happy demonstration, Mr. Lindsay's noble and large-hearted volumes.

One of the most famous of Roman theologians is reported to have said, some years ago, that no proper treatise "*De Ecclesiâ*" is extant. Since then, Murray has written, and Scheeben and Hurter, and Cardinal Franzelin, and all have laboured with a success that their loyal earnestness and conscientious learning deserved, at the raising up of the great edifice. So, too, has Mr. Allies in a work that is already making its power and its truthfulness felt in younger minds, and is thus gaining a permanent influence. And Mr. Lindsay, though his conversion does not date more than nine or ten years back, has now published two works, that for theological ability, research, calmness, and balance—the last a rare quality—will take rank with some of the best we know. His former book on the "*Evidences for the Papacy*" was answered, of course, by many amongst the friends who had esteemed him when president of the English Church Union; but it is as much a matter of course to say that the book remains unanswerable. Mr. Lindsay rejoins in the first of his new volumes; we think there can be no doubt upon which side victory has pronounced. This is the more easy to perceive, because of the frank and natural courtesy that enables Mr. Lindsay to let the truth speak for itself. He is not an advocate, but an exponent; and, therefore, not eager to make himself supreme at any cost, but only to attain perfect clearness in his expression as in his thought. He has done what he proposed

to do ; to our judgment, he has done it admirably. And though the two volumes run to more than a thousand pages, and there is a third yet to come—we hope it may not be long delayed—our readers will find them, on the whole, agreeable in manner, fluent, and, we may even venture to say, light. But we would choose for exceptional praise, from every point of view, the second half of the first volume and the first half of the second. We mean, in fact, the chapters on the Church's Unity and on the *charismata* or divine gifts that follow upon Unity.

Here will be found the justification of what we said above, that history shows us Protestantism and the Church confronted as the principle of confusion and analysis leading to anarchy, with the principle of a divine and life-giving order. In modern language, the Catholic Church proves her right to exist and expand, by virtue of this, that she is the heir of all the ages, of the promises made at the beginning, of the four thousand years' preparation, of the Grecian philosophy, of the Roman jurisprudence, of the Hebrew morality made perfect through Christ. Mr. Lindsay has laid hold of a principle that he never lets go, and that may be summed in the words of Scripture, "The gifts of God are without repentance." This is a deep truth, immeasurable in its consequences and its implications : and what is very remarkable, the whole modern world has accepted it under the name of the principle of continuity. Have we here some point of confluence, of lawful and possible reconciliation, by-and-by, between Science and Faith ? That we cannot tell ; neither does Mr. Lindsay busy himself so much with the philosophical explanation of continuity (though he touches upon it, and not without effect), as with its force and relevance in history. It is true that he does not argue ; he elucidates, and that is far better ; but we may bring out the character of the book by saying that it proves Catholicism as moderns prove the wave theory of light. Given the undulations of an elastic medium pervading space, and the laws of light are thence deducible : assume any other theory, and our knowledge that instant lapses from Science into mere haphazard empiricism. So too, given the Church, God's ways are made plain to us ; mankind has been led, according to a design that we see to be worthy of the merciful Creator ; the Old and the New Testaments become intelligible and full of light ; the poets and the philosophers are as prophets among the heathen ; God is good, and man, though still a creature, is free. But if the Church must be discarded as an unscientific delusion, as a fact that has got wedged into history somehow, and if not lawless, is still at first sight irregular, itself needing a reason, and not the reason of all else that is divine in this world, then there is no such thing as a principle of continuity, and what we call history is mere disorder. Now, an average Protestant ought to be convinced by this argument, for he confesses himself to be incapable of framing any theory whatever to explain the course of things since Christ. And we do not believe there is a Pantheistic view of the past and present that will bear to be closely looked into.

Mr. Lindsay has written with such unusual tenacity of purpose—unusual in these times of fitful interrupted thought—and has taken so much care to recapitulate the points and show their connection, that to

read his last fifty pages is to view his entire course at a glance. But that is not the same thing with accompanying him along his way, and we do not fear to assert that every chapter is worth studying on its own account. The principles that he regards as fundamental in the divine governance of the world, and as steadfast facts in history, are called by him the principles of Unity, of Monarchy, of the Original, of Succession, of Infallibility, and of the Temporal Power. Each one of them is traced up to its origin in Scripture, and exhibited in its various stages of development through the times of the Jewish and of the Christian dispensation. The language employed, not so much in the way of proof or argument, but as a felicitous rendering of these divine truths, is taken from the Fathers. We need hardly say that Mr. Lindsay has studied the great Christian classics with long-enduring zeal. He knows them well, makes most apposite and beautiful quotations from them, and is plainly in love with S. Chrysostom and S. Augustine; but he never dreams of pitting an individual Father against the Church which has received a divine commission to teach. He is not patristic in the Anglican sense, but a Catholic without qualification. The Fathers have let him into their secret of handling Scripture; and we can remember few essays which have pleased us better in that line than Mr. Lindsay's comments on the Epistle to the Romans, on the Apocalypse, on some parts of Ezechiel, and especially on the words addressed by the Lord to S. Peter. The cumulative illustrations brought to bear on these passages give us, as it were, the whole strength of the sea in a single wave. We do not understand with what conscience the High Anglicans can overlook so clear a challenge, or rather, so absolutely demonstrative an argument. Take them on the sense of Scripture, they are beaten; take them on the voice of tradition, they fare no better: where is the standing-ground left them? Perhaps it is true, as a convert clergyman once said to us, that the later generation of Anglicans prefer to read the religious newspapers, or if of a higher tone, to institute sisterhoods; but for nothing in the world will consent to study the Fathers. Anyhow, we may safely predict that they will not attempt to meet Mr. Lindsay in direct argument.

We have not the space to make extracts, and will beg our readers to peruse Mr. Lindsay's preface and plan of his book for themselves. They will find the plan exquisitely clear, marked by that symmetry which is an instinct in the well-trained theologian. But we do not guarantee beforehand that all will agree with some incidental statements occurring here and there. Quite the largest part of the book is unimpeachable theology, accepted and taught in all the Catholic schools. And where matters are open to debate Mr. Lindsay has spoken with prudence and a charming candour. If we may point out what seem to us to be shortcomings, we would say, for instance, that the style is upon occasion too gentlemanly; by which reproachful epithet we think it right to distinguish a certain lack of vigour, an occasional slackness of tone, and a too great diffuseness, owing, perhaps, to the courtesy that would smooth down what is harsh, or even smooth it away. The writing may yet gain by more concentration, and a more trenchant manner.

Then, as to points of opinion, some of the things said are fanciful, and

that at the beginning, where Protestant readers are likely to form their judgment upon the book. In so large a subject fancy and conjecture cannot be kept out, but we could wish the fancies were relegated from the text into the notes. Mr. Lindsay reminds us now and then of a great seventeenth-century divine who has never had to endure the discipline of nineteenth-century criticism. For example, he constantly employs the mystical or parabolic interpretation of Scripture, and argues from it with plausible ingenuity. But it would have served his purpose and ours very much had he spent a few pages on showing the reasonableness of allowing such a sense of Scripture texts. It can never enough be borne in mind that the real difficulties which prevent Anglicans from coming into the Church are not so much difficulties peculiar to them as a general inclination to close with the sceptical and unconsciously empirical philosophy. And we have to prove, first of all, that the Catholic Church respects common sense, and then to pass upward to that which common sense can neither affirm nor deny. Mr. Lindsay, we know, has not written for infidels; but infidelity is the prevailing epidemic, and its presence ought rather to be always taken for granted than always left out of the question. Whatever is written to meet instant wants must reckon with the spirit of the age.

Mr. Lindsay has, in this department of theology, suggested an interesting subject of inquiry; one, we think, that is likely to draw attention to itself as time goes on. We know how to formulate the doctrine of S. Peter's prerogatives, because the Church has told us what we are to say, and, in the Vatican decrees, has suggested to us the one scientific method to be here observed. But what was the exact relation of any other Apostle, taken singly, to the first Vicar of our Lord? Each and all were to be confirmed by S. Peter: true; but in what sense and on what condition did each by himself apprehend and infallibly declare the entire revelation? Perhaps some ambiguity lurks in the question. Mr. Lindsay inclines to think that the Apostles were infallible only as a College of which S. Peter was the divinely-appointed Chief, and therefore singly they would be liable to err. But this view has such a weight of authority and of reason against it, and is so completely without support, that it cannot be held even for a moment. The contrary doctrine which asserts their individual infallibility has ever been taught by the Church. F. Palmieri has gone into the matter with some care in his recent valuable treatise, "*De Romano Pontifice*." He would explain the relations of S. Peter and the Apostles, by insisting that each was infallible, but would take as a key the passage in S. Optatus (to which parallel passages may be found in Cyprian and Augustine) on the *Una Cathedra*. This is the course to be adopted. But we do not deny that the whole matter requires more complete handling, and would repay us the trouble.

The treatise, then, which we have thus briefly noticed may be looked upon as a real and very worthy addition to our theology in English. On many points it approaches very closely to perfection; throughout it is careful, patient, and learned. Its loyalty to Holy Church could not be surpassed; and it is, in the best sense of the word, theological. This we

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account very high praise, but to withhold or lessen it would be to do Mr. Lindsay an injustice. We beg leave to congratulate him on having got so far in his undertaking, and to express our hope that he may complete it in the same winning and effective way in which he has written these volumes.

The Via Media of the Anglican Church. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D.D.
Vol. II. London : Pickering.

THIS second volume will be intensely interesting to those who were personally cognizant in its various circumstances of the great Oxford revival, inaugurated by F. Newman, and led by him to so triumphant an issue. To such persons almost every page will be suggestive of this or that keenly interesting incident; and will furnish fresh illustration of the noble simplicity and conscientiousness of purpose, which distinguished F. Newman—as during all his life—so throughout that eventful period.

But we suspect that the book will be rather dull reading to those Catholics who were never mixed up in the movement; because they will be unable to read between the lines, and discern the various momenta which were then so actively agitating Mr. Newman's mind. In fact, we think it is only the fourth paper—"on the mode of conducting the controversy with Rome"—which will greatly interest them. This paper, however, is well worth the study of every Catholic, and will show how singularly pure and elevated was Mr. Newman's controversial method; how carefully he abstained from mere vague and random declamation; how desirous he was of doing fullest justice to all which could be said in his opponents' favour. The notes appended to this new edition, though brief, are most forcible. And we will here refer to two in particular, because they have a bearing far wider than is needed by the actual text to which they are appended.

F. Newman observes (p. 112), that "there is a large private judgment allowed to individual minds in the Church of Rome" on devotion to Saints; "and that very fact," he adds, "leads humble and charitable minds, while they profit by the toleration allowed to themselves, not to censure those who avail themselves of it for a different tone of religious sentiment." Our own "tone of sentiment" on the subject would undoubtedly be different from that with which F. Newman has occasionally seemed to show himself more in sympathy. We think it very far more important than some Catholics think it,—in order to the acquisition of a truly mortified and interior spirit,—that Christians be carefully trained to vent their religious emotions, not on the Infinite only, but also on finite objects of veneration and supplication. And, on the other hand, we are very sceptical as to the supposition, that any serious practical evils are at all likely to result with the mass of men from this habit. Mr. Newman objected (p. 111), that the Roman Church "has not felt sensitively on the subject of this particular evil." F. Newman meets this objection by

applying to it the principles set forth in his Preface to vol. i.; but our own reply would rather be that there *is* no prevalent serious evil, on which she *need* be sensitive. Still we agree most heartily with F. Newman, that he has to the full as much right to his opinion on these matters as we to ours.

Nor, of course, do we deny that there have been *individual* excesses. Our readers may remember, e.g., some most eccentric statements quoted by Dr. Pusey from a young writer, named Oswald; and they may remember also, how speedily Mr. Rhodes discovered that that writer's work had been placed on the Index. F. Newman refers (p. 121) to another excess, which has resulted from the statement, so common among Catholics, that (as Harding expresses it) "Mary has a certain right to *command* her Son." This statement, as commonly used by Catholic devotional writers, implies no unsound doctrine. F. Newman makes the obvious reference to Luke ii. 51. And take the parallel case of an absolute monarch, whose mother still lives and is fondly loved by him. His assent to her just petitions will not altogether resemble in kind his assent to other suppliants; he will regard her with what may be called a certain filial deference; and she may be said, in a figurative sense, to exercise over him a certain maternal authority. It is certain that this is all which is commonly meant by the expression. In July, 1866 (p. 187), we drew attention to S. Alphonsus's remark, that the sense of such words is so universally understood among Catholics to be merely figurative, that no possible danger of misconception is incurred by using them. Yet individuals *have* perversely gone beyond reasonable bounds. F. Newman seasonably cites a decree of Inquisition, dated so lately as Feb. 28, 1875, censuring those who "ascribe power to her, as issuing from her divine maternity, beyond its due limits"; and adding that "it cannot be piously affirmed" in any literal sense of the words "that she exercises command over Him."

We will take this opportunity to speak of a somewhat kindred matter. In our notice of F. Newman's former volume (Oct. 1877, p. 514), we followed the author in saying, that the woman who touched the hem of our Lord's garment had real superstition mixed up with her faith, because she deliberately expected that "virtue" might "go out" of Him without His knowing it. A most highly-respected correspondent protests against this allegation; and we cannot but feel that he has the best of the argument. These are his words:—

"The woman's faith in our Lord's Divine Person was manifestly imperfect, as she expected to be cured without His knowing it: which only makes our Lord's commendation of her faith the more striking, with reference to the question in dispute. Suppose it had been S. Peter, instead of our blessed Lord: would it have been superstition for a sick person to have expected to have obtained a cure, by secretly touching the hem of his garment? Does not, in other words, Almighty God vouchsafe miracles through the instrumentality of the relics of the Saints and for the sake of their (the Saints') merits, without any active intervention of the Saints themselves, and quite possibly without their knowledge? Must we suppose that S. Paul, for instance, was cognizant of all the miracles which were wrought by the 'handkerchiefs and aprons' which 'were brought from

his body'? (Acts xix). They are spoken of as being 'more than common miracles'; and yet they were in themselves the ordinary miracles of 'curing diseases' and casting out of evil spirits. May not the '*more than common*' refer to this very fact, that they were wrought without the immediate action and knowledge of the Apostle? At all events, has it not always been the practice of pious Catholics to expect graces from the devout use of relics, without any special invocation of the Saint to whom they belonged? Expecting the grace or favour from God through the merits of the Saint indeed, but without any advertence to the fact of the Saint knowing or not knowing anything about the matter."

On the Latin Vulgate as the Authentic Version of the Church. By the Rev. THOMAS G. LAW, of the Oratory. (From the Douay Bible, with Notes, &c. Revised by Canon OAKELEY and F. LAW. London: Virtue & Co. 1877.)

IT is not common to meet within a narrow compass such abundant and valuable information as the reader will find in the essay we notice here. It is evidently the result of long and conscientious labours; and, besides making the reader well acquainted with the matter of which it treats, is calculated to enable him to face other difficulties on the same subject, and resolve them by the application of the principles and method laid down in this dissertation.

After some well-grounded remarks on the difficulty of faithfully translating in general, the learned author points out the special difficulties attending translations of the Holy Scripture. The larger part of the Old Testament was written in Hebrew, which had already become a dead language, understood by only a few of the most learned Jews, before a single book of the Old Testament had been translated into any other tongue. Besides, the vowel signs are the work of Jewish scribes and doctors who lived many centuries after Christ. One must add to this the comparatively recent date of the oldest manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible in existence, the extreme scantiness of the materials available to the critic for deciding upon the original text, the peculiar genius of the Hebrew language, and the small remains of its literature which have come down to us. The Greek version of the Septuagint, the first translation made of the Old Testament, considerably differs from the present Hebrew text, not merely in single words and sentences, but in the arrangement of whole chapters and books, the essential points of important prophecies, as well as the entire system of chronology. . . . For instance, in the single book of Jeremias, whole passages, besides many single verses, are omitted in the Septuagint; so that altogether about 2,700 words are wanting in the Greek, which are found in the Hebrew.

In the case of the New Testament, apart from the circumstance that it is written, as it were, in a Greek dialect of its own, needing no little linguistic skill, as well as theological science, for its interpretation,—the earliest copies which have come down to us are of the fourth century, and

literally swarm with the mistakes of transcribers. Out of some 50,000 variations, through which the critical editor has to pick his way, there are not a few which concern important facts of history, questions of harmonizing the Gospels, and even dogmatical teaching. Striking examples of this kind are given by F. Law at pp. 12, 18. In fact, the old versions, both of the Old and New Testament, and the writings of the Fathers show that, even in the early ages of the Church, omissions, interpolations, and a perplexing variety of readings disfigured the current biblical texts.

"Now, it may be evident to a Catholic," says F. Law, "that notwithstanding the manifold errors which may have crept into particular copies, the substance of the Written Word could never be lost to the Church. It may be assumed that the Holy Spirit, whose office is to preserve the purity of tradition and to guide the Church in her interpretation of Scripture, could not fail to guard the sacred books themselves against essential corruption. Yet, if the autographs of the inspired writers are no longer accessible, and the extant copies of the original texts differ among themselves, and if some of them may contain false and dangerous interpretations, how are we to be certain, in the case of any one Bible before us, that we possess a faithful copy of the Divine Word, which is the source of true doctrine? This is the question which the Council of Trent set itself to answer in the year 1545" (p. 14).

After some remarks on the translations and editions of the Bible, brought forth by the Reformation and calculated to increase the confusion, concluded by reference to a striking avowal of Luther himself, the learned author of the dissertation gives a short but careful account of the discussions which took place at Trent in preparation for the decree concerning the authenticity of the Latin Vulgate. It is highly satisfactory for a Catholic to remark that objections and difficulties advanced every day by superficial writers had been foreseen and triumphantly answered by the Fathers of the Council, and that only a false interpretation of the Decree can lay it open to any serious charge. Let us, on this most important point, hear F. Law himself:—

"The Council," he says, "refrained from any mention of the original texts. The Vulgate is not once brought in comparison with them. To determine the state of those texts, or the exact philological relation of the Vulgate to them is a matter left to the investigation of private scholars. When the Church declares that *the Vulgate is an AUTHENTIC Latin edition of the Bible*, she declares that from this version we may learn, as from a certain and infallible source, all the doctrines and commandments of God, which He has been pleased to reveal through the sacred writings. *It is substantially identical with the original for all such purposes as the Bible was intended to fulfil.* The Church does not pronounce on the philological exactness of the book, but on its *real* value. . . . Just as if (to use an example given by Bishop Haneberg) the Emperor of Austria were to publish a code of laws in the German language, and at the same time several private translations were to appear in Hungary, some of which were more literally faithful, and others more free, the Emperor might declare the more free version to be the only legitimate and authentic organ of his legislation in Hungary. And further, the same code of laws might have many authentic translations for the use of various countries, differing one from another in certain details,

and yet the authenticity of the one would not exclude that of the other. So, in like manner, the Church's declaration that the Vulgate is authentic need not exclude the *intrinsic* authenticity of the Septuagint, or the Syriac Peschito, still less of the original texts. But since this definition of the Church has been made, we have a certainty which we cannot have in the case of any other editions, that not only is there no error whatsoever in the Vulgate regarding matters of faith and morals, but that the whole of the written revelation of God is therein contained" (pp. 20, 21).

A great task was now laid on the Pope,—that of the publication of a corrected edition of the Vulgate.

"The researches of the two learned Barnabites, Ungarelli and Vercellone," says F. Law, "have recently brought to light fresh evidence, if fresh were needed, of how faithfully and perseveringly the Roman Pontiffs laboured to carry out the wishes of the Council. These labours were indeed far greater than were at first expected. . . . The studies hopefully commenced in 1546, were to continue, with some slight interruption, for forty years before the anxiously-expected official text was ready to see the light. . . . This task was but just finished when Gregory XIV. died, October, 1591, and the glory of finally carrying out the Tridentine decree, and giving to the Church the official copy of the authentic Vulgate, was reserved for the Pontificate of Clement VIII., 1592" (pp. 24, 29).

How far, as it was to be expected, prejudices of sect succeeded in biasing the judgment of critics on the value of this edition, is plainly shown by the opposite opinions of Protestant scholars, and especially by the history of the printed Greek text of the New Testament as opposed to the readings adopted in the official edition of the Vulgate. There is enough in this history to make one distrust for ever bare assertions, even of the most celebrated biblical scholars, until they are supported by unquestionable evidence. After three centuries, however, the truth is now recognized, which was "long ago perceived by Roman scholars, that the Vulgate possesses great critical value in correcting the originals themselves. . . . No [ancient] edition of any kind, including the Septuagint itself, can now compete with that of S. Jerome as a critical representative of the original Hebrew text" (pp. 30, 31).

As for the New Testament, "it may be confidently affirmed, that although the Vulgate may be here and there capable of correction, the Greek text, which lies at its basis, rests upon better evidence than that of any critical edition yet produced. A rapid survey of the origin of the Vulgate and the labours of S. Jerome in its revision, which have been seriously misunderstood, even by very learned men, will make this plainer" (p. 37).

The following abstract of this part of F. Law's dissertation will not prove without interest to our readers:—

"The name *Vulgate* was originally applied to the edition of the Septuagint in common use, *κοινή εκδοσις*, and from that passed to the Latin translation of the Septuagint, and finally, to the Latin Bible as a whole. This ancient Latin Bible, as it existed before S. Jerome's time, now goes by the name of the *Itala*. The greater part of the Old Testament has been entirely superseded by the new version from the Hebrew, made by S.

Jerome, but the New Testament still substantially remains in the present Vulgate, which is, in fact, the Itala carefully edited by S. Jerome.

"The origin of this old Latin version is lost in obscurity. Its author, its native country, its date, are all unknown. . . . Its extreme literalness makes it almost a photograph of the original. . . . In course of time, however, this venerable version suffered the usual fate of books often copied, and lost much of its purity and its unity. . . . By the end of the fourth century there was no uniformity in the Bibles, and complaints were made that there were almost as many standards as there were copies (*tot enim sunt exemplaria pene quot codices*). . . . This want of uniformity was felt to be a great evil by the Roman See, and the Pope, S. Damasus, in the year 382, determined to remedy it. 'It happened providentially,' says Canon Lightfoot, 'that at the very moment when the need was felt, the right man was forthcoming. In the first fifteen centuries of her existence the Western Church produced no biblical scholar who could compare with S. Jerome in competence for so great a task.'"

We must now refer the reader to the dissertation itself, concerning the special qualifications of S. Jerome for the great task laid upon him by the Pope, and the way in which the work was carried on in the face of much opposition. The account is very instructive, and not without parallel with the way in which other great works were carried on in the Church.

It is a fact generally admitted, that he "proceeded on the soundest principles," and "produced the best and noblest work of the kind of which antiquity can boast." "It made its way in the Church by sheer force of its intrinsic worth" (p. 51).

In conclusion F. Law gives an interesting account of the Douay version, perhaps the most important of all translations made from the Vulgate since the Council of Trent, and one of the first fruits of the English Seminary founded at Douay under the direction of Cardinal Allen in 1568. The history of this version is particularly interesting as connected with that of the English Catholics in the time of persecution.

Such is, in the main lines, the little but remarkable sketch of F. Law, which, as it is now published, forms part of the introductory matter prefixed to the new edition of Haydock's Bible. If we may be allowed to express a wish, it would be that this dissertation should be reprinted and published in a more handy form. By making some divisions in it according to the contents, and adding a list of the works where the reader could find further information on the topics discussed, a manual of great utility would be offered to biblical students.

Pius IX. and the Revolution: a Pastoral Letter to the Clergy and Laity of the Diocese of Sydney. By ROGER BEDE, Archbishop of Sydney. Sydney: E. F. Flanagan. 1877.

THE key-note of this admirable Pastoral lies in the words of the Holy Father, which are here quoted from the Allocution regarding the proposed clerical Abuses Bill:—"We would wish that our voice might reach at one and the same time all the pastors, even the most distant of

the Catholic Church, to invite them to make known to the faithful committed to their care the ever-increasing perils of our difficult situation. . . . We exhort them to forewarn their flocks against the base and hypocritical insinuations of those who with insidious arts attempt to misrepresent our true and real situation, either by concealing the gravity of it or by extolling its liberty and independence. Our whole situation is epitomized in these words: The Church is persecuted in Italy, and the Vicar of Jesus Christ is neither free nor independent in the exercise of his supreme power." With the purpose of carrying out the desire of the Holy Father, the Archbishop of Sydney gives a vigorous outline of the wrongs inflicted upon the Church by her enemies in Italy; and, moreover, shows how Pius IX. has during his pontificate opposed with "Divine blows worthy of his greatness" the evils which threaten society. These evils he counts as Libertinage, which was confronted by the definition of the Immaculate Conception; Materialism, answered by the solemn canonization of the crowd of martyrs of Japan, who had shed their blood in defence of the unseen; Intellectual Pride, opposed by the publication of the Syllabus; and Rebellion against Authority, to which a marked contrast was shown in the assembling at the Vatican Council of a multitude from the ends of the earth all subject to one Head. This Pastoral Letter is in itself consoling evidence of the unity of the Church; bearing witness that not only in those countries that may be said to lie close under the voice of Rome, but far away under the southern cross there is the same spirit of faithful devotion spread everywhere among the children of one Father.

A Visit to the Roman Catacombs. By the Rev. J. SPENCER NORTH-
COTE, D.D. London: Burns & Oates. 1877.

A POPULAR work on the ever-interesting subject of the Catacombs ought to receive a ready welcome, especially when it comes from an author who has made that subject in England peculiarly his own, and whose study of the Roman Catacombs, as we are told in the preface, began more than thirty years ago. The chapters of the book which justify the title best are the last four, describing the cemetery of S. Callixtus as it would be seen by a visitor. But this is only something like a quarter of the book. The first three-fourths are devoted to giving an accurate idea of the Catacombs in general, the manner in which they were constructed, their appearance and use, their history, their artistic adornments, and such other information as would tend to give an ordinary reader a clear impression of the subject, all details and views being brought up to date by being drawn from De Rossi's volumes. Thus in a small compass, and with a clear, bright style, which makes every page interesting, a book has been produced which can give a fund of information to those for whom the larger volume by the same author would be too deep or too lengthened reading. In the preface it is stated that the object in view was to supply

the need of a short manual, "a safe guide to those who only desire to become acquainted with the leading features of the subject, according to the present condition of our knowledge of it." These pages, he adds, "do not pretend to give a complete account either of the past history or present condition of the Catacombs, but merely a correct outline of the whole, so that those who would pursue the study further shall at least have nothing to unlearn."

In the first chapter there is a brief refutation of the old idea that the Catacombs were quarries or sandpits, the plan of sandpits being contrasted with that of part of the Catacomb of S. Agnes, to show their radical difference of construction. Then, in explanation of the difficult question, How was it that the first Christians were able, without the interference of the government, to construct such extensive works? the Roman laws as to burial, and what might be called burial societies, are shown to have been peculiarly favourable, the sepulture of the dead being respected, whether pagan or Christian, while the custom of the assembling of relatives and dependents to do honour to the memory of the dead sanctioned the gathering together of the Christians, when their real object was worship or counsel in times of persecution? In the subsequent chapters their history is briefly told; their gradual falling into disrepair in later centuries; how the passages were stopped, and the chambers filled with "the accumulated rubbish of ages." Such was their state when the systematic work of reclaiming them from ruin was begun, at the end of the sixteenth century, by Antonio Bosio, the Columbus of the new world of subterranean Rome. After many years of labour, he died before he could complete and publish the result of his work. Then began excavations in various places, tending rather to confusion than to order. The year 1740 closes this period of individual and comparatively fruitless exertion; the interest that had revived for a time seemed to have died out, and "then followed another hundred years, during the greater part of which the Catacombs remained almost in the same obscurity in which they had been buried for so many ages before Bosio was born." Then the work recommenced, mainly through the influence of Father Marchi, S.J. He was appointed *custode* of the Catacombs, and began to publish a work on early Christian art. But after the appearance of the first volume it ceased, owing partly to new discoveries having shown him its imperfection, and partly to the troubles of the time (about 1840), which affected the Society. But a pupil of his took up the work, which had been too great for his failing strength. This new labourer in the Catacombs was destined to have his name associated with them as no other name can be. It was the Chevalier de Rossi, whose ardour, conscientious accuracy, and persevering devotedness to the study he adopted, have done more than the labours of all who went before him to send light into the darkness of the Catacombs, and to read from them the history of our fathers in the faith long ages ago.

The chapter on the painting and sculpture of the Catacombs forms in itself quite a little popular treatise, and it is made still more valuable by a number of illustrations aptly chosen. The two chief facts to be drawn from it are, that pictures were used in the places of divine worship from

the beginning, and did not come gradually into use in later years, brought, as it were, by stealth into the church, in dread lest they might be misused as the pagans used their idols. De Rossi's words are quoted on this subject as the words of one who argues only from facts, and those the facts that his own eyes have seen.

"I can only say," he wrote, "that the universal use of pictures throughout the subterranean cemeteries, and the richness, the variety, and the freedom of the more ancient types, when contrasted with the cycle of painting which I see becoming more stiff in manner and poorer in conception towards the end of the third century—these things demonstrate the impossibility of accepting the hypothesis of those who affirm that the use of pictures was introduced little by little—on the sly, as it were—and in opposition to the practice of the primitive Church."

The second fact that appears from this brief summary of the art discoveries in the Catacombs, is that, as De Rossi states, the subjects painted became "more stiff in manner and poorer in conception towards the end of the third century," so that there is more merit to be found in the works of its beginning and of the end of the second. Thus art rather declined than advanced, and not only did pictures illustrate religion at its beginning, but, instead of coming as if by stealth, they appeared with a "richness, variety, and freedom," which fell away as time advanced towards the fourth century. In the short chapter on inscriptions, their character is traced changing from century to century. In the earliest times Christians wrote only the name, with perhaps such a brief word of distinction as *filius dulcissimo*, or *dulcissimus parentibus*. Then came the anchor of hope, telling of belief in a future life, and at once dividing those sealed with that emblem from the pagans whose epitaphs showed no sign that all had not ended when the ashes mouldered away. Next, words of Christian faith and love appeared, those beautiful, well-known inscriptions in which "the dead speak," breathing into our later days the fragrance of the early time when all had but one heart.—*Mayest thou live in the Lord and pray for us.—Dionysius, an innocent child, lies here with the saints: and remember us, too, in your holy prayers, both me who engraved and me who wrote.* Before the end of the third century the record of the day of burial began to appear. In the time of Constantine the original simplicity of the epitaphs was unfortunately vanishing. As one author states here, "complimentary phrases as to the goodness, wisdom, innocence, and holiness of the deceased came into fashion," these modes of expression being borrowed from the outer world, and marring the beauty and simplicity that was the Christian habit of thought in earlier times. This ends the first part, and the second, which is so much shorter, is a graphic description of a visit to the Catacomb of S. Callixtus, where we tread our way slowly through passage and chamber, get an excellent black-and-white view of the crypt of S. Cecilia on the way, and hear the story of the recovery of the relics of that virgin bride of ancient Rome. Altogether this makes a most welcome and valuable book, which every one ought to read who desires, in a very short time and in a very pleasant manner, to receive as good and accurate an idea of the Catacombs and

their history as can be given by a facile pen in a brief space. The proceeds of the sale of the book will be sent to the Commendatore de Rossi "to promote the work of excavation, which languishes for want of funds. At more than one spot in the Catacombs, the Commission of Sacred Archaeology, of which De Rossi is secretary, has the strongest reason for believing in the existence of historic monuments of great value, and it is most desirable that these monuments should be recovered whilst we have amongst us so competent an interpreter of them."

The Written Word: or, Considerations on the Sacred Scriptures. By WILLIAM HUMPHREY, Priest of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates. 1877.

WE think that we can understand the reasons underlying the appearance of this learnedly written volume. It is the result of the impression made by Cardinal Franzelin's treatise, *De Divina Traditione et Scriptura*, on an appreciative mind, which desires to extend the benefit far wider than itself. All whose life is of the studious kind, can recall the exceptional results of some few books on their intellectual acquirements or tendencies. Sometimes a single treatise has decided our opinion on open questions, or given a predominant impulse to a special line of study, or so cleared and expanded our view of a particular subject, that, although no new one to us, it seemed to be really understood for the first time. For many reasons we think that very few works which have appeared in the last twenty years have left so lasting an impression, and so thoroughly settled some controverted theological points, as the treatise we have named. Its chief characteristics are well known, we presume, to theological readers. The theories are so complete, look so plain, hang together so admirably in all their parts, and are so satisfactorily applicable to all difficulties, that a powerful intrinsic argument is advanced in their simple statement. Besides, there is no modern theologian that has built up his arguments by such careful syntheses, as Cardinal Franzelin has done; and even when the copious erudition with which he establishes his principles may have been forgotten, the principles themselves, clear and stable as axioms, live in the mind. We point to the most important question in that part of the treatise given by Father Humphrey ("The Idea of the Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures, as contained in and derived from the idea of their Divine Authorship") as an example of Cardinal Franzelin's unrivalled power in explaining an obscure question. The stereotyped method of treating the point, was the arrangement of the views of theologians in order from the one extreme, a divine dictation *ad apices* of the Written Word, to the other extreme, which viewed inspiration as being little more than a divine *imprimatur*. Usually the extreme views were summarily rejected, and some one of the intermediate adopted for reasons not easily understood. It is not easy to forget the manifold perplexities of the question. The reasons for tending towards

what was called *inspiratio rigidior*, were manifestly strong, but the tendency was accompanied by difficulties of a most serious kind; while a leaning to the opposite extreme (*inspiratio liberalior*) seemed to be a departure from the instinct of faith. Cardinal Franzelin bases his exposition on a dogmatic formula, *God is the Author of the Sacred Scripture*; and from this principle develops the idea of Inspiration as adequately as the most reverent upholders of it can desire, and yet, with an elasticity that will reach the difficulties arising in its application to the various books or parts of the Sacred Scriptures. The success of his method, we judge, consists in his apprehension of the two agents, the Divine and human; above all in the fact, that the human, though an instrument, does not lose its characteristics, intelligence and freedom, in being made the instrument of a divine operation. We need hardly point out the harmony of the method with ideas familiar to us in questions of grace. But we must allow Father Humphrey to state the point more ably:—

“This supernatural operation of God is called *His Inspiration*, using that term in its active sense; in its passive sense, or, as *their* inspiration, it belongs to the writers of the Sacred Scriptures.

“That the Catholic Church holds God to be the Author of the Sacred Scriptures is plain from the decree of the Council of Florence, which defines that the Holy Roman Church most firmly believes, professes, and proclaims, that the one true God . . . is the *Author of the Old and the New Testament*,—that is, of the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospel,—since, *by the inspiration of the same Holy Ghost*, the holy men of both Testaments spoke.

“This decree of the Council of Florence is embodied also among the decrees of the Council of Trent. It is repeated in almost the same words. The Council declares that it receives and venerates all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament, since the one God is *the Author of both*.

“Further, the Council of the Vatican . . . declares that the Church holds as sacred and canonical all the books of the Old and New Testaments, inasmuch as being *written by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost*, they have *God for their Author*.

“It is evident, then, that the proposition, *God is the Author of the Sacred Scriptures*, is a dogmatic formula of the Catholic Church” (p. 23).

Passing over the proofs of the revealed truth, which are given at length from the Sacred Scriptures and from tradition, we come to the analysis of it. In the first place we must distinguish in the Sacred Scriptures, as in other documents, between the ideas or *sense*, and the words or *signs*, in which the sense is expressed. Again—the distinction is not quite the same as the preceding,—we must distinguish between what is *formal*, that is essential to the idea of Divine Authorship, and what is simply the *matter*, in itself capable of different forms, but determined in this case to a divine work. With those distinctions the author proceeds:—

“What we have called the *sense*, as opposed to the words or signs which express it, or what in such books as are the Sacred Scriptures, we may call the *truths* conveyed, as distinguished from the *language* in which they are clothed and whereby they are conveyed, constitutes the *formal* of the book, while the *signs* or words, including their order, and the language along with its style and method, belong to the *matter* of the book.

"We must, however, remember, that . . . even they—the signs or words—must always be at least adequately adapted to express the sense or truths intended. Otherwise the *formal* of the book could not be preserved" (p. 31).

We cannot give at length the careful development of the preceding principles, as found in the author; but the two following passages are the results:—

"Taking revelation, not in the strict sense but in a not uncommon sense, as the proposition of truths by God Himself, then certainly every inspiration, in order to the writing of Sacred Scripture, was a revelation, first made interiorly in the mind of the inspired writer, and then, by means of his writing, proposed as the Word of God to others; thus constituting an object of faith both for the inspired writer himself, and for every one to whom his work should be sufficiently proposed as inspired truth" (p. 35).

"Since God, by His inspiration of the *sense* of the Sacred Scriptures, so acts on the inspired writer in order to his writing that the document written by him should infallibly, in virtue of that divine operation, really and truly contain the sense divinely intended, it follows that in that inspiration is included such a divine operation as that the writer should not only actually choose, but that he should *infallibly choose* such *signs*, that is, such words, phrases, expressions, or formulas, as are apt and adequate truly to express the sense divinely intended, or, in other words, the truths which God wills thus to communicate" * (p. 35).

The idea of inspiration as developed by Cardinal Franzelin, is of the highest kind, and yet it easily explains, or admits explanation of, the difficulties which appear on the surface of the "Written Word," "manifest diversity of style and diction" (p. 41), verbal differences in the records of "not only the same events but also the same sayings," and the use of existing documents (p. 42). For the inspired instruments were *human* beings, and co-operated therefore in a human way, that is, intelligently and freely, with the Divine Author, and were not as the material tool in a workman's hand. The reader will be thankful for the author's thoughtful illustration of the point:—

"This may be explained and illustrated from the manner of God's ordinary dealings in the order of His grace. . . . By grace He elevates and endows the human soul with supernatural faculties and forces in order to even such acts of various virtues as might, so far as their substance is concerned, be performed by the unaided powers of nature. By the addition of divine grace, these acts become supernatural, and belong to an entirely different order to that in which they would have been had they been simply done in virtue of the natural powers of the man left to himself. Similarly, in the formation of the Sacred Scriptures, God, their principal Author, made use sometimes of external instruments, supplying to the writers documents, witnesses, observation, or a natural knowledge of that which they were to write; while at the same time, He conjoined with such external and natural means an internal supernatural illus-

* Cardinal Franzelin, more clearly than the author of "The Written Word," distinguishes between the *inspiratio* and *assistentia* given to a Sacred writer. The former pertaining to the revealed truths (*verbum formale*), the latter to the language, style, &c. (*verbum materiale*).—"De Divinis Scripturis," cap. i. th. iii. p. 347.

tration of the understanding and motion of the will in such wise as to effect that all those things, and those things only, the writers should conceive as to be written and should will to write, which He, in His eternal counsel, had previously conceived and willed to be communicated and proposed to His Church in writing as the Word of God" (p. 43).

The extracts we have given will enable our readers to understand in what way Father Humphrey has accomplished his undertaking. In common with many others, he has found in the learned work of Cardinal Franzelin, "*De Divina Traditione et Scriptura*," a revelation to his thoughts on the Idea of Inspiration, the mutual relations of Scripture and tradition, and their place in the divine dispensation of a teaching Church; and he has attempted "to popularize in English some of the arguments of the more dogmatic chapters of that admirable treatise" (Preface). A popular work "*The Written Word*" will hardly be. It is with large excisions and sundry compressions, that are judiciously made, a faithful following of the original, in fact almost a translation; but that very character will limit its utility. As may be seen from the extracts given, and they are found in the simplest pages of the book, "*The Written Word*" follows the Latin work too closely (even its technicalities are reproduced) to be a successful claimant for popular reading; while there are wanting many things—notably, references to and ampler insertion of Cardinal Franzelin's arguments on tradition—that a theological student would seek. We cannot complain much that the first part of the "*De Divina Traditione et Scriptura*," is not more extensively used, since "*The Written Word*" nominally professes to give the second part, and has generously incorporated from the first; but we feel that the treatise of Cardinal Franzelin must be studied as a whole, or else it loses in the force of its argument. We could hardly dream, for instance, that in the phrases "Catholic understanding and belief," "Consent of the faithful," "Consentient belief," &c. (Chapter viii.), we had the expressions, arguments in themselves, of infallible *criteria* of divine tradition. Their effect depends on the arguments of Theses IV.—XI., summed up by Cardinal Franzelin in the words "*Ex quibus omnibus apparet, ecclesiam universam omnium aetatum et omnium locorum, cum tota sua historia esse magnum commentarium realem, ac perpetuam confirmationem veri sensus, quem in verbis Christi et Apostolorum expressum Catholicis credimus et demonstramus.*"* The vivid conception of divine tradition left on the mind by a study of Cardinal Franzelin's theses, is, that the Church, being the ever-living, mystical Body of Christ, informed throughout—in every faculty and power—by the Spirit of Truth, must present an infallible criterion of truth under every aspect, be it the *conscientia fidei*, or *Catholicus intellectus*, or *ecclesiasticus sensus*, &c. The force of these formulas seems to us almost lost in "*The Written Word*." We must also note the want of precise references in Father Humphrey's book. He is so consistent on that point, that we look for a thoughtful motive; and no doubt it was confidence in the reader's ability to find out readily the quotations given. We must leave the matter to the reader's judgment with respect to the quotations from the Sacred Scriptures; but we venture to say that more defi-

* Franzelin: "*De Divina Traditione*," cap. ii. Th. xi. p. 97.

nite reference may be fairly desired than, "Philo gives the division," "Josephus does the same," "the decree of the Council of Florence," "among the decrees of the Council of Trent," "S. Augustine habitually proves," &c.

In a few words we may say that we have either too much or too little of Franzelin's work. A literal translation of the "*De Divina Traditione et Scriptura*" might be acceptable to some readers who have a preference for the study of theology in English. A work founded on it, but written in a clear simple style—such as we know from previous publications, is well within Father Humphrey's power—would be widely valued. But we fear the middle course adopted in "*The Written Word*" will not be deemed a complete success. The book, however, is a valuable contribution to our scanty store of English theology, and would be of great worth to Protestants of the educated class.

God our Father. By a Father of the Society of Jesus. London: Burns & Oates.

THIS little volume abounds in beautiful and touching thoughts, addressed to those who are deficient in tender filial love towards God, and who regard Him with too unmixed awe and alarm. No one can read its successive chapters without great edification and spiritual comfort. At the same time—we must frankly say—the volume gives us an impression, that its author has not fully apprehended those various circumstances and considerations, which occasion that unhappy state of mind against which he is so admirably earnest. As one instance of what we mean—though there are several others—we think a good deal more might with advantage have been said—especially considering the direction in which men's minds just now are travelling—on the tremendous verity of eternal punishment.

Memoirs of Missionary Priests and other Catholics of both sexes, that have suffered death in England, on religious accounts, from the year 1577 to 1684. By Bishop CHALLONER, V.A.L. Preface by the Rev. Father THOMAS G. LAW, of the London Oratory. Edinburgh: Jack. 1878.

THIS splendid quarto volume offers us an unusual number of attractions. First, the elegant cover, the beautiful paper and print, and a number of fine lithographs, render it a fit ornament for the drawing-room table. Next comes a letter of thanks to the publisher and recommendation of the work, by the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. Then follows an interesting preface by Father Law, who gives us a graphic sketch of the leading features of a lengthened persecution, which, for sanguinary and unrelenting cruelty, is unparalleled in history.

Finally, we have Bishop Challoner's "*Memoirs of the Martyrs of the Catholic Faith*," which are distinguished by truthfulness, and the pathos which naturally belongs to a narrative of heroic deeds told in the simplest language.

In 1741, Bishop Challoner brought out this work "as a supplement to English history," because the trials and executions of Catholics for religion had not been noticed by English historians. He flattered himself that it would interest lovers of history, of whatsoever religious persuasion they might be. For he naturally expected, "that every generous English soul would be pleased to find so much fortitude and courage joined with so much meekness, modesty, and humility, in the lives and deaths of so many of his countrymen, who have died for no other crime but their conscience." Above a century has elapsed, and his hope has found but a limited fulfilment, his work being hitherto known and prized almost exclusively by Catholics. But its reappearance in so attractive a form, at a time when the study of history inspires such general interest, leads us to augur a wider appreciation of it as a book which throws light on some of the most important crises of our national life.

The student of history, in reading these simple narratives, will involuntarily resign his lingering suspicions of foreign intrigues and treasonable plots, and will gain an insight into the true character and workings of Elizabeth's ecclesiastical policy. At a time when theological controversy engrossed and divided Europe, her inordinate love of personal power led her to anticipate, by three hundred years, the modern idea of a purely State Church. This Church she founded in the blood of both Catholics and Protestants. The defects in its Apostolic Succession, she avowedly rectified by Act of Parliament. Its worship and dogmas rested on the same authority. In the records of the time it is characteristically described as "the Queen's religion," or "the Church established by law." Her boast that she meddled with the conscience of no man, was true in a cynical sense; for she ignored the existence of conscience. So long as her subjects would practise a religion which they disbelieved, and refrain from practising that which they believed,—in fact, so long as they were hypocrites and practical infidels, she was content. But no sooner did conscience assert its rights in private spiritual worship, which touched not her temporal sovereignty, than the gibbet and vivisection were their doom; while the rack and the varied ingenuities of torture in her prisons, were called in to compel her victims to base acts of treachery to friends and benefactors, from which even natural conscience recoils.

To the ordinary reader, whether Catholic or Protestant, the charm of these memoirs is their touching simplicity. Here, without the least attempt at dramatic effect, we are told of priests and laymen, nobles and rustics, men and women, uniting in deeds of saintly virtue and heroic courage. We see gentlemen of birth and fortune resigning their social position, living in farm-houses in their own country, or in London garrets, in order to be more accessible to the poor; going about on foot meanly dressed, with a bag or pack, containing the necessaries for Mass, on their shoulders; defying walls and moats, bars and bolts, to carry the Sacraments to Catholic prisoners; and, at last, dying joyfully on the scaffold for their

priesthood. We see young men of all ranks banded together to guide the priest to a safe refuge at the risk of their own lives ; and every Catholic door thrown open to receive him, whose presence under their roof exposed them to a felon's death. So numerous and varied are the subjects of interest, that we must give up the attempt to do them justice. Two points, however, we must not omit. One is, the patriotism of these martyr priests, whose love of their country was scarcely less than their love of souls. The other is, their unfeigned love of their persecutors, and even of Elizabeth and her successors, which could spring only from a supernatural source.

In conclusion, we cannot too highly recommend this book to our readers ; nor can we omit to express our hope, that its wide circulation will recompense Mr. Jack for the public spirit which has led him to undertake its reproduction in so beautiful a form.

The Lectures of a Certain Professor. By the Rev. JOSEPH FARRELL.
Macmillan : 1877.

"THERE are book and books," says our professor, and his own book is certainly a full commentary on his own dictum. If of the making of books there is no end,—and Mr. Farrell himself complains of the multitude of them that swarm on every side,—we at first incline to ask why this special book should ever have been written at all. As we turn over the pages, however, we confess to seeing reasons why ; for if the thoughts are not particularly new or particularly deep, they *are* thoughts, showing a good and wholesome mind, considerably cultivated, and yielding us chapters of very pleasant, gossiping reading. The book is somewhat spoilt by a strain of jaunty egotism, and a certain preachy trick of such expressious as, "let me tell you," "I would have you to know, dear friends," and the like, as if looking down from a professional or other pulpit upon the benches below. The pattern of all essayists, Charles Lamb, lets the quaint, richly-tinted stream of his thoughts flow out as if he could not help it, enjoying the rare, unique wit, as it rises and bubbles away, with any chance passer-by ; but he never speeches or preaches about any of it. The playfulness of Mr. Farrell's remarks—and they are often not only pleasantly playful, but pregnant also with matter—is marred by the undercurrent of himself, the perpetual sub-consciousness of "c'est moi qui vous le dis." But having pointed out those obvious faults, which every one must stumble over on the surface, let us for a few moments advert to the pleasant side of Mr. Farrell's book. In his chapter "About Books" we fall upon a good idea in reference to his standing in hesitation before the bookshelves, and, while reading the titles, balancing the subjects and their pleasures in the mind, as a man acquainted with books can well do.

"The golden minutes roll themselves into still more golden hours, and I have opened never a book. Perhaps, after all, . . . my 'brown study'

may have stood me in good stead. Through the chambers of my brain has passed a goodly procession of the great thoughts of great minds. The music of remembered passages, and the melodies that have linked themselves imperishably with golden memories of the youth when first they bounded on my spirit's ear, raise their sweet, silent tunes within my heart. Perhaps I have been doing better than reading any books, however famous. I have, as it were, been extracting the subtlest essence of many books, and that is the sweetest perfume for the chambers whether of mind or heart" (pp. 35, 36).

It is a pity Mr. Farrell did not work out the deeper secret of another of his remarks in the same chapter, beginning with a "believe me," which should be left out.

"The great names in literature are rarely those of the men who, with the hands of giants and the hearts of heroes, have gone into the quarries of human thought, and hewed and blasted huge boulders from the mass. Rather are they the names of those who took the rough, undressed stones, and shaped and polished them, and built them into enduring structures,—whether the temple, or the palace, or the domestic home,—places where all generations come to pray, or to be guided, or to be happy" (p. 39).

There is a beautiful passage in the chapter "About Knowledge of the World," illustrated by the inner life of Paris, flaunting to the outsiders with cafés and boulevards, restaurants and glittering shops. The author, in illustrating the various strata of knowledge of any subject, gives an account of turning out of the gay surface-life of Paris, full of worldliness and sin, into the "Missions Etrangères," and witnessing the departure of twelve students for the Eastern missions. He describes the kissing of their feet, and their leaving the house without a word to any of their relations, going forth to almost certain death in China and Japan. Seeing these things, and knowing that they are a part of the yearly life of Paris, Mr. Farrell justly remarks upon the way in which that marvellous city may be intimately known in one sense, and yet remain a sealed book to those whose knowledge lies on the surface. And thus, he argues, if men would seek the good and not the evil in each other, there would not be that cynicism, "that evil knowledge that blossoms into scorn, the acquiring of which is like sowing salt, that not only produces no crop, but renders the soil for ever barren."

Again, in "About Life," there are beautiful thoughts upon materialism and utilitarianism, which can be pursued at leisure to greater depths than are there fully plumbed.

"The eyes of some insects are microscopic beyond conception, but such insects do not see in the blade of grass to which they cling what a man can see. . . . It is not the thing seen that matters, but the thing that lies behind it that it suggests. Thought must sit behind sight, if sight is to be of any permanent use. Nay, we must go farther still; it is not mere thought that steads,—lost spirits have it deep and keen,—but thought worked up by will into love" (p. 222).

But we have quoted more than enough to show that both the writing and the reading of the "Lectures of a Certain Professor" cannot be reckoned as loss of time.

The Marpingen Apparitions. From authentic German sources.

By CHARLES KEMEN. London: Washbourne.

PROBABLY most of our readers have made themselves acquainted with Prince Radzivil's account of the chain of remarkable circumstances that occurred at Marpingen, in the diocese of Treves, in Germany, during the years 1876 and 1877; and they will certainly be glad to see the pamphlet now before us, prefaced by Dr. Barry's admirable letter. The Professor of Theology at St. Mary's Oscott has done a public service by this letter, which, while giving the fullest and widest encouragement to belief in supernatural visitations according to the mind of the Catholic Church, yet throws out such clear suggestions of prudence as the Church also invariably practises in their case. At this moment no ecclesiastical authority can open an inquiry at Treves, owing to the troubles with the German Government, and under these circumstances the Church inevitably remains silent. And "whilst she is silent," as Dr. Barry says, "we may each of us form our own opinion, or abstain from forming one, according to the estimate we put on the various parts of the evidence." No devout person, Dr. Barry continues, could in the meanwhile feel startled, much less shocked, on hearing of a fresh apparition of our Lady. The circumstances also have a family likeness to others so well known to us. The appearances were vouchsafed to innocent children, while they were denied to many grown people, who afterwards accompanied them to the favoured spot. Again, there was an outflow of two wells of healing waters, giving occasion to a multitude of cures of the sick, always accompanied by the injunction to pray and repent. And lastly, a great concourse of pilgrims was drawn from all parts of Germany to Marpingen, in spite of the threats, chastisement, and every opposition of the Government. The whole story is well narrated in the ten chapters of Mr. Kemen's pamphlet, which is written, as Dr. Barry says, in the most simple and straightforward way. Marpingen is a little village six miles from St. Wendel, which again is on the railway line between the now historical Saarlouis and Kreuznach (or Creuznach). It contains about fifteen hundred mining and labouring inhabitants, who have for about a couple of centuries practised peculiar devotion to our Lady, even binding themselves by vow, in 1699, to abstain from work after the Angelus on Saturdays, and to say the Rosary publicly in the church. This vow was kept without intermission for a hundred years, till the French Republican troops, after the Revolution, occupied the village, and abolished all public worship. The vow was, however, renewed in 1814, and kept till 1847, when the Bishop of Treves released the inhabitants from the vow, while offering all who wished to renew it entrance into the confraternity of the Sacred Heart. The whole body of parishioners at once enrolled themselves as Children of Mary, and to this day it is the usual course for the children after First Communion to be enrolled in the guild. In July, 1876, three little girls of eight years old went out to gather whortleberries at Härtelwald, in the neighbourhood; and when the Angelus was rung they all knelt down to say it. Suddenly

one of them, who was rather apart from the others, uttered a loud cry, which made her companions run towards her, when they also shrieked out with fright, and all set off home as fast as they could run. They all said in answer to their mothers' questions, that they had seen a white lady; and, in spite of rebukes and punishment, maintained their story. The next day the same children went again, as if irresistibly attracted to the wood, and knelt down to say three times the "Our Father" and "Hail Mary," when the same bright figure appeared before them. Losing at once their dread, they began to ask who she was, to which she replied, "*I am the spotless conceived one.*" That same evening a crowd of people and children accompanied the first three to the Härtelwald, when the three children, and no others, again saw the radiant figure, and put questions to her which were answered. The answers were heard, but still no one else saw the vision. This time the children were told to pray devoutly, and not commit sin. The next time our Lady said that a chapel of stone should be built on that spot, and that she would appear that day and the next again, and at one of the succeeding apparitions gave leave for sick people to be brought to be healed. Immediately the listening crowd ran joyfully to the village to fetch out their sick and diseased, who were guided by the three children to lay their hands on our Lady's foot. After a number of cures, and vast crowds of people had been to the spot, even carrying away the least fragment of the bush where the vision had first been seen, grown people were first allowed to see the apparition. As it appeared to them, it was no longer a *white* lady. "A light-blue veil, covering head and shoulders, descended to her feet; rich fair hair glittered through it. . . . The garment which the Queen of Heaven wore was of a deep blue, and allowed the front part of her white feet to be seen a little. . . . The left hand . . . held the child Jesus, also dressed in light blue, His right hand raised as if in the act of blessing, His countenance beaming with the bright light of the mid-day sun."

Before the middle of July, pilgrimages of many thousands of people had passed through Marpingen, and on one day the three children had spent the entire time between eight in the morning till eleven at night in laying the hands of sick, maimed, and diseased people upon the Blessed Virgin's foot. Such unbecoming "disturbances," of course, could not be allowed to continue by the German Government. If our Blessed Lady must appear at all to her persecuted and oppressed children, she must do so in a quiet, orderly, not-to-be-wondered-at, regimental manner. Enthusiastic pilgrims, cures of sick people by otherwise than the physic-bottle of the village doctor, wells gushing out of hill-sides unauthorized by "most gracious" mayors and over-inspectors of the water-supply, were all wholly contradictory of the admirable military discipline of the Bismarckian period, in which also public teaching had loudly declared that the invisible and supernatural world had ceased to exist. The next day, accordingly, there was a military occupation of Marpingen, when the soldiers brutally conducted themselves, as if in an enemy's country. They seized, even with blows, the food and wine of the inhabitants, turned them out of their beds, and strictly prohibited any one from visiting the Härtelwald. The upper-

abundant well, which had sprung out suddenly after the apparitions had been seen, was filled with rubbish, and patrols were posted round the wells and through the wood. But notwithstanding every effort of the authorities, the visions continued to appear to many people and in many places during the time our Lady had herself mentioned, of one year and two months. Two priests were then arrested, and the three contumacious children were sent to the Protestant Reformatory at Saarbrück; though, as nothing whatever could be proved against either the pastor or the flock, they were all released in about two months afterwards. The pilgrims also flowed towards Marpingen in such bodies that the military sentries gave up their opposition in despair, and during the August of last year from 10,000 to 20,000 arrived every day. Among them were the Archduke Charles of Austria and his wife, and the Princess of Thurn and Taxis. The Government is apparently powerless to do any more than throw ridicule on what it calls "the Marpingen swindle." Meanwhile our readers will judge of the evidence for themselves.

Lenten Exercises. By ARCHBISHOP VAUGHAN. Sidney, 1877. Edward F. Flanagan.

IT is a pleasant task for us to welcome this volume, which comes like a voice from the ends of the earth, and increases our knowledge of the work of faith going on there. An absence of four years has not consigned to oblivion an author whose literary fame was wider than the household of faith; and his name, though it may stir still living regrets in the minds of many, will win for his work a warm greeting, yet not warmer than its own worth will justify. The discourses were preached last Lent by Archbishop Vaughan, in St. Mary's Pro-Cathedral, Sydney, and are inscribed by him "to all earnest persons who are struggling towards the unseen world, with a prayer that our Lord may lead them on." They will now serve a longer season than the period of their delivery, and a wider congregation than that which heard them from the lips of the eloquent prelate. As the Lenten season, during which the sermons were preached, was supposed to be, in a mitigated form, a time of Retreat, the truths chosen for consideration were the simple and fundamental ones, which commonly constitute the framework of "Spiritual Exercises"; namely, "the End of Man," "Sin," "Grace," "Prayer," "Confession," and "Communion." In the first exercise the preacher suddenly calls our attention to his purpose and his motive for choosing those truths:—

"But stay! before inviting your attention to this first meditation, one observation must be premised; and that is, that the object of these instructions is not to say new things, or propound new theories, or advance personal views, or broach novel questions. The main object is to touch upon what is old with the age of truth, and to enforce doctrines which have been handed down from the beginning: fundamental truths, cardinal doctrines of salvation, which contain within them the springs of life and

the seeds of immortality ; doctrines that elevate the interior man, expand his heart, enlighten his intellect, and fill him with something like to a Divine spirit of goodness, purity, and truth. We possess this human and intellectual comfort in our meditations, viz., that the truths which we are dealing with have come straight from the mouth of God, or from the revelation of our Saviour ; have been developed age after age by the highest intelligences, guided by the purest of hearts ; and have upon them the seal and the sanction of millions upon millions of the most exalted beings who have ever trod upon the earth. We are comforted with the thought that they have been at the root of all the growth there has been in the vast Church of God from the day of Pentecost till now ; and that they are the key to the secret of the successes achieved by weak flesh and blood in its contest with the fierce power of darkness, or the subtle blandishments of the world " (p. 5).

As the " Exercises " were given on Sunday evenings, and furnished the subject-matter of meditation in three distinct points for the ensuing week, it was necessary that the divisions should be of the most formal kind. But the reader will not find the work dry and uninteresting on that account. Each point is distinct as a link in its chain, complete in itself as a meditation, though closely connected, and ample enough to give the preacher room for a full and easy exposition of his subject. The style is simple, as popular preaching on the chief practical truths should be—simple, that is, as far as apprehension is concerned—and the eloquence consists in the never-failing flow of allusions and metaphors, the abundance of language, the vivid colours with which the subjects are portrayed, the evidence of close observation when the preacher's gaze is on the earth, and the sense of realization when he looks on the world beyond sense. Any " Exercise " will show the value of the volume, for its excellence is uniform ; but we shall give a brief extract from the one that would seem, *à priori*, the least interesting—that on " Grace." The life on earth which has not a knowledge of the supernatural gift, or any trust in it, is thus described :—

" The world, in the Scripture sense of that word, scorns the idea of Grace, and considers man sufficient for himself. Its pattern man is not the mortified recluse, or the contemplative monk or nun, or even the secular gentleman, who makes God his first consideration, and shuns bad thoughts, and overcomes evil devices, and lives a life of humility, purity, and love. No ! such is not the typical man of the world. The world knows nothing of humility and spiritual self-distrust. Who ever heard of the world throwing itself on its knees, beating its breast, and declaring itself to be a sinner and an outcast ? Who ever heard of the world combating the Devil, or waging war with the flesh, or putting its foot down upon honours, riches, and pleasures ? Who ever heard of its sacrificing its present inheritance for the sake of a heavenly reward ; or admitting that of itself it could do nothing worthy, and requiring the assisting grace of God ? We know it ; it is the maxim of the world to consider that itself is man's adequate reward, and that man is sufficient for himself ; to be rich, to be honoured here, to enjoy oneself, and to die quietly after a successful life and a happy one, is all that a reasonable creature need aspire after or covet " (p. 42).

In the Appendix, a fourth part of the whole volume, there are some

valuable and interesting discourses. The sermon on the "Domestic Life" (preached at the Blessing of the Presentation Convent), though on a theme that has been ably treated by several Catholic writers, namely, the purification of domestic life through the Christian idea of marriage, is conspicuous for ability and evidence of extensive learning. An answer to the address of the young men of Sydney, on the occasion of their presenting the Archbishop with a pastoral staff, is a valuable monograph on the office and claims of the Catholic Episcopate. Even on such commonplace occasions as replying to the children of the Convent School at Wagga-Wagga, or to a deputation of Catholics of the town, the Archbishop is prompt to say something well worth recording. For instance, taking as a suggestion an allusion to the glories of monastic history made in the address of the Catholics of Wagga-Wagga, he contrasts the result of Christian education, which had its highest form in the principle of monastic teaching, with the result of that popular system which, low in its aim and incomplete in extension, is the very opposite:—

"Take a notable example" (of what exclusively secular teaching can, at its best, accomplish). "If ever there was a pattern man of the Augustan age, surely that man was the poet Horace. He represents to us what was best and most refined in the Latin mind, and many of the most attractive traits of the Roman character. His friends adored him. He was generous and honourable. Mæcenas (?) loved him; Augustus himself treated him as a bosom friend. He was, as he says himself, 'a hog of the herd of Epicurus.' He tells us himself how carefully his father had him educated. For though his parent was a man of no family, and in narrow circumstances, he loved the child, and wished to preserve him from every harm. He refused to send him to a country school, but took him himself to Rome, and there, with his own eye, watched him and guarded him, and gave him every facility for acquiring all the information that the Augustan age could impart. Here, then, we have a specimen man, educated with the utmost care, and representing in his own person all that was best and highest in the life of a Roman citizen and in the career of a distinguished poet. He may be said to represent the result of the most exquisite culture that the schools of that day could bestow. If, then, you seek for the most successful outcome of the secular education of the empire, fix your eyes upon that king of poets, on Horace, the friend of Mæcenas (?) and Augustus, and the most cultivated intellect of the Roman world.

"Now let us look a little below this surface polish, and the spinnings of imagination, and the gymnastic of the mind. What were the ruling principles, not of the poet, but of the man, of that immortal personality which Horace, together with all others of the human race, possessed? 'Let us crown ourselves with roses, for to-morrow we die.' Of the providence of a Ruling Mind, he does not merely profess to have no notion, but he specifically denies it. The Gods, so far as he knows anything of them, 'Lie beside their nectar, careless of mankind!' With him, and on the principles of his training, earth ends all. If there be no heaven or no hell, he may be considered, possibly, a success; but if there be a heaven or a hell, he is one of the most egregious failures perpetrated by the joint action of worldly wisdom and pagan ignorance or disbelief" (p. 179).

We do not understand the application of the phrase "burning marl," twice repeated (pp. 11, 12), to the fire of hell. In the same sermon we

find, and do not like, the parallel and balanced clauses of this sentence : "Still, remember, fix the undoubted reality in your mind, that as sure as there is a God in Heaven there is a Devil in Hell." It may not have sounded harshly ; but, especially with the formidable capital letters used by the Australian publisher—whose part of the work, by the way, is good—it looks unpleasant, and unfortunately is repeated twice in worse form (pp. 14-18). A few blemishes of another kind may be laid to the printer's account. The founder of the Parsees is called "Zoroarter"; the friend of Horace has his name spelled "Mœcenas"; and the Irish poet has an additional letter to his name in *Sedulous*, which might be all right if it was put at the beginning. But these are trifles, and, being all we find in the whole work, though we have read it carefully, weigh little against the choice extracts that might be gathered from every page.

Daily Meditations on the Mysteries of our Holy Faith, and on the Lives of our Lord Jesus Christ and of the Saints. Translated from the Spanish of Rev. Father ALONZO DE ANDRADE, S.J. Burns & Oates. 1878.

THIS little book of a Jesuit father of the early part of the seventeenth century has the merit of short points full of Scriptural matter and solid considerations exciting to virtue in the most concise terms. This first part embraces the five weeks of Advent and the six weeks after Christmas, together with the chief mysteries of our Lord's life.

The Art of Knowing Ourselves ; or, the Looking-glass which does not Deceive.

By F. JOHN PETER PINAMONTI, S.J. With Twelve Considerations on Death, by F. LUIGI DA NUZA, S.J., and Four on Eternity, by F. JOHN BAPTIST MANNI, S.J. Translated by the Author of "S. Willebrord." Burns & Oates. 1877.

IT is rather a pity that the editors and translators of the Society of Jesus indulge in title-pages of such undue length, for it is the only blot we can find in their publications. The exquisite treatise of F. Pinamonti, and the others less known, which complete this volume, are admirably translated, and the appropriate get-up of this charming little work sets it off to great advantage.

A Popular Defence of the Jesuits. By Mr. WILLIS NEVINS. Williams & Norgate, Henrietta-street, Covent-garden.

WE have received the above, which successfully treats of the expulsion of the society from Germany, and the "reasons why."

An Authentic Account of the Imprisonment and Martyrdom in the High-street at Glasgow, in the Year 1615, of Father John Ogilvie, of the Society of Jesus. Translated from the Latin by CHARLES J. KARSLAKE, Priest of the same Society. Burns & Oates. 1877.

THE absorbing interest of this little book is partly owing to the excellent taste of the translator,—who has also done that part of his work unusually well,—in leaving the brief, interrupted diary of the martyred priest to tell its own tale. We have thus the actual photograph of the discussions, questions, revilings, and singularly apt and wise replies and retorts of the Jesuit priest—*lifelike*—exactly as they occurred, so much so that we seem to be actually present at the various scenes, to hear the hard, envenomed accusations of the different judges, and the shouts of the crowd, and to become witnesses of the diabolic cruelty and heartlessness of the persecutors. Our blessed Lord, in some of His last instructions and exhortations to the apostles, promised them a mouth and a wisdom which no man could gainsay; and these words must recur in reading this vivid account of a Scottish martyr of the sixteenth century. It has been well done of F. Karslake to send out this life at this moment, when the hierarchy is on the point of being re-established in Scotland, and thus to deepen the sense in Scottish men and women of what was done and suffered in their country when the Catholic religion had been publicly declared to be no longer the religion of Scotland. The hatred of the Presbyterians was probably envenomed to a sharper poison by their determinate resistance to the forced Episcopalianism of the Crown, but at any rate it was a louder, a deeper, and a more diabolically savage hate even than that manifested in England to the faith. A good photograph of F. Ogilvie's spiritual face is prefixed to this admirable biographical sketch, to which are added also a few interesting woodcuts.

Evidences of Religion. By LOUIS JOUIN, Priest of the Society of Jesus, &c. &c. New York: O'Shea. 1877.

THIS timely volume in every sense deals with subjects of the first magnitude in a summary so clear and condensed as to make it a useful "handy book" towards helping Catholic students to consider and meet some of their most deadly difficulties. The introduction deals at once with these difficulties of unending denial, the absurdities of "an Infinite Number," an "Unknowable" God, and Pantheism, and asserts the freedom of the spiritual soul in opposition to the blind mechanism of forces. Beginning then with the necessity of worship and religion as the impulse to the duties of life, and defining the natural and supernatural states of man, the author passes to the possibility and necessity of revealed truths, and the nature of miracles and prophecy, as opposed to scientific phenomena and heathen oracles. He proceeds to give a short

review of the false and true credentials of religion, instancing Mahometanism, and again Judaism, which pointed to a more perfect revelation to come. This first, toughest portion of the book contains sixteen chapters. The second and larger part of fourteen chapters, treats of the Divinity of Christ and the planting of the Church with the same clear brevity and exact knowledge.

The Spirit of S. Francis of Assisi. Sermon preached in the Church of the Franciscan Fathers, Stratford, E. By the Rev. JAMES CONNOLLY. Burns & Oates, &c.

THIS Sermon is sold for the benefit of the admirable and hard-working community of Franciscan Fathers at Stratford, who have lately finished their church, but who are put to great straits to fit it up. We sincerely hope that, besides giving some help to this work, Mr. Connolly will spread a wider and deeper devotion to the loving apostle of the thirteenth century.

To Rome and Back; Fly-leaves from a Flying Tour. Edited by W. H. ANDERDON, S.J. London: Washbourne. 1877.

IN the preface the Editor states that the letters which are published collectively in this little book were written and sent home to a near relative during the time of the Jubilee. Their appearance in the "Weekly Register" was due to friends who gave no opportunity of withholding consent, and the writer's depreciation of her own sketches has made her reluctant to see them now reproduced. Reluctance for that reason is in this case quite unwarranted. Allowing for the fact that the letters were not intended for publication, but merely to form perhaps a sort of written journal for another, once they are united—a continuous narrative—there is nothing wanting to them to make a charming book. We are all tired of diaries of travel; but if all such diaries were like this one, simple and unpretentious, but full of a running word-picture all aglow with colour, we should not be inclined to dread books of travel as the most wearisome and uncalled-for species of made-up literature. It is almost impossible to choose an extract to give an example of the tone of description in these "Fly-leaves," because we are tempted by every chapter and every opening at haphazard. However, we may take part of the chapter headed "Venice," because every one knows that strange city of the sea, either from pictures or poetry, from Mr. Ruskin's "Stones of Venice," or from other books. But while we have heard of her bygone grandeur, her palaces, her doges, and her present state of "dying glory," there have seldom reached us any details of religious life in the city of gondolas such as we find here. The travellers have been to the green island of S. Elena, and return thence to see the past and present;

dreams of splendour and solemn realities mingle in a function of that religion which is the same in the past, and now, and to the end :—

“ Behind us rose the domes and *campanili* of the water city ; but far away to the right, across the burnished mirror of the sea and girding the whole horizon by a lofty amethystine ridge, were the Alps, their mighty snow-peaks shining in majestic purity as the evening sunlight fell upon them. Not a cloud in the deep Italian sky ; not a ripple on the sea ; no sound but the vesper bells, which from shore to shore were calling to each other in measured cadence—it was an hour for dreamland ! And then we swept away with the gondola’s strong swift strokes, and passing Santa Maria della Salute, we re-entered the grand canal between the sad beauty of the decaying palaces, passed under the bow-like curve of the Rialto, and found our way through the side canals to the church of a poor and pious parish priest, who had resolved to defy the tyranny of the Government by having the procession of the Blessed Sacrament outside. We were too late to see it in all its beauty, for they were re-entering the church, and we hurried in to find places, which we did comfortably close to the altar. But the sight outside was most devotional ; the sides of the callé, the narrow bridges, and a crowd of gondolas, all were thronged with people, who knelt in reverent devotion as the procession passed. Inside the church we found the altar a blaze of lights, banners, and flowers ; and all along the benches that lined the nave stood tall wax tapers and lighted torches. Between them the procession streamed in, the crowd following, with a loud band playing the most lively music. Such a curious, bright-coloured, quaint procession ; first, men in crimson silk doublets, the numerous confraternities, white and red, with the hooded mask, which conceals their faces and has a ghostly appearance ; gondoliers, too, and sailors, each holding an enormous wax taper or flambeau wreathed with flowers. Then came some little children in a sort of fleecy attire, which left their round rosy limbs bare, each one holding a flower-wreathed cross and leading a lamb in a string, its white shorn fleece dotted all over with tiny loops of blue and pink ribbon. I don’t know which looked most innocent, the lambs or the babies. . . . Then came the acolytes and priests, and under a gorgeous canopy was borne the Blessed Sacrament, and as it was placed upon the altar the organ pealed out, the band clashed and clanged, the people rose up and sang, and the *Te Deum* sounded like one voice.”

Besides such pleasant descriptions, there is evidence of much thought in parts of the book. The record of visits to shrines is also given in a simple manner that makes their interest vivid. For instance, in the city of S. Catherine of Siena.

“ We went to see her house this morning ; it looks just like the surrounding ones, and cannot be a whit altered from the time when she dwelt in it, except that her room is turned into a chapel. But her sleeping-place is intact, with the stone on which she used to rest her head ; the staircase, the kitchen, &c., all the same. . . . The chapel of S. Catherine in the Dominican church is lovely, and covered with Sodoma’s most devotional frescoes. Here also her head is preserved ; and the lower part of the church, where most of her heavenly communications occurred, is walled off as specially holy. We went in ; and I was much touched at a small slab let into the pavement, with a heart and a short inscription, saying that here she had received our Lord’s Heart in exchange for her own. It assists one’s faith very much to see all these things, and Siena is perfectly filled with memorials of these two saints, S. Bernardine

and S. Catherine. Would that its people were still impregnated with their atmosphere of sanctity; but I fear it is not so. . . . The convents are entirely suppressed; only two Dominican monks remain, and they are obliged to wear a secular dress. A shopkeeper, where we bought some photographs, began to extol Garibaldi, and to laugh at a picture of S. Catherine."

Pio Nono ed il suo Episcopato nelle Diocesi di Spoleto ed Imola.
Da Teol. GIACOMO MARGOTTI. Torino.

THIS is one of the many books which were called forth by the Papal jubilee last year; but the name of the valiant editor of the "Unità Cattolica" distinguishes it from the rest, marking it at once as an accurate and valuable contribution to the history of Pius IX. His account is based only upon indisputable evidence. "A most eminent personage tried to obtain information from the Holy Father himself, but he could not succeed in overcoming the modest humility of the great Pontiff." However, his first pastoral letter as Bishop of Spoleto was obtained from a friend, and with this and an hitherto unpublished "Life of Pius IX.," and his own extraordinary knowledge of the history of many years in Italy, the Abbate Margetti set to work to publish a thoroughly reliable narrative of that long, eventful, and fruitful episcopate. The unpublished "Life" had been composed at Rome by a writer "who had the most precious documents before him, and who had written it with the object of rectifying all those false and inexact statements which have been printed by many with the best intentions and in good faith." From this record of the five years' episcopate at Spoleto, and about that length of time at Imola, the two characteristics of the rule of the future Pope seem to have been his love of the poor, and that union of benevolence, power, and tact which now distinguish him at the Vatican, and which, in the days of his episcopate, enabled him always to master the hearts of his people, and to pass safely through situations of the utmost difficulty and danger. Every one knows how it grieved him to part from his beloved orphans in Rome when he was sent on the expedition to Chili. The same partiality for the orphaned little ones of Christ made itself manifest when he became Bishop. His orphanage at Imola bore witness to it, and previously, during his reign at Spoleto, his first care was to make arrangements for the systematic and effectual relief of distress. The institutions of charity founded by him counted amongst them the House of Refuge at Imola, to which he brought the Sisters of the Good Shepherd from Angers, to conduct a work which he had also specially at heart. As for that admirable tact and mastery of difficulties which arose from and was guided by his love of his flock, occasion for it was not long wanting at Spoleto. In 1831, when the people of Spoleto were rising in insurrection, he induced the Austrians to retire from the city, and by promises of provision for their wants and safe conduct to depart, he prevailed upon many of the insurgents to lay down their arms, and thus saved his people by a wonderful exercise of prudence and mercy. There is a story that on this occasion a written list of the rebels known to him being demanded from the Bishop, he was overcome by pity and solici-

tude for those committed to his care, and at the last moment cast the list into the fire ; and that he was summoned to Rome to explain his conduct to Pope Gregory. The well-informed author of this little work, who, as Editor of the "Unità Cattolica," has established his fame for sound opinions and accurate statements, tells us here that this story is entirely untrue. Monsignor Mastai threw no list into the fire, and was not called upon to give an account of any act of his. He pacified the rebellious factions, and received the blessings of his people and of the Pope. He did, indeed, go to Rome, but it was to obtain pardon for those insurgents who were remaining in Spoleto ; and on his return the horses were taken from his carriage, and the arms of a crowd of men drew it into the city amid loud acclamations of gratitude.

It is interesting to read here of the return of Pius IX., in 1857, to visit his former sees. At Spoleto he was received with illuminations, bonfires, and triumphal arches. But what pleased him most was the action of the municipality of Spoleto, who on this occasion distributed to those in need four thousand five hundred pounds of bread, and redeemed and gave back to their owners all the goods at the Monti di Pietà. Another expression of welcome which equally touched his heart, was the erection before the cathedral of a lofty column, surmounted by a statue of our Lady of the Immaculate Conception. At Imola he was greeted with equal demonstrations of joy ; but it is most likely that his greatest happiness there was his visit to the house of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd, where he encouraged the penitents and also the young who were under their guardian care, and where he was met by the children of his own orphanage, and leading them into a large room, talked familiarly with them, as if being in their midst he was in the home of his heart. This little work of the Abbate Margotti is preceded by an admirable photograph of the Holy Father, which, being different from the style of those most frequently seen, appears to give a more life-like and recent representation of him. In the end is the Latin text and Italian translation of his first Pastoral Letter as Archbishop of Imola.

Sketch of the Life of Henri Planchat, &c. &c., One of the Hostages massacred by the Commune at Belleville, May 26th, 1871, out of Hatred to Religion.
By MAURICE MAIGNEN. Translated from the French. With an Introductory Preface by the Rev. W. H. ANDERDON, S.J. Burns & Oates. 1877.

THE Abbé Planchat was a priest of the Congregation of the Brothers of S. Vincent de Paul, and we are glad that F. Anderdon expresses a wish, which must be re-echoed from a multitude of minds, that the way may be prepared for the establishment of this admirable institution in England. Such a congregation, living for and among the most destitute populations of our great cities, and ministering to them not in one stereotyped but in all kinds of ways, is indefinitely needed at this moment among us. This record of Abbé Planchat's life is, therefore, as timely as that of

his glorious death in the Rue de Haxo. Born at Bourbon-Vendée, in 1823, he was early distinguished for his love of sacred subjects and things, and at fourteen was sent to the College of S. Stanislaus for three years, and thence to Vaugirard, where the Jesuit Père Olivaint was for a long time rector. There young Planchat became a member of the lay Society of S. Vincent de Paul, and began to prepare for his future life of active and apostolic charity. In 1850 he was ordained priest, and immediately joined a very small community of Brothers of S. Vincent de Paul, in order to devote himself heart and soul to the poorest of the poor. The little community established many good works at Grenelle, among one of the poorest populations of Paris. Before the Society of S. Francis Regis had been formed, the Abbé Planchat effected some hundreds of marriages between people who had been living only in the bonds of sin. He laboured especially at the excellent work of the "Patronage" for young women out in service and workshops, and presided at their guild, the *Bon Conseil*, established, like so many other admirable things, by the saintly Bishop de la Bouillerie, then of Carcassonne. If among such various good works undertaken by Abbé Planchat any may be distinguished as supereminent, probably the "Patronage" of S. Anne for workmen and apprentices stands out as that productive of the most marvellous results. It was established in 1870, and was interrupted only by the siege of Paris, when every variety and office of charity that came in his way was discharged by him, who was truly called in Paris the apostle of the people. Such a life, and such universal enthusiastic love was most meetly crowned with martyrdom; and the narrative of Abbé Planchat's imprisonment, last sufferings, and the final massacre, will be read with emotion which seems ever to spring up, fresh and unworn, for the martyrs of the Commune.

Utterly unheeding the gathering storm of civil war, which was so soon to threaten Paris with utter destruction, Abbé Planchat had commenced on Palm Sunday the usual retreat preparatory to the Easter Communion of his workmen and apprentices. Holy Week opened with the arrest of the Archbishop and Vicars-general. On Maundy-Thursaday, while M. Planchat was distributing to the mothers of the children who were about to make their first communion clothing for the occasion, a commissary of the Commune arrested him. Taken prisoner on the same day as his Divine Master, he was, like Him, pursued from guard-house to judgment-seat with the execrations of those for whose benefit alone he lived. After a week's confinement in the Prefecture he was removed to Mazas. M. Maignen gives a careful and, it need not be said, a most interesting and edifying account of the six weeks' "enforced retreat," as he called it, which prepared the holy priest for the crown of martyrdom. In what a spirit he spent them, let this brief extract from one of his letters tell:—

"I need your prayers now in a threefold sense, in order that I may hold myself in constant readiness to receive the fatal blow, which may fall at any time without previous warning and without opportunity for confession, and that I may maintain myself in unbroken union with God whilst I am dependent solely on the direct help of His grace; finally, that I may not lose, through the oft-recurring infirmity of my unmortified will, the merits of that saving cross now laid upon me by God for the good of my own soul and the welfare of my flock."

But every detail of his life at this time, and as many as possible have been piously gathered by M. Maignen, is equally characteristic of the sublime simplicity of his character. He fell on Friday, the 26th of May, amid that noble troop of holy priests and upright civil servants, brutally slaughtered by the Paris mob for their devotion respectively to the Church of God and the moral order of society. May their blood and their prayers strengthen in France the causes for which they died! We cannot too strongly recommend this most interesting book to our readers.

The Children's Garland, from the Best Poets. Selected and arranged by
COVENTRY PATMORE. London: Macmillan.

CHILDREN'S books are a great difficulty in the present day of liberty of unlicensed printing. There is a profound truth in Pope's hackneyed line,—

“Just as the twig is bent the tree's inclined.”

How easily may a bad book in a child's hand incline his mind the wrong way for years and pervert his intellectual and moral development,

“Tortive and errant from its course of growth”!

In the little volume before us Mr. Coventry Patmore has endeavoured, as he tells us, to bring together nearly all the genuine poetry in our language fitted to please children of and from the age at which they have usually learned to read in common with grown-up people. The test applied in every instance, he adds, has been that of having actually pleased intelligent children. It is needless to say that an undertaking such as this, in the hands of so accomplished a poet as Mr. Coventry Patmore, has been carried out with excellent taste and great discretion. The oldest and the newest stores of English poetry have been explored for flowers for this garland, from the Earl of Surrey down to Mr. Mathew Arnold. Perhaps we should have hesitated to include the ballad of “Fair Rosamond,” charming as it is. But we have no doubt Mr. Patmore considered the question fully, and we are not prepared to say that he has decided it wrongly. It is excessively difficult to know exactly where to draw the line in such matters, and there is undoubtedly a real danger on the side of prudishness.

Letters on Music to a Lady. By LOUIS EHLERT. Translated by FANNY
RAYMOND RITTER. London: William Reeves.

THE name of Ehlert is hardly known in England. In Germany he enjoys a considerable reputation, both as a composer and as a musical critic. The twenty letters contained in this little volume present his views about some of the great modern masters of his art. He begins with Beethoven, whose last compositions are his starting-point, and then goes on to Mendelssohn, Chopin, Berlioz, Schubert, Schumann, Rossini, and Meyerbeer. He writes always with feeling, and generally with judgment, but perhaps upon the whole in rather too transcendental a tone for the average English reader. “When I am in earnest,” he pleads, “I

must also be read earnestly"; an appeal which is likely to be more successful in his own country than here. There are, however, scattered through the volume sparkling little bits of criticism which every one will welcome. What can be happier than the following on Rossini?—"Rossini represents realism itself; his scores display the unfettered, unconcealed, simple sensuousness of the Italian nature; he is the typical expression of southern enjoyment of life, the audacious full enjoyment of the present. . . . The genius that sparkles in the *Barbière* is like a fine day at Sorrento, cloudless, brilliant with colour, and heavy with perfume" (p. 155).

Rubāiyat of Omar Khayyam, the Astronomer Poet of Persia. Rendered into English Verse. Third Edition. Quaritch.

THIS little book may serve, like so much else, to illustrate Solomon's dictum that there is nothing new under the sun. In its hundred quatrains we have the whole gist of the philosophy of materialism set forth with a clearness and precision which might put to the blush Mr. Huxley or Mr. Tyndall, and lighted up by touches of true poetic thought and feeling, that but serve to bring out more strongly the dreariness of the poet's creed. Here are a few verses by way of specimen of Omar Khayyam's mode of unravelling the "master knot of human fate."

Oh, threats of hell and hopes of paradise,
One thing at least is certain, this life flies;
One thing is certain and the rest is lies;
The flower that once has blown for ever dies.

The revelations of devout and learn'd
Who rose before us, and as prophets burn'd,
Are all but stories, which, awoke from sleep,
They told their fellows, and to sleep return'd.

I sent my soul through the Invisible
Some letter of that after-life to spell:
And by-and-by my soul return'd to me,
And answer'd, "I myself am heav'n and hell!"

Heaven but the vision of fulfill'd desire,
And hell the shadow of a soul on fire,
Cast on the darkness into which ourselves
So late emerg'd from shall so soon expire.

And this is his practical conclusion:—

Ah, make the most of what we yet may spend,
Before we too into the dust descend,
Dust into dust, and under dust to lie,
Sans wine, sans song, sans singer, and—sans end,
Alike for those who for to-day prepare,
And those that after some to-morrow stare,
A muezzin from the Tower of Darkness cries
Fools! your reward is neither here nor there.

Thus did mediæval Persia anticipate the Gospel of the modern apostles and evangelists of matter.

Wrecked and Saved. By Mrs. PARSONS, &c. Burns & Oates. 1878.

MRS. PARSONS has given us, as usual, a story full of faith, good feeling, and common sense. The boy, Peter Sands, runs his persistent course by the help of prayer and the Sacraments, while another boy, Frederick Drake, who yields to temptation, narrowly escapes involving Peter in misfortune. In spite of his excellent life and character, Peter is put on his trial for murder, the circumstances of which, and the conclusion of the trial, are well told. "Wrecked and Saved" is an excellent book for schools and lending-libraries.

Erleston Glen. A Lancashire Story of the Sixteenth Century. By ALICE O'HANLON. Burns & Oates. 1878.

THOUGH not very much as a story, this is an excellent book, giving a faithful and lifelike transcript of the "troubles" of our forefathers. We welcome the even thrice-told tales of Lancashire or North country faith and persistence, and the homely annals of the Kidcote and Little Ease. The historical names, too, such as Anderton, Ashworth, and the like, are well preserved in this story, for they should always be held up to honour. Henry Anderton's interrupted marriage with Helen Rutherford, the hiding of the Jesuit priest, F. Christopher, and the breaking of the sacred image and emblems of the chapel by the sheriff's posse, are told in the clearest and most forcible manner, with unexaggerated truth. The death of Henry Anderton, also, and his mother's subsequent derangement, are thoroughly true to nature and full of pathos. The falling away of Walter Willoughby is also an incident of the times which it was well to bring prominently forward, though his love and lovemaking are the one unnecessary blot upon the book. One admirable feature in "Erleston Glen" is the prominence given to the pressure of persecution upon the lower middle classes, and the cruelty wrought upon the really pious and faithful yeomen, farmers, and labouring poor by giving them the single alternative of ruin or the renunciation of their faith. We have been accustomed to give all honour to the Stourtons, and Towneleys, and Vavasours of the North, and the long line of priestly martyrs and confessors to the faith; but we have scarcely sufficiently recognized the undercurrent of the yeoman and labouring population of Lancashire and Yorkshire, who, without the fiery enthusiasm and chivalrous esprit de corps, spiced with the hatred of the conquering race of the Irish, have clung persistently to the old faith. For deepening our sense of this fact, among other things, we are thankful to "Erleston Glen."

The Three Tabernacles : a Golden Treatise, by THOMAS À KEMPIS. Edited by the Rev. M. COMERFORD. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1877.

IN the year 1722 there was printed by S. Ballard, at the "Blue Bull," in Little Britain, a volume dedicated "to the unhappy sufferers by the Great National Calamity of the South Sea." It was the work of Dr. Willymott, of King's College, Cambridge, and comprised an English translation of the "Imitation of Christ," and also of this work now republished under the title of "*The Three Tabernacles*." The translation of Dr. Willymott is here retained, because of the beauty of its style, except in those passages where, in comparing it with the original, it was found that the sense had been altered or portions suppressed. The three tabernacles treated of in the colloquy between Christ and the disciple are humility, patience, and poverty. The plan of the treatise is shown in the second chapter, where the words of Peter on the Mount are quoted, and the desirable tabernacles are explained to be the virtues which specially characterized the three who appeared there in the Transfiguration. "Considering, therefore, the foresaid virtues in thyself, O Lord, and in certain of Thy servants, I find Thee of all things the most humble, Thy servant Moses exceeding meek, and Elias extremely poor." The subsequent chapters, carrying out this plan of the little treatise, form excellent subjects for meditation, and can have no stronger recommendation than the title-page, which bears the name of À Kempis. It is time that we should at length have been given, in modern and authorized form, these pages, advocating what he calls "three militant virtues."

The Unknown Eros and other Odes. Odes I.—XXXI. George Bell.

SOME months ago a few very striking poems appeared in the "Pall Mall Gazette," signed "C. P." We thought we could not be in error in judging these initials to denote Mr. Coventry Patmore, and yet we hesitated; for, although there were about the verses touches which recalled the "Angel in the House," they struck far other and stronger chords than are found there. The volume before us clears up the doubt. Here are our old favourites of the "Pall Mall," with much else of not lower merit or inferior interest; and although Mr. Patmore's name does not appear upon the title-page, the fact of his authorship is an open secret. The lines which, under the title of "Proem," usher in the rest, give the keynote of the book. His Mentor admonishes him:—

Say wherefore thou,
As under bondage of some bitter vow,
Warblest no word,
When all the rest are shouting to be heard?
Why leave the fervid running just when Fame
'Gan whispering of thy name,
Amongst the hard-pleased Judges of the Course?

And he replies:—

O season strange for song !
 And yet some timely Power persuades my lips.
 Is it England's parting soul that nerves my tongue,
 As other kingdoms, nearing their eclipse
 Have, in their latest bards, uplifted strong
 The voice that was their voice in earlier days ?
 Is it her sudden loud and piercing cry,
 The note which those that seem too weak to sign
 Will sometimes utter first before they die ?

This is, indeed, the keynote of the present volume, in which he gives to
 "hasty times and hard":—

Chants as of a lonely thrush's throat
 At latest eve,
 That does in each calm note
 Both joy and grieve,
 Notes few and strong and fine,
 Gilt with sweet day's decline,
 And sad with promise of a different sun.

But all the Odes are not in this strain. Take, for example, the following poem, one of those which appeared originally in the "Pall Mall Gazette." Singularly beautiful and touching it is; perhaps the most beautiful of all. At all events it is one of the shortest, and so may be presented here in its entirety:—

IF I WERE DEAD.

"If I were dead," you'd sometimes say, "Poor Child!"
 The dear lips quivered as they spoke,
 And the tears broke
 From eyes which not to grieve me brightly smiled.
 Poor Child, poor Child!
 I seem to hear your laugh, your talk, your song.
 It is not true that Love will do no wrong.
 Poor Child!
 And did you think when you so cried and smiled,
 How I, in lonely nights should lie awake,
 And of those words your full avengers make?
 Poor Child, poor Child!
 And now, unless it be
 That sweet amends thrice told are come to thee,
 O, God, have Thou no mercy upon me?
 Poor Child!

Literary Primers. Edited by JOHN RICHARD GREEN, M.A.—*English Literature.* By the Rev. STOPFORD BROOKE, M.A. London: Macmillan.

A Guide to English Literature. By MATTHEW ARNOLD, in the *Nineteenth Century* for December, 1877. C. Kegan Paul.

MR. STOPFORD BROOKE has been fortunate. His "Primer of English Literature" has formed the subject of an article in the "Nineteenth Century," by one of the most competent and popular of living critics; and the judgment has been in a high degree favourable. Mr. Matthew

Arnold's review is not, indeed, unmixed eulogy. He points out imperfections, suggests alterations, nay, occasionally begs the author "to make a clean sweep of all this." Nevertheless, he holds that Mr. Brooke possesses "all the qualifications of a good guide to English literature." He pronounces him to be "clear, short, interesting, observant of proportion, free from exaggeration, and free from arbitrariness." And in another place he says, "Freedom of touch, a treatment always the opposite of a pedantic treatment of things, make the great charm of Mr. Stopford Brooke's book." On the whole, we assent to Mr. Arnold's verdict. This little book is certainly a long way the best of its kind in our language; but the changes Mr. Arnold suggests would make it better still. There are, indeed, blemishes in it which Mr. Arnold has not noticed, and could hardly have been expected to notice,—blemishes, it is fair to add, which are very natural in an author who writes from Mr. Stopford Brooke's point of view. Thus the comparison of Wiclif to Wesley (p. 29) is certainly false and misleading, as well as very unfair to the founder of Methodism. Again, the proposition insinuated in the same page that the religious revolt in England which was consummated under Henry VIII. was the result of "strong cries for Truth and Purity in Life and in the Church," is a quite exploded superstition, and we wonder how Mr. Green, the editor of the series in which this Primer finds a place, could have allowed it to pass; for Mr. Green, at all events, knows something of English history.

Voltaire. By Col. HAMLEY. (Foreign Classics for English Readers, edited by Mrs. Oliphant.)

THE author of "Lady Lee's Widowhood" here gives us, in some two hundred pages, a sketch of the life and work of the most conspicuous of the "philosophes." We need hardly say that the standpoint from which Col. Hamley regards Voltaire is very different from that which we should choose, and that the view of him presented in this little volume is not such as we can adopt as it stands. With a few exceptions indeed, we do not know that we should be disposed to object very strongly to anything Col. Hamley asserts about the patriarch of Ferney. As a specimen of such exceptions we may instance the proposition that "the morality of the New Testament was altogether in unison with his creed" (p. 190), a proposition which it is difficult to understand, except upon the hypothesis that Col. Hamley's acquaintance with the morality of the New Testament is by no means intimate. But our complaint would rather be that much which ought to be said, in order to a correct appreciation of the cause and results of Voltaire's influence, is left unsaid, and that the general impression produced is therefore misleading. Here, however, first principles come in. Where, indeed, do they not come in? Our way of telling Voltaire's story and of judging of his relation to his times and ours, would differ widely from Col. Hamley's, because we apply to history and to the biographies of which history is made up, quite

another philosophy. As a mere bit of literary workmanship, this book is entitled to very high praise. The style is always clear, easy, and flowing, and is occasionally lighted up by happy little epigrammatic touches. Thus Voltaire's niece, Madame Denis, is described as "a short, fat woman, vulgar, unfeeling, extravagant, and fond of gaiety, who seems to have devoted herself generally to promote his unhappiness" (p. 199). And in an earlier page we read of "the laced suit and perruque, which called themselves Louis XV. and which resemble nothing so much as Feathertop, who was put together, clothed, and inspired with a kind of vitality by the old witch in Hawthorne's tale" (p. 147). On the other hand, we here and there meet with literary judgments which seem hardly sufficiently considered; as where we are told that Goethe "may perhaps alone contest Voltaire's pre-eminence in the field of letters" (p. 185). Col. Hamley's translations of Voltaire's verses are invariably good, and sometimes reach a very high degree of merit.

The Battle of Connemara. By KATHLEEN O'MEARA, Author of "Iza's Story," "Life of Thomas Grant, First Bishop of Southwark," &c. London: R. Washbourne. 1878.

THIS is the story of the conversion of an English lady, who, having married an Irishman, Colonel Blake, is thus led to live in "the wilds of Connemara," and who embraces the ancient faith at last, because of her experience of its practical working among the people there; and also because of her acquaintance with an English priest visiting Ireland, who, at first much to her dissatisfaction, had become her husband's guest. There is no controversy, and it is more a story of Irish life than anything else; the peasantry of that rough, storm-washed bit of Atlantic coast having their native brightness set off by a foil in the shape of glimpses of life in Paris during Lady Margaret's stay there at the end of the Franco-Prussian war. Everything else is but a sketch compared with the Irish scenes, which are written *con amore*, and though not very highly coloured, are faithful to life. Perhaps the best chapter is the description of the morning at the little roadside chapel, when Mr. Ringwood, the priest, whom chance has led into that remote district, goes to say Mass, the people who have crowded in praying in their own tongue, and those who knew his language coming beforehand to confess to him in English. There are not wanting humorous touches even about this solemn though simple picture. First, it is on Colonel Blake's fat cob that the priest makes his way to the chapel, the roads being deep with mire, and Burke remarking to him, "What did that matter so long as it was fine and dhry overhead?" The chapel itself—thatched, whitewashed, earthen-floored, more like a barn—is well described; and the peasants kneeling "before the poverty-stricken shrine, praying as he had never seen people pray before." "Young Ruin" is to act as sacristan and serve Mass; and the loquacious Dan explains, "We have vestments of our own; but it's

Young Ruin that keeps them." . . . "As Dan opened the sacristy door . . . a tall, portly man, on the shady side of fifty came in, carrying a long flat box under his arm. 'Here he is himself, yer Riverence! It's Young Ruin,' cried Dan. Some of these Connemara pages are so good that it is to be regretted that the rest of the book is not better, and free from certain flaws. There is sometimes an incorrect use of words, and in other cases a certain want of clearness, or perhaps we might say correctness, of ideas. For instance, it is said of Lady Margaret during the Siege of Paris, "She did not mind starving, one got used to it; but the *perishing* was awful." And certain passages, regarding the ocean, the horizon, and the next world, should have shown their correctness by more distinct expression, if it was possible to show it. After her husband's death, Lady Margaret spends much of her time sitting on the cliffs looking out over the Atlantic waves.

"It seemed as if gazing and gazing at that far-away horizon drew her nearer to it—to the mystic brink it symbolized. The blue-green line where sky and ocean kissed, was like a bridge to that spirit world where the loved ones gone before were dwelling. Would her patient watch remain always unrewarded? Would the moment never come when that silvery sapphire veil would lift and let her snatch a glimpse of the mysterious world behind it? . . . Wonderful unquiet-hearted ocean! Symbol of human life and of man's unresting spirit, ever the same and ever changing; now lashed by passionate stormwinds, and filling the earth with 'the tumult of thy mighty harmonies'; now lifted up in shouts of victory and exultation; to-day sighing in *soft sphere-music*; to-morrow shrieking in wild lament; never at rest, never satisfied, *eternally journeying on to that unseen shore where the going and the coming streams meet and lose themselves in the ocean of eternity.*"

There are also some slight mistakes as regards Paris and the war. How was Mr. Ringwood setting out for the frontier as a French army chaplain, when the Prussians were close upon Paris? This short story has many good points, but at the end it leaves the impression that the pen that wrote it is not so well fitted to write fiction as to record the facts of good and great lives, as we have gratefully seen it record those of Dr. Grant and Frederic Ozanam.

The Catholic Hymn-Book. Compiled by the Rev. LANGTON GEORGE VIRE. London: R. Washbourne. 1877.

FOR a long time, our hymns have been scattered, some in one manual, some in another. At last, a much-needed work has been done by the publication of a very large and admirably-chosen collection, at the price of a few pence—a merely nominal price, which ought to spread these popular songs of faith still wider in churches and schools and homes. Amongst these two hundred and nine hymns are to be found all the old favourites, and many original ones now first published and addressed to the English Saints. To show the variety of the collection, we may

instance that F. Faber's immortal verses appear in it. F. Newman's sublime anthem from the "Dream of Gerontius," "Praise to the Holiest in the height"; a hymn to the English Saints, extracted by permission from a work of the late F. Caswall, and many new stanzas headed by Saxon names, held in special veneration in different English dioceses. The compiler has supplied a long-existing want by putting thus within the reach of all, such a store of those verses which may be ranked among our riches, because they become known to the masses, and have a teaching power at once over head and heart, imparting the truth, not only of doctrine but of religious feeling.

Règlement Ecclésiastique de Pierre le Grand. Traduit en Français sur le Russe, avec Introduction et Notes par le R. P. C. TONDINI, Barnabite. Édition accompagnée par la traduction latine, imprimée à St. Pétersbourg en 1785, par les soins du Prince Grégoire Potemkin, du texte Russe original; et de l'instruction du procureur suprême du synode. Paris, London, Bruxelles. 1874.

Anglicanism, Old Catholicism, and the Union of the Christian Episcopal Churches. An Essay on the Religious Question of Russia, by the Rev. CÆSARIUS TONDINI, Barnabite. London: Pickering. 1875.

The Future of the Russian Church. By the Rev. Father CÆSARIUS TONDINI. New York: Catholic Publication Society. London: Pickering. 1876.

F. TONDINI has made the subject of the Russian Church his own by the perseverance and intelligence with which he has studied its history, its constitution, and its action, and the zeal he has devoted to the apostolate of prayer for its reunion with the Holy See, an apostolate bequeathed to him by his friend and brother in religion, F. Schouvaloff, himself a convert from the Russian schism. Of the three works before us the first is the most important. It contains the Russian text, with a Latin and French version of the fundamental statutes of the Czar-made Church of Russia. The version is accompanied by notes taken, for the most part, from Russian sources, and displaying a wide range of reading in a language that is all but unknown to most students and writers in the West. This makes the book invaluable, and a necessity for all who wish to understand clearly what the Russian Church is. The "Règlement" enters into every detail of the organization and the life of the national Church, which Peter the Great succeeded in converting into a submissive department of the State. His father, Alexis Nikhailovitch, had prepared the way for his work by his victorious conflict with Nikon, the last free Patriarch of Moscow. "What is more iniquitous," said Nikon, "than for the Czar to judge bishops, taking to himself a power which has not

been given him by God? Where is now obedience to the Word of the Gospel, and the observance of His holy commandments? That is an apostasy from God." Nikon's protest was in vain. In 1666-67 he was abandoned and condemned by his own brethren of the Episcopate, the Czar triumphed over the Church, and in the year 1700 Peter the Great bound it in fetters to the throne by abolishing the Patriarchate of Moscow and establishing the Supreme Synod. For the future government of the enslaved Church he had the "Ecclesiastical Regulations" drawn up and published. Their actual author, whose remarkable career is sketched in F. Tondini's Introduction, was Theophanes Prokopovitch, a courtly ecclesiastic, who attracted Peter's attention by a sermon on the victory of Pultowa, and by unhesitating subservience to the Czars, advanced from dignity to dignity, till he died Archbishop of Novgorod and Vice-President of the Synod. Prokopovitch wrote the statutes contained in the "Regulation," but Peter made them his own by retouching and correcting them, and finally confirmed them by a Ukase in 1721. We trust that now that political events are attracting general attention to the affairs of the Russian Church, F. Tondini's scholarly edition of its fundamental laws will have a wide circulation amongst Catholic readers.

The second work before us is a pamphlet called forth by certain assertions of Mr. Gladstone's in his now half-forgotten onslaught on "Vaticanism." It proves most conclusively that Mr. Gladstone was in error when he supposed that "popular election and control" of the episcopate "still subsisted in the Christian East," and it exposes the absurdity of the plan so much in favour in certain English High Church circles for uniting the Anglican and the Eastern Church, and finding a link for this purpose in the Old Catholic schism.

The interesting pamphlet on "The Future of the Russian Church" is a reprint of a series of articles which we remember having read about two years ago in the "Catholic World," of New York. In order to obtain a basis for any forecast of the future, F. Tondini deals at great length with the present condition of the Russian Church, and in his pages is to be found much information, that, at least in a popular and easily accessible form, is to be met with nowhere else. The facts he brings forward from sources in the main friendly to Russia, reveal a growing disorganization in the National Church. F. Tondini expresses a hope that the changes in progress will eventually tend towards Catholic unity, and gives certain grounds for his belief. Making allowance here and there for a certain vagueness of statement, we have nothing but praise for the pamphlet. We may, perhaps, be able later on to review it and the "Réglement" at greater length. The two works taken together give a very complete view of the Russian Church.

Shall we seek Reconciliation with the Roman Bishop? A Question for High Churchmen. London: Burns & Oates. 1877.

THE title and the phraseology adopted in this little pamphlet would lead one to believe that the author was himself a High Churchman, were it not that a note to the reader, printed immediately after the title-page, informs us that "where the words *us* and *we* are retained, it is solely with the view of entering more plainly into the difficulties and miseries of those who still remain outside the household of Faith. From these difficulties and miseries the writer is, by the mercy of God, now happily free." This effort to speak from another man's position gives at times a kind of constraint to the style. It has certain advantages, of course, in the way of making it easier to state a difficulty in the way in which one hopes to bring the reader to face it; but it has also many dangers, and we must congratulate the writer before us on a certain amount of daring in having thus put himself in his adversaries' place, in order to convince them that their position is untenable.

The writer does not hesitate to use plain words, and to call a sham a sham; he ranges over a wide field, shows much reading, and succeeds in making many home-thrusts. We might quote page after page of clear exposition of truth, or clever satire upon error. Take, for instance, the following account of the attitude of the bishops of the Church of England:—

"That Church has no moral or religious cohesion or unity whatever; but it has a visible iron bond and worldly unity in the civil power. The State refuses to 'turn out' one party to please another; hence, whether they will or not, churchmen are handcuffed and kept together. The bishops do not exactly know whether they are the ministers of God or Cæsar. They are constantly endeavouring to cut the mean between these two extremes, God and Cæsar. This mean they call '*comprehensiveness*.' Neither as individuals nor as a corporate body have they the slightest hold upon the religious feelings of the people, but they are highly respected as peers of the realm. Their position as peers will, of course, terminate with the Establishment. Attacks upon the Establishment are to the bishops worse than heresy. The mission of an Anglican bishop is so to temper and dilute the Christian verity that none but fanatical sticklers for obsolete truths can complain of the Church of England. . . . The Ritualists speak of the episcopate as having supernatural powers, which the bewildered old bishops have always been taught, and have taught others, are mere Popish pretensions. The most amusing part of an Anglican bishop is his sublime ignorance of his functions, according to the Ritualistic idea of a bishop's functions. . . . The attempt to thrust a false character on these venerable and highly-respected officials of the Establishment is evident, as they can never be brought to *believe* in the things High Churchmen would fain credit them with."

Again he says:—

"A short time ago there was an assemblage of German schismatics, individuals belonging to Oriental sects, some tourist clergymen, a self-deputed bishop of the Church of England, and sundry others, at Bonn, for the purpose of trying to come to some amicable conclusion about

the Christian religion. They began with a '*readjustment of the Trinity*,' and something like a confusion of tongues fell upon them.

"Probably the first thing Churchmen will have to do when they come to settle the terms of their belief as an independent religious society, will be to decide upon the same question.

"Given a fair representative assemblage of Anglican bishops, clergy and laity, and put the propriety of retaining the three creeds to the vote—*tableau*.

"Comprehensiveness is very good, when enforced by an iron authority perfectly indifferent as to the truth or error of the various whims and aberrations of the 'Christian mind'; but comprehensiveness put to the vote!"

Our author is very happy in his brief telling treatment of the Syllabus and the Vatican Council. One of the chapters contains a concise exposition of the question of Anglican orders, in which the argument loses nothing of its force by being condensed. Throughout, the main question of reunion with the Holy See is kept steadily in sight. The reasoning is close and to the point, and if there is some hard hitting, there is throughout an undercurrent of good-humour and good-will. The little book is, we think, calculated to do good work among Anglicans. It tells them frankly some startling truths. If they would face them for a single hour, they could not stand still where they are.

Correspondence.

"THE PARADISE OF THE CHRISTIAN SOUL."

To the Editor of the "DUBLIN REVIEW."

DEAR SIR,—In your notice of "The Paradise of the Christian Soul" in the DUBLIN REVIEW for October last, you have stated that "this edition (of 1877) is a new and complete translation." As this is so far from being the fact, that it is only a reprint of the "new and complete translation" in the original edition of 1850, of which I was the Editor, I beg that you will have the goodness to correct that statement in your next number. Some of my co-contributors to that work are still living, but some also are deceased; and to say that what they wrote in or before 1850 was not written till 1877, is to ascribe to others the fruits of their labours, and do them a serious injury.

I am, dear Sir, yours faithfully,

H. W. LLOYD.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, KENSINGTON.

Dec. 31, 1877.